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Chapter One  
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 The challenge of modelling Islam and Muslim organisations 
It is difficult to say what in the discourses, debates and discussions about 
Islam in the West holds so much power and influence over how we think, 
understand and frame Muslim life in Europe. Is it the way religious life is 
structured, governed, and regulated in the deep structures of those old 
models of state sponsored norms of Christianity that still holds sway over 
the constricted field in which Muslim institutions and organisations must 
navigate? Is it the inculcated self-effacing and victimization of Muslims in 
Europe that locks Muslim organisations in internal strife? Is it the 
mismatched expectations and political manhandling, which leaves 
organised Islam unable to meet the difficult institutional challenges state 
and government? Is it the societal pressure from right-wing conservatives, 
liberal secularism, media and the court of public opinion? Or, is it all a 
matter of misrepresentation and a powerful game of shadows and symbolic 
communication orchestrated across the width of the plural, modern society? 
In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, when trying to make sense of the 
permanent presence of Islam and Muslims in Europe, the established 
research networks and groups of scholars initially perceived of Muslim 
institutions and organizations in relation to or in extension of the existing 
state and religion research (cf. Ferrari 2000; Robbers 2001, 2005; Sandberg 
2008). When trying to structure and interpret the increasing data and 
material on Islam, this sort of research framed the findings within the 
existing parameters and paradigms of religion in Europe. Initially, this 
allowed for a starting point that could help open the field of Islam in 
Europe research. It helped scholars and researchers grapple with the new 
realities and provided a macro-level working hypothesis of how things 
were. Then in time, the state of research would mature and the bodies of 
research widen and a more coherent understanding would materialise.  
However, as with most initial hypotheses and models, they were crude, 
generalizing and made unsubstantiated assumptions of a reality still in the 
workings. Furthermore, the modelling and the attempt at analyzing patterns 
and trends did not take Islam as a religion as the point of origin, but rather 
Islam in Europe was understood as migratory labour, as a refugee crisis, as 
an economic challenge, as a political agenda in itself, as a gender problem, 
as a post-colonial trend, or even as a medieval legal system. There were 
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truth in all of these partial perspectives, but only a few of them took the 
approach of Islamic Studies in order to see how Islam as a religion did 
meet the challenge of Europe and how Muslims framed their responses to a 
new reality. In the perspective of the models of Europe, Islam remains a 
‘case’ and an example to illustrate a point already made (Bæk Simonsen 
2002, 23). 
In all fairness, from the perspective of the theorists and researchers 
building and discussing these models, it is important to stress that they 
often are among the first to criticize the imperfect nature of modelling and 
the limits of such an endeavour. However, the models and paradigms 
created by scholars and academics were adopted by governments and 
politicians in order to make sense of the political, social, economic and 
religious challenge posed by Islam and Muslims. In this adoption, the 
inherent problems of the working hypotheses were forgotten and during the 
1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s the assumptions made of Islam and Muslims 
were embedded into the state structures and institutions.  
As will be shown in this thesis, these models, hypotheses, conceptual 
frameworks and attempts at analyzing patterns and trends in Islam in 
Europe have been of substantial value for decades, but now they warrant a 
serious and critical review. Equally, alternatives to modelling must be 
explored. Although they are an important part of the history of research on 
Islam in Europe, models and hypotheses have in them an important feature 
that is relevant when making sense of Muslims and Muslim organisations. 
That is, models can never just be models of something as mere depictions, 
but are always models for shaping, adapting and conforming to some ideal 
or norm built into the very model. As the American anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz observed, models shape and change the social world as they express 
and describe it (Geertz 1973, 93). Due to the observer effect, the modelling 
at work wields a power that changes the very things it is trying to depict. It 
is often the problem with academic research that it is often bound to 
manipulate the very thing it sets out to handle and describe. As such, it 
remains both descriptive and normative.  
1.2 The religio-organisational field and the ‘peculiar game of chess’ 
Rather than limiting the theoretical and exploratory scope by proposing 
hypotheses and models, the ambition of this thesis is to study the 
institutionalization of Muslim organisations as these position themselves 
within the frame of the religio-organisational field. 
The phrase religio-organisational field is coined for the occasion and it 
builds on the theories and concepts advanced by French philosopher, 
anthropologist and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002). The field is 
“defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between 
positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 96). Bourdieu compares it to a 
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social arena, a playground or even a battlefield, where there are basic rules, 
tools and resources available and where those who enter use what they 
have to make the best of it. The religio-organisational field is such a social 
arena, where religious organisations and institutions struggle to gain 
influence, recognition, power and capital. The religio-organisational field is 
made up of all the institutions, organisations and agents that contest to 
positions available in the field and lay claim to the power and capital to be 
gained from these. Paraphrasing organisational theorists, who discuss 
Bourdieu’s influence on recent organisational theory, it is of great 
importance to know that the organizational field includes not just one type 
of organisation, such as religious organisations, but all the organisations 
that play one role or another in the activity in question, such as the 
buildings used in religious service, the functionaries of these buildings, the 
people who attend services, the media, international religious actors and 
institutions, the local and national governments and ministries, and so on 
(cf. Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 2-3). 
The field has the significant advantage as an analytical strategy when 
considering the problems of modelling. The virtue of the field is not to 
simplify by reducing complexity as models tend to do, but rather to limit 
the scope of study by focussing and to maintain the complexity of the 
relevant conflicts and struggles studied. 
Illustrating the difference between analytically entering the field rather 
than relying on a model, a rather peculiar game of chess comes to mind. 
The field is comparable to a chessboard that is unlimited in the number of 
spaces and where hundreds of chess pieces are lined up. With scores of 
different capabilities these are gathered in a complex cluster of stalemates 
and locked positions. Within the field of this peculiar game of chess, the 
clusters of pieces are locked in positions actually held and the open spaces 
on the board are the potential of positions to be occupied. However, the 
strategic value of a position is entirely dependent on where the other pieces 
are.  
In order to play this peculiar game of chess, we must use not only the 
standard rules for the game, known as the ‘Official Laws of Chess,’ but we 
must imagine additional variant rules for new kinds of pieces and a 
new number of implicit prudent moves and a new ethics of conduct. Here 
are vast scenarios of conflict, stalemates and deadlocks. The chess 
problems are so complex and so difficult that they may never be solved and 
here are all sorts of different possible moves, which cannot be determined 
to be right or wrong in the light of the whole game, but only in the light of 
the limited scope and their subjective position. 
From an epistemological point of view, the whole of this peculiar game 
can never be appropriately described and so a strategy of limitation must be 
chosen. One such choice could be to produce statistics of the population of 
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pieces, or a history of moves, or even a political analysis of the strategy of 
possible moves to be made with the most powerful of pieces. Similarly, a 
‘case’ may be focused upon and described in depth as to know the outcome 
of the moves to be made in one focused part of the field or in a particular 
difficult problem or deadlock.  
However, and this is the point of the example of the peculiar game, the 
field retains its complexity beyond the epistemological choices and holds 
unlimited potential of knowledge more or less relevant, but is always 
unfolding. From an epistemological point of view, the analytical strategy of 
the model, by contrast, excels by virtue of the statement “White is 
winning!” – followed perhaps by the question “What else do you need to 
know?” Albeit exaggerated, this reflects the logic of reduction of 
complexity and with it follows disinterest and redundancy. The analysis of 
the field may never enjoy the privilege of asserting the all-decisive 
judgment of the peculiar game of chess, but it does not indulge in the 
normative and declarative conclusions to which the model is prone. 
Imagine again the peculiar game of chess, and now add to it another 
colour in addition to white and black. For the sake of argument, we shall 
choose the colour green. The model still shows that white is winning, but it 
does not know what to make of green. What is at stake? Why join now, 
when winning is no longer a likely option? The model was made on the 
basis of only two colours and builds on the assumption that winning was 
the goal. Now the model is skewed, biased and no longer has the requisite 
variety to represent the dynamics of the game. The field, however, retains 
its nuance and new research may be launched on the basis of changing 
conditions and facts. Such research could be on the integration of the green 
pieces into the field, it could be a comparison of the social performance of 
the green pieces to the others or it could even be on the ‘threat’ of the new 
green force that is expanding rapidly within the boundaries of the old 
game?  
Metaphorically, it is within this peculiar game of chess that this thesis 
will pursue an analytical strategy of a religio-organisational focus on 
Muslim organizations in Denmark, Germany and England.    
1.3 What’s at stake?  
The overall guiding questions of the thesis are,  
 
What is at stake for Muslim organisations in Denmark, Germany and England? 
Which conflicts and fault lines arise when they enter the religio-organisational 
field? What is to be won and lost by addressing and challenging the states, 
churches and other relevant institutional actors? How do Muslim organisations 
change the religio-organisational field as they enter it and how do the struggles in 
the religio-organisational field change Muslims and Islam?  
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The problem, with which this thesis grapples, goes beyond the mere 
epistemological concern of focusing rather than modelling. It is focused on 
specific problems that Muslim organisations and the Islamic community 
struggles with as they navigate and position themselves amongst the old 
churches, the state institutions and the many other relevant actors in the 
religio-organisational field.  
The questions are sought answered throughout the chapters of the thesis, 
but as will become evident  when discussing the outline of the thesis, the 
questions will receive the keenest attention in the Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven, each of which focuses on select fault lines in the religio-
organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England. By contrast, 
Chapters Two, Three and Four are theoretical, discursive and introductory.  
The idea to explain the presence and peril of Muslims in Europe in terms 
of fields is far from new. Lene Kühle in her thesis from 2004 spoke of the 
Muslim field. She was followed by other scholars, who have “utilized the 
concept of a Muslim field with explicit reference to Bourdieu to describe 
the establishment and institutionalization of Muslims in national contexts in 
Europe” (Kühle 2012C, 9). Kühle discusses the Muslim field in the context 
of Bourdieu’s religious field and she presents an intriguing innovation in 
the idea of a field of religious powers into which the Muslim field is 
presented as a subfield.  
The approach of the present thesis, however, while acknowledging the 
existence and the explicability of the field of religious powers and while 
being concerned with several similar issues has a distinct focus on both the 
institutional and the organisational in its construction of a field. A field 
exists, as will be explored further in Chapter Two, where there is a 
‘network, or a configuration, of objective positions” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992, 97) and the interest here remains with these objective 
positions, the Muslim organisations that hold them and the environment of 
state and other religious organisations and institutions that contest and 
challenge these.  
1.4 The original application 
This thesis is the product of a PhD project based at the Centre for European 
Islamic Thought at the Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen. It 
was funded from 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2012 and Prof. Jørgen S. 
Nielsen served as advisor and Prof. Hanne Petersen from the Centre for 
Studies in Legal Cultures at the Faculty of Law served as co-advisor.  
The objective of the project in the original application was to investigate 
the relationship and interaction between organised Muslims and the states 
in England, Germany and Scandinavia. On one hand, the ambition was to 
study the current situation and conditions in these countries of Islam and 
organised Muslims. On the other hand, the ambition was to investigate 
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states’ understanding of the regulation of religion in general and Islam 
specifically. However, much changed during the project and several 
choices where made, which warrants further comment.   
The choice to focus on the frame of the religio-organisational field rather 
than on the specific intricacies of Muslim organisations grew out of the 
questions that Nielsen posed in his chapter on Muslim organisations of his 
Muslims in Western Europe (2004). He had specified a number of research 
problems that had to do specifically with the Muslim organisations, but 
pointed to the importance of further research into the context and 
environments. In addition, Fetzer & Soper’s Muslims and the State in 
Britain, France and Germany (2005) has been a significant inspiration and 
the theories tested lay much of the foundation in the present thesis. As a 
supplement to both these studies, there was a need to consider the frame in 
which Muslim organisations had to operate. As such, the focus on the 
religio-organisational field is in first instance a focus on the environment of 
Muslim organisations and a focus on the impact of context. 
The choice of countries was made primarily on the basis on the fact that 
Denmark, Germany and England are relatively comparable in terms of the 
challenges that state and government institutions face in dealing with 
Muslim organisations and vice versa. As will be discussed further in 
Chapter Four, there are a number of similar circumstances that shows that 
the problems are similar and, with reasonable variation, so are the solutions 
attempted. In addition to this, the choice was based on accessibility in 
terms of geographical proximity, language and the availability of 
information concerning the specific cases analysed.1  
Regarding the choice of cases, the original perspective was much wider 
than the end product could hope to be. Originally nine different cases were 
identified, which dealt with the same three problems across each of the 
three countries. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the individual 
cases the complimentary perspective from the two other countries has been 
abandoned. Each of the three remaining cases are, however, fairly easily 
relatable to anyone familiar with one or more of the three countries.   
The Danish case focuses on the administration of the government 
approval authorising religious communities to perform marriages with civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 When speaking of Denmark, the thesis excludes the Faroe Islands and Greenland. 
There is no basis in any of the material to make any assumptions as to what is going on 
in these autonomous political entities. Something similar may be said of England. The 
study makes no claims as to what is going on in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. 
As such, this is not a study of Britain or the United Kingdom, but of England. The 
reason for this is amongst others that the much of the material only covers laws of the 
English Parliament and the Church of England. As for Germany, the study considers 
unified Germany although many current religio-organisational constellations originate 
in West Germany (cf. Nielsen 2004).  
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validity. This is seen by Muslims as a mechanism of arbitrary 
differentiation in the religio-organisational field and is the reason for much 
frustration amongst Muslim organisations. Obvious German parallels can 
be made to the corporation status under public law and English parallels 
can be made to the charitable status. 
The German case focuses on the German Islam Conference and the 
deliberation of a number of issues concerning the constitution, the 
organisational coherence of the Muslim organisations and a perceived 
‘religious risk’ as to what might happen if Muslims were treated as other 
religious communities. Obvious Danish parallels can be made to the 
Church of Denmark ‘religion meeting,’ which is a forum for cooperating 
with Muslim organisations, and English parallels can be made to the 
formation of the Muslim Council of Britain. 
The English case focuses on the Shari’a councils and their position 
between the Muslim communities and the wider English society. Obvious 
parallels can be made to similar institutions in Denmark and German, 
where the threat of parallel societies and legal orders is just as worrying to 
the state and governments.  
Each of these three cases focuses on fault lines in the religio-
organisational field and on the structural dispossession of Muslim 
organisations. Commenting on such a select and particular approach to 
cases, Bourdieu observes provokingly that “A particular case that is well 
constructed ceases to be particular” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 77).  
1.5 Method and epistemological approach 
Both the choice of method and the analytical strategy applied originate 
from the epistemological position close to the nature of the problem and the 
questions asked.  
 As the field is clearly a social construction and the norms, capital and 
power available are all contingent upon the social relations of human 
beings, this thesis is firmly based in the epistemology of social 
constructivism. (Barlebo Wenneberg, 2000). Human knowledge is only 
possible in the construction of categories, which again are drawn from the 
differences and distinction present in social life. According to Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann, who in 1966 published The Social Construction of 
Realtity – A treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, the foundations of 
human knowledge are drawn from the structures and institutions of every 
day life. “The social order exists only as a product of human activity,” 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966, 70) and the institutions, organisations, habits, 
norms, symbols, structure, religions and much more are such products.  
Needless to say, the very wide social arena of the religio-organisational 
field is such a human and social product. Bourdieu’s theories and concepts 
are very much advanced continuations to these initial social constructivist 
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observations. In its own right, the term that fits Bourdieu theories is 
structuralism (Kunin 2011) with significant contributions to network 
analysis (Adams 2011). The study into the field is a study of the structures 
of relations that are constructed in relations between individuals, 
organisations and institutions. Much of Bourdieu’s effort goes into 
understanding the power of symbols and social representations as strategies 
for minimizing human effort and maximizing social impact in the field. 
Therefore he observes, human “…action aims to produce and impose 
representations (mental, verbal, visual and theatrical) of the social world 
which may be capable of acting on this world by action on agents’ 
representation of it. [M]ore precisely, it aims to make or unmake groups – 
and, by the same token, the collective actions they can undertake to 
transform the social world in accordance with their interests – by 
producing, reproducing or destroying the representations that make groups 
visible for themselves and for others” (Bourdieu 1991, 127). Chapter Two 
deals in much greater detail with these issues but suffice to say that in order 
to approach these human products analytically through any methodology, 
such a method needs to be attuned to social relations and social 
interconnectedness. 
The overall approach to the questions in this thesis is sociological. 
Following Danish sociologist of religions Vejrup Nielsen and Kühle, the 
choices in this thesis adhere to an understanding of sociology that goes 
beyond merely counting and calculating under the banner call of ‘if you 
don’t count, you don’t count.’2 By contrast, Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle has a 
threefold understanding of sociology in their research on state and religion 
relations in Denmark:  
 
“First, it means taking a bird’s eye view. Research on church and state in 
Denmark has mostly been conducted from a legal or theological perspective, 
typically with a normative focus. […] Second, it entails transcending the Danish 
context. Discussions on religion and state in Denmark have had an inherently 
‘local’ feel. […] Third, a sociological perspective means looking beyond the 
formal content of the constitutions and church laws” 
(Nielsen & Kühle 2011, 174). 
 
This approach is applied in the present work and this sociological 
perspective can be fruitfully taken in regards to Germany and England as 
well. As such, this sociology promotes a macro level of study with focus on 
the specific divisions in the religio-organisational field. As soon as the 
religio-organisational field has been defined, conscious and focused 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This phrase is quoted here without any reference, as it has only been related orally and 
it has been impossible to verify its origins.   
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choices must be made as to what to include and not to include from the 
study because it is utterly impossible to look at everything at once.  
As for the specifics of the methodological choices, the information 
presented and analysed in the chapters of this thesis come from a number of 
different sources. However, all of the three countries rely on a combination 
of three approaches.  
Firstly, in relation to the RELIGARE project3 under the European 
Commissions 7th Framework Programme, a number of qualitative 
interviews were made in Denmark and England. The 20 Danish interviews 
were conducted primarily by Christoffersen and are available in the Danish 
report that followed from these interviews, Danish Regulation of Religion, 
State of Affairs and Qualitative Reflections, by Vinding & Christoffersen 
(2012). The material from the 26 English interviews was made available in 
the UK Report on Fieldwork by Hoque & Shah (2011). The interviews 
from both Denmark and England reflected broadly the religio-social 
spheres in these countries, including judges, religious leaders, politicians, 
key media profiles and academics. The questions asked focused, however, 
on the basic tensions of conflict regarding issues of religious diversity and 
secular models. The diverse nature of the material has been excellent for 
the framing of the religio-organisational field. While the RELIGARE 
project did not conduct interviews in Germany, interviews have been 
related in media and in reports concerning the key Muslim participants of 
the German Islam Conference. Here, the website4 of the conference relates 
a number of highly useful interview portraits, which have informed the 
analysis of Chapter Six.  
Secondly, a significant amount of generally available ‘normative 
material’ has been studied in building the general overview of the religio-
organisational field and the specific cases. This includes the constitutions 
of Denmark and Germany, the relevant constitutional statutes in England, a 
number of government reports and studies on the questions of state and 
religion, policy papers and ministerial guidelines. In addition, many of the 
by-laws and foundational declarations of Muslim organisation in Denmark, 
Germany and England were gathered in the project. Much of this is 
available online and has been used to inform the self-expressions and 
interpretations of the positions of the state and Muslim organisations made 
by the institutions themselves. Such material is biased, of course, and this 
bias has helped to inform the tensions, conflicts and struggles in the field.  
Thirdly, a number of specific initiatives were taken to build the three 
focus cases in Denmark, Germany and England. In Denmark, two Freedom 
of Information Requests were filed in the spring of 2012, which were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 www.religareproject.eu – accessed 20 February 2013.  
4 www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de – accessed 20 February 2013 
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granted on 26 September 2012 and 1 October 2012, respectively. The first 
request regarded material from the Division of Family Affairs with the 
government agency of National Social Appeals Board concerning Advisory 
Committee on Religious Denominations and the second regarded the 
consultations of the Prime Minister with Muslim leaders held on 30 
November 2004, 20 September 2005 and 13 February 2006. In Germany, 
all the public information regarding the German Islam Conference was 
analysed in the light of the criticism from German academics and Muslim 
leaders. In England, all the available academic studies on Shari’a councils 
were gathered and access was granted to a number of commission reports 
during a week long visit to the British Library in the early summer of 2011.  
All of this material was analysed in order to produce the overview of the 
religio-organisational field and the specific cases. Analysis is defined as 
“an explicit rendering of structure, order and pattern” (Daly 2007, 209) and 
the analytical strategy build around the Bourdieuian concepts and focus on 
the religio-organisational field in Chapter Two has been guiding the 
analysis in the thesis. 
At this early point, let it be emphasised that the analyses here are not 
designed to be comparative, and that the thesis holds no ambition of a true 
comparative basis for the three countries in question. It is rather to be seen 
as a demonstration of an approach to Muslim organisations in the religio-
organisational field, which will be shown to be equally applicable in 
different foci. This is not to say that there is no basis for comparison in the 
material and a reader familiar with the issues and challenges in one of the 
three countries will most likely recognise parallels and patterns in the 
material presented.  
1.6 Outline of the structure  
There is deliberate purpose behind the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter Two introduces the analytical strategy for studying Muslim 
organisations as they are embedded in the frame of the religio-
organisational field, which is their institutional environment. In doing this, 
in turn, it introduces and discusses the definitions and concepts of models, 
of fields, of organisations and institutions, of norms and of symbolic 
representations. The chapter is informed by the theories and concepts by 
Bourdieu, which is a returning perspective in the entire thesis. The Chapter 
grows into a strategy for developing focus case studies in the religio-
organisational field and as such it goes beyond what the thesis can deliver 
in the chapters to come.  
Chapter Three looks at the existing models of Islam within the paradigm 
of European church and state research. It was conceived as an introductory 
discussion of research history but grew into a critique of the 
oversimplifications of the governing academic models of Islam in the 
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European context broadly and in Denmark, Germany and England 
specifically. Therefore, the argument that unfolds in Chapter Three is rather 
of the presence of Islam as a catalyst for the critical revision of the models 
traditionally applied to church and state relations. 
Chapter Four is an introductory chapter which frames and constructs the 
religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England. Here, the 
history of regulating religion is seen as a building on the structures into 
which Muslim organisations must now navigate and position themselves. A 
returning focus in each of the three country subsections is the relationship 
of Muslim organisations to the states and governments and to the other 
religious communities. The presentations and outlines given are by no 
means exhaustive or even begin to draw a complete outline of the religio-
organisational fields in question. Rather, Chapter Four is meant as an 
introduction to the most important historical and legislative contexts and 
the most essential facts about Muslims and Muslim organisations, in order 
to prepare the reader for the more specific analyses in Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven.  
Chapter Five discusses the Danish case of the administration of the 
government approval authorising the religious communities to perform 
marriages with civil validity. Of specific focus is the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denominations, who since 1998 have advised on the approval 
of religious communities. The Bourdieuian perspective applied here is on 
the construction and maintenance of fundamental dividers in the religio-
organisational field.  
Chapter Six focuses on the German Islam Conference and looks at the 
struggle between the German government and the Muslim organisations 
who are trying to position themselves as eligible and respectable partners in 
the religio-organisational field. The Bourdieuian perspective applied here is 
on the generative structuration that transforms ‘Muslims in Germany’ to 
‘German Muslims.’ 
Chapter Seven focuses on the Shari’a councils and their position 
between the Muslim communities and the wider English society. The 
Shari’a councils are locked in a tricky game of managing expectations and 
have the difficult task of stewardship of the cluster of Islamic norms 
embedded in Shari’a. The Bourdieuian perspective is on the symbolic 
resignification and reproduction of Shari’a norms as these become new 
resources for Muslims in the religio-organisational field.  
Chapter Eight concludes on the guiding questions of the thesis and 
outlines the most important perspectives from the analyses of the religio-
organisational fields. The conclusion, furthermore, summarises the most 
important and critical insights into the impositions of division in the 
religio-organisational field and the Muslim positions taken in response to 
these impositions. 
Introduction 16 
 
1.7 Acknowledgements 
I would like to extend my sincerest and warmest appreciation to all those 
who at one point or the other helped and supported me during the project 
and when writing the thesis.  
I wish to express, first of all, my gratitude to my advisor Jørgen S. 
Nielsen, whose isnad and line of scholarship I hope to qualify for! I wish 
also to thank co-advisor Hanne Petersen for suggestions, comments and 
advice during the run of the project. I am very grateful to Lisbet 
Christoffersen, whose research into law and religion has been a great 
source of inspiration and whose collaboration and friendship I have 
benefited from greatly. My close colleagues and friends at the Centre for 
European Islamic Thought, Riem Spielhaus, Thomas Hoffmann, Nadia 
Jeldtoft, Safet Bektovic, Gina Smith, Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, Line 
Stæhr, Emil Saggau and Karen Giødesen. Our conversations and 
discussions have been invaluable and are a continuous influence. I wish to 
thank the members of the research network, Norms and Narratives in the 
Nordic Nations (NONA) for sitting through my tedious papers and for your 
excellent comments. In this regard a special thanks to Michael Perlt for our 
great teamwork and to Pernille Carstens for her support.  
Thanks also to Nordic colleagues and friends – Pamela Slotte, Mathilda 
Arvidsson and Kjell Åke Modeer – for years of collaboration at 
conferences and meetings. Thank you for listening to my ideas of all-
encompassing norms that do not conform easily to the definitions in law. I 
hope and trust that we have more work ahead of us than behind us. At Yale 
University, I wish to thank Frank Griffel for inviting me to come to New 
Haven as Visiting Assistant in Research. My sincerest thanks also to 
Andrew March and Philip Gorski for allowing me to audit your inspiring 
and challenging classes. I hope to visit again someday. My international 
colleagues with the RELIGARE Project deserve my sincerest gratitude for 
the unique opportunity to participate; Marie-Claire Foblets, Prakash Shah, 
Mathias Rohe, Veit Bader and many others! To Jørgen, Lisbet and Pamela, 
thank you for your critical and important suggestions during the writing.  
A final version of the thesis would never have been possible if not for 
the edits and language revisions by Batool Alamire and Alexander Ørstrøm 
Bjødstrup. Thank you both! Thanks to Marcus Grønbech for the photo 
edits.  
Finally and most importantly, I am grateful to family and friends for 
allowing me this bizarre self-indulgence. To Kisser and to Alva, the time 
and energy put into this thesis was taken first and foremost from the two of 
you. I hope to repay you both manyfold. 
Chapter Two 
  
Theories, Concepts and an Analytical Strategy of the 
Religio-Organisational Field 
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The ambition of this chapter is to build the analytic strategy for conducting 
studies of detailed and focused cases within the religio-organisational given 
field. Rather than settling for modelling as an analytical strategy, the 
attempt here is to construct the field in which the religious organisations 
and institutions navigate. The construction of the field is as much a 
hypothesis as it is a map in the sense that it does not only concern itself 
with the positions taken and the relations formed, but with the possible 
positions and relations available. The power of this hypothetical and 
descriptive view is to maintain that, while the focus of the individual 
organisation may be subjective, the entire field in itself has objective 
structure. As introduced in Chapter One, the simultaneous social 
construction of society as both objective and subjective is maintained as we 
embed the individual organisation into its environment and into its social 
and institutionalised reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966). The theoretical 
foundation of the analysis of Muslim religious organisations and 
institutions is to hypothesize the socially institutionalised reality of the 
religio-organisational field as an environment that frames and engulfs these 
organisations and institutions.  
The power of Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus comes from its 
applicability as integrated theories of the individual agent (habitus), of the 
social structure (the field), and the power relations (the forms of capital) 
(Dobbin 2008, 53). This makes the theory ideal for studying not only the 
inter-organisational relations and structures, but also the intra-
organisational focus in a study of the organizational environment and 
associated institutions and agents. For the purpose of the present study, this 
wider field of associated organisations is delimited by the factor of, and 
focus on, religion; thus, the theoretical insights drawn from Bourdieu will 
help create the outline of an analytical strategy of the religio-organisational 
field. 
Although each is made a spokesman of their perspective, Foucault, 
Bourdieu and Geertz, could by right of their respective oeuvres, easily 
explain all three Bourdieuian concepts from slightly different angles. 
However, of the three, Bourdieu’s key insights are used throughout the 
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discussion of this chapter. Bourdieu’s idea of field will inform the first 
third of this chapter, his insights into institutionalization will be crucial in 
the second, and his notion of symbolic power will guide the final third of 
the chapter. 
This chapter concerns itself with introductions to the problems discussed 
within this thesis. It unfolds in five sections, in the attempt to break down 
the interrelated concepts that inform the religio-organisational field. The 
account of the religio-organisational field is ambitious and hypothetical, 
and must be taken one step at the time. Therefore in this chapter, the five 
related concepts that give language to the further analysis will be 
introduced and discussed in the chapters to come.  
Initially, Clifford Geertz’ definition of religion a both models of and 
models for reality as religious ethos and religious worldview are elucidated.  
Here, some of the reoccurring themes in the symbolic mediation of the 
objective world of structures and the subjective world of relations emerge.  
Second, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field as a structured social space in 
which positions and relations meet is discussed. The field is a socially and 
institutionally constructed reality that is both historical and objective, but 
equally changing and subjective. The field concept is applicable to an 
analysis of the accommodation available for Muslim organizations in the 
national use of European religious models. The discussion of fields gives 
an initial outline of what a religious field can be considered as, as well as 
what organisational theorists inspired by Bourdieu (eg. DiMaggio and Scott 
1983) imagine an organisational field to be.  
The chapter then introduces institutionalisation as the all-important 
constructivist element as it defines the concepts of organisation and 
institution. With institutionalisation it becomes clear how meaning and 
stability are created and become necessary in maintaining the field and the 
positions and relations within it.  
Next, in order to understand the structures of power at play in the religio-
organisational field, a quite thorough account of the concept and 
applicability of norms must be given. Brought together with the stability 
and meaning of institutions and the structure of positions and relations of 
fields, norms are viewed as the qualifying standards operable within the 
social space, and are embedded in the models for social action and power 
dominant within the field. Norms are essentially definers of groups that 
create distinctions, levels, and hierarchies with the field. The section on 
norms will demonstrate how three related applications of norms can be 
devised as technologies of the self in the religio-organisational field. 
Finally, as power is involved in a relationship between the dominant and 
the dominated, the power of visibility, recognition, and representation 
comes into play. Here an introduction to Bourdieu’s understanding of 
symbols and symbolic power is useful. Symbolic power is an invisible 
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power that serves to distort and produce legitimacy irrespective of reason. 
Like other models, representations and symbols work by way of reducing 
complexity and hiding details, so with a reminder from cybernetics of the 
importance of requisite variety, the conclusions of the chapter summarise 
the analytical strategy to be applied in the chapters to come.  
 
2.1 Models 
2.1.1 Clifford Geertz and the two sides of models 
In 1973, the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz published a 
collection of essays entitled The Interpretation of Culture. Here, he not 
only sketched his interpretive theory of culture – which would direct the 
discipline of anthropology towards a cultural analysis of the symbolic 
dimension of social action – but also defined and interpreted religion as a 
cultural system (Geertz 1973: 87f). Although Geertz’ approach is 
anthropological, his framing of religion closely relates to “the cultural turn 
in sociology” within cultural sociology (Alexander & Smith 2011, 4). With 
religion understood under a heading of cultural sociology and 
anthropology, the object of study and the premise of Geertz’ work becomes 
a social constructivist making of meaning, which is exactly what cultural 
sociology defines as its object (Spillman 2002). In his definition of religion, 
Geertz therefore focuses on distinct patterns of meanings that are embodied 
in a symbolic system by which mankind communicates the ethos of life and 
worldview. He defines religion as: 
 
“…a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, persuasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.” 
 (Geertz 1973, 90) 
 
Geertz’ essay “Religion As a Cultural System” is a five-part explanatory 
exegesis of this definition, through which he means to give to the 
anthropological study of religion as a way to reinvigorate general academic 
stagnation. Inspired by the analytical ideas of philosophy, history, law, 
literature and other sciences, he sought to develop the cultural dimension of 
religious analysis (ibid., 87-88). It is not without reason that he is both 
praised and criticized as a “darling of the humanities” (Schilbrack 2005) 
and as a “proponent of humanistic, interpretative, hermeneutic” scholarship 
(Olson 1991). Not surprisingly, the cultural sociologists have adopted him 
as one of their own (Spillman 2002, 10), as his theories and ethnographical 
empirical data supply cases and examples to sociology and its related 
disciplines. Leaving the traditional confines of his own discipline, Geertz’ 
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approach paradigmatically takes its point of entry with the premise that the 
cultural system of sacred symbols functions to bring peoples’ ethos and 
worldview together in the representative synthesis that is the religious 
symbol. These two concepts are the pillars of his definition of religion. 
Ethos is understood as “the tone, character, and quality of life, its moral 
and aesthetic style and mood” (Geertz 1973, 89), while worldview is “the 
picture people have of the way things are, their most comprehensive ideas 
of order” (Ibid.). According to Geertz, these two concepts enlighten each 
other in religious groups’ religious belief and practice, as: 
 
“Ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of 
life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while 
the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an 
image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a 
way of life.”  
(Geertz 1973, 90) 
 
Geertz’s understanding of religion builds on a confrontation and mutual 
confirmation between a rational, objective approach by the descriptive 
worldview, and an emotional, subjective approach by the imperative of the 
ethos. This mutual confirmation has two functions in the religious life of 
the group. On one hand, it builds a common sense, or a set of beliefs, with 
which to approach the reality of the world, while on the other hand, it 
confirms this common sense by offering emotionally and aesthetically 
experienced evidence for the truth embedded within it (Ibid.). The 
constructs of this mutually confirming confrontation between worldview 
and ethos are the symbols by which the religious groups navigate life and 
give it meaning. This construction, or systematization of symbols, depends 
on the ever-changing calibration of these symbols of embedded ethos and 
the particular structure of the world around the religious group, and is of 
great importance for Geertz’ definition of religion and for the 
institutionalization of a religious organization.  
Remaining, however, with the definition of religion and its inaugural 
concept of ‘a system of symbols,’ we return to the emphasis that cultural 
sociology puts on the making of meaning. Symbols are products of the 
human mind. They are signifiers, constructions of correlations and 
conceptions of meaning, which are understood by Geertz as acts of culture 
performed by social beings. In fact, Geertz tends to frame cultural acts, 
generally, “as the construction, apprehension, and utilizations of symbolic 
forms,” (Geertz 1973, 91). As culture is by its nature is a social thing – and 
as cultural acts appear in society with structure and pattern – Geertz’ theory 
views cultural acts as systems of symbols with near endless complexity as 
the only limit. One cultural act after another constitutes as such a cultural 
pattern or complex system of symbols.  
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These systems of symbols – that are the backbone of the definition of 
religion that Geertz later qualifies – are not only cultural acts, but also have 
a life of their own in relation to one another. Cultural patterns are 
considered as models when put in relation to each other. Together they 
form a set of symbols. Entities and processes, as well as physical, organic, 
social, and psychological phenomena relate to other such phenomena and 
form relations by way of paralleling, imitating, simulating, or struggling 
with one another. Thus, a model is born from patterns consisting of one set 
of symbols maintaining relations to another set. The relational rationality is 
one of the frequent ways in which social life is explained and 
communicated, whether it is in Habermas’ Theory of Communicative 
Action (1985) or in George Lakoff’s and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We 
Live By (1980). Geertz’ original contribution, however, is to add a 
distinction to the basic concept of a ‘model’ by pointing out two categorical 
senses of the concept. On the one hand, models are sometimes models of 
something that render aspects of reality apprehensible in depictions or 
descriptions. On the other hand, models can also be models for something 
that manipulate or organize reality in accordance with a truth already 
established in the model. Therefore, the first understanding of models as 
‘models of’ informs description and the second as ‘models for’ informs 
prescription. This feeds well with ethos as a normative prescriptive and 
worldview as descriptive, while both are socially constructed reductions or 
representations. When speaking of cultural patterns in particular, Geertz not 
only distinguishes the one from the other, but maintains that both happen at 
once:  
 
“Unlike genes, and other symbolic information sources, which are only models 
for, not models of, culture patterns have an intrinsic double aspect: they give 
meaning, that is, objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality 
both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves”  
(Geertz 1973, 93) 
 
According to Geertz, this dual feature of models is unique to human 
activity. Broadly speaking, many aspects of life model themselves to 
something else and dictate modes of action, development or survival. 
However, the constructions of ‘models of’ as representations or symbols in 
addition to the ‘models for’ are fundamental traits of human thought. This 
holds immense impact for our production of cultural patterns and religious 
symbols. To the anthropologist in Geertz – and to generations from a wide 
array of disciplines – this dual feature of constructing models is what keeps 
his analytical interest in religion and returns him to the interpretation of 
culture. In short, Geertz’ definition of religion thus combines the ethos in 
the ‘model for’ and the world view in the ‘model of’ into the complex of 
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symbols or pattern of culture, which is the religion’s model of reality and 
by which religious groups create meaning.  
2.1.2 Talal Asad’s postcolonial criticism of Geertz’ definition of religion  
Although Geertz’ program and definition enjoys wide acceptance, it also 
became the object of serious criticism – most notably from fellow 
anthropologist Talal Asad (Asad 1993, Schilbrack 2005). In his 1993 book, 
Genealogies of Religion – Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam, Talal Asad argues in a series of essays against the asymmetrical 
power relations in the constructed opposition between “the West” and “the 
non-West”. This dichotomy is, in Asad’s view, partially produced in 
religious genealogy that arose as western culture changed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With the advance of natural sciences 
and the increasing contact with the rest of the world, there need arose for a 
definition of religion as a trans-historical, universal essence. Asad is 
problematizing this essentialism which he finds in Geertz’ definition as 
such an understanding of religion is constructed as part of the modern, 
Western world (Asad 1993, 54), and is “specific [to] Christian history” 
(Asad 1993, 42). The critique is manifold, but in this context, it has 
relevant implications for the examination of the models. This examination 
rests on a premise in Asad’s criticism that Geertz holds a cognitive 
assumption in his essentialism – that is, that Geertz’ definition is a mere 
acceptance of an established set of propositions from Christian history. 
“Geertz’ treatment of religious belief, which lies at the core of his 
conception of religion is a modern, privatized Christian one,” Asad argues, 
“because and to the extent that it emphasizes the priority of belief as a state 
of mind rather than constituting activity in the world” (Asad 1993, 47). 
Here, Asad clearly states the ‘state-of-mind’ cognitive premise assumed in 
Geertz’ argument and Asad’s conclusion is that this is done at the expense 
of ‘activity in the world.’  
However, according to a thorough reading of both positions by Kevin 
Schilbrack (2005) Asad is misreading Geertz’ position. The reading by 
Schilbrack constructively explores lessons from each opinion and argues 
that the problem with Asad’s criticism is an assumption of a problem in the 
cognitive claims in Geertz’ definition. “It is precisely by insisting that one 
of the things that religions do is to make cognitive claims,” Schilbrack 
argues, “that Geertz distinguishes his approach from the modern study of 
religion” (Schilbrack 2005, 437). Modernists in the study of religion tend to 
deny that religion has anything to say about the inter-subjective world. On 
the contrary, Geertz, Berger, and Luckmann, as well as later schools of 
research of the religious subjectivity and the sense of selfhood and self-
consciousness in religion, argue in favour of the co-examination of the 
subjective with the objective (Grøn & Zahavi 2002). Such is Bourdieu’s 
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perspective, as will be seen in the next section of this chapter. By insisting 
that religions hold a worldview that they teach, Geertz is leaving the 
modernist trends behind. The point which Asad misses is that Geertz’ 
definition of complex cultural patterns consisted of bringing together an 
ethos and a worldview--and that this is simultaneously a cognitive and a 
communicatory endeavour, and, must be both subjective and inter-
subjective by definition. If it were not for the mutual qualification of both 
ethos and worldview, Asad would have been correct in his critique of the 
cognitive. Nonetheless, he overlooks the importance in Geertz’ definition 
of the objective and graspable nature of religion. A worldview is exactly 
based on acceptance of certain phenomena as real. In fact, Geertz insists 
that the meaning created in religion is “as public as marriage and as 
observable as agriculture” (Geertz 1973, 91). The two processes of making 
sense and meaning in the language of a given ethos, and of correlating this 
to the phenomena of the world are, according to Asad, confused in Geertz’ 
definition. Asad rightly states that “theological discourse does not 
necessarily induce religious dispositions, and … conversely, having 
religious dispositions does not necessarily depend on a clear-cut conception 
of the cosmic framework on part of the religious actor” (Asad 1993, 36). 
However, this is not Geertz’ claim in his definition. Rather, he advocates 
an implicit and not conscious correlation of the metaphysical to the real in 
interpretation, representation or resonance. He is far from interested in 
theological discourse or clear-cut conceptions, but they too are included in 
his twofold model. The very notion of a dialectical relationship between the 
metaphysical and the real, the ethos and the worldview, can easily exist in 
both an explicit theological discourse and in an implicit ritual or a 
humorous puppet show. In fact, this is what makes Geertz’ definition so 
applicable and so insightful, and it returns to the importance of the idea of 
cultural patterns as models of reality and models for reality. Again, Asad 
misreads Geertz in his dialectics, because Asad assumes that social change 
can never occur if cultural patterns both shape themselves to the world, and 
shape the world to themsleves (Asad 1993, 32). The assumption is that 
these are the only things that shape cultural patterns and the world. The 
instance a dissonance occurs in both, each must change in accordance. 
Such a dissonance can be political, social, cognitive, or even doctrinal. Put 
critically, Asad mistakes institutional stability for unchangeable paradigms 
in cultural patterns, and misses the social constructivist point that objective 
reality is socially produced through institutionalisation of habitual actions 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). By contrast to his argument, cultural patterns 
actually allow for what Asad initially praises of modelling-- namely that “it 
allows for the possibility of conceptualizing discourses in the process of 
elaboration, modelling, testing, and so forth” (Asad 1993, 32).  
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In sum, the coercive, modern, stabilizing, theological post-colonialism 
that Asad assumes for Geertz’ definition appears to be misplaced. By 
taking the objective reality and the inter-subjective creation of meaning 
together, these concepts allow for an ongoing discourse that conceptualizes 
our reality. However, the lesson to take away from the argument between 
Asad and Geertz, as mediated by Kevin Schilbrack, is that religious 
meaning cannot be treated as autonomous from its social context. Both 
social context and religious meaning must be kept in dialogue with the 
other. This is part of both Geertz’ and Asad’s agenda. Geertz stress it in the 
duality of the model, where reality is both portrayed and changed by 
religious symbols and cultural patterns. Asad makes similar claims in his 
genealogy of religions. He maintains that Christianity is both a model of 
society in its historical context and that it becomes a model for the world 
with the colonial and imperial powers that be. Asad’s argument and Geertz’ 
definition seem convergent when speaking of the implicit adoption of an 
ethos and the interpretation of a worldview within current and changing 
contexts.  
Asad’s criticism of the Christian genesis of western thought and Geertz 
modelling both operate with an assumption that takes the anthropologists 
out of Europe and Christianity into the worlds of other religions, and each 
brings a warning. Geertz argues for putting sufficient energy into a 
thorough analysis of the meanings of symbols that make up the religions 
encountered. We cannot cope effectively with religions if we neglect the 
reality produced in both aspects of the symbolic modelling. In addition, 
Asad warns against forcing the products of our particular history of 
knowledge and power upon the rest of the world.  
The insights of Asad and Geertz are central to this thesis, as they add a 
very important understanding of modelling of religion-state relations in 
Europe. If we refocus on the critical post-colonial perspective and look at 
the change in Europe, the warnings synthesised from Asad and Geertz 
seem doubly relevant. We are not anthropologists that bring an ethos into 
the world and try to challenge the existing worldview. Rather, as 
sociologists, we must that see the Eurocentric models in their original 
setting and add the world of incoming religions. In such a context, we are 
to consider the ethos of Islam and the view of the world in Europe (Grillo, 
Ballard, Ferrari, Hoekema, Maussen, and Shah 2009). However, Kevin 
Schilbrack’s work demonstrates that Talal Asad misreads Clifford Geertz’ 
definition of religion, and together, they add a defining layer of cognitive 
self-consciousness that brings both the ethnocentricity of culturally 
dependent models and the social context of state, church, and religion in 
today’s Europe to the forefront.  
Realising that the construction of meaning has social context that shapes 
both the context and itself, a wider and more dynamic space is needed in 
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which both the subjective and the objective become analytically operable. 
The idea complex of cultural patterns is a model both as a representation of 
reality and as a guide for its change, and begs at least two further 
definitions before the dual dynamics of the religious models can be 
explored. On one hand, the scope and limitations of the worldview implicit 
in the ‘models of’ a specific reality must be defined. This is proposed 
through the development of Bourdieu’s concept of field. On the other hand, 
the workings of the particular norms in the ‘models for’ must be 
established as the techniques of the social institutionalisation. Both of these 
perspectives must come together before we can analyse the structure and 
context that work on Muslim organisations and institutions, and of the 
positions and relations in which they act.  
 
2.2 Field 
2.2.1 Pierre Bourdieu and fields of social reality  
The work on theories of praxis by French philosopher, anthropologist and 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu are an attempt to map out the mechanisms of 
control within an existing social order between the dominating and the 
dominated (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 106; DiMaggio 1979, 1460). In 
Bourdieu’s scope, all individual and institutional social life unfolds in 
praxis, and thus, praxis is the object of his theories. The theories of praxis 
consist primarily of a theoretical complex of three related and constituent 
ideas. The first is the material, social, and cultural structures and relations 
consisting of positions, which he terms field; the second is individual and 
institutional habitual dispositions, termed habitus; and the third is capital, 
or the sum and application of all available resources related to a position 
within the field. These three must be examined together. The language that 
Bourdieu uses to describe these three aspects of his theory is complex, and 
the English translations give little credit to the many simultaneous levels of 
abstraction on which he speaks. Therefore, the three ideas have been 
expressed and phrased in many different ways to illuminate their individual 
and collective aspects. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of 
Bourdieu’s theories in their own right, while making clear why and how 
they can be applied to the organizational and institutional life of religious 
groups, an epistemological context seems in order. 
Bourdieu’s work is in many ways both broad and bridging, which can be 
credited to his focus on the praxis of social life. As individuals and 
institutions simultaneously relate to the objective structure of a framing 
system while they also perceive, experience, and interpret things 
subjectively as a product of consciousness, these two concepts are 
connected.  
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In this observation, Bourdieu can be related to Geertz, Berger, and 
Luckmann. It is, therefore, fruitful to think of Bourdieu’s overall project as 
an ongoing attempt to link different theories of the social in a twofold 
perspective of praxis, and as a balancing act giving equal credit to the 
structuralist and the phenomenologist theories (Furseth & Repstad 2003, 
79). His original approach is what he calls generative structuration, which 
focuses on the twofold process of interaction between subjective positions 
and objective structures (Ibid.). Basically, generative structuration is the 
production of and ‘being-produced-by’ structures in a network of social 
relations. According to Merriam-Webster, the term generative refers to the 
“power or function of generating, originating, producing or reproducing” 
(2013). Again the terminology used varies, but Bourdieu groups both the 
positions to be taken in a social structure and also the processes of taking 
these positions under one perspective (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008: 2). The 
language of “positions” and “position-taking” infers that relations are the 
very structures of social life, and that social interaction requires people to 
take positions in relation to each other (ibid.). Elsewhere, Bourdieu 
explains that individuals and institutions relate to existing ‘structured 
structures’ while at the same time generating new ones by ‘structuring 
structures’ (Bourdieu 1985, 13; Wilken 2005, 214). This generative process 
of both ‘changing’ and ‘being changed by’ is structuration. It merges the 
social with the societal – especially in organizations or religion (Calhoun 
1991, xi). The generative structuration approach is defining for Bourdieu’s 
work; that is, keeping in mind that social life unfolds in relations of 
positions is the hallmark of Bourdieu’s contribution to relational sociology 
(Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).5 In order to explain how, why, and when 
generative structuration unfolds, Bourdieu applies the three core theorems 
of praxis – habitus, capital, and field. 
Habitus explains what people and institutions are able to do or not do; 
that is, what positions are available to them. Bourdieu defines habitus as a 
“system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past 
experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, 
appreciations and actions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 94ff). Habitus is 
closely related to habitualisation, which Berger & Luckmann explains to be 
the production of the social human being in relation to his environment 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966; 70). To be a habitual creature is to cast any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term structuration, as employed by Anthony Giddens, labels his entire theory. 
Giddens holds that structuration are the conditions governing the continuity or 
transformation of structures, and thereby, the reproduction of social systems. He states, 
“[a]ccording to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of systems 
are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise… Structure is 
not to be equated with constraint, but is always both constraining and enabling” 
(Giddens 1984: 25). 
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frequently repeated action “into a pattern, which can then be reproduced 
with an economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its 
performer as that pattern” (Ibid, 70-71). The habitual pattern is, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, the result of different experiences and different 
connections collected over time, and allows for a measure of the available 
tools in dealing with a new situation.  
Capital explains why certain positions are more attractive than others; 
that is, what looks good socially or pays off strategically. Capital is a good 
in itself, as well as a resource to be applied. To the individual it may be an 
endowment, while to the structure, it remains the measure or height of the 
position. Capital takes many shapes and may be economic, social, or 
cultural and there seems to be a strategic advantage to those who 
successfully manage to exchange one for another. Both habitus and capital 
are applicable in the objective reality and by the subjective due to their part 
in the field. More will be said of capital in section 2.5, as different kinds of 
capital may appear to have symbolic power if the holder can demonstrate 
the attractiveness of the particular kind capital in a particular position.  
As the primary focus of this section, field explains how social space is 
constrained by existing positions and limited by resources and time. If 
resources were limitless and no other demands, socially speaking, 
everything would be possible and there would be not constraints. Equally, 
everything would be impossible because in social life people act in 
relations because there are social positions and prestige to be gained or lost. 
Specifically, Bourdieu defines field as “structured spaces of positions (or 
posts) whose properties depend on their position within these spaces, and 
which can be analysed independently of the characteristics of their 
occupants” (Bourdieu 1993, 73). The field is an autonomous space, where 
social relations and interactions are played out, and where resources, 
power, acceptance, and recognition as well as material, cultural, 
social/symbolic capital are distributed—depending on the condition (and 
power) of the relations. Bourdieu likens field to a social arena, a 
playground, a schoolyard or battlefield – all connotations which are 
embedded in the French word champ. Entering a field is like playing a 
game; with a rudimentary understanding of the rules, those who enter use 
what they have (i.e. their habitus in terms of experience and their capital in 
terms of abstract resources) and make the best of it, while continuing to 
learn about the existing positions and the positions to be taken. In a lecture 
series from 1987/88, published in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 
Bourdieu explores the metaphor of the game to further explain the concept 
of field. He does this with explicit reference to the two other features of his 
theory of praxis and shows how the application of all three gives language 
to the praxis of playing a game: 
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“We can picture each player as having in front of her a pile of tokens of different 
colors, each color corresponding to a given species of capital she holds, so that her 
relative force in the game, her position in the space of play, and also her strategic 
orientation toward the game – what we call in French her ‘game,’ the moves she 
makes, more or less risky or cautious, subversive of conservative, depend both on 
the total number of tokens and on the consumption of the piles of tokens she 
retains, that is, on the volume and structure of her capital[…] To be more precise, 
the strategies of the ‘player’ and everything that defines his ‘game’ are a function 
not only of the volume and structure of his capital at the moment under 
consideration and of the game chances[…] they guarantee him, but also of the 
evolution over time of the volume and structure of this capital, that is, of his social 
trajectory and of the dispositions (habitus) constituted in the prolonged relation to 
definite distribution of objective chances”  
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 99)  
 
Winning – if there is such a thing – is, from a structural point of view, 
gaining more capital and occupying better positions. The mechanisms of 
the field reveal that all social life, all things changing and changeable, and 
all social organization is build on relationships of power, constructed 
culture, and social stratification. 
There are many different fields, levels of fields, and fields within fields. 
Each field has its own implicit premises, its own external boundaries, and 
its internal relations with constitutive powers and norms. These must be 
observed together if any sense is to be made of a field. Accounting for the 
borders and limits of a field, for its premises and its constituent norms, are 
the initial steps toward building an analytical strategy out of the theoretical 
building blocks that make up a field. This is the difficult task undertaken in 
the chapters to come. “The process of constructing the field is,” as 
Bourdieu points out, “perhaps among the most difficult and challenging of 
all phases of research. It is a process that obeys principles that are less of a 
method (a route that one retraces after the fact) and more than a simple 
theoretical institution” (Bourdieu 1996: 232).  
For this purpose, Bourdieu outlines a few initial steps in the study of 
fields. First, the given field must be seen in relation to the different kinds of 
forces or powers at play. Bourdieu explains that physical, social, economic, 
or symbolic powers enter into a balance where one form of power is 
opposed to another, and that a struggle unfolds between them (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992, 76). This overarching power struggle seems general to 
society and will feed into any field analysed. Depending on the governing 
logic, the hierarchy of the power, and the distribution of capital in this 
field, there will be a counter-power of the dominated that will be 
distributed in an inversely symmetrical pattern within the hierarchy. Thus, 
for example, in a field of material production, the holders of economical 
capital will be challenged by, and poised against, the holders of symbolic 
capital. Second, the analyst or researcher must try to map out the hierarchy 
Theories, Concepts and an Analytical Strategy 	  	  
	  
29 
and structure of positions in the field. This is done in order to see how 
power is distributed within the field. It is important to distinguish between 
the objective positions in the field, understood as possible positions to 
occupy, and the stances actually taken by individual organisations or 
institutions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 105). A place to start is to look at 
the positions of distinguished power or most capital, and to see how this 
position is separated from others. Once the dominating position is 
identified, the various degrees of the dominated slowly becomes clear in 
the analysis.  
As mentioned briefly above, the first of the defining features of fields is 
that they are relational. This concerns the coupling of the subjective 
interactions of people and institutions with the objective relations that are 
the constraints of available positions within a structure. The focus on 
relations is an old truth in sociology, and both Karl Marx and John Dewey, 
the American pragmatist, held this view before Bourdieu. Marx maintained 
that capital was not a thing, ‘but a social relation,’ while Dewey stresses 
that behavior of one thing “is modified by its connection with others” 
(Dewey 1988; Emirbayer & Johnson 2008; 5-6). Ultimately, the relational 
approach holds that nothing exists entirely in isolation, but is always 
related to something.  
In their reading of Bourdieu for the purposes of organizational analysis, 
American sociologists Mustafa Emirbayer and Victoria Johnson stress the 
importance of the relationalism of the field, and paraphrase Bourdieu’s 
definition in order to clarify that “any field… must be conceptualized as a 
configuration of relationships not between the concrete entities 
themselves… but rather, between the nodes those entities happen to occupy 
within the given network or configuration” (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 
6). This is important to the understanding of the dichotomy between the 
objective relations of the structure and subjective interactions. It is not 
enough just to see how one organization looks to other organizations to 
map out their interactions. Rather, the positions and the nodes within the 
structure are different from the stances actually held by the individual 
organization – which has significance for the generative structuration. The 
stances are so because different organizations manoeuvre and navigate in 
and out of different positions at different times--according to their 
institutional habitus and dispositions, and depending on the capital 
available. This they do exactly because the structure is objective and the 
positions held at any given moment grant a subjective view from inside 
these positions.  
The distinction between positions actually held and potential or 
hypothetical positions is the analytical virtue of looking for the structural 
when trying to map out the relations between organizations within a field. 
Given the objective nature of the structure, it becomes possible for one 
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organization to take a dominating position and force others into subjection. 
This power and position relationship is the premise for all relations within 
the field. Although a definition of field was already given above, Bourdieu 
reiterates the importance of position in the field, especially when concerned 
with analysis of the field:  
 
“In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of 
objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in 
their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents 
or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the 
distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access 
to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective 
relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.)” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 96).6 
 
With this understanding of the relational nature of fields, a second insight 
becomes clear; namely, that fields extend only so far as the relations of 
power extend (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 7). As organizations relate, 
structure, and dominate each other into holding varying levels of attractive 
positions, the limits of the field becomes clearer. Key positions are 
considered to be key, and poor positions are considered to be poor, because 
something within a field is worth fighting over. That something is, in 
Bourdieu’s words, the capital appropriate to the field; the general idea 
being that there are as many fields as there are forms of capital to be fought 
over. Capital may assume different shapes and sizes relative to the field and 
is changed according to the struggling individuals and institutions. Capital 
as such is an abstraction that denotes the specific value appropriated and 
valid within the field. As inspired by Marx, capital in the sense of worth 
and value is expressed as positions within the structural grid of relations. 
Max Weber informs us of the virtue of classic capitalist theory of Adam 
Smith and Benjamin Franklin7, that holds that capital in addition to being a 
resource, must be applied, practiced, and put to use (Weber 2005, 14). In 
this language, the field extends as far as capital has value and as far as there 
are positions to be held in relation to the value of other positions held 
elsewhere in the structure. The field ends when there are no more relations 
or when the nature of the attractive and valuable capital changes.  
Thirdly, there is an unspoken consensus about the constitutive elements 
of the fields. Bourdieu calls these doxa, Greek for a common belief or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For the purpose of the analysis in the chapters to come, this distinction between 
stances actually held and positions capable of being held will reveal the first key parts 
of the religio-organisational field as the analysis unfolds. 
7 “Remember, that time is money… Remember, that credit is money… Remember, that 
money is of the prolific, generating nature” (Exert from Benjamin Franklin, full quote in 
Weber 2005, 14-15).  
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opinion. They are the ground rules or common conceptions without which 
there would be no field. The maintenance of the ground rules is critical to 
the field, and when contested, most agents within field will try to support 
them. In a key quote from a later synthesis of the understanding of field, 
Bourdieu addresses the implications of the implicit agreements for the 
whole field; “another property of fields, a less visible one, is that all the 
agents that are involved in a field share a certain number of fundamental 
interests, namely everything that is linked to the very existence of the field. 
This leads to an objective complicity, which underlies all the antagonisms. 
It tends to be forgotten that a fight presupposes agreement between the 
antagonists about what is worth fighting about; theses points of agreement 
are held at the level of what ‘goes without saying’ they are left in a state of 
doxa, in other words everything that makes the field itself, the game, the 
stakes, all the presuppositons that one tacitly and even unwittingly accepts 
by the mere fact of play, of entering into the game” (Bourdieu 1993, 73-
74). The secondary legal rules and subset of regulations that English legal 
theorist H.L.A. Hart maintained as ways of validation and recognition of 
legality seem to be an exemplification of the doxa pertaining to the legal 
system and the legal fields (Hart 1961: 91ff., Freeman 1994: 345, Vinding 
2009, 61).  
Fourthly, the norms and principles of a field are paramount for any 
concrete analysis. If structured positions were constitutive to the field, if 
capital was the motivator for struggle within the field, and if doxa were the 
implicit of secondary ground rules, then norms are the principles of 
division within the field that not only presumes the three prior, but also 
gives the field both its hierarchy, its durability, and its dynamics.8 The 
principles for division and distinction are “the system of criteria that could 
account for the set of meaningful and significant differences that 
objectively separate [entities within the field] or, if you will, enable the set 
of relevant differences among [them] to arise” (Bourdieu, quoted in 
Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 8). Bourdieu summerizes this as “vision and 
division” (Bourdieu 2000, 65). The very existence of these normative 
criteria will give rise to the dynamics and the change within the field, as 
Bourdieu states, “struggles for the impositions of the principle of legitimate 
hierarchization do in fact cause the dividing-line between those who belong 
and those who do not to be constantly discussed and disputed, and therefore 
[to be] shifting and fluctuating, at every moment and above all according to 
the moment” (Bourdieu 1988: 77).  
It is the norms that make the field of positions and structure hierarchical. 
The relations of positions hold power and the capital accounts for the value 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Doxa as ground rules or implicit assumptions are of course also to be considered 
norms, although not necessarily contested.   
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and the possibilities within the field, but the norms qualify and empower 
the value of the positions. By definition, the divisions of inside and outside 
that the norms set up within the field are those that give the levels and 
ranks native to hierarchy. The most powerful of norms yield the strongest 
divisions and, in turn, are those most difficult to transgress and transform. 
These strong dividers give stability to a field and allow for positions to be 
held for a long time and at low upkeep. Simultaneously, it is because of 
these norms that struggles arise and positions are challenged, which in turn 
yields the shifting and fluctuating dynamics of the fields. In Bourdieu’s 
terms, this is the nature of differentiation and struggle (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992, 100-101). 
As norms are so important to illustrating ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ 
stability is enforced and challenged, they will be further developed in 
section 2.4 of this chapter.   It will suffice here to stress that they remain of 
analytical importance in the development of the analytical strategy, that 
they are much more than mere rules, and they hold much more power than 
sanctions. An analytical focus on the normativities and regularities of a 
field is critical because it gives a much more complex idea of the 
navigations of a field.  
2.2.2 Religious fields 
For this chapter and the theoretical framing of the institutional positioning 
of Muslim organizations in the religio-organisational fields in Denmark, 
Germany, and England, there is need to elaborate further on a few of the 
implications of examining specific fields, and what a theory about fields 
has to offer when looking at organizations and religion. 
Building on what we know about fields theoretically, there is basis in 
Bourdieu’s own analyses to go deeper into the two related fields of 
organizations and religions. This will help to clarify important aspects for 
the expositions and analyses later in this thesis, and help to further specify 
the object of this study – establishing a framework for the study of religious 
organizations.  
Craig Calhoun, who translated and published Bourdieu’s 1971 work on 
religious fields “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field”, observes 
how field and the procedural view on structuration engages directly with 
the great minds of sociology of religion such as Weber (1978, 2005) and 
Durkheim (1912). “Religion is constituted as a specialized field 
addressable as such,” he states of the historical transformations that become 
visible in the analysis of the religious field, and continues on to state, “from 
this vantage point we can look back to see the religious dimensions of 
societies which were much less clearly differentiated into fields, and 
forward to see (perhaps always partial and temporary) ‘domestication’ of 
religion by its compartmentalization” (Calhoun 1991, xii). Indeed, 
Theories, Concepts and an Analytical Strategy 	  	  
	  
33 
Bourdieu’s concept of field can be seen as a reduction of a social complex 
by variation of the governing logic of that particular field. Equally, the 
governing logic within the field defines the appropriate and applicable 
strategies operating within that same field.  
When looking specifically at religion in Bourdieu’s essay, it becomes 
clear that religious organizations are dually exposed to structuration by 
compartmentalization. Religion, as a field, has only narrow space to 
operate within society, and this space is continuously confirmed from the 
outside as well as contested from within. Amongst the agents and 
institutions inside the field, the limited space available becomes more 
critical and the strategies applied in the struggle thus more inventive. Both 
tendencies seem to be confirmed by a review of increased attention in the 
first decade of the millennium and that the recent resurgence of religion is 
cause for such uproar seem only to confirm that religion has indeed been 
assumed domesticated and that things now seem to change “after 
secularization” (Casanova 2006).  
The concept of a limited space with available positions, scarce resources, 
and influence and power in relations is not only a convincing theoretical 
approach, but it is also a way for specific agents to give language to their 
positional struggle within this compartmentalized space. This is seen in 
particular in the specific case of the religious field which he develops in 
“Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field” from 1971 (Bourdieu 1991 
in Calhoun 1991). Here, Bourdieu considers religion as “language, that is 
as both an instrument of communication and an instrument of knowledge 
or, more precisely, as a symbolic medium at once structuring and 
structured” (Bourdieu 1991, 2, my italics). Clearly, in this perspective 
Bourdieu is on par with Geertz, and although they each take a distinct 
perspective and use different terms, there is little distance between Geertz’ 
ideas from 1973 and Bourdieu’s from 1971. Both are deeply indebted to 
Durkheim in appreciation of the religious semiology and both define 
religion as a symbolic system. However, Geertz does so for a much wider 
model perspective, which takes into account the whole worldview. In that 
sense, Geertz is much closer to Peter L. Berger and his Sacred Canopy 
from 1967 (Berger 1967). By contrast, Bourdieu sets his system of symbols 
into the frame of field, where the structural division creates stronger and 
weaker positions. “Because symbolic systems derive their structure, as the 
case of religions shows, from the systematic application of one and the 
same principle of division, and because they can organize the natural and 
the social world only by carving out antagonistic classes (owing to the fact 
that they give birth to meaning and consensus on meaning by logic of 
inclusion and exclusion), they are predisposed by their very structure 
simultaneously to serve the functions of inclusion and exclusion, of 
association and dissociation, of integration and distinction” (Bourdieu 
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1991, 3). This “carving out of antagonism” is, by definition, the social 
power of the symbolic systems of religion, and is a clear reference to 
Durkheim. The categorisation of the world in a sacred-profane divide on 
Bourdieu’s part is the point of origin for his own generative structuralism. 
Within the religious field, structuring and being structured, positions and 
position-taking, and communication between subjects and knowledge of 
objects, is governed by the social differentiation and legitimation of 
differences by the ‘one and the same principle of division.’ This is the basic 
religious norm, and from this first divider, the rest of the field can be 
mapped. With the system of symbols, the division principles of norms and 
the relational power of the structures, the religious field rests on a 
correspondence between social structures and mental structures. In a very 
compact quote from Bourdieu, the generative structuration between the 
objective and the subjective of the religious field receives its most 
condensed expression:  
 
“If one takes serious both the Durkheimian hypothesis of the social origin of 
schemes of thought, perception, appreciation, and actions and the fact of class 
divisions, one is necessarily driven to the hypothesis that a correspondence exists 
between social structures (strictly speaking, power structures) and mental 
structures.  
This correspondence [is] obtain[ed] through the structure of symbolic 
systems, language, religion, art, and so forth; or, more precisely, religion 
contributes to the (hidden) imposition of the principles of structuration of the 
perception and thinking of the world, and of the social world in particular, insofar 
as it imposes a system of practices and representations whose structure, 
objectively founded on a principle of political division, presents itself as the 
natural-supernatural structure of the cosmos.” 
 (Bourdieu 1991, 5) 
 
To Bourdieu it is “the production, reproduction and diffusion of religious 
goods of salvation”, the systematisation and the symbolic representation of 
this production constitutes “relatively autonomous religious field” 
(Bourdieu 1991, 7). The production of religious goods of salvation are 
produced and generated into religious capital by those who as priests or 
religious specialists have religious knowledge and who can dispossess 
those who are excluded from the production. Again the language is 
borrowed from capitalist criticism of Marx, but Bourdieu soberly maps out 
the implication of this capitalist criticism in the language of sociology of 
religion. This field is reproduced and differentiated by a division of 
responsibilities and an organisational hierarchy with priests at the top.  
With reference to Durkheim’s fundamental observation of religion as the 
very first categoriser of the social world, Bourdieu argues that the priests of 
religion were the ones to apply the sacred-profane set of principal divisions 
within the different classes of society. “The construction of a religious field 
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goes hand in hand with the objective dispossession of those who are 
excluded from it and and who thereby find themselves constituted as the 
laity (or the profane, in the double meaning of the word) dispossessed of 
religious capital (as accumulated symbolic labour) and recognizing the 
legitimacy of that dispossession from the mere fact that they misrecognize 
it as such…” (Bourdieu 1991, 11) 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the religious field with the dispossessed of 
religious capital and the misrecognition of the legitimacy are key elements 
of the construction of the religious field. On the one hand, the laity is those 
who do not produce religious capital, which Bourdieu defines as 
accumulated symbolic labour; while on the other hand, the laity needs to 
recognize the dispossession, that is, understand the legitimate the order of 
the symbolic system. This order, Bourdieu reveals, is naturally arbitrary, 
which makes the nature of the recognition as mis-recognition. Profane 
means both the religious ignorant and those who cannot administer the 
sacred (Bourdieu 1991, 12).  
The basic opposition between the sacred and the profane is the basis of 
religious knowledge and is created by those who draw the limits between 
these produce the sacred and the religious knowledge. This dispossession 
of religious knowledge is embedded in the structure between the 
dominating position and the dominated position. The symbolic order of the 
social world becomes religion because it is legitimate and recognised, 
rather than magic or sorcery, which is the name of the dominated religion. 
“Religion can produce the objectivity it produces in structuring structure,” 
Bourdieu says, “only by producing the misrecognition of the limits of the 
knowledge it makes possible. Religion therefore adds the symbolic 
reinforcement of its sanctions to the limits and… barriers imposed by a 
determinate type of material conditions of existence” (Bourdieu 1991, 14). 
Knowledge of the sacred and the generation of religious capital are 
identical to the stronger, and therefore, structuring position in the religious 
field. In addition, the mis-recognition of the limits of the knowledge, i.e., 
the idea that religious specialists may know the intention of gods or the end 
of days, allows for a sanctioning force that reinforces the original symbolic 
order. The illegitimacy of the structuring structure makes it objectively 
arbitrary rather than relational. It is through the subsequent mis-recognition 
that the dominated are assigned position and relations. Established religion 
and religious practice is only “a function of the reinforcement that the 
considered religion, by its power to legitimate arbitrariness, can bring to the 
material and symbolic force that can be mobilized by this group or class in 
legitimating the material or symbolic properties attached to a definite 
position in the social structure.” As is slowly becoming clear, when we 
discuss the postions held and the potential positions capable of being held, 
there is a relationship of power between the two. A strong position in the 
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social structure is so because of the capital required and applied, but there 
are material and symbolic force attached to this specific position. These 
forces are legitimated by reference to the objective position in the structure 
with which it overlaps as a ‘second-order objectivation of meaning’ that is 
a ‘process of explaining and justifying’ as Berger & Luckmann explains 
(Berger & Luckmann 1966, 110-111).  In this case, it is done by reference 
to the ‘symbolic processes […] of signification that refer to the realities 
other than those of everyday experience” (Ibid., 111). This circular 
argument is exactly what makes the power to legitimate arbitraryness and it 
lives only because of the laity, the other religions and the weaker positions, 
that do not see that the recognition of legitimation is mis-recognition. 
“Because religion, like all symbolic systems, is predisposed to fulfil a 
function of association and dissociation or, better, distinction, a system of 
practices and beliefs is made to appear as magic or sorcery, an inferior 
religion, whenever it occupies a dominated position in the structure of 
relations of symbolic power, that is, in the system of relations between the 
systems of practices and beliefs belonging to a determined social 
formation” (Bourdieu 1991, 12). As the picture of the religious field 
becomes the more nuanced, it is possible also to see the relations between 
different religions, where the structuring and dominating position is able to 
see other religions as inferior and therefore by definition as magic. This is 
because the production of religious knowledge and ‘the sacred’ in other 
religions is seen as illegitimate and by definition as profane. “Every 
dominated practice or belief is doomed to appear as profanatory, inasmuch 
as, by its very existence and in the absence of any intention of profanation, 
it constitutes an objective contestation of the monopoly over the 
administration of the sacred, and therefore the legitimacy of the holders of 
the monopoly.”  
Although Bourdieu is very indebted to the capitalist criticism from Marx 
(1887), it is of course possible to distil the structuralism of the religious 
field specifically and other fields in general without turning to Marxism. 
The focus is very much on the relationship between the priests and the laity 
as religious capitalists by establishment and religiously dispossessed 
labourers or religious consumers. Even further, Bourdieu contrasts the 
religious establishment to the religious irregular entrepreneurs like prophets 
and sorcerers. When keeping the structuralism and distinguishing it from 
the capitalist critique, what remains is a picture of the structure of the 
religious field, which we can build further on later in the chapter when 
turning to the organisational field. The organisational theorist are very 
successful in the exercise to take the structuralism away from the capitalist 
critique and apply the lessons learned to modern businesses and corporate 
knowhow.  
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In summing up the lessons for future analysis, these are the initial items 
to look for when sketching out the dynamics of different fields. Firstly, 
analysis requires identification of relations of positions rather than mere 
interactions. Secondly, the nature of the capital common to the field  ust be 
established. A field is only as wide as those positions to be taken within the 
field are attractive. Thirdly, that distinct logic of the common rules of the 
game will need identification, and fourthly, norms understood and 
identified both as barriers and qualifiers following the principles of the 
generative structuration. Fifthly and lastly, the field can be constructed as it 
streches between on the one hand the objective dispossession and exclusion 
and, on the other hand, the socially symbolic power of the positional 
hierarchy. 
 
2.3 Institutions and organisations 
We have already made brief acquaintance with Berger and Luckmann and 
their Social Construction of Reality from 1966, both in Chapter One and 
previously in the present, but not yet treated their contributions 
systematically. As mentioned, Berger & Luckmann are, as the book title 
suggests, concerned with the social construction of reality rather than, as 
John Searle was, the construction of social reality (Searle 1996). The 
relevant difference is in the observation of the sociality of the construction 
rather than the sociality of the created. This stronger statement on behalf of 
Berger and Luckmann reflects that the creation of everything objectively 
and subjectively real is social by definition, because man is a Homo Socius 
that socially produces himself and the knowledge of himself (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966, 69). As such, “social order exists only as a product of 
human activity” (Ibid.). With a statement like this, and with an endeavour 
to analyse the social construction of knowledge, it is clear that Berger and 
Luckmann draw from Durkheimian sociology. They concern themselves 
with the same overall themes as Durkheim in the search for the foundations 
of social reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 28). Seen from the history of 
these ideas, Berger and Luckmann may be tentatively understood as the 
mediators and stewards of the Durkheimian sociology with their own 
distinct contributions. As such, on one hand they compliment Bourdieu in 
his dialectical structure between the positions objectively available and the 
stances taken and on the other, they provide a basis for many of the 
institutional theorists with their dynamics between the institutionalisation 
of the objective reality and the internalisation of the subjective reality. 
Many of Berger and Luckmann’s contributions add context to Bourdieu’s 
theory of fields and they clearly inform neo-institutionalist and 
organisational analysts when these adopt Bourdieu’s thinking into their 
study of the organizational field. Going further, the recent focus by 
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institutionalist theorists on the relational nature of the organisational field 
has clear references to the social constructivism that Berger and Luckmann 
represent together with a new appreciation of relations as expressions of the 
structural (Wooten and Hoffman 2008, 141). 
Like Geertz and Bourdieu, Berger and Luckmann operate with both the 
objective and the subjective social reality. In doing so, they understand the 
dual dynamics of institutionalisation and internalisation as mutual ways of 
making the two realities into each other. In this respect, the section on 
institutionalisation will receive thorough attention, as the production of 
institutions is of great importance for an understanding of the 
organisational realities and environments constituent to the organisational 
field. Internalisation becomes a relevant perspective when organisations 
and individuals are asked to position themselves and navigate within 
structured fields.  
With their social constructivist point of origin in their treatise, Berger 
and Luckmann naturally place the social man in an open relationship with 
the world around him. He is free to establish relationships with and 
structure the environment around him as far as humanness becomes a 
socio-cultural variable contingent on these relationships (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966, 65-66). Resonating the lesson from Durkheim that “…we 
have taken [the structures] from society and projected them into our 
representation of the world. Society has furnished the canvas on which 
logical thought has worked” (Durkheim 1912 [1995], 149), Berger and 
Luckmann remind their readers that man’s humanity and his logic are 
inseparably intertwined in the social world (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 69, 
n. 13). Similarly, under threat of chaos and the collapse of order, the social 
world must continuously be produced and reproduced in an ongoing 
externalisation of the structures he himself has created, because “… the 
social order exists only as a product of human activity …” (Ibid., 69-70). 
According to Berger and Luckmann, the emergence, reproduction, 
maintenance and transmission of social order becomes the subject of a 
habitually repeated pattern and ultimately results in institutionalisation. As 
this section of the chapter unfolds, this making of institutions will be 
explored further, and we hone in on the institutionalist definitions of 
institution, organisation and organisational fields. 
2.3.1 Institutions, institutionalisation and neoinstitutionalism  
Understanding, conceptualising and defining institutions and 
institutionalisation is the self-proclaimed task of institutionalism theory and 
institutional analysis. Such an endeavour has a long history and tradition in 
a wide array of disciplines and academic fields. In particular, however, the 
most recent school within institutional theory, the so-called neo-
institutionalism, takes a particular view of institutions and 
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institutionalisation in that they focus on the sociological, political and 
economic perspective on institutions and organisations. They theorise and 
analyse how institutions interact with and affect society. Neo-
institutionalism therefore focuses as much on the individual institution and 
organisation as it does on the relations to the whole of society and to the 
surrounding environment. Neo-institutionalism is something new only to 
the extent that the focus on the sociological and behavioural is new to 
classical organisational and management theory. Thus it characterises itself 
by the interdisciplinary approaches, by the implicit rejection of the rational 
economic behaviour of actors, agents and organisations (Thronton and 
Ocasio 2008, 100), and neo-institutionalists take as their object of study the 
inter-organisational field and the relations between organisations and 
institutions that unfold within this field.  
Obviously the history of institutional research has wider foundations that 
the neo-institutionalist merger of institutional theory and socio-economic 
method and arguably the sociological perspective has been there all along. 
Karl Marx with his materialist criticism (Marx 1887), Max Weber with his 
analysis of the bureaucracy (Weber 1978) and Emile Durkheim with his 
‘crystallized social facts’ (Durkheim 1982) understood as institutions are 
foundational (Alexander 1983, vol. 2, 259; Scott 2008: 12). In addition, in 
his review of the history of institutional research W. Richard Scott count 
also Parsons, Mead, Bourdieu and Berger and Luckmann amongst the 
ranks of pioneers (Scott 2008). Talcott Parsons laid the mirco-sociological 
foundations to neo-institutionalism with his focus on institutions as systems 
of norms that regulate the relations of individuals to each other (Parsons 
1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 15-18; Scott 2008, 14). George Herbert 
Mead conferred that meaning is created by social interaction and gave 
attention to the role of the symbolic systems in the creation of the social 
and the institutional (Scott 2008, 15-16). Common to both Mead and 
Berger and Luckmann is the social constructivist and the symbol-
interactionist approach to organised social life, where Parsons is more of a 
structural functionalist. The merger of the social constructivist and the 
structural functionalist seems foundational to institutional theory and 
resonates well with Bourdieu’s overarching ambition of a theory of practice 
beyond the subjectivist-objectivist divide. 
The reason for the prominent position of Berger and Luckmann in the 
institutionalism theory is in part due to the cognitive construction of shared 
knowledge and symbolic systems in the dynamics of the objectively and 
subjectively real. As mentioned, the predominance of the cognitive 
construction in Berger and Luckmann’s theory resonate Durkheim, but 
when put in institutionally sensitive language it has strong inter-
disciplinary impact and could cross-fertilize institutional theory. As 
opposed both to the classical sociology of Durkheim and Weber and to the 
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normative perspectives of Parsons and colleagues, Berger and Luckmann 
“… had a more direct influence on institutionally minded organizational 
scholars, no doubt because it granted institutions a larger role in ensuring 
social order …” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 21).   
Brokering social constructivism to the neo-institutionalists, Berger and 
Luckmann’s definitions of institutions and institutionalisation provides an 
excellent epistemological and comparative point of entry for a discussion 
of these concepts and for their utilization of the returning outlook towards 
an analytical strategy of the religio-organisational field. Taking both 
institutions and the social construction of institutions, i.e. the 
institutionalization, under one, Berger and Luckmann define these, saying, 
“Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such 
typification is an institution…” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 72, my 
italics). Defining institutions as reciprocal typifications of habitualized 
actions is, Berger and Luckmann admit in the note to the paragraph, 
“broader than the prevailing [understanding] in contemporary sociology” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, 221, n 21). From a social cognitive and 
constructivist point of view the definition is applicable, although not 
exhaustive. Habitualized actions are those frequently repeated actions that 
by mere repetition constitute social patterns. The cognitive recognition of 
this pattern and its repetition paves the way for cognitive categorisation and 
typification, and once this is externalised, shared, and socially recognized, 
we see and understand these actions as institutions. As such, these 
institutions are products of human actions and gain history and stability by 
the externalisation and objectivities of the common and reciprocal use 
(Ibid., 72). With their historicity and their stability, “…institutions also, by 
the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up 
predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against 
the many other directions that would theoretically be possible …” (Ibid.). 
This structural control has direct parallels to the social structures and the 
structuration that both Bourdieu and Giddens spoke of and points to the 
fact of power and capital by merits of merely being institutionalised 
(Bourdieu 1985, Giddens 1984, Scott 2008). American sociologists and 
first generation neo-institutionalists Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell 
comment on this definition of institutionalisation and the power that 
institutions have, saying, “Berger and Luckmann grant extraordinary power 
to institutions as cognitive constructions, suggesting that they ‘control 
human conduct … prior to or apart from any mechanisms or sanctions 
specifically set up to support’ them …” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 21; 
Berger and Luckmann 1966, 72). Whether or not the power of 
institutionalisation to control human conduct is too extraordinary, as seen 
from the point of view of DiMaggio and Powell, there is no doubt that the 
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power invoked by institutions being produced must be understood in 
addition to the structures that are secondary to them. The lessons learned 
from Bourdieu would suggest that institutions hold power by merits of their 
place in the overall structure and that they – inherently – themselves direct 
behaviour and impose limits on social structure.  
However well the Berger and Luckmann definition of institutions 
provide context for the social construction of reality and however well it 
speaks to neo-institutionalists, it does not exhaust the possible conceptions 
of institutions and there are several additional useful definitions to be 
championed. Taking stock of the developments in institutional theory of the 
1970s and 1980s, DiMaggio and Powell edited an anthology volume on 
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis published in 1991. 
Here several of the influential articles within neo-institutionalism were 
reprinted, including DiMaggio’s and Powell’s own “The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organisational Fields” originally from 1983. This edited volume was also 
the occasion for revising and refining institutional theory and for this 
purpose Ronald L. Jepperson wrote a review-article on “Institutions, 
Institutional Effects and Institutionalism” in which he described the core 
semantic field of institutional terms and terminology. He set out to weed 
out misconceptions and conflations of the terms of institutional theory in 
order to gain some clarity and agreement about the concepts of institution 
and institutionalisation (Jepperson 1991).  
According to Jepperson, the word institution is used to describe anything 
from marriage and motels to vacations and voting and is often misused, but 
must commonly refer vaguely to large or significant associations 
(Jepperson 1991, 143-144). Despite obvious differences between these 
social entities, there are important and abstract commonalities amongst 
them that warrant the label institution for all of them. They are all ‘stable 
designs for repeated activity sequences,’ which is how Jepperson propose 
we begin the clarification of the concept. “… Institution represents a social 
order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property; 
institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment. By order or 
pattern, I refer, as is conventional, to standardized interaction sequences. 
An institution is then a social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction 
process” (Jepperson 1991, 145, original italics). At first glance there seems 
to be little difference between this and the definition presented by Berger 
and Luckmann as both reference the reproduction of a social pattern. 
However, the Berger and Luckmann definition refers to actions by actors 
and this seems to be a cardinal issue of criticism in Jepperson’s 
understanding. He says of institutions that “their persistence is not 
dependent, notably, upon recurrent collective mobilization … that is, 
institutions are not reproduced by ‘action,’ … rather, routine reproductive 
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procedures support and sustain the pattern, furthering its reproduction – 
unless collective action blocks, or environmental shock disrupts, the 
reproductive process” (Ibid.).  
The contrast between institutionalisation and action is a core aspect of 
Jepperson’s critically revised definition. Institutionalisation understood as 
the reproduction process of social patterns is sharply contrasted to actions, 
which Jepperson defines as another and different form of reproduction 
(Jepperson 1991, 148). Action is understood as a weaker form of social 
reproduction, because it relies on repetitive mobilization and will face 
problems and high costs in the attempt to reignite social initiative and to 
repeat social production (Ibid.). By contrast, institutionalisation is 
characterised by convention and congruence with existing social patterns 
and stability in the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of certain social facts, such as 
those Berger and Luckmann analysed (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 65ff.). In 
his analysis, Jepperson’s contrast seems as stark as to suggest that 
institution is ‘non-action,’ just as the taken-for-grantedness can be 
characterised by the absence of active thought (Douglas 1986). In fact, 
Jepperson states that “… if one participates conventionally in a highly 
institutionalized social pattern, one does not take action, that is, intervene 
in a sequence, make a statement. If shaking hands is an institutionalized 
form of greeting, one takes action only by refusing to offer one’s hand. […] 
The point is a general one: one enacts institutions; one takes action by 
departing from them, not by participating in them …” (Jepperson 1991, 
148-149). 
This understanding of institutions as relatively self-activating social 
processes that reproduce themselves without any deliberate action provides 
a useful point of origin for a revised sociological analysis of institutions in, 
say, organised religious life. However, a third definition may add further 
perspective to the insights from Berger, Luckmann and Jepperson. 
American sociologist and institutional theorist, W. Richard Scott, has in his 
third edition of Institutions and Organisations from 2008 set out to give an 
omnibus definition that would incorporate perspectives from the two 
previous definitions, but also add to an analytical framework for 
approaching institutions and organisations more generally (Scott 2008). 
After a review of early institutionalism and the foundations of neo-
institutional theory, Scott gives his broad definition as an attempt to 
‘encompass a variety of arguments’ and to ‘identify the analytical 
elements’ of institutions. Thus, “Institutions are comprised of regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (Scott 
2008, 48). 
While Scott calls this his definition and refers to it as such, it seems he 
has given something rather like a statement of three constituent elements, 
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which he investigates further. He comes closer to an actual statement of 
what institutions are in the subsequent paragraph, where it becomes clear 
that “institutions are multifaceted, durable social structures made up of 
symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources” (Ibid.). Almost 
like an homage to Durkheim, Weber and Marx in turn, the durable social 
structures that are institutions draw on the symbolic, the socially active and 
the material. However, it is the feature of stability and meaning provided to 
social life that is the focus of Scott’s definition of institutions. They are 
relatively resistant, enduring and stable and they continuously provide 
meaning to the social life around them. Scott agrees with Berger and 
Luckmann and Jepperson in the observation of enduring meaning and he 
acknowledges that institutions exhibit these properties by reference to 
reproductive processes in addition to supportive behaviour and resources. 
However, Scott’s claim is that these processes themselves are set in motion 
by the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive elements that 
remain the key ‘facets’ or pillars of institutions (Scott 2008, 49). 
Notwithstanding the three regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements, Scott is very close to the understanding of institutions as 
provided by Anthony Giddens in The Constitution of Society from 1984, 
saying, “institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social 
life … giving ‘solidity’ [to social system] across time and space” (Giddens 
1984, 24). Giddens is not concerned with institutions as such, but rather 
with defining them in opposition to action they are the frames, which 
provide the structure of social systems. 
The three pillars are Scott’s original contribution to institutional theory, 
which itself is a construct drawn from the theoretical literature and 
collected into an analytical framework that maps the trends within existing 
research and guides future endeavours. Being regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive the three pillars form a continuum from the legally 
enforced to the taken for granted (Scott 2008, 50-51). In his definition these 
three elements draw together divergent perspectives that need to be looked 
at both independently and in conjunction. Drawing up a dense table of 
constituent elements, Scott analyse each pillar in turn from the perspective 
of how it warrants compliance, how it creates order, the mechanisms, 
logics and indicators of each, the affect it has in social life and the basis of 
legitimacy upon which the institution draws. The table is reproduced in part 
below for the sake of reference as each of the principal dimensions is of 
great interest to the analytical chapters in this thesis. The complete table 
holds further reference to various arguments and assumptions in the 
literature, but the five dimensions included are the most significant for 
understanding institutions. 
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Table 2.1 “The three pillars of institutions,” after Scott (2008, 51).  
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-
grantedness, shared 
understanding 
Basis of 
order 
Regulative rules Binding 
expectations 
Constitutive 
schema 
Basis of 
legitimacy 
Legally 
sanctioned 
Morally governed Recognizable, 
culturally supported 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Affect Fear of guilt vs. 
innocence 
Shame vs. honour Certainty / 
confusion 
  
The regulative pillar informs those institutions that constrain and regularize 
behaviour. The regulatory process and systems are seen as those that 
govern society by expedience. Scott quotes economic historian and Nobel 
laureate Douglass North for holding institutions as ‘perfectly analogous’ to 
the rules of the game and considering the formal written rules and the 
unwritten codes of conduct as the basic regulatory instruments (North 
1990, 4; Scott 2008, 52). The economic systems, the legal systems and 
many of the rules, governances and by-laws that by statute and measures 
govern our lives are very much institutions of society. A legislative body 
that holds jurisdiction and gives laws according to established principles is 
the principal agent or organisation to reproduce the regulative institutions. 
Control, coercion and legal sanctions are the principal powers that maintain 
and support the regulative institutions. Equally, the legal instrument is 
sought to enable and empower constituents and actively reproduce the 
existing order in society. The normative power that the regulative pillar 
holds is embedded both in this coercive power and in the enabling powers. 
Scott warns against conflating the functions and instrumentality of law with 
the normative and cognitive dimensions that are also part of the socio-legal 
complex of law and regulation. Law is so much more than a mere 
instrument (Scott 2008, 54).  
Scott sums up his understanding of the regulative view of institutions, 
saying, “A stable system of rules, whether formal or informal, backed by 
surveillance and sanctioning power that is accompanied by feelings of fear 
/ guilt or innocence / incorruptibility is one prevailing view of institutions” 
(Scott 2008, 54). The regulative norm will affect and delimit a social body 
into a dichotomy of two groups, namely the guilty and the innocent. As we 
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shall see with the two other institutional pillars, despite the name that Scott 
has given then, each of the three will, with reference to a norm, delimit and 
divide the social body into two primary categories. It seems this is to a 
lesser degree function of the institution and more a function of the 
particular norms that are constitutive to the pillar and regulative elements 
of institutions, but this is an argument that we will return to later in the 
section on norms in this chapter. 
The normative pillar and the corresponding trend in institutional theory 
focus on normative rules and the prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
dimensions of social life (Scott 2008, 54). The imperatives in play in this 
kind of institution are those social obligations, moral codes and the 
normative social statements and expectations of ‘how to behave’ and ‘what 
one ought to do’. These are social conventions and paradigms, which are 
those that define the group or collective. Values and other definitions of the 
‘good,’ the ‘right’ and the ‘beautiful’ morally govern these groups. By 
socially sanctioning and enforcing the collective identifiers, standards are 
erected and institutionalised.  
Like the regulatory institutions, the normative both constrain and enable 
social action and do so through the logic of the acceptable and the 
appropriate. Violating the values of the group and thereby trespassing on 
the protective norms, the repercussion and sanctions are disgrace or shame 
(Scott 2008, 55-56). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, from a 
sociological perspective, there is little difference between the regulative 
and the normative as one seems to be a representation of the other. 
Normative institutions regulate behaviour and regulatory institutions 
proclaim a normative order.  
The cultural-cognitive pillar of institution theorists, which by Scott’s 
account include Clifford Geertz, Peter L. Berger, Paul DiMaggio, Walter 
Powell and Scott himself, emphasise the social constructivist nature of 
social life and the construction of meaning by reference to the symbolic 
systems of culture (Scott 2008, 56-57). Quoting Scott, it is not difficult to 
see the kinship with Geertz and Berger and Luckmann: “Symbols – words, 
signs and gestures – shape the meanings we attribute to objects and 
activities. Meanings arise in interaction and are maintained and 
transformed as they are employed to make sense of an ongoing stream of 
happenings” (Scott 2008, 57). The taken-for-grantedness and low 
maintenance reproduction that speak of a high degree of institutionalisation 
would often fall under this pillar. The deeply rooted cultural habits and 
conventions of culture explain the compliance to this kind of institutions. A 
handshake or the wearing of ties is taken for granted in some cultures and 
strange in others. Intuitively we recognise these institutions as ‘the way we 
have always done things,’ and we recognise the fact that it may be 
arbitrarily constituted, but normal and accepted. These intuitions are more 
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deeply rooted than mere values and are governed by a logic of orthodoxy 
and, perhaps, of orthopraxy in that ‘this is how we do’ and ‘this is how we 
think.’ Scott concludes his introduction to the culturally-cognitive by 
saying, “a cultural-cognitive conception of institutions stresses the central 
role played by the socially mediated construction of a common framework 
of meaning” (Scott 2008, 59). The wording of the common framework of 
meaning is very significant for the understanding of the norms that tacitly 
operate behind these institutions. Oddity, confusion, cluelessness and 
perhaps even craziness characterise the trespassing of the culturally-
cognitive norms in play as opposed to the normal, taken for granted and 
confident certitude that operate here.  
Regarding the issues of this thesis and the progress of this chapter, it will 
be easy to identify the social constructivist and symbolically sensitive 
approach presented here as part of the cultural-cognitive pillar. Repeated 
reference has been made to Clifford Geertz, to Bourdieu, and to Berger & 
Luckmann. However – and this opens for a criticism of the three pillars that 
Scott presents – there is good reason to approach institutions without 
reproducing the sharp distinctions implied in Scott’s scheme.9  
While it may be fruitful to distinguish the three pillars from one another 
in analysis, there is good reason to make Scott keep his promise of 
approaching the pillars as aspects and facets of the same institutions (Scott 
2008, 50-51). It seemed the three aspects were more a distillation of the 
literature on institutions. In presenting the pillars, Scott gave order and 
structure to the research on institutions rather than defining institutions and 
actual difference in the institutions analysed. Scott’s definition only looked 
at these elements and did not distinguish and delimit institutions from what 
they are not, which remains one of the virtues of a definition. Therefore, for 
the purpose of understanding institutions in the analyses in this thesis, 
Scott’s three aspects of the institution should be considered against the two 
previous definitions given by Berger & Luckmann and Jepperson. This will 
also help summing up what we know about institutions so far and how it is 
relevant to the returning perspective on the religio-organisational field.  
Reading the three definitions together in the light of Bourdieu’s 
structuralism and his idea of capital as an expression of positions in a 
structured field, it becomes clear that the power of institutionalisation is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Religion, for example, operates within each of the three pillars. Berger may emphasise 
the World-construction and projection upon the sacred canopy (Berger 1967), while 
others may look to religion as governing the right and the good from a moral or ethical 
perspective, while still others look to religion for a deep institutionalisation of laws that 
govern society, economics and politics and direct the sanctions for the maintenance of 
these. This is clear in both a very secular society like the French, where the Burka has 
been outlawed, and in a very religious society like the Iranian, where the clergy legislate 
by authority of God. 
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positional power. When the upkeep and maintenance of a position is 
institutionalised, the capital needed for maintenance is greatly reduced. 
When Berger and Luckmann speak of the extraordinary power that 
institutions have in and of themselves, this power is in part relational, but 
also an expression of the capital needed for the taking of the position in the 
first place. The revision and refining of the Berger and Luckmann 
definition by Jepperson did away with the conscious action in upholding 
the positional power of institutionalisation. The reciprocal typification of 
habit was complimented by the ‘certain property or state’ that a social order 
or pattern had attained to be an institution. The maintaining in a particular 
reproduction process without action of a position, state or pattern, is 
institutionalisation. A highly institutionalised position is maintained at a 
very low cost and almost taken for granted. The power of being taken for 
grated is indeed extraordinary and must be established by an abundance of 
the social or symbolic capital and only when seen as legitimate. Taking 
Jepperson’s insight even further, it becomes clear that it takes an effort of 
action and power to vacate an institutionalised position within a social 
structure. Challenging and overtaking a social position requires not only 
adequate capital, but also legitimate power and deliberate action. By the 
capital required, the power and action needed to attain it, a measure of the 
stability of an institutionalised position in social life becomes clear. 
The duality of structure versus agency, which is clear throughout the 
institutional literature and presents itself in the disagreement between 
Berger and Luckmann’s definition on the one hand and Jepperson’s on the 
other, returns to Bourdieu’s overcoming of the opposition of objective and 
subjective. The resulting “structuralist constructivism or constructivist 
structuralism” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 11) returns us to the dual 
focus of both positions and relational structures. It reminds us that 
institutionalisation is a characteristic of the position held, not necessarily of 
the organisation that holds the position, and is thus contingent on the 
structures rather than the individual dispositions and habitus of the 
organisation.  
A final comment before looking further into organisations and 
organisational fields may be to reiterate the point that Jepperson made 
about institutionalisation and the process of turning into an institution. His 
argument in short was, “that institutionalisation best denotes a distinct 
social property or state, and that institutions should not be specifically 
identified, as they often are, with either cultural elements or a type of 
environmental effect” (Jepperson 1991, 144). Keeping in mind that 
institutions express a property or state of a social pattern that is 
characterised by a particular reproduction process, it becomes clear also 
why Scott keeps talking about pillars, aspects, elements and facets. He is 
describing these properties and not specifying their object. As such, it 
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seems Scott has more to say about laws, norms and symbols, rather than 
institutions specifically. This question of what institutions are a property or 
state of, is exactly what we need to keep in mind when looking firstly at 
organisation, but also in the final sections of this chapter at norms and 
symbols. We will see that the ability to convey stability, meaning and 
order, is why organisations, norms and symbols may be called institutions 
or rather are described as having institutional properties.  
2.3.2 Organisations, organisational theory and organisational 
environments  
Organisation studies and the theory of organisations have, to a certain 
extent, been co-opted by institutional theory. There is, however, good 
reason to try to distinguish these, as there is significant difference in certain 
crucial aspects such as the object of study, the methodology and the 
academic tradition.  
Taken at its very core, organisation can be understood by reference to its 
etymological origin. The word derives from Greek όργανον, meaning 
instrument, tool, or organ by which something is done and infers 
instrumentalisation for a specific goal or task (Liddell and Scott, 2002). As 
such, an organisation is an entity or social group, which solves tasks and 
reaches goals by a particular distribution of assignments. Organisation as a 
term or label can be used equally of the group of people, the ordering 
principles and the distribution of tasks and assignments.  
Many theorists of organisations have a management or administrative 
perspective on the study of organisations, but as organisational theory was 
consolidated during the first half of the 20th century, it became apparent 
that organisations could and should be approached from all sorts of 
disciplinary and methodological angles. American organisation theorist 
Mary Jo Hatch, in her Organisational Theory from 1997 argues that 
organisations must be understood in the intersection of the different spheres 
of life that contextualise these: “…organisations are usefully 
conceptualized as technologies, social structures, cultures, and physical 
structures that overlap and interpenetrate one another within the context of 
an environment …” (Hatch 1997, 15). These four spheres are the returning 
focus of her exposition of organisational theory and they represent the 
classical understanding of what managers of organisations need to account 
for in the ordering and distribution of the organisational body. 
Adding ‘environment’ as a crucial fifth factor or sphere, organisational 
theory moves forward into a much more nuanced understanding of how “… 
[the organisational environment] influences organizational outcomes by 
imposing constraints and demanding adaptation as the prize of survival …” 
(Hatch 1997, 63). Survival in the long run is the structural criteria of 
success for organisations in this perspective. The environment of an 
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organisation is a highly complex construct and is usually seen from the 
point of view of the organisation as something surrounding it. However, 
when orienting itself from within the environment, the organisation is 
biased and subjective in its view of its own position in the structures. 
Although it may be needed to do so for the purpose of analysis, it is 
counterproductive to distinguish sharply between the organisation and its 
environment. Rather, the organisation is embedded in the environment and 
remains contingent upon the conditions, change and complexity of the 
environment (Hatch 1997, 75-77).  
In her view of the environment that embeds organisations, Hatch follows 
the neo-institutional approaches introduced in the previous sections. 
Describing above organisation theory as co-opted by neo-institutionalism, 
reference is made to the research focus of neo-institutionalists on how the 
environment puts demands and requirements on the organisations. 
Organisational studies don institutionalism in the recognition that 
institutionalisation, as an organisational strategy, is a very effective way to 
conform to the demands and expectations of society. The low maintenance 
reproduction and recalibration of stability and meaning that is 
institutionalisation is by definition conformity and synchronicity with the 
governing social order. The risk of not responding to environmental 
demands or the risk of losing social, political or legal legitimacy is a very 
real danger to organisations. “Organisations adapt, not only to the strivings 
of their internal groups, but to the values of the external society” (Hatch 
1997, 83-84). The governing rationality is that of conformity and tuning in 
to the institutional environment. It is not surprising, then, that Hatch and 
much of contemporary organisational theory subscribes to the incarnations 
of institutional theory as expressed by W. Richard Scott and others (Powell 
& DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1992; Hatch 1997, 83-87). 
While Hatch frame the organisational environment as different sectors 
that include the social, cultural, legal, political, economic, technological 
and physical factors (Hatch 1997, 67-69), Scott similarly understand 
environment as sectors, but frame these as institutional influences that 
include regulatory structures, government agencies, laws and courts, 
professions, interest groups and mobilized public opinion (Scott 1987; 
Scott & Meyer 1991: 117). The high complexity, inconsistency and 
unpredictability of organisational environments have massive impact on 
organisations and the institutionalisation process (Scott 2008: 159-160). 
For institutional theorists and analysts this explains the difference and 
variety of institutions. As a consequence and in order to reduce the 
complexity, the environmental impact on organisations can be seen at the 
level of the mentioned sectors rather than at the whole width of the general, 
‘big picture’ environment (Hatch 1997: 67-73).  
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As a result, Scott and fellow Stanford colleague John W. Meyer argue in 
favour of applying societal sectors as the analytical focus and prefers to 
look at groups of organisations under one scope. These societal sectors are 
defined as “… (1) a collection of organisations operating in the same 
domain, as identified by the similarity of their services, products or 
functions, (2) together with those organisations that critically influence the 
performance of the focal organisations; for example, major suppliers and 
customers, owners and regulators, funding sources and competitors …” 
(Scott & Meyer 1991; 117). These sectors incorporate much of what is 
traditionally understood in economic theory as industry with its kinship of 
products and services, but Scott and Meyer see the societal sectors as much 
wider. They encompass different types of organisations and include many 
of the institutions that are secondary to the focus organisations. All 
manners of supporting, enabling, framing, and constraining institutions are 
likely to be included in the sector environment. This all adds to the 
institutional environments of the organisation, which Scott and Meyer 
define as “… characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to 
which the individual organizations must conform if they are to receive 
support and legitimacy. The requirements may stem from regulatory 
agencies authorized by the nation-state, from professional or trade 
associations, from generalized belief systems that define how specific types 
of organisations are to conduct themselves …” (Scott and Meyer 1991, 
123; also, Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Returning to our recurring reference to Bourdieu and to an analytical 
strategy of the religio-organisational field, it becomes clear that 
organisations are to be understood as holding a position within the structure 
of the surrounding environment. An organisation is understood as biased 
and subjective in its positioning and tries to make sense of the structures 
around it from its point of view. This exercise is the institutionalisation 
strategy analysed by neo-insitutionalists. The language from Bourdieu 
provides additional understanding of the internalisation of the 
environmental structures and culture. The organisation may be seen to have 
a certain habitus as it navigates the structures of the environment (Scott 
2008: 42). In the sections above, habitus was understood as the lasting and 
transposable dispositions, which functions as perception, appreciation and 
action by – in this case – the organisation. Habitus allows the organisation 
to structure its behaviour and appropriate its strategies contingent on the 
environment as a sort of internalization of society and culture (Ibid.). In the 
paragraphs above, the societal sector was seen as the collective of both the 
organisations that are similar in production and service and the 
organisations that support or limit this production or service. Added to that 
was the institutional environments, which were defined as the rules, 
principles and requirements that govern the possible actions of the 
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organisation. Taken together, the societal sectors as analytical subject-
matter and the institutional environment as the structuring principles, we 
begin to see the outline of a particular field of positions taken, positions to 
be taken and structures and relations in between them. This is analogous to 
the religious field, but with a distinct focus on organisations and with a 
different set of institutional logics and structures.   
2.3.3 Organisational fields 
Research on organisational fields is integral to neo-institutionalism and 
American institutional sociologist Paul DiMaggio gave one of the first 
American readings of Bourdieu in a 1979 review essay of two translations 
into English, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu 
1977A) and Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu 1977B), in which 
DiMaggio introduces Bourdieu’s concepts and theories to new American 
readers (DiMaggio 1979). He relates the important aspects loyally, while 
still giving his own critical reading. DiMaggio centres on field as “the 
critical metaphor in Bourdieu’s work,” as “field refers to both the totality of 
actors and organizations involved in an arena of social and cultural 
production and the dynamic relationships amongst them” (Ibid., 1462). In 
the same breath as he accounts for Bourdieu’s understanding of fields as 
relatively autonomous entities that operate according to their own internal 
logics and dynamics of conflict, DiMaggio gives similar properties to 
institutions embedded as agents within the fields stressing that the 
structuring logic of the fields govern the institutions (Ibid., 1468).  
This demonstrates a plausible and operational correlation between the 
positions in the field and the field itself. This shows not only how 
DiMaggio is thinking in Bourdieu’s analytical terms, but also suggests that 
much of the early neo-institutional theory on environment and the 
organisational field is influenced by Bourdieu. DiMaggio follows Bourdieu 
and regards the organizational field in that he proposes to think of it “… in 
the dual sense in which Bourdieu uses ‘champ,’ to signify both common 
purpose and an arena of strategy and conflict” (DiMaggio 1983, 149). 
Furthermore, he paraphrases Bourdieu referring to fields as “… both the 
totality of actors and organisations involved in an arena of social or cultural 
productions and the dynamic relationships among them” (DiMaggio 1979: 
1463).  
DiMaggio is indeed one of the early adopters of Bourdieu’s thoughts on 
the American scene. Although he warns against the possible transformation 
of the theories as they enter American sociology and against a productive 
misreading, he is himself guilty of such ‘creative treason’ (DiMaggio 1979, 
1472). He stresses a focus on organisations and in Bourdieu’s name directs 
his fellow sociologists to ‘inspect the relationship between social structure 
and symbolic production’ in the diverse fields of prevailing research (Ibid., 
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1471). In addition, he places his own ‘cultural-organisational’ approach to 
the interplay of relationships between organisations and their culture within 
the organisational field (Ibid. 1472). In his review of Bourdieu it could 
even be suggested that the early strokes of the ‘new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis’ (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) are visible and that 
Bourdieu’s framework in his concept of field is indeed transformed by 
American organizational theorists. This is at least how Scott reads the 
influence (Scott 2008, 16). Important here, however, is that the concept of 
field holds such inspiring and fruitful analytical properties and is equally 
ambiguously defined that it is both adaptable and applicable. The 
institutional processes that define the struggles over capital and influence in 
the field can be shown to work equally well both inside organizations and 
amongst them, both structuring them and making them structuring agents 
(DiMaggio 1979; 1471-2; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Powell & DiMaggio 
1991, 25-26; Scott 2008, 16). 
As Hatch suggested it is in the organisational field that we find the 
environment of the organisation with all its contingencies and demands. In 
1983, DiMaggio and Powell defined the organisational field as “…those 
organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of 
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 143), while in 1995, Scott defines the 
organisational field as “a community of organisations that partakes of a 
common meaning system and whose participants interacts more frequently 
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott 
1995, 56; Scott 2008, 86). From an analytical point of view, organisational 
fields present themselves as a considerable complex. As already suggested 
we are moving into the inter-organisational level – as opposed to intra-
organisational – of analysis and focus on how individual organisations 
navigate and position themselves (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 2).  
In a recent reading of Bourdieu and the applicability of his theories for 
organizational analysis from 2008, Mustafa Emirbayer and Victoria 
Johnson promote ‘a relational agenda for organizational research,’ which 
aspires to bring a study the organisational fields back to a closer relation 
with Bourdieu’s own concept of field. In fairness, the field concept that 
DiMaggio referenced in 1979 has later been given additional specification, 
and in the Chicago conversations from the winter of 1987/88, the relational 
nature of the field was given emphasis (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 94-
115).  
Emirbayer and Johnson stressed the importance of the relationalism of 
the field and thus gave an understanding of organisational fields that was 
much closer to Bourdieu’s own, defined the organisational fields from the 
point of interest of the organisations rather than the theorists, stating 
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“Organisations must always be situated within the matrices of relations, the 
relational contexts, within which they are constituted in sometimes unseen 
or unrecognizable ways and with which they are ever dialogically engaged” 
(Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 5) and went further, drawing on both the 
DiMaggio and Powell emphasis as well as the Scott definition,  
 
“An organizational field includes not just one type of organization (e.g., all car 
manufacturers), but all the organizations that play one role or another in the 
activity in question (e.g., car manufacturers and steel suppliers, dealer, consumers, 
insurers, and local and federal government agencies regulating the manufacture 
and operation of cars). Because the institutions governing a given organization’s 
structure and practices are often influenced by a wide variety of other 
organizations – a variety not adequately captured by other organization-theoretic 
concepts – the concept of organizational field has been of particular value to neo-
institutionalist scholars” 
(Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 2-3). 
 
To Emirbayer and Johnson, the return of focus in neo-institutional theory to 
the influence by Bourdieu gives a central place to the social conditions of 
the power relations in play between organisations. The consequence for 
organisational and institutional theory is that the argument of the difference 
in positions of structure and the stances taken by individual organisations 
must be taken seriously and holds crucial analytical value. As mentioned in 
previous sections, the field consists of nodes or positions in organisational 
space, which taken together with the forces between them, are the very 
structure of the field. The relational nature of the study of the 
organisations’ fields thus focuses not on the actual organisations, but the 
relations between them. Emirbayer and Johnson stress this point: “… any 
field – one consisting, for example, of two or more organisations – must be 
conceptualized as a configuration of relationships not between the concrete 
entities themselves – e.g., the specific organisations at hand – but rather, 
between the nodes those entities happen to occupy within the given 
network or configuration” (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008, 6).  
This lesson is of great significance to the analysis of the organisational 
field. Bourdieu (1993) stresses the importance of not looking at the 
arbitrary holders of positions but rather looking at the structural 
relationship between the dominant and the dominated. An analysis that 
mistakes structural positions for the organisations holding them will expose 
itself to the accidental particularities and subjectivity of the organisations 
and not necessarily learn anything about the structural powers at play.  
As have been touched upon, there are two analytical difficulties to 
consider when trying to make sense of the organisational field that informs 
any analytical strategy. The first is to delimit and define the field, which is 
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done by reference to the logic of the field, and the second is to define the 
basic principles of division within the field.  
The first difficulty in making sense of the organisational field – as with 
any field – is defining its commonalities and its boundaries. In such an 
endeavour, we are returned to the insights from Bourdieu and can benefit 
from the much closer reading of his influence by Emirbayer and Johnson. 
The common logic of the field, or rather, the implicit agreement that the 
struggle of being in the field is worth the effort is what grants access to the 
field. For businesses and others that are the subject of most established 
organisational theory, access to the organisational field is granted by the 
struggle for survival and success. The logic can be stated tautologically in 
that it defines the premise. For example, the quote attributed to Milton 
Friedman – “the business of business is business” – becomes the doxa or 
implicit belief of the field of competitive business to the exclusion of all 
other logic (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 98). The field by this trait only 
exists so far as this principle governs and “… the boundaries of the field 
extent only so far as the power relations – field effects – that are 
themselves constitutive of that field hold sway” (Emirbayer & Johnson 
2008, 7). For the analyst considering the organisational field, the task is to 
give language to the doxology of the field and then investigate the extent of 
its effect. This must be done individually for each field considered and 
must draw from empirical data. This is the only way to identify the limits 
of the field. For a generic game of cards, for example, this logic would be 
that there is something to win that is worth the effort and the risk and all 
players in the field agree. Seen from a statistical or a strategic point of 
view, playing the game is not worth it to most of the players, however, but 
such perspective does not enter into the field as it defies the logic of the 
field.  
The second analytical step in to uncover the basic principles of division 
within the field. Any structure and any competition imaginable originate 
with differentiation. Without difference there would be no competition and 
nothing to win. When the logic in the organisational field has been 
identified, “one seeks to identify the most pertinent indicators, properties, 
or principles of division within the field” (Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 8). 
This basic principle of division in the field requires, according to Bourdieu, 
a “system of criteria that could account for the set of meaningful and 
significant differences that objectively separate [entities in the field] or, if 
you will, enable the set of relevant differences among [them] to arise…” 
(Bourdieu 1996, 232; Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 7-8). At the risk of 
oversimplification, there is a need in the field both for something to fight 
about or compete over and for this ‘system of criteria’ that establishes the 
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basic principles of division in the field, which is crucial.10 From this basic 
principle of division, the dominant will dominate the dominated and thus 
the outline of a tautology appears that will define the hierarchy of the field. 
Of this tautology normativity originates and thus within an organisational 
field, “… the dominant firms exert their pressure on the dominated firms 
and their strategies: they define the regularities and sometimes the rules of 
the game” (Bourdieu 2005: 195). Defining the rules of the game and with it 
the normativity of the field is perhaps the strongest position of power in the 
field and will introduce a meta-game within the game by which inclusion 
and exclusion operates. It changes the nature of the stakes and the values of 
the capital in play and will ultimately qualify some and disqualify others. In 
the end, the “participants in a field … constantly work to differentiate 
themselves from their closest rivals in order to reduce competition and to 
establish a monopoly over a particular subsector of the field” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992: 100). Setting up criteria and establishing difference by 
reference to a governing norm is one of the most significant institutional 
strategies an organisation can apply. 
For the intents and purposes of devising an analytical strategy of the 
religio-organisational field, it seems clear that there is firstly a need to 
identify the governing logic empirically within the religio-organisational 
field, guided perhaps by the symbolic-interpretive insights from Geertz and 
Bourdieu. Secondly and in addition to identifying the logic empirically, we 
must also establish an operational understanding of norms that is applicable 
across the religious and the organisational fields.  
 
2.4 Norms 
2.4.1 Introduction and a little context to the present study of norms 
If Bourdieu created the frame and structure of the field with a strong focus 
on the relations between positions, and Geertz nuanced the dual aspects of 
the models operating within the structures in this field, then it will take a 
Michel Foucault to develop the power of the relations so crucial in 
Bourdieu’s structuration and it will take a Francois Ewald to develop the 
functional aspects of norms. Although relationalism is a strong trend in 
Bourdieu’s thinking about the functions of the field, it is in need of 
adaption and supplementation by Foucault and Ewald.  
The striking thing about norms is that they seem key both in Geertz’ 
model, in Bourdieu’s structuration of difference and in the institutional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This logic resonates Durkheim and many others after him, in that his entire 
sociological theory of knowledge rests on the basic criterion of distinction between 
sacred and profane. The basic categories of thought are the origins of knowledge 
(Durkheim 1912/1995, 17), and thus of differentiation. 
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order as Scott presented it above. As implicit forces in a Western 
understanding of religions, they were unmasked in Asad’s criticism and for 
the purpose of the religio-organisational field in present day Denmark, 
Germany and England the chapters to come will explore their role further. 
To illustrate this perspective, it seems the core of normative contestation of 
the increased attention to Islam is the presence, position and character of 
Shari’a in the West. As will be unfolded further in Chapter Seven, Shari’a 
is usefully understood as the hub of Islamic norms and every argument 
against Islam in Europe seems to at one point or the other to return to a 
criticism of the strict demands and radical punishments imposed by Shari’a. 
Whether this is a correct understanding of Shari’a and Islamic norms or 
not, every defence of Islam returns to the position that there is no Islam 
without Shari’a, and that Shari’a is not something to dispose of, but is the 
true way of life for Muslims (Ramadan 2004). Thus it can be argued that a 
survey of conflicting legal, social and religious cases in Europe would 
show that presently the most tension occurs when Shari’a is identified or 
thought to be involved.11 This is seen in the plethora of cases concerning 
the headscarves, it is seen in the question of prayer and work relations, but 
most significantly it is seen in the cases of the Muslim arbitration and 
dispute resolution institutions and the institutions of Shari’a councils, as 
they are popularly referred to.  
Without unfolding this argument further at the present stage, the core of 
the problem is the perception of Shari’a from a Western discourse point of 
view. As will be demonstrated, this is the realisation that the Islamic norms 
are very different. They are so firstly in that legal, social and religious 
norms in Islam cannot be meaningfully separated from one another, 
secondly in that they cannot without serious effort be understood 
comparatively to the concepts of norms that Western legal and sociological 
traditions apply, and thirdly, they cannot without political, social and 
religious effort and understanding on our behalf be made commensurable 
with Western traditions (March 2009). This is crucial in order to 
understand and distinguish the potential in Shari’a both for conflict but 
certainly also for conflict resolution. Naturally, this leaves a series of 
questions about what Shari’a is; who can interpret and re-interpret true 
Shari’a and what parts should be given preference in resolving conflicts of 
norms? This includes both issues internal to Islam and Shari’a, but as in the 
cases mentioned above, it remains highly relevant in the encounter with 
Western ideas or concepts of conduct, belief and justice.  
Before any of these questions can be answered in the chapters to come, a 
deeper understanding of norms in relation to the religio-organisational field 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The RELIGARE project, amongst others, have set out to survey socio-legal conflict 
and tensions in six different European countries. Cf. Vinding & Christoffersen 2012 and 
Bader 2011.  
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is needed. The section unfolds in two overall steps that will distinguish 
different understandings and technologies of norms within a given 
relational field. On one hand, sanctioned norms are introduced as legal and 
social norms that wield a power that has been conferred unto it. On the 
other hand, norms can be seen to hold power in their own right by being 
identifiers of the collective and institutions of the commons. Initially, 
however, this twofold distinction is traced back to Durkheim as this is 
where both Bourdieu and Foucault find their sociological point of origin in 
regards to the institutionality and technology of norms. 
2.4.2 “What, then, is a norm?”   
In his article “Norms, Discipline and the Law” from 1990, Francois Ewald 
half way through his argument asks enigmatically, “What, then, is a 
norm?” (Ewald 1990, 154). He does so because, following Foucault, his 
endeavour is to make us rethink the nature and impact of norms, as it seems 
that normalisation is the regulatory paradigm of the modern era (Foucault 
1980, 135). Under the logic of bio-power, the force of the normal holds 
exceptional power by virtue of the public nature of common norms and 
protects against the different and ‘uncommon,’ as well as holding a capital 
of distributed risk (Ewald 1991, 202). As will be explored in the present 
section, the history of research into the power of norms establish these as 
two-fold, where some norms seem to be sanctioned and others do not. For 
the benefit of the analytical strategy applied in the chapters to come, an 
operational definition and typology of norms will be developed that goes 
beyond the limits of a particular discipline.  
There is clear common ground in the predominant understanding of 
norms as they constitute, ”... cultural phenomena that prescribe and 
proscribe behaviour in specific circumstances” (Hechter & Opp 2001: xi). 
Norms play an integral part in the construction and regulation of individual 
and collective social behaviour between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. As such, both 
can be said to address issues regarding the implications of ‘Ought’ rather 
the statements of ‘Is’ (von Wright 1963). Roughly stated, however, this is 
the limit of the consensus in the literature. Serious disagreement arises 
from the logical, theoretical and empirical implications of these two 
concepts that question the language, the nature and function of norms.  
While much of the contemporary understanding of norms in 
organisational sociology and neo-institutionalism goes back to William G. 
Sumner and his research on folkways and mores, to Charles H. Cooley and 
his primary social groups or perhaps at a later date to Talcott Parsons and 
his system of norms that regulate the relations of individuals to one 
another, there is significant reason to take a starting point with Durkheim 
before exploring contemporary sociology of norms (Mortensen 1990, 97-
106). With Durkheim originates the analytical sensitivity that distinguishes 
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a societal level and an inter-subjective level, which is crucial for a 
sociologically operative understanding of the moral imperatives and 
sanctions usually associated with norms.  
In The Determination of Moral Facts originally from 1906 (2010), 
Durkheim ventures an investigation into a qualified understanding of norms 
as seen from the point of view of morality (Durkheim 1906 [2010], 16). 
Although the authority on morality and normative imperative at the time of 
Durkheim remained Emanuel Kant, who stressed duty and obligation in 
adherence to a normative command, Durkheim insists that the normative 
power of morality is not exhausted by the concept of duty (Ibid.). 
Durkheim orders his concept of norms from the question, “by what 
characteristics can we recognize and distinguish moral facts?” (Durkheim 
1906 [2010], 20). The answer he gives is in the violation of the rules of 
conduct and by the consequences that follow. “The violation of a rule 
generally brings unpleasant consequences to the agent” (Ibid.). In this 
regard, Durkheim distinguishes between two different kinds of 
consequences of violation – one that automatically and mechanically 
follows from the act of violation and one that does not:  
 
“… (i) The first results mechanically from the act of violation. If I violate a rule of 
hygiene that orders me to stay away from infection, the result of this act will 
automatically be disease. The act, once it has been performed, sets in motion the 
consequences, and by analysis of the act we can know in advance what the result 
will be. (ii) When, however, I violate the rule that forbids me to kill, an analysis of 
my act will tell me nothing. I shall not find inherent in it the subsequent blame or 
punishment.  
There is complete heterogeneity between the act and its consequence. It is 
impossible to discover analytically in the act of murder the slightest notion of 
blame. The link between act and consequence is here a synthetic one. Such 
consequences attached to acts by synthetic links I shall call sanctions ” 
(Durkheim 1906 [2010], 20) 
 
These remarks are the origins of Durkheim’s idea of non-sanctioned and 
sanctioned norms by which he distinguishes between those that follow 
analytically from the violation and those that follows by consequence of a 
synthetic link. Analysis of the immoral act itself will not reveal any idea of 
punishment. There is no necessary consequence from performing an act 
and the sanction that follows, which is why Durkheim points to the social 
fact that sanction occurs because there is a relation between the rule that 
forbids an act and the act itself (Ibid.). He explains further, “it is because 
there is a pre-established rule, and the breach is a rebellion against this rule, 
that a sanction is entailed” (Ibid., 21). The moral rules are the synthetic 
norms with a socially established relation to the collective, while other 
norms, when violated reveal themselves as automatic in their result. 
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From this initial exploration of the moral sanctions of norms, Durkheim 
concludes that moral rules and norms by their relational result must take 
the collective as its object. The individual relations will not do, and “… 
there remains as the only possible object of moral activity the sui generis 
collective being formed by the plurality of the individuals associated to 
form the group …” (Durkhiem 1906 [2010], 25). As such, society is a 
moral authority that constitutes a moral power that in objective relations 
govern the lives of individuals.  
Durkheim adds, as way of bridging the understanding of the Kantian 
emphasis of command and obligatory duty, that there is indeed in morality 
and in the power of norms also a crucial element of desirability. He thus 
not only operates with negative sanctions such as blame and punishment in 
a subjective domination of the violator, but also positive sanctions that 
result in praise and honour and serves to promote disciplinary self-restraint 
(Ibid., 21-22).  
With these very few observations from Durkheim, the influence on both 
Bourdieu and Foucault shows itself. The structural nature of objective 
relations that governs the individual has influenced Bourdieu and the 
normative and disciplinary power of the norms are early precursors to 
Foucault’s bio-power and governmentality. As opposed to the power of 
force of the sanctioned system, Foucault points to the paradigmatic power 
of normalisation that ”has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize 
rather than display itself in its murderous splendor” (Foucault 1980, 144). 
Durkheim’s distinction between the synthetic and the analytic 
consequences to violation of a norm suggests that there is a critical 
difference between sanctioned and non-sanctioned norms. As will be seen, 
legal norms and social norms are well within the parameters of the 
synthetically sanctioned norms, but as Foucault and in turn Ewald develop 
the disciplinary power of normalisation, the contours of a non-sanctioned 
norm appear – a norm without any sanction beyond that of mere deviance. 
This is emphasised by reference to norms as common denominators and as 
symbols that identify the collective.  
2.4.3 Legal norms 
The first of the two established concepts of norms that are synthetic and 
sanctioned are legal norms. These can be explained to be positive 
commands, imperatives, ought-statements or – in a philosophical sense – 
performative utterances or speech acts (Searle 1969). The legal norms are 
deliberately designed with a clear regulatory purpose in mind and they are 
written and formalised by being explicitly sanctioned (Hechter & Opp 
2001: xi). However, the most significant feature of legal norms are their 
systemity as they are understood in the extensive legal scholarship by Hans 
Kelsen (1881 – 1973) and the generation of legal scholars who came after 
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him.12 Kelsen had set out to refine a Pure Theory of Law (1934/1960) that 
centres on the positively established norms within an orderly system. These 
positive norms are basically either duty-imposing or power-conferring, and 
derive their validity from a basic norm (Freeman 1994: 274, 280).  
The idea of purity of law rests on its sole reference to a basic and 
stronger norm and nothing outside of this norm. This is, therefore, in sharp 
contrast to moral or religious norms that have recourse to some subjective 
basis (Hartney 1990: xxi) and to social norms that are unwritten, irregular, 
and informal which makes these unfit and invalid for a legal system that 
champions equality before the law, accountability, transparency and the 
rule of law.13 The social norms will be elaborated on further in the section.  
The basic distinction between norms as commandments, imperatives or 
basically duty-imposing and norms as power-conferring has to do with the 
key question of validity. In order for norms to be valid laws – that is legally 
enacted and enforceable laws – they must be backed by secondary rules or 
norms that are equally important parts of the legal system (Hart 1961: 92; 
Woodman 2009, 136). These are the rules of change, rules of adjudication 
and rules of recognition. The first two prescribe the proper and just use of 
power and how to enact new laws without revolution and how to punish 
crimes. These are the power-conferring norms that enable one norm to 
sanction another, that is, be imposable by the judiciary and enactable by the 
executive. This is an important part of the systematic nature of legal orders 
and illustrates how the individual norm and its incentive are disjoined 
within the system. It is not the singular law or norm that you violate that 
secures punishment, but it is the secondary sanction. We will return to this 
when looking at social norms, because here is a notable difference. The 
third kind of secondary rules are the rules of recognition. These are unique 
in that they distinguish themselves not by conferring power, but by not 
doing it (Hart 1961: 97). The core of the rules of recognition is that the 
legal institutions recognize the validity and due process of the individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See amongst others, H. L. A. Hart, Concept of Law from 1961, and Joseph Raz, 
Concept of Legal System from 1971. For a fuller discussion, see Vinding 2009, in 
particular Chapter Two on Regulation as Governance.  
13 For good measure, there is reason to hold that positive law is not the only authority 
enforceable by courts. The argument of legal pluralism remains that courts may 
adjudicate on the basis of moral and religious orders and social customs. Discussing 
English legal practice and the conflict that arises from the integration of foreign legal 
cultures, Woodman reiterates an argument in favour of law as ’social phemomenon’ 
(Woodman 2009, 137). Of significance for distinction between legal norms and social 
norms, Woodman argues in favour of a normative recognition of valid norms rather 
than institutional recognition that limits recognition to the critieria of the production of 
the laws. For a detailed discussion, see Woodman 2009 and for additional aspects of 
legal practice and cultural diversity Grillo, Ballard, Ferrari, Hoekema, Maussen and 
Shah 2009. 
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law in applying it. The same is true when laws that are recognized as just 
do not result in civil disobedience or non-conformity. The community and 
the subjects of the law will adhere to a law it if the judiciary maintains its 
legality, and the judiciary will maintain a law that the subjects of the law 
recognizes as legitimate.  
One of the most interesting observations about the legal norms returns to 
their positivity. In being explicitly enacted to impose duties on behalf of the 
greater collective and in being recognised as justly so, the legal-systematic 
understanding of norms entail that they have constitutive and constructive 
power. The examples of this are plenty and draw upon the very reason for 
having laws. It is clear that the legal norms of a common legal system 
under the same jurisdiction functions to bring together the community and 
protect it from destructive forces. By upholding legitimate justice the polity 
may build stronger relations within the community. Legal norms become 
tools or building blocks that construct, maintain and perfect a community. 
This feature of law is the key feature in any constitutional theory of society 
and maintains law as both a social construction and socially constructed.14 
2.4.4 Social norms 
By contrast, the second approach to sanction and synthetic norms concerns 
the social norms. These norms are understood to be spontaneous, unwritten 
and informally sanctioned, in the sense that it is unclear and difficult to 
predict how sanctioning will occur (Hechter & Opp 2001: xi). The social 
sciences terminology applied to norms is very diverse and the versatility of 
the language makes it even more difficult to pin down. Thus, customs, 
conventions, roles, rules, principles, identities, institutions and cultures 
(Horne 2001: 3) are all terms applied in describing or referring to norms or 
normativity.  
Within the social sciences, one of the more predominant approaches to 
the study of norms is focused on behaviour and behavioural structures. In 
the sociological and psychological literature, this approach to 
understanding how groups and individuals influenced by norms is heralded 
most significantly by Michael Hechter (2001, 2004) and Christine Horne 
(2001, 2009) and others. The sentiment is that norms are rules that enjoy 
some sort of social consensus and that this consensus is enforced by social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In a Danish context, the Codex Holmiensis ‘Code of Jutland’ from 1241 dictates that 
With law shall land [nation] be built. [...] And if all men would keep [be content with] 
what is theirs, and let others enjoy the same rights, there would be no need of [a] law. 
[...] If the land had no law, then he would have the most who could grab [by force] the 
most.” (From the Royal Library, http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/manus/41/, accessed 
13 January 2013). For a fuller discussion of the constitutional theory of such a social-
constructivist view, see Friedrich Hayek The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, 
Legislation and Liberty (1973).  
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sanctions (Horne 2009: 401). Horne and others (Bendor & Swistak, 2001: 
1403ff.; Coleman 1990; Giddens et al 2009) agree that indeed the essential 
component in the study of norms is sanctioning. Bendor and Swistak note 
that the nature of sanctioning is integral to the ‘social’ of the social norms. 
First of all, if there were no triggers of punishment, there would not be any 
incentive, and secondly, the execution of punishment is not necessarily 
between the two parties directly involved, but can be and often is extended 
to third parties (Bendor & Swistak, 2001: 1404).15 It is this involvement of 
the third parties that qualify norms as ‘quintessentially social.’  
However, the complexity and indeed the very nature of social behaviour 
suggests that there may be norms without sanctions, or, more precisely, that 
there are some norms that have power even when not violated and which 
do not incur sanctions when violated. We may call these norms natural, 
necessary, arbitrary or automatic. They are the basic social conventions and 
institutions that embody the very social itself such as the preference of right 
to left, or the names or associations of colours, or even the names we give 
things. Although this is not the place for philosophical speculations about 
the nature of these social and psychological phenomena, but it suggests that 
we need to think norms separately from their violations and sanctions and 
that we must explain the power of norms without reference to these. This 
way of thinking about norms is implicitly institutional and brings the taken-
for-grantedness and ‘banality’ of the social and religious institutions front 
and centre (Berger 1967; Woodhead 2011, 124-127).  
The relational nature of norms maintains that there is power and force in 
the relation itself. This is not controversial, but shows that both the legal 
and the social norms presented above are blind to the power of the norm 
itself. It seems that the individuals or groups who are depended on or 
constituent to the norms – that is those who are part of the legal or social 
system – do not necessarily experience the immediate independent power 
of norms beyond its sanctions. Nonetheless, this independent relational 
power of the norms is still present and can be observed once the 
perspective turns to those outside society or those outside the law, in an 
extra-systemic sense.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Although the economical aspects of sanctioning and any spin-off into game theory 
experimental modelling may prove very rewarding research, the concern of the present 
chapter is the continued reference to a third party. The concept of ’meta-norms’ in the 
social system and the secondary rules of the legal system seem to be somewhat akin. 
Both lead to, or presume, extra-systemic sanctions that are crucial to the strategic 
decisions within the system. A common language of power seen in the light of the 
Kelsian positivism may suggest that norm and power are two sides of the same coin 
(Bobbio 1998: 435; MacCormick 1998), and this will also explain the secondary nature 
of sanctions, as no ruler can rule through coercion alone (Weber 1978).  
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In addition to the two well-established approaches to norms presented 
above, three further approaches to norms present themselves. Focusing not 
on the individual or the group, but on the phenomenon of the entire society, 
there is a growing realization that society itself is not a given. This means 
that society is no longer something in itself, but a product of social 
ingenuity and the meaning and ideas we introduce as core constituent 
entities. Society is no different than the elements that compose it.  
These three approaches to norms present themselves as technologies of 
normalisation and instrumentalise the power of the norm itself in the 
construction of ‘common denominators’ (2.4.5), ‘instruments of 
examination’ (2.4.6) and ‘procedural management of risk’ (2.4.7).  
2.4.5 Norms as common denominators  
The ability to decide or to know what is good for society rests on or draws 
upon a basic structure of normativity in society. Therefore a profound 
understanding of the norms of a given society constitutes perhaps the first 
and basic precondition for the government of this society. Without norms 
or guidelines there would be no conductibility of conduct, and thus there 
would be neither order nor governance nor leadership. Therefore, the 
norms and the ability to manipulate and control norms is a returning basis 
for government. This is exactly the realisation that arises from a concept of 
norms that is separate from the threat of sanction by coercion. Government 
to the good of society in this sense uses norms without recourse to 
violence.  
The deliberate inclusion of norms into strategies of governance goes 
back very far, but Michel Foucault have in his neologism of 
governmentality traced some of the key aspects of norms that can be 
compared to the idea of the secondary rules of the legal system. In an 
interview in 1982, Michel Foucault elaborates on his understanding of the 
word government in its broader sense: ”This word [government] must be 
allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. 
’Government’ did not refer only to political structures or the management 
of states; rather it designates the way in which the conduct of individuals or 
states might be directed: the government of children, of souls, of 
communities, of families, of the sick. Not only did it cover the legitimately 
constituted forms of political or economic subjugation, but also modes of 
action, more or less considered, which were designed to act upon the 
possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to 
structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 2002b: 341, my 
italics). To govern is to develop and further the spheres of action of right 
and limit the spheres of action of wrong, and this is especially relevant in 
relations and networks, where power manifests itself. The art of 
government is to refine and perfect the ability to build network and 
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relations. A social-constructivist understanding of norms, as presented in 
what follows, clarifies how the direction of conduct and thus the very social 
structure norms transcends a use of sanctions. With this understanding from 
Foucault on governing and structuring the possible field of action of others, 
a clear parallel to Bourdieu’s structuration and thinking in terms of fields 
can be made.  
François Ewald, who was a close associate of Foucault’s at the Collège 
de France, have developed and refined the idea of governance on the basis 
of the common norms of society (Touri 2002: 53). Ewald argues that norms 
are the basic tools to regulate the conduct of individuals and groups in 
society. He establishes three different yet related concepts of norms, all of 
which stress the normative power of the ‘common’ (Ewald 1990: 154).  
Firstly, a norm is the common denominator of a certain group or society. 
It is entirely contingent on the group and thus independent of any external 
source of validity, ”… What, then, is a norm? It is a way for a group to 
provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous 
principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external 
reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object” (Ewald 1990: 
154). Norms are the expression of a group and serves to identify the group 
with itself and to maintain it as such; it is the group’s recognition of itself. 
It is the way the group defines itself apart from any other group. Thus 
common norms are the first characteristic of a group, and the norms define 
what is inside and what is outside the group. In this way, the norms can be 
understood as the truths that a certain group or society can agree upon. This 
is the idea from which Ewald’s two additional understandings of norms 
unfold.  
Secondly, norms are to be understood as standards and yardsticks. The 
common denominator in this sense implies a specific idea of what is 
common. To explain this Ewald draws upon a common sense 
understanding of ’standard’ (Ewald 1990: 148), as exemplified in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica article: ”... A standard is that which has been 
selected as a model to which objects or actions may be compared” 
(Encyclopedia Britannica 1988, vol. 11, 209). As an ideal the norm is the 
common standard; it is when held against this a group is constituted and 
defined. The norm is visible and comprehensive, but is indispensable and 
necessary for the group. As it defines unity in the group, the norm is always 
relative. In Ewald’s concept, the norm is only a norm to those who relate to 
it and can conceive of it (Ewald 1990: 156), which fits very nicely with the 
fourth concept of norms to be elaborated below. 
The third sense of common norms is developed from the second. In 
applying the idea of a standard, the norm is the basis for control, testing 
and evaluation. It is meaningless to conceive of a common norm, if it is not 
able to both qualify and disqualify. Thus, the norm is the basis of social 
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judgements in society. It is this sense of the word that derives the concept 
of ’normal’ and through this sense it is normalising. To be normal is to be 
measured against the norm and to fall inside the commonality of the norm. 
To be abnormal is to be measured against the same norm and to be judged 
dissimilar. Yet to be abnormal is still to be in relation to and measured 
against the norm. (Ewald 1990: 156-7). This reveals that norms are also the 
basis for comparison and examination, and thus the basis of a process of 
normalisation. Normalisation can be defined as the production of these 
norms and standards in the breadth of their employment within the given 
field. Ewald note that the power of normalisation is not only the standard to 
which conformity is measured, but additionally the overall agreement as to 
conform: ”Normalization, then, is less a question of making products 
conform to a standard model than it is of reaching an understanding with 
regard to the choice of a model” (Ewald 1990: 148). This ‘understanding 
with regard to the choice of model’ seems to be similar to what Bourdieu 
says of doxa and the implicit agreement of the field in question. It is the 
implicit and initial choice of model that allows for the secondary question 
conformity or non-conformity, of adherence or deviance. Bourdieu’s 
choice of words for the commonality of the norm and the imperative of 
conformity that comes from it would be communication. The common 
denominator unifies through communication and to separates through 
division (Bourdieu 1991B, 167). Section 2.5.1 returns to this point in 
particular and will elaborate upon it further. 
Norms are not to be understood as unchangeable or governing entities in 
themselves. Norms are constructions in social relations and are subject to 
change and continuous negotiation. This is the feature that makes norms 
interesting in the context of governance. When a group actively establishes 
themselves with reference to the norm, it is basis for unity and 
understanding, but when norms provide means for separation and disunity, 
it will accentuate difference (Ewald 1990: 154). When norms are the basis 
for comparison they tend to individualise as they emphasise the smallest of 
differences against a higher standard and marks the difference between 
each individual. Thus norms are both including and excluding, but also 
establish a spectrum on which everyone measuring against the norm can be 
tracked. One of Ewald’s most distinguished contributions is the suggestion 
that the norms in social spheres help to polarise and differentiate against a 
necessarily common denominator, which renders both the normal and the 
abnormal to be measured against the same scale. The consequence of this is 
that the conventional meaning of ’different’ disappears and becomes 
abstract (Ibid.: 157). In this radical sense, to be different is to be utterly 
unable to judge against any norm, and therefore to be outside the normative 
order and unattainable by both norms and secondary norms.   
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In the context of this exposition, the two most notable features of the 
norm as a common denominator are, firstly, that norms both define groups 
in their totality and individuals in their singularity, and secondly that norms 
themselves are changeable. If one is capable of governing through the 
construction or definition of new or altered norms, one can define groups 
and their understanding of themselves and define the individuals both 
inside and outside the group. This is the realisation that makes norms 
necessary in the governance of conflict. Not the norms in their incidental 
appearance, but in the techniques for the control and structuring of the 
norms. In the quest for the conduct of conduct, when norms can be said to 
be constituent to society, they are also constituent to the art of governing. 
In other words, to govern society is to govern norms. 
This technology of norms as common denominators will be explored 
further in Chapter Seven in the English case of the Muslim alternatives to 
dispute resolution in the religio-organisational field. 
2.4.6 Norms as instruments of examination 
In Discipline and Punish from 1975, Foucault accounts for the normativity 
of power and demonstrates some of the basic mechanisms of this 
normativity. He favours the expression ‘discipline’ to describe the 
normativity, and his returning example is the prison as a metaphor for 
society. What happens in prison and incarceration reflects the surrounding 
society (Heede 2004: 93). At the core of the government of prison lie the 
ideas of submission and surveillance. Both apply the norm as its basic 
concept in the discipline of the inmates that is both the understanding of the 
norm as judgement and as standard. The key word is control, which 
captures both these senses of the norm; control as inspection and 
surveillance and control as constraint. In order to institutionalise and 
employ these two technical applications of the norm, it must be established 
as a standard to the groups and individuals that are to be disciplined. From 
what was mentioned above, it becomes clear that to establish a norm as a 
model for comparison is to create the norm as such.  
According to Ewald, norms become standards by selection of authority, 
custom or consent, but these rests on the recognition and acceptance of this 
selection (Ewald 1990: 152). To recognise and accept is to choose and to 
validate, and the creation of norms is a technical and social process of 
power that rests on recognition in the political process (Ewald 1990: 152). 
According to Ewald this is what Foucault calls disciplinary ’normalisation’ 
(ibid.: 148). In the normalisation process the norm and the society, by 
which it is defined, is inextricably connected. Society is created through the 
recognition of the norm, which itself is created by the unity of society. 
Ewald maintains that the reciprocity between norm and society is one of 
the fundamental social processes of society (Ewald 1990: 149). Ewald calls 
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this the paradox of the norm, and the paradox can only be understood by 
reference to other norms in the sharing and communication of their 
normativity: ”… The norm finds meaning only in relation to other norms: 
only a norm can provide a normative value for another norm. The paradox 
of the norm is that before one can exist, there must be another” (Ewald 
1990: 153).16 Neither Ewald nor Foucault has any interest in this paradox 
itself, but in the political opportunity that grows out of the paradox. For 
norms to partake in networks and social systems they, and thus one norm, 
defines another. This is the basic idea in the power of discipline that the 
norm of a higher order or authority defines the normativity of other norms 
(Ewald 1990: 153).  
The governing and controlling of the normative discipline is expressed 
as the attempt to design or reshape the dispositions of the individual and the 
group and this is done by its own logic of perfection of the art of 
governance. Earlier imprisonment was to be punishment, but in the logic of 
governmentality the imprisonment has to be both productive and rational. 
Thus the productive and the normalising are found to be convergent and 
everything in society is determined by its productivity and efficiency, and 
this again is done by carefully selecting the appropriate strategy or 
technology calibrated to the problem at hand. The strategies and 
technologies are expressed through institutions, procedures, analysis, 
methods, programmes, tools, policies and tactics. Surveillance and control 
are institutionalised and spread to the entire society, and the techniques and 
methods are continuously made more effective. The methods are calibrated 
and made available to the governing institutions. They are cumulatively 
made stronger by their confluence, and thus new tactics, programmes and 
procedures are developed.   
According to Foucault, one of the most distinct and effective techniques 
of norms is the social institution of examination (Foucault 2005: 201). The 
examination is the epitome of governmentality as it is well established in 
the history of man and is found in every part of society. Also, it is sensitive 
to nuances of power and it promotes and demands self-discipline. In the 
word itself both control and surveillance is understood. The examination is 
done to make sure that the standards are met. Soldiers, for example, are 
measured and weighed in order to make sure they are physically fit, 
patients are examined to make sure they are healthy, and guidelines are 
established in order to ensure fitness and health in a normalising process. 
But the examination takes this further. Not only are the examined found to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The paradox is, as most paradoxes are, a question of perception. In this case the 
common denominator is framed as an expression of identity according to a ‘rigorous 
principle of self-referentiality’ while it exists only in relation to other norms. However, 
the self-referentiality is only perceived to be so and is very much a product of contrast 
to that which is outside the self, that is, the norms of the other.  
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be fit or unfit, healthy or sick, but the examination also qualifies and 
graduates the investigation according to the spectrum of the standard. Thus 
the examination in the first instance is normalising, but in the second 
instance it also distinguishes the examined from one another into a 
hierarchy or order.  
Although examinations are often used as control and graduation of 
character or standard, the examination also qualifies the normative order 
itself. When Ewald states that norms governs each other, this can be 
developed with reference to the process of examination in that the exam is 
also a process of authorisation and delegation of power. By 
institutionalising the examination a weak or secondary norm can be 
empowered or enforced, which enables it to define a broader group or 
society. This is also done by concrete techniques and processes. By 
establishing the authority to examine the governing institution’s strong 
position may further relations and manipulate the balances of power 
(Foucault 2005: 326). 
Bourdieu conducted his own study of the academic examination and has 
demonstrated how the normative institution has the power to create a 
categorical difference and deep divides in the continuities of a community 
or population. He borrows the language of religious rituals and rites in his 
description of the acts of institution, and points to the Durkheimian insight 
that such institutional rites and acts “tend to consecrate or legitimate an 
arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of 
the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate” (Bourdieu 1991, 
118). This is the same arbitrary power to draw a line that created symbolic 
capital in the religious field, as seen above, and in general creates the 
difference in positions in the field.  
Following the observations that Foucault and Ewald made on the 
graduation on the scale of norms that was the outcome of the examination, 
Bourdieu returns to the observation of the most powerful consequence of 
the acts of institutionalisation by making divisions. Truly Durkheimian in 
his perspective, the categorisation, or line-drawing, is the most powerful 
function of norms according to Bourdieu and is one of the fundamental 
operations in order to give structure to the field, but also to propose 
organisation and distribution of efforts to solve a problem or meet a 
challenge (Bourdieu 2000, 53, cited in Epstein 2012, 168-169).  
Bourdieu prefers nomos, rather than ‘norm’ and its principle of internal 
coherence, and thus stresses the etymology, which returns to Greek nemos, 
meaning to divide or to separate. As Charlotte Epstein explains it in her 
article on Bourdieu’s nomos, or the structural power of norms (2012), “The 
nomos is first and foremost a principle of inclusion and exclusion that sets 
the boundaries of a field” (Epstein 2012, 169-170). In this understanding, 
norms are a basic principle of organisation, and Bourdieu in his eloquence 
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calls it ‘a principle of vision and division,’ which very much anticipates 
connection of the normative and the symbolic, on which the next section 
will expand further (Bourdieu 2000, 65; cited from Epstein 2000, 170). In 
the field in question, the religio-organisational field, the most fundamental 
struggles and games to be played, are those about the constitutions of 
identity and definitions of division in the field. 
In Bourdieu’s study of the academic examination, the structuring 
division is not between those who get top grades and those who get average 
grades, but between those who fail and those who pass. In the case of the 
ritual of religion, the division is not between boys and men, but between 
those who are not subject to it, i.e. the girls and women: “In fact, the most 
important division, and one which passes unnoticed, is the division it 
creates between all those who are subject […] and those who are not 
subject to it, […] There is thus a hidden set of individuals in relation to 
which the instituted group is defined. The most important effect of the rite 
is one which attracts the least attention: by treating men and women 
differently, the rite consecrates the difference, institutes it, while instituting 
man as man, […] and women as women …” (Bourdieu 1991B, 118). In 
order to cement the observance of the arbitrary nature of the act of 
institutionalisation, he maintains that “it tends to make the smallest, 
weakest, in short the most effeminate man into a truly manly man, 
separated by a difference in nature and essence from the most masculine 
woman, the tallest, strongest woman, etc. To institute, in this case, is to 
consecrate, that is, to sanction and sanctify a particular state of things, an 
established order, in exactly the same way a constitution does in the legal 
and political sense of the term” (Bourdieu 1991B, 119). 
This technology of norms as instruments of examination will be explored 
further in Chapter Five on the Danish case of the institutions that define the 
limits of approval and recognition as these are fundamental dividers in the 
Danish religio-organisational field. 
2.4.7 Norms as procedural management of risk 
Additionally, norms and drawing boundaries in the social field is a 
technology of managing risk and a social strategy of limiting exposure to 
unnecessary danger. This sense of norms draws on the two previous 
technologies, as the essential feature of warding against risk remains the 
protection of the common and the critical evaluation of who do and who do 
not belong.  
Insurance is the management and technology of distributing and 
minimizing risk and it applies the normative order that defines a social 
collective. Insurance is an old discipline and takes as its object the idea of 
risk, which is derived from Italian risco, meaning ‘that which cuts’ in 
reference to reefs and the dangers of navigation (Ewald 1991, 198-199). 
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Italian bankers and merchants developed production of insurance that 
would limit and distribute losses amongst other equal buyers of insurance.  
Although everyday language connotes risk with danger or peril, it is not 
an event as such, “but a specific mode of treatment of certain events 
capable of happening to a group of individuals – or, more exactly, to values 
or capitals possessed or represented by a collectivity of individuals” (Ewald 
1991, 199). According to this definition, risk is not anything real, but 
something potential that is, a hazard or eventuality and it follows a logic of 
randomness and chance. However, with the realisation that hazards 
happens regularly and at a certain rate, it becomes calculable when taking 
the perspective of the collective. Put another way, framing risk and taking 
insurance is a way of regularizing the dynamics of a complex and open-
ended world. 
“Insurance can only cover groups; it works by socializing risks. It makes 
each person a part of the whole. Risk itself only exists as an entity, a 
certainty, in the whole, so that each person insured represents only a 
fraction of it. Insurance’s characteristic operation is the constitution of 
mutualities …” (Ewald 1991, 203). The question of norms enters the 
discourse of risk and management, when the technology of insurance puts a 
capital on the mutuality and thus defines the individuals eligible to enter 
into the collective. In the language of the norm, one must be normal to 
qualify for insurance and for the identity of the collective, which it brings 
with it. “Insurance individualizes, it defines each person as a risk, but the 
individuality [is] relative to that of the other members of the insured 
population, an average sociological individuality” (Ewald 1991, 203). As 
such, speaking both in financial and in social terms, the cost of the 
premium and the security of capital is only available to those who have a 
position or capital to be lost.  
From this logic, it is the norm of the collective of insurers that defines 
and identifies risk. The technology of insurance allows for the cost of 
accidents and the prize of the risk to be distributed amongst the mutual 
constituents of the collective whose capital may be threatened or in danger. 
The technology of insurance is limited by two parameters in that “… risk 
can only be insured when they are sufficiently separable and dispersed, and 
when the value of the risk is not in excess of the insurer’s capacities” 
(Ewald 1991, 200). In a social sense and for the kinds of capital that are not 
economic, the insurance must also be socially constituent. An individual 
must be part of a group of equals in order to be eligible, and thus the 
technology of insurance draws on the two technologies mentioned above, 
namely, of defining the commonality and defining the criteria for 
qualification. 
In addition to a technology of insurance, the reality of risk also warrants 
safety. The identification of a particular source of harm or a specific hazard 
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demands action that limits the danger. Where as insurance would 
generalize and regularize risks of the collective, the specific knowledge of 
foreseeable danger demands safety principles and norms of procedure that 
works to eliminate or reduce the hazard. In the philosophy of technology, 
as discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on risk, 
safety is devised as contingency measures that seek to establish multiple 
independent barriers, where if the first fail a second, and perhaps third, 
principle of safety comes into operation (Hansson 2012). They are to be 
sensitive to different kinds of impact and danger, so that one event does not 
eliminate all safety procedures. By contrast to insurance, safety factors 
“…aim at protecting us not only against risks that can be assigned 
meaningful probability estimates, but also against dangers that cannot be 
probabilized, such as the possibility that some unanticipated type of event 
gives rise to an accident” (Hansson 2012).  
Risk as managed through insurance and safety measures carry with it a 
normative order when looking at the social world. The dangers and 
hazardous elements of the foreign and unknown, which may harm us, must 
either be insured by the guarantees of mutuality in the social power of the 
collective or – if insurance will not be able to transfer the potential loss 
equitably – the vulnerable individual or group must devise social safety 
measures and barriers. In the case of social insurance, the norm that defines 
the common of the collective is estimated to be so strong as to be able to 
absorb the potential damage. The norm in this case will be seen to be 
stronger than the foreign normative orders, which in turn will be rejected, 
integrated or assimilated by the common order. In the case of the safety 
measures that would seek to eliminate or reduce exposure to risk, a 
procedural norm demands cautionary action to ward of the uncertainty. The 
procedural norm of safety would isolate a weak social entity and close it 
unto itself by erecting normative divisions. The virtue of procedure is to 
dictate proper and safe action and is well known through out the social 
world. The procedural protective norm is institutionally expressed, i.e., in 
the Standard Operating Procedures of routine action designed to guarantee 
a specific result, in the rituals of religion where the procedural performance 
may if done properly manipulate the gods, in the procedures of the 
legislative or the courtroom designed to deliver justice and protect against 
anarchy, in the methods of science that yield a correct result and accurate 
knowledge or in the everyday life of the ‘straight and narrow path’ 
designed to further moral virtue and limit the exposure to sin and moral 
hazard.  
In short, the power and technology of the norm explains how ‘society 
must be defended’ and how the ‘vision and division’ of the field comes 
about.  
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For the purpose of the present analytical strategy, this technology of 
norms as procedural management of risk will be explored further in 
Chapter Six on the German case, where the granting of the privileges of 
corporation status to the German Muslims is perceived to threaten the 
constitution.  
 
2.5 Symbols, representations and requisite variety 
This fifth and final section seeks to bring together the different strands of 
the argument in the chapter and seeks to bring together the key ideas of the 
analytical strategy for entering the religio-organisational field. We return to 
the idea of ‘symbolic system,’ into which art, language, culture and religion 
count and which Clifford Geertz saw to be conceptions of a general world 
order that was presented and understood as factual. The relationship 
between ‘reality’ and the symbols thereof was presented in a frame where 
the model in its twofold implication - as a model of and a model for – 
sought to bridge the indicative and the imperative of a normative symbolic 
order. Bourdieu’s treatment of the symbolic system brings together 
elements of the contemporary theories of religions and worldviews, the 
relational powers in the structural system of positions, the normative power 
of defining and drawing lines and the notion of symbolic capital that will 
further the analytical strategy before entering in the overall game of power 
and positions in the religio-organisational field.  
2.5.1 Symbolic capital and symbolic power 
As the social world is understood as accumulated history, so capital is 
understood as accumulated labour (Bourdieu 1986, 241). By contrast to 
games of chance, capital is characterised by the capacity it has to produce 
and reproduce profits and it endures in the reproduction of itself. As such – 
not randomly produced and not distributed by chance – capital is a 
testament to the objectivity of the structure that distributes it (Ibid.). 
Bourdieu operates as mentioned in section 2.2.1 primarily with three types 
of capital. Economic capital which sums up monetary value and other 
financial resources, investments and other practical assets as well as 
institutionalised economic capital in rights of property and such (Bourdieu 
1986, Anheier et al 1995). Cultural capital is the product of socialisation 
and culturation in a process of embodiment and labour of inculcation, 
which is a personal investment in time and effort by the individual, and it 
often takes the shape of schooling, competence, appreciation and 
apprehension (Bourdieu 1986, Anheier et al 1995). Social capital is the 
total of potential and practical resources, which can be drawn from 
membership of organisations, associations and social networks in the 
widest definition as the product of “institutionalised relationships of mutual 
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acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986). Common to all three is 
that the language applied is drawn from the financial world and that the 
strength of capital determines the appropriate position in a particular field 
corresponding to the appreciation of the type of capital. The concept of 
capital infers liquidity and convertibility and thus exchanging one type of 
capital for another is done at a rate with the assumption of a loss in the 
transaction, but with the promise of a stronger position in the field.  
Also, common to all three types of capital, and this is the key to this 
chapter, they can all be guised as symbolic capital through the act of 
institution as mentioned above in section 2.4.6. The social transformation 
or disjunction of the reality and the model of it is the product of the act of 
institution and is sanctioned by the governing norm or performed by the 
technology of the non-sanctioned norms – or both. As such, there is a 
performative doubling in the act of institution as the effect of symbols 
comes from the distance between something and its representation. This 
was true in the modelling, as seen in Geertz’ quotes above, which gave a 
world in the indicative (models of) and the imperative (models for). 
Bourdieu is very much attuned to this understanding of the relationship 
between models and reality, and from the perspective of field he is 
concerned not only with symbols and symbolic representations, but with 
the effect and power of symbols. “Symbolism is not effective on its own, 
but only insofar as it represents – in the theatrical sense of the term – the 
delegation” (Bourdieu 1991, 115, original italics). The power of symbols is 
indeed an important factor in the structuration and the game of positions 
and positioning that unfold in every field. In the sections above, Bourdieu 
has been shown to see the field as a battlefield or a game that unfolds with 
all its rewards, gains, profits and sanctions, but, concerning the symbolic, 
additional attention must be given to the more or less implicit rules of the 
game (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 18), which is where symbols and 
representations come into the argument. “Symbolic power is that invisible 
power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not 
want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves 
exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991B, 164).  
The most important feature of symbols is that they are instruments in the 
service of those that produce them and must be understood as a form of 
capital, very much on par with other forms of capital. As such, they are a 
resource that determine potentials and define the positions to be occupied 
in the structure of the field in question. Symbolic capital is a crucial source 
of power, in that it is an appropriation or instrumentalisation of any of the 
three (or more) kinds of capital. Indeed, power follows from the ability to 
mobilize capital. When these kinds of capital are perceived through the 
distinctions and classifications of the structured field, the holder of the 
symbolic capital can dominate those who hold less or none. The generic 
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types of capital may don the cloak of symbolic capital to distinguish 
themselves, and therefore not to represent, but to be un-recognisable and 
thus function to exert an effect of misrecognition. The task it performs is to 
present one type of capital – or one position – as legitimate, attractive, 
natural, proper or authoritarian, when it is not by default. This is the 
specific symbolic logic of distinction and representation, which “secures 
material and symbolic profits for the possessors of a large cultural capital 
[in that] any given cultural competence derives a scarcity value from its 
position in the distribution of cultural capital and yields profits of 
distinction for its owner” (Bourdieu 1968). In short, symbolic power works 
to misrepresent itself to those who are objectively dispossessed. 
This converges well with the one of the most important observations 
from the Bourdieuian complex of norms as institutions and means of 
structuring structures and imposing social dominance in a given field, 
namely, that these norms as institutions and acts of institutions can both 
produce symbols and produce themselves as symbols. It is the distinctions 
in the field by the force of the institutionally enacted norms that gives the 
unequal distribution of capital and thereby creates distinction and division 
(Bourdieu 1986).  Bourdieu explains that the symbolic capital comes from 
defining these divisive lines. “To institute, to assign an essence, a 
competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so (or 
to be so). It is to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct 
himself as a consequence. In this case, the indicative is an imperative …” 
(Bourdieu 1991, 120). This clearly echoes Geertz with his models of and 
models for, but also echoes Foucault, who said of governmentality that it 
was the ‘conduct of conduct,” and that with the mere institutional being 
comes a normative imperative. In the light of this, he goes on clarify his 
understanding of institutionalisation in this specific social context: “The 
institute, to give a social definition, an identity, is also to impose 
boundaries…” (Ibid.). And to return once more to his comtemporary 
Durkheimian perspective, the institutionalisation is also “… an act of 
communication, but of a particular kind: it signifies to someone what his 
identity is, but in a way that both expresses it to him and imposes it on him 
by expressing it in from of everyone (kategorein, meaning originally, to 
accuse publically) and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of 
what he is and what he must be …” (Bourdieu 1991B: 121).  
The holder of a significant position in the field with its institutional 
embedding and its relational power can, once it is visible and subject to 
cognition and re-cognition, be understood as a symbol or representation of 
itself and in its position (Honneth 2003). As such, the Marxist tradition, on 
which Bourdieu reflects, maintains that such a symbolic production in its 
relational context can have substantial ideological effect on the power and 
capital at stake in the field. Bourdieu points to the nature of the power of 
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the symbolic production as entirely dependent on the ability to unify 
through communication and to separate through division. In the power play 
of the field, Bourdieu says, “the dominant culture produces this ideological 
effect by concealing the function of division beneath the function of 
communication: the culture which unifies (the medium of communication) 
is also the culture which separates (the instrument of distinction) and which 
legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as 
subcultures) to define themselves by the distance from the dominant 
culture” (Bourdieu 1991B, 167). This resonates very well with the above 
technological power of the norm, which used this ability of the symbol to 
both unite and divide the community. 
2.5.2 Representation  
Bourdieu sums up his understanding of institutionalisation and its symbolic 
consequences by underlining the importance of the “symbolic efficacy of 
rites of institution, that is, the power […] to act on reality by acting on its 
representation.” This is the case of the investiture, that is, the placing into 
office or into a position of power.  
 
“An investiture consists of sanctioning and sanctifying a difference (pre-existent 
or not) by making it known and recognized; it consists of making it exist as a 
social difference, known and recognized as such by the agent invested and 
everyone else […] the process of investiture, exercises a symbolic efficacy that is 
quite real in that it really transforms the person consecrated: first, because it 
transforms the representations others have of him and above all the behaviour they 
adopt towards him (most visible change being the fact that he is given titles of 
respect and the respect actually associated with these enunciations); and second, 
because it simultaneously transforms the representation that the invested person 
has of himself, and the behaviour he feels obliged to adopt in order to conform to 
that representation. By the same logic, one can understand the effect of social 
titles of credit and credence – of credentials – which, like aristocratic titles and 
academic qualification, increase in a durable way the value of their bearer by 
increasing the extent and the intensity of the belief in their value”  
(Bourdieu 1991B, 119).  
 
Further, and for the specifics of the sociology of groups and organisations, 
this has implications of the symbolic use of social capital institutionalised 
in the norms that define the borders of the group and the value at the core 
that symbolises the totality or essence of the group. The act of consecration 
by institutionalisation and the bestowing of credentials upon someone is the 
social production of the group that provides its members with collectively 
owned social capital vis-à-vis the membership. This is key to the survival 
and the social formation of the group or organisation.  
The social capital is seen as closer relations within the group or as rights 
and obligations secured institutionally. This capital is maintained and 
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reproduced in the social relations of mutual exchanges of goods and mutual 
recognition of the symbolic power of the social capital. “Exchange 
transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the 
mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it 
implies, reproduces the group. By the same token, it reaffirms the limits of 
the group, i.e., the limits beyond which the constitutive exchange – trade, 
commensality, or marriage – cannot take place” (Bourdieu 1986).  
This is also the fundamental liability of the symbolic constitution of the 
organisation or group, in that these signs of recognition keep the social 
entity bound together. “Through the introduction of new members into a 
family, a clan, or a club, the whole definition of the group, i.e., its fines, its 
boundaries, and its identity, is put at stake, exposed to redefinition, 
alteration, adulteration” (Bourdieu 1986). From a social point of view, 
there is no greater risk than the exposition of the very identity and 
definition of core values. Following the technology of norms and the 
management of risk from section 2.4.7, this is why it not only takes an act 
of institution to reproduce the group, but also procedure and proper conduct 
to make sure that new members live up to the norms and standards, and that 
– so to speak – the credentials are in order.  
Coupling this to the divisions drawn by the norms of the field and the 
distinction between layers, hierarchy and structure that follow from these, 
Bourdieu is able to point to the symbolic power in making models. Models 
are representations and needed to create the social reality of groups and to 
make visible the divisions in the field. From semiotics it is known that 
”models are made when an observer is confronted with a complex 
phenomenon, which cannot be exhaustively explained by everyday 
language alone. In such a case, the model is a representation, which in part 
is simpler than the phenomenon itself and in part explains the phenomenon 
by reference to structural relations between primitive cognitive elements, 
which require no further specification” (Østergaard 1998, 188, my 
translation, original italics). Representation is particularly interesting to 
Bourdieu as it is an investment of the collective social capital into one 
particular focus, and from the perspective of the field, where groups vis-à-
vis their representatives hold certain positions, the representative receives a 
symbolic or iconic power that underlines the normative difference (Giesen 
2012). As such, in the structures of the field,  
 
”everything combines to cause the signifier to take the place of the signified, the 
spokesmen that of the group he is supposed to express, not least because his 
distinction, his ‘outstandingness,’ his visibility constitute the essential part, if not 
the essence, of this power, which, being entirely set within the logic of knowledge  
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and acknowledgment, is fundamentally a symbolic power; but also because the 
representative, the sign, the emblem, may be, and create, the whole reality of 
groups which receive effective social existence only in and through 
representation”  
(Bourdieu 1986, 253)  
 
This seems to be both an advantage and a risk to the group in question. As 
such, the delegated power of the representative can be wielded much more 
effectively and nimbly, but is equally exposed to corruption and 
compromise.  
 
”Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of delegation which 
enable it to concentrate the totality of the social capital, which is the basis of the 
existence of the group (a family or a nation, of course, but also an association or a 
party), in the hands of a single agent or a small group of agents and to mandate 
this plenipotentiary, charged with plena potestas agendi et loquendi, (‘full power 
to act and speak’) to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with 
the aid of this collectively owned capital, to exercise a power incommensurate 
with the agent’s personal contribution.”  
(Bourdieu 1986, 245) 
 
Ritual symbolism, then, seems to be at the core of Bourdieu’s 
understanding of institutions, of norms, and of the symbolic representations 
of different kinds of capital in the guise of identity, of definition and of 
other types of accumulated work in need of protection and procedural 
safekeeping. Bourdieu pays careful attention to the symbols and the play of 
visibility and invisibility in the field and he underscores the importance of 
the implicit rules of the game and observance of order in this regard 
(Bourdieu 1991B, 115). The reason for this – and the need for the 
protective acts of the institution – comes from the inherent risk that follows 
from acting upon a representation. Although necessary in social life, this 
acting on the symbol and the model, rather than upon the totality of the 
social world and the reduction of complexity that comes with it, is 
inherently dangerous and potentially deceiving. 
2.5.3 Requisite variety  
As we saw in the quote from Østergaard above, models are representations 
that are simpler than the phenomenon itself and that explain the 
phenomenon by reference to cognitive structural relations (Østergaard 
1998, 188). Østergaard draws on the lessons from semiotics and says of 
models that their defining ability is the depiction of a complex phenomena 
or domain by reference to a simpler phenomena or domain, which in turn 
has cognitive explanatory power (Østergaard 1998, 189). Metaphoric 
images or simple geometrical structures are examples of such simple 
domains that depict complex domains.   
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A chaotic pattern is an indicator of complexity (Østergaard 1998, 193) 
and the model becomes a mental construction when coping with the 
apparently chaotic complexity and as such the model is simplistic 
reductions and generalisations that deal away with complexity. However, 
“a chaotic appearance is one level of reality, caused by a hidden organising 
principle, which must be found at another level …” (Østergaard 1998, 
193).  
When talking about systems and structure – which is the basis of the 
whole idea of fields, and when talking about the reduction of complexity in 
iconic symbols and representations, a very important lesson from 
cybernetics must be highlighted. Semiotics is very clear about the use of 
models and representations and from it follows a heeded word of warning. 
Symbolic power – as well as tangible risk, as Bourdieu is well aware – 
follows from the use and misuse of representations and recognitions, which 
is the essence of the manipulation of the rules of the game. 
Cybernetics, which is the analytical study of systems, their structures and 
their dynamics, and most widely used in mathematics and science, are the 
rules of mechanics and ’self-operating’ systems. Both the words 
cybernetics and governance has the same origin in the Greek verb 
κυβερνάω which means to steer or to guide. We usually define it with some 
reference to power or authority and it means to control, structure or 
regulate. There are plenty of references to a contemporary use of law as 
governance while Foucault has demonstrated that governance becomes a 
bio-ethical necessity in most aspects of human life. However, the Catholic 
Church also uses the name ’Kybernetik’ for the governance of the Church 
and as such, it is an ecclesiastic discipline that is as much theology as it is 
law (Grandfield 1968 on Ecclesiastical Cybernetics) 
Cybernetics has defined the logical limit to effective reductions of 
complexity. To a certain extent simplifications are necessary, but not to the 
degree of loss of regulatory control or loss of critical nuance. To this end, 
William Ross Ashby (1903-1972) in his An Introduction to Cybernetics 
from 1956 formulated the Law of Requisite Variety, which states that a 
model or regulator can only model or regulate something to the extent that 
it has sufficient internal variety to represent it. Variety is understood as the 
possible number of positions or variations in a system (Risbak 1985). That 
is, the model must be able to express the complexity and variety it is set in 
motion to depict or represent. For example, in order to make representation 
of a world in colours a television needs to be able project colours. A black 
and white image does not have the requisite variety to represent the 
complexity of colours. The Law of Requisite Variety also goes by the name 
of the ‘hammer law,’ in that if the only tool available is a hammer, all 
problems will be treated like nails – to an unsatisfactory result. Therefore, 
two lessons can be drawn about modelling from the law of requisite 
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variety. Firstly, the quantity of variety that the model possesses provides an 
upper bound for the quantity of variety that can be modelled. Secondly, a 
model that is less complex than the reality it is trying to represent will yield 
an unreliable result and most likely reproduce the assumptions for entering 
into modelling in the first place.  
In the governance of larger systems and in the modelling of great 
complexity, the Law of Requisite Variety defines the possible limits of 
regulatory governance in the sense that a regulatory scheme that does not 
have requisite variety will not have the instrumental norms required to 
affect change and will return to its own ’self-operating’ dispositions and 
result in a compartmentalised autonomy. 
When approaching models and representations in Bourdieu’s reading of 
norms, symbolic power and the entire system of the field, the cybernetic 
and systemic insights are important, because the struggle in the field is 
defined by the number of positions taken and the number of positions there 
are to be taken. The structures of the field are likened to the rules of the 
game and the limit the positioning, i.e. dispositions., of the organisations, 
groups and other agents in the field. Sociologically speaking, these are the 
‘ties that bind’ (Kymlicka 1995, 173; Marshall 1964, 69; Vinding 2009, 
90). The most successful player, and structurally, the agent in the strongest, 
dominating position, is the one who has regulatory control – that is, the 
power to model – the relations and positions available.17  
Before concluding on the entire chapter, with insight from his 
understanding of the political field, we may note a trait that is not only 
characteristic for the political field in particular, but common to all fields 
that interchange symbolic, political and other forms of capital. “The field as 
a whole is defined as a system of deviations on different levels and nothing, 
either in the institutions or in the agents, the acts or the discourses they 
produce, has meaning except relationally, by virtue of the interplay of 
oppositions and distinctions” (Bourdieu 1991B, 185). From this the 
importance of not reducing complexity, not marvelling in the visions of the 
symbolic and not necessarily acting on the representations of the model the 
technology of the norms and the acts of institutions keeps the interplay of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Emirbayer and Johnson’s observation on the organizational field and its complexity 
seem relevant. “An organizational field includes not just one type of organization (e.g., 
all car manufacturers), but all the organizations that play one role or another in the 
activity in question (e.g., car manufacturers and steel suppliers, dealer, consumers, 
insurers, and local and federal government agencies regulating the manufacture and 
operation of cars). Because the institutions governing a given organization’s structure 
and practices are often influenced by a wide variety of other organizations – a variety 
not adequately captured by other organization-theoretic concepts – the concept of 
organizationsal field has been of particular value to neo-institutionalist scholars” 
(Emirbayer & Johnson 2008, 2-3). 
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opposition and distinction alive, even when perceiving the width and depth 
of the religio-organisational field. 
 
2.6 Conclusion: the religio-organisational field and the analytical 
strategy to approach it 
Geertz defined religion as a system of symbols and throughout the chapter 
both the systemic and the symbolic was given serious attention. It was 
demonstrated how the system of symbols was designed to bring people’s 
ethos and worldview together in the representative synthesis that is the 
focus of the religious symbol. The symbolic power of representation was 
the identification of a way of life with a perception of the world, which 
indeed is one of the most powerful social constructs. It serves to build the 
commonalities and the identity of the religious group and in the returning 
cases of Islam, the recreation of the religion and reproduction of the 
institutionalisation is entirely dependent on the calibration and power of the 
iconic symbols of the religion. Attention to other definitions of religion will 
be given in the next chapter as focus turns to the specific models of 
religion, generally, and Islam, specifically. 
In terms of the system of symbols, the models of the world are 
reductions of the complexity of these systems. Geertz stressed the near 
endless complexity of the cultural patterns that make up religion. Here the 
cultural patterns, called models, aided the cognitive effort by the individual 
and the institutional constructivist effort of the organisation in creating 
identity and expressing this symbolically. The patterns and models was 
shown to have a twofold ability to both represent and depict the world, 
while at the same time expressing an agenda for the world and an 
imperative to those who identify with the worldview.  
The postcolonial criticism that Talal Asad addressed in Geertz’ 
definition of religion exposed the asymmetrical power relations in any 
construction of reality. The criticism brought to the fore the assumptions of 
modelling – both as a social constructivist endeavour, but also as an 
academic effort. Following this, it gave rise to two epistemological 
consequences for the analytical strategy in this thesis. Firstly, any approach 
must be attentive to the dialects between the subjective world and the 
objective structures that frame it. Secondly, that the presentation of the 
dialects must be absolutely aware of the potential misrepresentation that 
follows from any modelling and any rendition into symbols. Geertz 
stressed the immense effort that goes into analysis of symbols and Asad 
reminded researchers that the products of particular efforts always remain 
particular and therefore biased.  
Although the chapter introduced Geertz’ definition of religion and 
models, the discussion between Geertz and Asad made necessary the 
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adoption of Bourdieu’s concept of field into the analytical strategy of the 
thesis. Defined as ‘…structured spaces of positions (or posts) whose 
properties depend on their position within these spaces and which can be 
analysed independently of the characteristics of their occupants,’ (Bourdieu 
1993, 73) it was able to give focus to both the subjective and the objective, 
to the particularities of a given position and to the universality of the entire 
system, to both the structural disadvantages of certain positions and the 
potential power of the same. Ultimately, it is able to grasp both the 
complexity necessary and the unavoidable simplifications.  
As a veritable Egg of Columbus, the concept of field works on two 
parallel analytical levels, one religio-organisational, the other academic-
epistemological and both of them in jeopardy of misrepresenting its object 
by not satisfactorily revising its models and always at risk of being blinded 
by its own iconic oversimplifications. As such, the use of field in this thesis 
echoes Bourdieu’s approach, which was both a ‘reflective sociology’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and a ‘reflexive epistemology’ (Pouliot & 
Merand 2012, 26). 
2.6.1 The analytical strategy of the religio-organisational field  
From the many references Bourdieu and others make to the different 
aspects of the field and from the difficulties, warnings, benefits and 
potentials to be drawn from field analysis, it is possible to distill a 
framework for an analytical strategy for the field in general and for the 
religio-organisational field in general. As already referenced above, 
Bourdieu famously said, “the process of constructing the field is perhaps 
among the most difficult and challenging of all phases of research. It is a 
process that obeys principles that are less of a method (a route that one 
retraces after the fact) and more than a simple theoretical institution” 
(Bourdieu 1996: 232). He does, however specify that the given field must 
be seen in relation to the different kinds of forces or powers at play. The 
analyst or researcher must try to map out the hierarchy and structure of 
positions in the field. For the present purposes and by way of concluding 
the present chapter, some six lessons for future analysis of the field are 
presented here, which will identify the relations and the structure of 
positions in the field.  
Firstly, the field itself is a representation of a complex struggle and will 
help to explain how a social space is constructed and limited by resources 
and time. Rather than reducing complexity by way of reducing variety, the 
field reduces complexity by way of scope. Thus, the field is focused rather 
than homogenous and may operate with requisite variety. In order to 
produce this focus, it is important to identify the borders and limits of the 
field. According to Bourdieu, this is done by identifying the species of 
appropriate capital, that is, those that hold value to the given field. There 
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are as many fields as there are forms of capital to be fought over. The field 
extends as far as the appropriate type of capital has value, because where 
there is capital with value, there will also be relations of power.  
Secondly, and this is closely related, the constituent logic of the field 
needs to be identified. Bourdieu’s concept of field can be seen as a 
reduction of a social complex by focus on the governing logic of that 
particular field. This logic is expressed as the common rules of the game, 
the doxa, without which there would be no game and thus no field. This 
logic can be identified empirically by identifying the implicit principles at 
work. For business, i.e., these are the logics of valuation, namely, that the 
value of things can be agreed upon and that wealth must be accumulated. 
For the social fields, these principles are the principles of social interaction 
and the value of community and commonality. As such, the governing 
logic within the field defines the appropriate and applicable strategies 
operating within that field and becomes the logical premise for a field’s 
existence. Without profits there can be no economic field, and without 
collectivity no social field. Bourdieu reminds us that “all the agents that are 
involved in a field share a certain number of fundamental interests, namely 
everything that is linked to the very existence of the field … these points of 
agreement are held at the level of what ‘goes without saying’ they are left 
in a state of doxa … [these are] in other words, everything that makes the 
field itself, the game, the stakes, all the presuppositions that one tacitly and 
even unwittingly accepts by the mere fact of play, of entering into the 
game” (Bourdieu 1993, 73-74). Governed by the limits of its logics, the 
field has the potential of an unlimited number of positions, combinations of 
these and the capital required and the interrelated relations. These are only 
limited by the bindings of the logics and ‘rules’ of the field, which can in 
turn be renegotiated or subverted, and by the structures of domination of 
those in stronger positions and with more capital.  
Thirdly, from these two instances, the specific and most dominant 
positions in the field are to be accounted for. This will reveal how power is 
distributed in the field. This part of the analysis starts with the positions of 
distinguished power or most capital and goes on to specify how this 
position is separated from others. Once the dominant position is identified, 
the various degrees of the dominated will slowly become clear. 
Fourthly, it is important to distinguish between the objective positions in 
the field, understood as possible positions to occupy, and the stances 
actually taken by individual organisations or institutions. The structure of 
the positions available is different from the position actually taken. The 
position occupied defines the relative force in the game from where the 
individual organisation orients itself and acts according to its dispositions 
and its habitus. Both the availabilities of positions in the field and the social 
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or organisational trajectories over time in the objective structures are 
defined by these specific and subjective preferences.  
Fifthly, it is the norms that make the field of positions and structure 
hierarchical. The relations of positions hold power and the capital accounts 
for the value and the possibilities within the field, but the norms qualify 
and empower the capital value of the positions. By definition, the divisions 
of inside and outside, which the norms set up within the field, are those that 
specify the levels and ranks native to a hierarchy. The most powerful of 
norms yield the strongest divisions and, in turn, are those most difficult to 
transgress and transform. These strong dividers give stability to a field and 
allow for positions to be held for a long time and at low upkeep. By 
contrast, it is exactly because of these norms that struggles arise and 
positions are challenged, which in turn yields the ‘shifting and fluctuating’ 
dynamics of the fields. Equally, the inverse is true as these dynamic define 
the structuration as generative. The weaker norms shape themselves to the 
stronger norms and as well as shaping the strong to the weak. 
Sixthly, according to Bourdieu a struggle arises from the nature of the 
norms. This is the struggle “…for the impositions of the principle of 
legitimate hierarchization [which] cause the dividing-line between those 
who belong and those who do not to be constantly discussed and disputed, 
and therefore [to be] shifting and fluctuating, at every moment and above 
all according to the moment” (Bourdieu 1988: 77). If anything, this is the 
struggle of the field and the struggle to be identified in the chapters to 
come. Here, the different technologies of norms will be seen as decisive. 
These technologies of norms were shown to define the commons, to 
establish legitimate principles of division through examination and to 
specify how risk is managed collectively and procedurally in the face of 
danger to positions and capital.  
2.6.2 The hidden imposition of arbitrary principles of division 
Before drawing this chapter to a close, there is reason to dwell on the 
specific impact of an analysis of the religio-organisational field. This 
returns to ‘the imposition of the principle of legitimate hierarchization’ and 
the recognition of it. For Bourdieu this is a specific point he makes for the 
religious field and one that seems valid, also for the related organisational 
subfield of the religious field. Quoting Bourdieu once more, we know that 
“… religion contributes to the (hidden) imposition of the principles of 
structuration of the perception and thinking of the world, and of the social 
world in particular, insofar as it imposes a system of practices and 
representations whose structure, objectively founded on a principle of 
political division… ” (Bourdieu 1991, 5). As has been established 
repeatedly, Bourdieu borrows this insight from Durkheim, but Bourdieu 
draws attention to the ‘hidden imposition of the principles of structuration,’ 
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which is the specific application of the game of perception and 
representation to be found in every field. The religious hierarchy serves to 
Bourdieu as an example of the arbitrary nature whereby the principle of 
division and structuration is imposed. The defining difference that leads to 
the powerful objective dispossession and exclusion of those in a weaker 
position is not the production of accumulated symbolic labour, but the 
recognition by the dispossessed of the dispossession as legitimate. This is 
where it all becomes a matter of the relative position in the game of the 
field. From the limited scope of a weak position, that which is recognized 
as legitimate is only so because of the fundamental deception of the 
structure of the field. This recognition is therefore mis-recognition and 
arbitrarily illegitimate. 
This arbitrary principle of division and the arbitrary legitimacy that 
follows from the mis-recognition of the perspective of a weak position 
allows for the power of symbolic capital to receive its effect. An effect that 
is enhanced by the social patterns that are institutionalisation by way of 
habitualized and frequently repeated actions. Once the in-action of the 
habitual repetition kicks in, the cost decreases and the division widens. The 
maintaining in a particular reproduction process without action of a 
position, state or pattern, is institutionalisation. A highly institutionalised 
position is maintained at a very low cost and almost taken for granted. It is 
the ability to convey stability, meaning and order at a low cost of 
maintenance with no deliberate action or effort and the product of well 
defined positions of capital that makes the institutional trait so attractive to 
organisations and makes it an inherent characteristic of many of the norms 
in the religio-organisational field.   
Bourdieu sums up his understanding of institutionalisation and its 
symbolic consequences by underlining the importance of the “symbolic 
efficacy of rites of institution, that is, the power […] to act on reality by 
acting on its representation. For the specifics of the sociology of 
organisations, this has implications of the symbolic use of social capital 
institutionalised in the norms that define the borders of the group and the 
value at the core that symbolises the totality or essence of the group. The 
capital that is the identity and common values of the group is maintained 
and reproduced in the social relations of mutual exchanges and mutual 
recognition of the symbolic power of the social capital.  
Symbols, we learned from Berger & Luckmann, are products of the 
human mind. They are signifiers, constructions of correlations and 
conceptions of meaning and are understood by Geertz as acts of culture 
performed by social beings. Geertz’ definitions of religion, the ethos in the 
‘model for’ and the world view in the ‘model of’, were combined into the 
complex of symbols or patterns of culture, which is the religion’s model of 
reality and by which religious groups create meaning. The concept of field 
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brings together the objective structure of cognitive and social 
systematisation and the perspective, experience and interpretation of things 
subjectively as a product of consciousness. From this objective structure 
comes knowledge and from the subjective relations comes communication. 
As an addendum drawn from this Durkheimian insight drawn from Geertz, 
Bourdieu reminds us “the systematic application of one and the same 
principle of division” is the basic organisational principle which serves “the 
functions of inclusion and exclusion, of association and dissociation, of 
integration and distinction” (Bourdieu 1991, 3). Following the 
organisational logic, which “solves tasks and reaches goals by a particular 
distribution of assignments,” the arbitrary symbolic order with its principle 
of division does exactly this. So as a point of origin for analysing the 
religio-organisational field, we must assume that the distribution of 
assignments is particular, but that principles of division are arbitrary. A 
final reminder from Bourdieu holds true in that “symbolic power is that 
invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those 
who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they 
themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991B, 164).  
In sum, it may solve its tasks and live up to its purpose by a particular 
distribution and ordering of its tasks while the original divisor is arbitrary. 
The specific organisations are always locked in a network of relations that 
are difficult to pin down in the unseen and mis-recognisable dominated or 
dominating positions, but, taking all the organizations that play a role in 
field into the equation, it becomes the object of analytical examination and 
therefore exposed. This is exactly how the relative position of the 
individual organisation may be legitimate, while the whole order of the 
particular religio-organisational field may be arbitrary. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Governing Models of 
Church, State and Religion Relations in Europe  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“Church-state relations constitute a classical topic in the sociology of 
religion, as well as in the related disciplines of church history and 
ecclesiastical law,” writes Lene Kühle introducing a recent thematic issue 
of Nordic Journal of Religion and Society on church and state in the Nordic 
countries, and continues: “In recent years, however, church-state relations 
have been reformulated to ‘religion-state relations’, and these issues have 
moved center-stage” (Kühle 2011B, 111). In the introduction to the theme 
of the issue, Kühle argues for a new approach to religion-state relations in 
Europe. A call for a new approach assumes that the old approach is 
outdated, but the change that Kühle so precisely calls the reformulation of a 
traditional church-state perspective into a religion-state relations 
perspective is very saying of the change in the empirical material available 
to scholars. Kühle is far from alone in this call for a revision of research on 
religion-state relations in contemporary Europe. She joins a growing body 
of researchers and scholars, who in their work criticise the reliance on old 
stereotypes and outdated models. Most significantly, perhaps, Silvio Ferrari 
repeatedly (2000; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2008; 2010) has argued that the 
traditional model is “outdated and does not answer the needs of 
contemporary societies” (Ferrari 2008, 107). Ferrari and Kühle are joined 
by British colleague Russell Sandberg of Cardiff Law School, who argues 
‘that scholarship itself has become a barrier to the understanding of church 
and state relations’ (Sandberg 2008: 329). Sandberg has written repeatedly 
about the shortcomings of the old approach of building models of church 
and state relations. He calls for a ‘sociology of law and religion’ as it infers 
an interdisciplinary approach that takes seriously the input from both 
sociology, law and studies of religion (Doe & Sandberg 2007, Sandberg 
2008). All three are joined by German colleagues, among them Sabine 
Riedel who, with reference to immigration and the Muslim presence, states 
that the academic “challenges to church-state relations in European 
democracies are obvious” (Riedel 2008: 251). Ferrari’s repeated argument 
of the outdated model seems to be well received empirically and 
analytically in Denmark, Germany and England.  
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A central theme to this thesis and through out this chapter is that the fact 
of the presence of Islam and Muslims plays a key part as a catalyst for the 
critical revision of the models traditionally applied to church and state 
relations. Both the argument of the critical revision of the model and the 
argument of the role of Islam presented here is as much an epistemological 
argument as it is sociological. The core sentiment is that the presence of 
Islam as religion and Muslims organisations as an institutional factor 
challenges the prevailing models to the extent of revision because the 
relevance of these models seems to have diminished. The sociological fact 
of Islam demonstrates the diminishing explanatory value of the existing 
models, which is how it becomes an epistemological problem more that 
anything else.  
In the first section of this chapter, section 3.2, the ambition is to give an 
introduction to the history of the models in the research of church and state 
relations in Europe as seen in three distinct phases. In addition, the 
ambition is to critically discuss the ‘perils of modelling’ (Bader 2007B) as 
this becomes a factor in research on church and state relations in Denmark, 
Germany and England. This is done in section 3.3. The development of 
modelling in this area of research is seen through the epitomic example in 
the research of Silvio Ferrari with repeated references to the substantial 
body of literature, both in Europe and in the three countries in focus, in 
each of the three phases, which the research on church and state goes 
through in the attempt to incorporate the fact and presence of Islam. From 
the point of view of the history of research in resent years, the research by 
Ferrari is particularly interesting, because he has been a proponent, a critic 
and a commentator of each of the three phases of modelling.  
Beginning with the traditional tripartite model of that which has been 
handed down from the large clusters of European church-state 
researchers,18 the first phase grows out of the secularization thesis with its 
assumption of a diminishing relevance to religion and its secondary 
position of church in relation to state. The crisis of the secularisation thesis 
inaugurates the first review of the models. The second phase acknowledges 
the fact of Islam and the endeavour is reformulated into state and religion 
research, as remarked by Lene Kühle above. A second crisis and thus a 
third phase unfolds with the challenge of Islam and the revised model is 
shown to misrepresent the observed facts of religion in the interactions with 
state equally as much. As Ferrari states in 2003, “European Islam has yet to 
find a precise place within this model,” (Ferrari 2003: 241) and suggested 
by Jytte Klausen’s 2005, ‘The Islamic Challenge,’ Islam becomes a 
significant political and academic challenge. Particularly after 9/11 there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 To this effect the European Consortium of Church and State Research has had 
substantial influence and has been gathering on a yearly basis since 1989 
(http://www.churchstate.eu, accessed 19 January 2013).  
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has been a growing literature on the crises and challenges that the models 
of church and state relations in Europe face in the presence of Islam. This 
challenge is more and more apparent, as “the visible and active presence of 
Muslims in European societies has increased the ambiguities and struggles 
over the meanings and implications of dominant norms and principles, 
especially due to the fact that Muslim communities have started to demand 
spaces for recognition, sometimes even in the name of such norms” (Amir-
Moazami 2005, 278). As shall be explored both in the present chapter and 
throughout the thesis as it unfolds further, the challenges that Islam pose 
hinge on conventions that no longer enjoy the agreement they once had, 
norms that no longer reflect the common identities, regulative criteria that 
no longer reflects meaningful differences in society and Muslim 
communities who refuse to be subject to discrimination and prejudice.  
The limitations and inadequacies of the research paradigm of church and 
state relations modelling become clearer as the focus on the contemporary 
situation of Islam in Europe grows. The understanding of models 
introduced and discussed in chapter two can be seen in both its 
epistemological nature and its history of research when, in section 3.5, we 
turn to some of the alternatives discussed by researchers. Amongst these, 
the religio-organisational field takes shape as a viable analytical alternative 
to the collapsing models in Europe. The virtue of thinking in terms of fields 
rather than models is one of nuanced focus that seeks to identify the 
specifics of Denmark, Germany and England. In the third phase of the 
recent history of research, the researchers of religion and state relations 
begin to apply a developing understanding of field as the models start to 
wither and as the complexity of the object of study increases.  
One of the outcomes of the inadequacies of the models of church and 
state relations is an increase in the attempts to ‘pin down’ Muslims or fit 
them into the models. As the crisis of the models become more urgent the 
attempted definitions of Muslims in Europe expose themselves more and 
more to the critique from Muslims, Islamic scholars and Islamic Studies 
researchers alike. This is seen in the attempt of subjective models to frame 
Muslims and structure their possible fields of actions as was framed 
theoretically by reference to Geertz, Asad, Bourdieu and Foucault in the 
previous chapter. However, as this chapter delves further into the 
epistemological and sociological realities of the research currently done, it 
becomes apparent that a reaction or countermeasure to the ‘essentialisation’ 
of the models can be seen in a recent tendency, where the problems and 
inadequacies of defining, ordering and counting Muslims is emphasised. 
This is an attempt to counter the model-tendency and try to deconstruct 
Muslims within the limits of research. The resultant minimum definition of 
Muslims is almost as wide as possible and adds a further factor to the 
already increasing complexity. This deconstruction of Muslims is the point 
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of origin when we begin to define the significant limitations that in turn 
will help us narrow the religio-organisational field in Denmark, Germany 
and England.  
 
3.2 The governing paradigm of models and modelling  
From 1991 to 2002, W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld published a 
series of six edited volumes on The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in 
Western Europe from 1991, on Religious Freedom and the Position of 
Islam in Western Europe from 1995, on Muslims in the Margin: Political 
Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe from 1996, on 
Political Participation and identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States 
from 1996, on Religious Freedom and the neutrality of the State: The 
Position of Islam in the European Union from 2002 and Intercultural 
Relations and Religious Authority: Muslims in the European Union also 
from 2002.  
With these comprehensive thematic investigations, Shadid & 
Koningsveld took great steps towards making sense of Muslims and Islam 
in Western Europe from a specific church and state perspective. An 
abundance of similar volumes with similar thematic approaches were 
published in the same period, such as Islam and European Legal Systems 
by Silvio Ferrari and Anthony Bradney from 2000, Islam and the European 
Union by Richard Potz and Wolfgang Wieshaider from 2004, and Gerhard 
Robbers’ second edition of State and Church in the European Union from 
2005, which does not mention Islam in the title, but certainly addresses it in 
the country reports. More recent volumes in this trend include Islam & 
Europe: Challenges and Opportunities edited by Marie-Claire Foblets in 
2008 and Islam & Europe: Crises are Challenges edited by Marie-Claire 
Foblets and Jean-Yves Carlier from 2010. Also, the Muslim Minorities 
book series, edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen and in particular Muslims in the 
Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society, edited by Brigitte Marechal, 
Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen S. Nielsen in 2003, maps out 
the main characteristics and specific challenges of contemporary European 
Islam. Although it is impossible to mention everything, the Yearbook of 
Muslims in Europe, now in its fourth volume (Brill, 2012) seems to warrant 
a word. It goes country by country to give an overview of Muslims and 
Islam in 46 countries. In addition to this Europe-wide perspective, a body 
of research is expanding on country-specific perspectives, on cross-country 
comparisons with one or more thematic foci and purely thematic or issue-
specific approaches.19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The EURISLAM bibliographical database provides an overview over this body of 
research. It is ”intended for scholars and teachers, and takes into account all 
publications concerning the current situation, in contemporary Europe in a wide sense, 
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Turning the perspective and focus to research projects, the interest in 
Islam and Muslims in the context of church and state inflates greatly. Here 
it seems appropriate to mention the most key of the very large pan-
European top-down sponsored projects such as the ongoing “International 
Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE)”20 research 
network run out of University of Amsterdam, the “Religious Diversity and 
Secular Models in Europe project (RELIGARE)”21 based at University of 
Leuven from 2010 to 2013, “A European Approach to Multicultural 
Citizenship Legal Political and Educational Challenges (EMILIE)”22 
running from 2006 to 2009 out of Bristol University, “Tolerance, Pluralism 
and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in 
Europe (ACCEPT)”23 based at the European University Institute in 
Florence and running from 2010 to 2013, the “European Consortium for 
Church and State Research, (ECCSR)”24 which has been active since 1989 
and the “International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies 
(ICLARS)”25, “European Studies on Religion and State Interaction 
Network (EuReSIS NET)”26, the “Law and Religion Scholars Network 
(LARSN)”27, and the “Sociological and legal data on religions in Europe 
website (EUREL).”28 In addition to and with considerable overlap with the 
projects are the very large national research centres, university departments 
and clusters, such as – but not limited to – the “Erlanger Zentrum für Islam 
und Recht in Europa (EZIRE)”29 at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität 
Erlangen-Nürnberg, the “International Institute for the Study of Islam in the 
Modern World (ISIM),”30 based in Netherlands across four Dutch 
universities, but discontinued in 2008, the “The Impact of Religion – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Islam as a religion (beliefs and religious practices, religious sensibilities) and of 
Muslims as a diversified group of population (Muslim immigration, institutions, public 
regulation). The database contains press articles, books, book sections, study or 
investigation reports, theses, grey literature” (EURISLAM 2013). The database 
currently holds some 4480 entries.   
20 IMISCOE, www.imiscoe.org, - accessed 20 January 2013 
21 www.religareproject.eu, - accessed 20 January 2013 
22 EMILIE at Bristol University webpage, 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/emilie/, - accessed 20 January 2013 
23 http://accept-pluralism.eu/Home.aspx, - accessed 20 January 2013 
24 http://www.churchstate.eu, - accessed 20 January 2013 
25 http://www.iclars.org/, - accessed 20 January 2013 
26 http://www.euresisnet.eu - accessed 20 January 2013 
27 http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/networks/lrsn2.html, - accessed 20 January 2013 
28 http://www.eurel.info, - accessed 20 January 2013 
29 http://www.ezire.uni-erlangen.de/, - accessed 20 January 2013 
30 No website available, but the National Academic Research and Collaborations 
Information System in the Netherlands has this brief about ISIM, 
http://www.narcis.nl/organisation/RecordID/ORG1238811, (accessed 20 January 2013) 
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Challenges for Society, Law and Democracy (IMPACT),”31 which is a 
centre of excellence at Uppsala University sponsored for at ten year period 
from 2008 to 2018, the Centre for Law and Religion in Cardiff32, the 
“Politics, Religion, Institutions and Societies: European Mutations 
(PRISME),”33 based in University of Strasbourg, and the “Centre for 
European Islamic Thought (CEIT),”34 based in Copenhagen. There are 
plenty more, but these are a few of the ones that have informed different 
aspects of this thesis. Finally, of course there are the countless smaller and 
individual projects that are directly, somewhat loosely or not at all 
affiliated with these institutions. Taken together the body of research on 
Islam in relation to state, religion, politics, media, governance, 
globalisation, secularisation, securitisation and so on seems to indicate that 
Islam and Muslims have drawn considerable academic attention from 
church, state and religion scholars. It is from this body of academic 
endeavours, institutions and projects – of which I have only mentioned a 
fraction – that the critical perspectives on modelling discussed here are 
directly and indirectly drawn.35  
The paradigm of modelling has its clearest manifestation in the work of 
Silvio Ferrari. As a key member of many of the Europe-wide research 
groups and programmes, Silvio Ferrari, Professor at the Law Faculty of the 
Universita degli Studi di Milano and president of the International 
Consortium for Law and Religion Studies, has in a series of different 
introductory articles spread over more than a decade suggested and revised 
a model for understanding the position of Islam in the existing church, state 
and religion relations. Analysis of his work shows that he does not only 
suggest patterns and models, but in the span of a decade of articles (Ferrari 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) a history of an understanding of 
Islam’s position in the European models of church and state can be seen in 
three phases. 
In the first phase, a crude but functional tripartite model classifies 
patterns of Church and state relations into separation systems, concordat 
systems and national Church systems (Ferrari 2002: 6). In the second 
phase, the classification is revised to include a greater focus on religious 
rights to freedom and equality. With the focus on these rights the question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 http://www.crs.uu.se/Forskning/impactofreligion/, (accessed 20 January 2013) 
32 http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/, (accessed 20 January 2013)  
33 http://prisme.u-strasbg.fr/pindex.htm, (accessed 20 January 2013) 
34 http://www.teol.ku.dk/ceit/english/, (accessed 20 January 2013) 
35 It must be clearly stated that neither Shadid and Koningsveld, nor Ferrari, nor any 
other of the theorists discussed in this section have any illusions about the durability or 
denies that there are problems with the existing models. In the articles that discuss Islam 
and church-state relations, indeed much time and energy is devoted to elaborating on the 
inadequacies and inabilities of the models. 
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of religious autonomy arises. In the third phase, religious communities and 
churches begin to struggle with the model that defines the state as the point 
of origin of the state-religion relationship. Alliances between different 
religious organisations start forming and the political authority and the 
legal jurisdiction of the state is seriously contested when it comes to the 
question of religion. 
The virtue of the example of Silvio Ferrari’s research in the decade of 
articles is that he not only revises his own point of view in each of the three 
phases, but also develops a criticism of the previous phase. As such, the 
analysis of Ferrari’s work suggests an epitomic case for demonstrating the 
redundancy of modelling and for showing how traditional church and state 
researchers have gone through these three different phases of church and 
state modelling in the attempt to make Islam and Muslims fit into the 
models.  
3.2.1 First phase of modelling: church and state 
In the article aptly titled ‘Islam and the Western European Model of 
Church and State Relations’ (Ferrari 2002), Silvio Ferrari pursues to 
demonstrate how the European model for state and church relations in the 
so-called tripartite classification is in need of amendment with the advent 
of Islamic norms and communities in Europe. The article first introduces 
the patterns of church and state relations as (i) separation systems, (ii) 
concordat systems and (iii) national church systems and secondly revises 
this first phase in suggesting an alternative understanding in order to fit 
Islam and Muslims into the paradigm of the tripartite model. This model 
has been widely used, referenced and criticised in the body of academic 
endeavours mentioned above (e.g., Bader 2007B, Riedel 2008, Sandberg 
2008, all of whom are very critical).   
The first of the tripartite classifications are the countries with a 
separation model of regulating relations between state and church. These 
are the secular ones and include most obviously France, but also Ireland, 
Belgium and the Netherlands fit the model with reasonable variety. The 
Netherlands, for example, has traditionally applied an ordering of society 
into Protestant, Catholic, Liberal and Socialist ‘pillars,’ although with the 
Muslims present as a viable ‘fifth pillar,’ this distinction has in general 
become more difficult and Dutch society is becoming more multicultural 
(Riedel 2008, 259; Kaya 2009, 140). By contrast, France adheres to the 
principles of -laïcité, which can be defined as a layman’s rule. According to 
the ‘Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de 
l'État,’ France is a secular state, where religion has no institutional 
influence on state affairs and where the state is not to interfere with 
religion. Although this is the clearest expression of the separation model, 
even in France the state, the churches and the religions must interact. This 
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is seen in a vast number of issues, such as maintenance of buildings, the 
regulations of the religious labour market, the fundamental freedoms, 
religious functionaries and chaplaincies in the armed forces because the 
1905 law does not apply to the armed forces. By such interaction in 
practice and by such systematic exceptions, it becomes clear that a 
separation model can only explain so much and thus the limits of modelling 
begin to show. In “Church-State relations in Europe and the crisis of the 
‘European social model’” from 2008, Luca Diotallevi argues that 
secularisation does no longer explain the role of religion in Europe: “The 
old paradigm for explaining the crisis of laïcité regimes (the so-called 
‘inherent model’) is not good enough. Indeed, positing the demise of laïcité 
is equivalent to positing the crisis of the old paradigm itself – the crisis of 
the classical secularization theories” (Diotallevi 2008: 128). This echoes 
Jose Casanova, who unequivocally says, “the return of religion to the 
European public sphere as a contentious issue does constitute a challenge to 
European secularism and to European secular identities.” (Casanova 2008, 
74). 
Turning to the second of the tripartite classifications, the concordation 
model also known as the coorporation model or hybrid model, we find in 
this category, states that govern state and religion relations by entering into 
agreements and concordats with religious institutions and churches (Riedel 
2008). The obvious examples are Spain, Italy, Poland and Portugal, 
because these states have a strong history of making legally binding 
bilateral treatises of international law with the Holy See in Rome, who 
speaks on behalf of Catholic institutions internationally. This principle is 
then applied to other religious communities with obvious problems for 
Muslims, who do not by default follow the institutional logics of the strong 
churches (Nalborczyk & Borecki 2011). According to Ferrari (2002), 
Germany also falls into this category with its ongoing negotiation of certain 
corporation status for religious communities and churches together with old 
and implicit agreements with the Catholic and Protestant churches. 
The third of these classification models is the national church model, 
also known as the Establishment model or state church model. Denmark 
and England are the examples followed in this thesis, but the other British 
and Nordic countries have the same or similar model, except perhaps 
Ireland. While everyone has freedom of religion and the freedom to 
worship, there is no religious equality and the state or national Church 
enjoys preferential treatment in the relationship with the state and state 
institutions. There is in some of the countries in this category a tendency to 
disestablish the relationship between state and church, as is seen in for 
example Scotland, where the Church of Scotland was disestablished in 
1921, or in Sweden, where Svenska Kyrkan was so in 2000, changing from 
a state church to a people’s church. In this regard, former Archbishop 
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Gunnar Weman of Uppsala argued, “the disestablishment is coming in a 
friendly climate that should be better for the church. It will be a revival of 
the people’s church’ (Interviewed in Trexler 1996).  
In this tripartite model, Ferrari acknowledges a pattern of church and 
state relations, that was an academic point of reference when scholars 
during the eighties and early nineties tried to make sense of the Europe 
wide perspective. This was done most significantly under the auspices of 
the European Consortium of Church and State Research. Here scholars 
have met on a yearly basis since 1989 and consecutively published the 
proceedings from their meetings in the attempt to map the church and state 
affairs in Europe with a new thematic focus for each issue. Ferrari, 
however, warns against the tripartite classifications and he calls it a ‘gross 
oversimplification’ (Ferrari 2000, 4) and stresses “… the need to tackle the 
question in a more articulate and precise way …” (Ibid.). In his 2002 article 
he clearly states, “… this traditional tripartition is culturally and legally 
outdated. Therefore it is of little use in understanding what is going on in 
the field of Church and State relations…” (Ferrari 2002: 6). Ferrari 
distances himself from the model of this first phase and calls it a ‘leftover 
of a Europe divided.’ In spite of this, however, he insists on a revised 
model of church and state relations, which he builds on a wider basis than 
law and on a common pattern on religious rights protected under the 
authority of the states that have promised to protect the rights of religion. 
Furthermore, Ferrari maintains that a revised model must incorporate and 
understand Islamic principles of regulation of state and religion in order to 
come to grips with the complexity of that is introduced as Islam enters the 
model (Ferrari 2000: 3). Although his criticism of the model is already 
clear by the article from 2000, Silvio Ferrari does not abandon the 
reference to the classification of countries in the tripartite system. In 2008, 
he writes “… although the classification is outdated and does not answer 
the need of contemporary societies, we start with the distinction …” 
(Ferrari 2008: 107). It seems clear that although he adds the reservation of 
the model being outdated, Ferrari still regards it as informative of the 
relations between state, church and religion in Europe – at least at a 
pedagogical level. 
The tripartite model finds its demise by the realisation that religion is a 
living, changing and challenging social fact. The secularisation thesis in its 
varieties and with its proponents accepts that religion is still highly relevant 
and as such secularisation is in need of critical rethinking (Casanova 2008, 
7). In their book on Religion and Democracy in Contemporary Europe, 
Yochi Fischer and Gabriel Motzkin generalise the experience of the ‘re-
entry of religion’ and give voice to a revision of the model of church and 
state:  
 
Governing Models of Church, State and Religion Relations 	  96 
“Until 20 years ago, most scholars in various disciplines adhered to a variety 
of ‘secularization theses’ that stressed the gradual ‘victory’ of secularism 
over the old religious past. The experience of recent decades has shown that 
religion is not about to disappear from the European national public or 
private sphere. On the contrary, the last decades have witnessed the re-entry 
of religions into the public arena, which has involved the emergence of new 
religions with novel features as well as significant changes in the old 
religions. These processes of religious resurgence and religious 
transformation have accelerated and intensified on account of rapid growth 
of immigration and the creation of new diasporic communities that are 
globally networked. In contrast to the idea of a one-track ‘secularization 
process’, religion is now playing an important role in constituting collective 
identities and in shaping both national and international cultural 
characteristics and boundaries”  
(Fischer & Motzkin 2008, 13-14) 
3.2.2 Second phase of modelling: religion and state  
After the criticism of the first phase of the model, Silvio Ferrari asks: 
“Does a European, or at least Western European model, of state-church 
relations exist?” (Ferrari 2003: 226). His answer is neither affirmative nor 
dissentient, but he reframes the problem of state and church modelling and 
changes the perspective. Thus, the second phase is not as much a revision 
of the tripartite classification as it is a framing to extent the model to 
include state relations with both church and religion. The revised model 
focuses on the limits, power and selective cooperation of the state. It 
centres on the state perspective in the individual country and underlines the 
common features of the different national systems. The second phase 
begins to wrestle significantly with the question and position of Islam in 
the church and state model and as the complexity of the issues increases, 
the body of literature begins to expand rapidly.  
As indicated by the bulk of the volumes edited by Shadid and 
Koningsveld, this second phase is spread from mid 1990’es to the first few 
years into the 21st century. Ten years ago, Shadid and Koningsveld wrote 
about the future of Islam and the existing church and state relations; 
“[Islam] could contribute to reform a system of Church-State relations that 
can still offer a sound legal framework to the peaceful co-existence of 
religious groups in Europe” (Shadid and Koningsveld 2002, 2). Equally, 
Ferrari’s earlier articles speak into this phase, most significantly those from 
2000, 2002, and 2003. Arguing out of the criticism of the first phase, he 
suggests a deeper pattern that is characterised by religion and state relations 
rather than church and state relations. As such, the revised model is 
characterised by three features. Firstly, the pattern is characterised by a 
right to and protection of religious liberty. Secondly, the pattern insists on 
the principal incompetence of the state in religious affairs and the 
autonomy of religious groups. Thirdly, it includes the feature of selective 
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cooperation between state and religious groups. These are the three basic 
tenets of the second phase of church and state research. Each of these three 
adds an increased political and cultural European focus while also taking 
serious the legal impact of Islam. Ferrari visualises the new model in a 
pyramid outline of state and religion relations in Europe situated around the 
right to religious liberty and the limits of the state.  
The basic rights of religious communities are guarantied by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights36 (art. 18) and the 
European Convention on Human Rights37 (art. 9), and are signed by most 
countries in Europe (Ferrari 2002, 7). Equally, most European countries 
have provisions for the protection of religious liberty. The protection of 
these basic rights is enforced by the individual states and holds a two-fold 
mandate. On the one hand, the state must make sure that religious practice 
does not inhibit other political or civil rights and there must be no 
discrimination by reference to religion. On the other hand, the states must 
also protect the fundamental values and principles of society, such as rule 
of law, public safety, and general clauses of non-discrimination and 
protection of the individual against what a religious community might see 
as their obligation. To this, Ferrari adds, the important platform of 
collective rights that most religious communities enjoy in Europe. These 
are amongst others the right to assemble, the right to publish and express a 
religious view, the right to educate and teach religion, the right to receive 
financial contributions and the other basic collective freedoms of a 
democracy. The fact this is available to religious communities is by no 
means irrelevant, he says (Ferrari 2002, 8). 
In addition to these fundamental rights, Silvio Ferrari points to the limits 
of state jurisdiction and the autonomy of the religious group as a 
fundamental condition for religious communities in Europe. “The most 
relevant difference among the E.U. States,” says Ferrari, “regards the 
extent of the autonomy granted to religious groups” (Ferrari 2002, 9). 
Many of the European states and certainly Denmark, Germany and England 
hold a constitutional promise of recognition of self-determination and 
autonomy of religious groups with more or less a minimum of 
registration.38 The principle of autonomy is very closely related to that of 
sovereignty in both internal doctrinal and organisational affairs. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Full text available from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (Accessed 20 January 
2013). 
37 Full text available from the European Court of Human Rights, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf, (Accessed 20 Januart 2013).  
38 For England, understand a quasi-constitutional promise or a constitutional principle 
distributed among a number of legal texts and decisions (Turpin & Tomkins 2007).  
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the freedom to decide for one-self and independently is not one that can be 
given by any other entity or force or be dependent of anything external. 
According to liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin, freedom is ultimately 
defined negatively as freedom from something rather than positively as a 
freedom to do something, which in turn is a right rather than a freedom 
(Berlin 1969). In 2001, Gerhard Robbers defined church autonomy as 
“…the right to self-determination of religious bodies. They decide freely 
their teachings and offices, the range of their activities and the shape of 
their structures …” (Robbers 2001: 5).  
In the three country cases, the very question and promise of religious 
autonomy and self-determination is part of the changing of the models of 
state, religion and church. As a negatively defined phenomenon in the 
freedom to decide for oneself, autonomy cannot strictly speaking be given 
at the legislative benevolence of a ruling parliament or government. Rather, 
the sovereignty of self-determining autonomy can only either be recognised 
or denied by the governing polity. The difficulty of autonomy which legal 
scholars from both Denmark (e.g., Christoffersen 2010B), Germany (e.g., 
von Campenhausen 2001) and England (e.g., Hill 2001; Doe 2011; 
Sandberg 2008) return to is where to draw the limit between the right to 
self-determination and the “law that applies to all,” (von Campenhausen 
2001, 83) which includes religious communities. Because there can be no 
exhaustive enumeration of all the laws that apply to all, von Campenhausen 
specifies that “the whole civil law as well as the regulations of the public 
law, which constitute the basis of the public order that applies to all, is part 
of it” (Ibid.). However, according to von Campenhausen not just any 
limitation of the right to self-determination can be made by the legislative. 
While the legislator “hold the sovereignty of lawgiving and determines the 
limits of ecclesiastical autonomy,” he should only make a law “which is 
mandatory for a peaceful communal life in a state, which is neutral towards 
religion and ideology thus respecting the independence of the religious 
communities” (von Campenhausen 2001, 84, original italics). Well 
intended as this overarching principle is with regard to the limits and inner 
affairs of religious life, it does not, however, absolve the fact that the 
autonomy of organised religion is structurally compartmentalised and 
remains at the mercy of the legislative. In the language of the generative 
structuration from chapter two, organised religion is organised in two 
related senses. Not only is organised religion organised by its own internal 
prerogatives, but it is also organised by the structures that the powerful 
bodies of its environment makes available for it. At the end of the day, 
autonomy in the modern constitutional democracies is autonomy on the 
basis of legal delegation (Bader 2007A).  
It is from this context of autonomy that the critical idea of state 
incompetence is derived and Ferrari holds that states do not have the 
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jurisdiction to “… outlaw a religious group just because its doctrine is in 
contrast with State laws” (Ferrari 2002: 9). The important fact here is that 
state – even in the sum of the separated and delegated powers – is by far 
omnipotent and that there are serious limits to what a religious community 
can be held accountable for. The individual may be punished for 
polygamous marriage,39 but the Islam as religion and the Muslim 
community may freely support polygamy. The question has everything to 
do with the struggle between competing norms, as was introduced in 
chapter two, but which we will return to later in chapters five, six and 
seven. 
Having framed the limits of state and the rights of religious 
communities, Ferrari sketches a pyramid to illustrate the relationship of 
religious communities to the state that governs through formal and informal 
agreements and arrangements to the result of a selection amongst the 
religious communities. This is a key aspect of how the second phase of 
state-church-relations research understands the patterns as it draws up the 
levels of the pyramid. The defining feature that determines the cooperation 
of the model is the proximity of values of the religious community to the 
values of the state: “generally speaking, co-operation is broader where the 
central principles and values of a religious group are in accordance with the 
principles and values shared by the majority of the … society” (Ferrari 
2002, 10).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Such is the case of a former leader of the Slough Tory party, Pervez Choudhry, who 
admitted to and was convicted of bigamy. 
http://www.sloughobserver.co.uk/news/slough/articles/2012/05/22/59745-/ (Accessed 
June 12, 2012) 
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Figure 3.1: The Silvio Ferrari pyramid priority of selective State co-
operation40  
 
 
An important aspect of the three features of second phase of modelling is 
that they introduce not only compartments and positions defined in relation 
to the state, but also that these are separated by norms and normative 
institutions that all govern the appropriate level into which a religious 
community is allowed. “Climbing from the first to the second platform of 
the pyramid,” Silvio Ferrari argues, “is subjected to some kind of State 
registration or recognition, that is to some kind of State control…” (Ferrari 
2002, 10). The appropriate difference may be clear in the language of core 
values which are compatible with state values, but the impact of this 
difference is governed by state sponsored norms of distinction, 
differentiation and separation according to the logic of norms as presented 
and discussed in chapter two. Here Bourdieu reminds us that such criteria 
should “account for the set of meaningful and significant differences that 
objectively separate entities in the field,” and which “enable a set of 
relevant differences … to arise” (Bourdieu 1996, 232). The impact of such 
a differentiation will be explored both later in this chapter and in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 This diagram is drawn from the descriptions in Ferrari 2002, 10-11. Later on, he adds 
that the close relationship with state at the 3rd level of the pyramid can even result in 
the values of religion, say for example Catholic values, to be ”…raised to the rank of 
civil religion.” (Ferrari 2010, 29) 
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chapter five on the gate-keeping institutions in the Danish religio-
organisational field. 
Two final perspectives of this second model must be stressed. On one 
hand, it explicitly refers to religion rather than churches, which adds 
nuance and complexity to the model. On the other hand, it demonstrates the 
unequal distance between state and the different religious groups and 
communities. As such, the pyramid model focuses on the state perspective 
and frames many of the in-detail questions into the priority of the selective 
state cooperation.  
These reservations notwithstanding, Silvio Ferrari is still able to 
conclude this about the features and models: “It must be stressed that the 
model described in this paragraph is just a model: it does not correspond 
perfectly to the Church-State system in force in any E.U. country. But it is 
fair to say that everywhere State co-operation with religious groups is 
selective and graduated …” (Ferrari 2002). The state maintains a selective 
prerogative and, obviously, this concerns Islam. Fitting Islam into the 
model, it is assumed that Islam will organise, represent itself and try to 
climb from the first level to the second. It is clear from the very struggle 
with models and modelling that Islam is primarily understood in relation to 
this hierarchy of state relations and that institutional and organisational 
Islam is expected to orient itself in relation to the model and integrate itself 
into the given frame.  
As such, the second phase ends as each phase does when the model is 
unable to answer or explain what is going on in a satisfactory degree. This 
time, however, it seems the problem with the expectations build into the 
pyramid model occurs when Islam and Muslims do not conform to the 
space set aside for it. Here – amongst others41 – Werner Menski has 
demonstrated that an alternative legal order is forming and that Islam and 
Muslims are far from dependent on the paths of other religious 
associations. Menski specifically has pointed to angrezi shariat as an 
English Shari’a (lit. trans. from Urdu, Pearl & Menski 1998, 73). As such, 
it is an experiment with bringing together the internal structures of the 
Muslim community and the external frames that are set up by the English 
state. In Pearl & Menski’s analysis constitutes a new form of “recreating 
shari’a in Britain” (ibid.: 74). The hybrid angrezi shariat occurs because 
Muslims have slowly learned to navigate their legal needs between the 
traditional norms of the Muslim community and the official legal system. 
Pearl & Menski indicate that the English legal system is understood by 
Muslims as valid jurisdiction, but that it is only recognised as such out of 
necessity. “… the development of angrezi shariat is marked by awareness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See c.f., Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity from 2009 by Grillo et al. 
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of the need to combine the requirements of both legal systems” (Pearl & 
Menski 1998: 77).  
The construction of angrezi shariat as an object of research is an attempt 
to develop a model for how Muslims at a late stage in their integration in 
England begins to take a critical and active stance. Pearl & Menski calls it 
“... a process of consciously building the English legal requirements into 
the framework of localised shari’a rules" (ibid.). However, as of recent, 
some Muslims have started to ignore the English legal system, even though 
they are aware that it has jurisdiction. “… British Muslims, men and 
women, are now refusing to accept English law as binding for them and 
feel that recourse to Muslim law in Britain, albeit unofficial, is preferable” 
(Menski 2008: 60). Thereby they renounce the formal legal certainty that 
the state guarantees to both Muslims and everyone else. They have no 
confidence in the official system. According to Menski, this is a new stage 
in the development of angrezi shariat. The hybrid is rejected, the legal 
needs, demands and security of the Muslim legal subjects disappear from 
the knowledge and watchful eye of the state, and an informal shari'a is 
preferred to the public ‘angrezi,’ “After 9/11 and 7/7 we are now learning 
that many Muslims in Britain are simply refusing to follow English legal 
requirements, even though they are aware of them. This is a new … stage” 
(Menski 2008: 48). 
3.2.3 Third phase of modelling: the Islamic challenge  
The realisation out of this is that the state has to do with an Islam that does 
not conform neither to the governance models of the legal system nor to the 
analytical models of the scholars. In this context Veit Bader (2007B) 
introduces his perspective on the governance of Islam with the insight that 
focus needs to turn away from the internal aspects of Islam and instead 
towards the external frame. In a sense, this is a reflexive turn in two 
parallel steps. Firstly, the state institutions begin to realise that the models 
and assumptions have their limits and that also the state and government 
institutions must change its regulatory and governmental paradigms. The 
state has to include itself in the equations of regulating religion and can no 
longer – if ever – assume the prerogative of the invisible hand or power to 
regulate systemically. This is the challenge that Islam poses to the states. 
Secondly, the academics researching state, church and religion relations 
also reflexively realise that the framing environment of religion has 
significant impact. It is no longer enough to research Islam on its own 
premises with its everyday religiosity or its doctrinal articulations, but the 
agency and position of Islam must be taken into the perspective of the 
researcher and thus into the models. “… We can see a shift from research 
of the internal structure and culture of Muslim religiosity – the formation of 
their associations and organisation, the development of Muslim identities 
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(if any) – to the ‘way in which societies create opportunities for the 
development of Islam, or oppose them,’ in other words, to the external 
opportunity structure generally” (Bader 2007B).  
This is what can be called the institutionalist turn in research on Islam in 
Europe and taken together with the Islamic challenge – in that Islam is not 
challenged, but rather challenging the governmental and academic 
presumptions (Klausen 2005, The Islamic Challenge) – it inaugurates the 
third phase of modelling. With the dual realisation as the state and religion 
models are challenged by Islam, it becomes explicit that churches and 
Muslim organisations alike share the problems of recognition and 
autonomy in relation to the state. The third phase begins with dual 
reflection on the bias of modelling which coincides with the entering into 
explicit alliance between churches and Muslim organisations resolving 
pressing issues without the state locally (Jonker 2003, 60) and in joined 
lobbying of the state on a national level (Modood 1998; Ferrari 2008, 108; 
Fetzer & Soper 2005). 
With their Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany from 
2005, Fetzer & Soper were amongst the first to actively engage with a 
critical examination of the influence that the existing models of church and 
state had upon the conditions of Islam in these three countries. Their 
overarching research question concerns why different states have 
responded differently to the needs of Muslims (Fetzer & Soper 2005, 2, 
12). The overall argument of Fetzer & Soper is indeed a part of the 
institutional turn in the study of Muslims in Europe. The correlation of the 
generative structuration seems to be direct, as Fetzer & Soper seek to 
examine the hypothesis that “… the constitutional and legal status of 
religions in each nations, along with the historical context through which 
the institutions of church and state have been related, are very significant in 
shaping how Britain, France and Germany have accommodated the 
religious needs of Muslim groups” (Fetzer  & Soper 2005, 13). Although 
the focus is indeed the relationship between the states and Muslims, the 
questions of ‘accommodating’ and ‘shaping’ posed are addressed more to 
the state and the frame that the state provides than it is to Muslims and 
organised Islam. Similar to Jytte Klausens analysis of the challenge that 
Islam poses to the political agendas in contemporary Europe (Klausen 
2005), Fetzer & Soper apply a language of the Islamic challenge to the 
state and to the models the state has applied so far “… the migration and 
the settlement of a large number of Muslims into Western Europe poses a 
challenge to the existing church-state arrangements in countries and has 
resurrected somewhat dormant religious disputes…” (Fetzer  & Soper 
2005, 6). 
At this point it is significant to note that Silvio Ferrari maintains that 
“European Islam has yet to find a precise place within the European model 
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of Church-State relations,” (Ferrari 2006: 88). After exploring the model of 
state religion relations in the pyramid of the second phase of modelling, he 
still insists that the critical evaluation of the models of state and religion 
relations is far from complete. On par with Bader and Fetzer & Soper, 
Ferrari is well aware that the burden of shaping and changing belongs to 
the state and the government institutions. From this realisation he goes on 
to explore the aim of “identifying a methodology with which to evaluate 
the possibility of accepting the requests put forward by the Muslim 
community, bearing in mind the European model of relations between 
states and religions…” (Ferrari 2003, 242 / Ferrari 2006, 89). Although he 
goes on to list and discuss the items put forward by the Muslim community 
that cause the scandals (gr., σκάνδαλον, lit., stumbling block) in state and 
religion relationship, Ferrari does not specify what this methodology 
implies.  
As the institutional and organisational fact of Islam begins to gain 
influence in the change of the modelling, political opportunities and 
strategic alliances become available to Muslims and Muslim organisations 
(Fetzer & Soper 2005, 10-13). Far from left, passively at the mercies of 
state powers of recognition, approval, acknowledgement and 
accommodation, Islam enters the politics of multiculturalism (Modood 
2005), which can be seen by the growing language of alliances between 
churches and Muslim organisations in opposition to the state (Ferrari 2008, 
108). The clearest example, which is also returned to in chapter seven, is 
that of the Church of England and the willingness to re-interpret the 
mandate of the Bishops in the House of Lords as speaking on behalf of all 
religion in consultation with other religious denominations. This is done 
exactly in understanding of the need to accept the religious pluralism in 
contemporary England, and thus building a stronger case for the interests of 
religion. Fetzer & Soper observe, “Britain’s established Church has been an 
ally of Muslims, who want the state to positively recognize their religious 
claims. The religious establishment provided institutional access for 
Muslims to make the case of their religious needs for state recognition. 
Moreover, the religious establishment sustains a cultural assumption shared 
by most Muslims that religion has a public function and that it is 
appropriate for the state and religious groups to cooperate to achieve 
common goals” (Fetzer & Soper 2005, 38).  
From a Danish perspective this highly visible and very public position of 
religion would be difficult to imagine. “In Denmark, religion is generally 
believed to belong to the private sphere, and the Evangelical Lutheran 
majority church is considered to have only a very limited role in society…” 
(Kühle 2011C: 209). On this question, there is ongoing political and 
academic debate as to what the Danish model of religion should include 
and how it should be framed. A Danish politician, Ms PVB, representing 
Governing Models of Church, State and Religion Relations 	  	  
	  
105 
one of the parties in government reflected in an interview the ambiguities 
of the Danish calibration of modelling: “I don’t want a model where 
religion is completely in the realm of the private sector, outside the reach of 
the public, but I don’t want us to be a non-secular society either. I would 
like a middle road where we make religion part of the society and 
community, somewhere between the state and the free market …” (PVB, 
quoted in Vinding & Christoffersen 2012). Recently, there has been put 
considerable academic effort into qualified discussion of what changes are 
coming to the Future Model of Religion in Denmark (Christoffersen, 
Iversen, Kærgård & Warburg 2012).  
At the present state of the models of state, church and religion – 
especially as they are expressed in Silvio Ferrari’s research – it seems that 
something has got to give. Muslim organisations have voiced their 
demands and needs for rights for at least three decades and at the 
institutionalist turn with the alliances of religion it seems that an opposition 
to the state is forming. However, there remains a significant tendency to fit 
Islam into the model of church and state research and Ferrari throughout 
the decade maintains that “…the fundamental principles of the European 
model of relationships between religion, politics and law cannot be altered” 
(Ferrari 2000, 5). The frame of mind that insists on modelling is very much 
well and alive in the scholars and research of today. This is only natural as 
models may be fruitful and productive if revised frequently enough. 
Furthermore, in the investigations of the kind that needs to be done in 
Europe now and in the future, the models will prove important stepping 
stones towards a more nuanced picture. As no-one can cope with 
everything all of the time, some things need simplified descriptions, which 
models amply supply. However, and this is the task of the next section, the 
modelling frame of mind and the lingering of depleted models may do 
more harm than good.  
From this short review of the three phases of modelling and modulation 
of the relationship between state, church and religion, as challenged by the 
catalyst of Islam, it seems that some considerable ‘perils of modelling’ 
arise (Bader 2007B).  
 
3.3 “The peril of modelling” and other criticisms 
The interesting thing about the different phases of modelling as seen 
through Silvio Ferrari’s research is that while he is one of the most 
significant reproducers of the models in the academic literature of the 
1990s and 2000s, he is equally one of the most vocal of its critics. Ferrari 
has somehow become a spokesman for both the model and its 
shortcomings. Each of the six articles referenced here reproduce an aspect 
of modelling in one of the phases discussed and actively applies it as a 
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frame for understanding the European configuration of constitutional law. 
At times, however, he is one of the most explicit critics of the tripartite 
model “… this traditional tripartition is culturally and legally outdated. 
Therefore it is of little use in understanding what is going on in the field of 
Church and State relations…” (Ferrari 2002: 6). In all fairness, this quote 
reveals that Ferrari does distinguish between the models and the realities of 
the ‘field of Church and State relations,’ but he never really departs from 
the paradigm of modelling.  
The paradigm of models has been criticised from different disciplines 
and different contexts. The present section will limit itself to a critical 
perspective from each of the three countries of interest to the thesis, before 
returning to Veit Bader’s ‘perils of modelling’ and the institutional 
shortcomings of the attempts to model state, church and religion relations. 
Taking a cue from the criticism voiced by Silvio Ferrari and recognising 
the limits of law in the struggle to perceive the ‘complex interactions 
between laws and religion,’ Russell Sandberg develops an outline of an 
alternative to modelling (Sandberg 2008: 329). Sandberg calls the 
‘conventional approach misguided,’ he suggests that the models themselves 
have become ‘a barrier to the understanding of law and religion’, and he 
vocally calls for ‘critically evaluating the model approach’ by striving 
towards a ‘new conceptualisation of the field of law and religion’ 
(Sandberg 2008: 329-330). Criticising the tripartite model of the first phase 
of modelling, he deconstructs the country perspectives one by one until 
only the flawed and crude generalisations remain. While the separation 
model is shown to be myth and the idea of neutrality and secularity as a 
passive obligation is refuted, Sandberg collapses the distinctions between 
the state church categorisation on the one hand and the residual category of 
the hybrid country models on the other. His criticism of the state church 
categorisation is at least three-fold and leaves the category, to which 
Denmark and England belongs, in ruins (Ibid.). 
Firstly, the countries labelled under the state church heading do indeed 
have a preferential relationship with one religious community, but this is 
only by the fact of the constitutional letter. Many of the other countries in 
Europe has a special relationship with one church, be it either the Catholic 
Church in Southern Europe or the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe, 
the only difference is the formality of the relationship. The perspective of 
constitutional law neglects both the social realities and the positivity of the 
lived law in the courts and administrations across Europe and the models 
that build on it are blind to these perspectives.  
Secondly, Sandberg goes even further in his criticism. He argues that 
merely stating the fact of state churches or established churches says very 
little about the legal regulation of religion in these countries in general 
(Sandberg 2008, 331). As a matter of fact, there is an argument to be made 
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that the established churches are the special cases on the backdrop of 
general principles of freedom and equality of religion that the states would 
apply to all religions (Vinding 2012). From this point of view, the ordering 
of state relations to religion should begin at the general principles and then 
at look at the special and singular cases of the established churches. In 
Denmark and England, especially, the nature of the established church is 
the object of serious study, as we shall see in the sections on Denmark and 
England in the next chapter.  
Thirdly, and this follows from the previous point, the focus on the state 
church ignores the nature of the relationship with the other religious 
groups. This echoes the criticism presented in the second phase, but the 
assumption is of the state church countries that they are religiously 
homogeneous. This is as far from the reality as can be and it is 
counterproductive to understanding the serious challenges that the states 
face with pluralism and multiculturalism. There is no state or government 
in Europe that does not somehow relate to or cooperate with the religious 
groups and communities within their dominion. In his argument, Sandberg 
convincingly demonstrates that the complex nature of the state church 
countries qualifies them for the residual category of the hybrid or 
corporation rather than a distinct mislabelled category (Sandberg 2008, 
331).  
Sandberg changes perspective and turns to the hybrid category. As the 
residual category it is for all those countries that do not have either a 
separation model or a state church model, the hybrid or concordation model 
is very difficult to define and seems to have no common distinguishing 
features independently of the other tripartite perspectives. More or less 
formal agreements of cooperation characterises most of the countries in 
Europe whether it is rights and support, pending recognition, or informal, 
historically favoured positions. The only real distinction between state 
church countries and hybrid countries is, according to Sandberg, that “… 
the favouring of a particular religious group is provided in a different 
constitutional form, in terms of agreements as opposed to classical 
establishment” (Sandberg 2008, 334). Playing favourites in regards to 
religion seems to be a feature of most, if not all, European countries.  
This point is amplified by reference to Germany,42 where Sandberg’s 
criticism of the tripartite models and the collapsing categories addresses 
Gerhard Robbers’ characterisation of Germany as a hybrid model, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Summerizing her analysis of the troubles and struggles concerning Muslim 
organisations in Germany, Schirin Amir-Moazami argues “the German model is today 
characterised by the principle of coorperation between church and state institutions, 
which attributes to the Christian churchs a remarkably strong public role. Depending on 
one’s standpoint, Germany is therefore characterised a having undergone a ‘friendly’ or 
an ‘incomplere’ version of church and state separation” (Amir-Moazami 2005, 270). 
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amalgamated model, that follows the middle road between state church and 
strict separation (Robbers 2005, 579). Sandberg argues that ”the existence 
of a formal agreement is merely a reflection of the cooperationist nature of 
the system rather than the proof of the existence of a cooperationist 
system” (Sandberg 2008, 334). Sandberg’s argument reiterates the early, 
but very saying, observation of Monsma & Soper’s that Germany can be 
labelled as ‘an informal multiple establishment’ (Monsma & Soper 1997: 
11). This is a point that Fetzer & Soper returns to and argues that the 
multiplicity of establishment is both at the national level with several 
religious organisations and at the länder levels (Fetzer & Soper 2005, 105). 
Ultimately, Sandberg finishes his critical review of the model by 
summarizing that ‘it seems that the characteristics commonly attributed to 
hybrid states are invariably characteristics common to Europe as a whole 
and cannot distinguish or justify the existence of a separate ‘catch-all’ 
category” (Sandberg 2008, 335). He reiterates Ferrari’s repeated critique, 
while doing little to hide the fact that Silvio Ferrari laments the persistent 
recourse to an outmoded model and thus “… the question of whether there 
is a preferable approach remains unanswered” (Sandberg 2008: 336). 
Common to many of the scholars and researchers, who are trying to 
grapple the Muslims out of the models of state and church, is that they find 
fault with the initial attempt of defining religion generally and defining 
Muslims specifically. Amongst others, scholars from minority studies and 
from religious studies argue that models not only frame and define the 
relations to state and other religions, but that they label, essentialise and 
even define Muslims in this relationship. Amongst others Nadia Jeldtoft 
argues that “… the process of counting and identifying is … neither 
objective nor neutral, because it always depends on contextual and 
relational circumstances” (Jeldtoft 2009, 9). Out of a Danish context, she 
argues that Muslims are such a heterogeneous group that do not easily fit 
one category, but rather constitute a ‘complex empirical reality’ (Jeldtoft 
2009, 10). Politicians and statisticians obviously do this, but researchers 
also fall prone to the reductionist essentialisation: “… When Islam research 
all the time focuses on how minorities are religious and ask people what 
role Islam plays in their lives, a definitional pressure arises and the 
interviewees will describe their religiosity in an other way, because they 
are all the time being told that they are Muslims” (Jeldtoft 2007, my 
translation).43 In this process, Islam research amplifies the biases of the 
models rather than adding analytical nuance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The original Danish qoute: ”Når islamforskningen hele tiden fokuserer på, hvordan 
minoriteten er religiøs, og spørger folk, hvor stor en rolle islam spiller i deres liv, så 
opstår der et definitorisk pres, og interviewpersonerne kommer til at beskrive deres 
religiøsitet på en anden måde, fordi de hele tiden får at vide, at de er muslimer… ” 
(Jeldtoft 2007) 
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As similar point is made by Riem Spielhaus, who is researching the 
German discourses of defining and ‘making sense of Muslims.’ Spielhaus 
takes cue from Peter Mandaville (2007) and applies his observations to the 
contested German contexts. Mandaville argues that “not all of those 
identified as European Muslims necessarily identify primarily or even 
strongly with Islam. Many are ‘Muslims’ in the sense of having an ethno-
national background from a Muslim majority country” (Mandaville 2007, 
294). In the context of recent German debates Spielhaus argues that the 
construction of Muslims in public and academic models and the subsequent 
identification as ‘those Muslims’ remains a reductionist stigmatization: “… 
the terminology of religious differentiation leads to the reduction of 
individuals to their being Muslim or at least to an emphasis on this fact” 
(Spielhaus 2010, 25). Religion as identifier is emphasised at the expense of 
nuance and complexity in the economic, political, social and legal debates 
about the future of Germany and the community of those who live in 
Germany. In a sense, religion becomes the overarching explanatory 
category that every argument returns to. “Religion thereby becomes the 
pattern for explaining both positive but especially negative social 
behaviour. This obscures the more complex reality that religion is neither 
the only nor the most important identity for the majority of Muslims, and it 
is certainly not the only reason for their actions” (Spielhaus 2006, 18).  
Both the Danish and the German analysis of the modelling made by 
researchers and politicians alike and its crude representation of the 
empirical data, reveal some of weaknesses of models and how these expose 
themselves to considerable risk, cf. chapter two, section 2.4.7. If the 
assumptions and the theories, on which the models are built, do not hold 
true or are attuned to the changes, variety and the dynamics of the real 
world, the models do a disservice to those who rely on them. In the 
chapters to come, this will be shown to be the case in all three countries, 
and Spielhaus is adamant that this is what is currently happening in 
Germany, “the assumption that all people coming from Muslim countries 
are a closely related group, whose supposedly joint interests could be 
represented by a single delegation, is a false assessment of the situation and 
partially caused by the misleading term being used to describe them” 
(Spielhaus 2006, 20).   
A final critical perspective returns to Veit Bader’s warning against the 
‘perils of modelling’ (2007B). From an institutionalist perspective Bader 
addresses the “inherent problems of constructing models of regimes of 
governance of religion” (Bader 2007B, 873). His argument is that the 
regimes of religious governance face the critical ‘perils of modelling’ if 
they do not approach these with proper concern. Bader warns against 
overreliance on patterns, because unforeseen changes will appear with time 
and an over-focus on patterns will neglect this. It seems that for every 
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variable exchanged for a constant the model is likely to become 
increasingly redundant (Bader 2007B, 875). Furthermore, he warms against 
the overexposure of similarities to the exclusion of heterogeneous elements 
that do not fit the models. It is often the heterogeneous elements that are the 
most interesting (Ibid.). Finally, he warns against trading of coherence 
against sensitivity of the model in that it seems models allow only for one 
or the other (Bader 2007B, 876). 
 
3.4 Fragments of alternatives  
Although the criticism of the models may be significant, although the 
attempts at defining Muslims are failing and at times inappropriate, and 
although much of the language used insufficiently describes the complex 
nature of law, religion and churches in contemporary Europe, there are a 
few serious attempts at framing an alternative to modelling. For the 
purpose of highlighting the difficulties with overcoming modelling, three 
scholars have given voice to sketch fragments of some alternatives to 
modelling. For one, Veit Bader’s alternative is an institutionalist focus on 
governance based on the complex of actual interactions. Secondly, Silvio 
Ferrari is calling for a reexamination of the foundations of European law. 
Thirdly, Lene Kühle returns to Bourdieu and his relevance in a critical 
study of conflict and contestation in pluralistic societies (Kühle 2011A, 
2012B).  
Implicitly in Veit Bader’s warnings and criticism of modelling there is a 
suggestion for an alternative that points in the direction of a new, 
institutionally sensitive research agenda for the understanding and 
governance of religion and Islam in the contemporary European reality. 
Bader’s argument remains that models are important, but that it is equally 
important to keep in mind the actualities and complexities of the structures 
studied. This is indeed part of the institutionalist research agenda and it 
assumes many of the concepts and theories introduced in chapter two. In 
order to conduct studies of societal structures and in order to properly apply 
the technologies of governance that – according to Bader - is a 
supplementary alternative to modelling, researchers and politicians alike 
must inform themselves of two necessary conditions of governance.  
Firstly, researchers and politicians need to widen the focus not only to 
the religious institutions and organisations directly involved. Rather, argues 
Bader, they need to take heed of the “relevant interactions between 
economic, social, cultural, political, legal, juridical, administrative and 
religious relations in all their diversity” (Bader 2007B, 873). He further 
insists that, “studies of society-religion patterns have to analyse all 
mechanisms of action-coordination – markets, networks, associations, 
communities, private and public hierarchies – and all relevant coalitions of 
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actors, their organisations and strategies, including governments at all 
levels” (ibid.). Comprehensiveness seems to be the operable word to 
describe Bader’s first focus. 
Secondly, rather than limiting themselves to the constitutional 
perspective, which has been the approach of the prevailing models, 
researchers and scholars must look at what is actually done. Echoing 
Sandberg and others, Bader argues that “much less research has been done 
on what state (e.g. courts, administrations) actually do, on how these 
diverse and changing practices relate to the country-specific predominant 
legal models or ideological policy-models, and on how different religious 
minorities respond to those policies, which include not only legal 
opportunities and threats but a broad spectrum of other resources (money, 
expertise, networks etc) and policy options (incentives and persuasions)” 
(Bader 2007B, 875).44  
With these two conditions of governance and with Bader insisting on this 
‘fuller analysis’ it seems almost impossible to make any models at all. 
Bader does not shy away from complexity and it seems that the 
comprehensive governance approach championed here needs complexity to 
be effective. With its resonance to Foucaultian bio-power, it seems the 
governance and the governmentality in play tries to transcend the need for 
models. The governance of the modern state strives to know everything 
about its subjects and with comprehensive knowledge seeks to control ‘one 
and all’ (“Omnes et Singulatim,” Foucault 2002). As such it will seek to 
build only normative models for the population to follow while seldom 
relying on crude generalisations or reductions of complexity. Veit Bader’s 
endeavour is to insist that the state, church and religion relations are 
understood and analysed in these terms.  
As Silvio Ferrari comments on the crisis that Islam presents to the 
revised models, he points to the limits of law. He insists that if the models 
are outdated it must be because there is a need for revised foundational 
principles upon which to create a new legal commonality in Europe. Silvio 
Ferrari sketches what seems like a manifesto for devising an alternative or 
supplement to modelling. This concerns “the definition of the lineaments of 
a European law in order to provide the frame within which to place the 
different national legislations and their provisions with regard to Islam. It is 
necessary to identify a few principles, which translate what is in common 
in the legal tradition of Europe, leaving ample room for what is different in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The question of ‘how’ as Bader champions here concerns the instrumentality of 
technologies and production. As was seen in chapter two, section five, norms these are 
to be understood as structural instruments. As demonstrated in the three specifications 
of section 2.5, these are technologies that perform a desired function when applied. In 
order to understand how all the diverse institutions and organisations in the religio-
organisational field do what they do, we must analyse the technologies. 
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the individual national realities. A reexamination of the foundations of 
European law is called for. This must be done in such a way as to allow us 
to integrate the values of a different legal culture into the context of a new 
‘ius commune’. It is on this ground that the legal approach can provide an 
original contribution towards resolving the problems raised by the Muslim 
presence in Europe” (Ferrari 2000, 8).  
It is difficult to assess the extents of this very ambitious and very 
European call for the re-examination of European foundational values. This 
fragment of Ferrari’s conclusions is his original, legally based contribution 
to the problems brought out by the presence of Islam and Muslim 
organisations. Ferrari seems to take the full logical consequence of the new 
socio-economic outline of Europe. His solution is nothing short of a new 
‘ius commune’ – a new common law – based on those few core values that 
may fathom and frame all the peoples, cultures, religions and traditions of 
Europe. ‘Re-examining’ is the operative term and it seems that Ferrari is 
willing to apply the first two of the technologies of norms, as seen in 
chapter two, section 2.4.5 and 2.4.6. Ferrari’s alternative to the old models 
is to reconstruct the principles on which these models where negotiated. To 
do this he must redefine the common denominators of Europe.  
From a pluralist perspective, a third alternative to modelling could be 
suggested. In her dissertation from 2004, Lene Kühle defines the field of 
religious power as a way to study relations between religions in a 
contested, pluralistic situation (Kühle 2004; 2012B). She writes, “the 
existence of a religious field of power is identified by existence of a 
specific logic (capital) and specific existence of relations between religious 
organizations. These relations can be seen directly as ‘objective’ social 
relations in the form of cooperation, competition, or hostility” (Kühle 
2012B, 12). As specific competitors in a field of power, religious agents 
seek to gain the recognition of their religion and affirmation of their 
religious capital as genuine and therefore of value to the wider religious 
field (Ibid.). This power struggle between limited numbers of producers of 
religious capital is a struggle with different strategies, which rests on a 
common logic. The field of religious power rests on the agreement that 
religion as such is relevant and that it is worthwhile. The religious 
disagreement comes second to this premise. Therefore the introduction of 
Islam into the spheres of state and church and the subsequent struggles to 
reframe the nuances and complexity of religious diversity is a testimony to 
the viability of a concept of field (Ibid., 13).  
In a perspective of models, Lene Kühle demonstrates that the concept of 
field is an applicable alternative. Rather than a reduction of complexity by 
reducing variety to simpler constants, the field is an alternative, as it 
reduces complexity by scope. The field perspective is focus on that which 
is worth fighting over, those who fight and what divides them. This is the 
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logic of the field. From the perspective of this governing focus, all relevant 
empirical evidence must be taken into account. Thus she calls for new 
research programs, where “new types of data on religion-state relations 
need to be collected in addition to traditional data” (Kühle 2011A, 116)  
Studying the field does not yield exhaustive information on everything, 
nor does it give a wide overview, but neither does it propose to do so. It 
does, however, give a reliable focus on conflict, which allows for emphasis 
on heterogeneity and it is capable of a limited and concentrated coherent 
and sensitive snapshot of conflict.  
 
3.5 Conclusions and steps towards the religio-organisational field 
The analysis and discussions in the present chapter has focused on the 
governing models of church, state and religion relations in Europe with a 
special focus on Islam as a catalyst for revisions of these models. Drawing 
on the concepts from chapter two, the models constructed and applied by 
academics and politicians are locked in their dual nature. On one hand they 
are models of a reality because they are built on an empirical reality and are 
presented as simplifications that contain the most important variables of the 
complex, difficult and insurmountable empirical evidence. As such, models 
are important tools in the attempt to master the many facets of state, church 
and religion relations. On the other hand, the models are also shown to be 
attempts to structurally transform Islam and Muslim organisations, because 
models have a strong normative claim over the modelled. They are 
normative propositions that in the attempt to define and delimit in fact 
essentialise and reduce the object of concern to fit the models. The critical 
discussion about the perils of modelling has demonstrated this and Veit 
Bader’s comments supplement the discussion of model representivity and 
the laws of requisite variety from chapter two, sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 
nicely. Stating that a model or regulator can only model or regulate 
something to the extent that it has sufficient internal variety to represent it, 
the laws of requisite variety are given additional governmental perspective. 
Bader reminds us that with additional variety comes additional difficulty in 
modelling, because models tend to overexpose of similarities, exclude 
heterogeneity and can seldom be both coherent and sufficiently sensitive to 
a comprehensive analysis of the complex evidence of church, religion and 
state relations (Bader 2007B, 876). 
The criticism of the models made Russell Sandberg call for ‘critically 
evaluating the model approach’ by striving towards a ‘new 
conceptualisation of the field of law and religion’ (Sandberg 2008: 329-
330). Similarly, Silvio Ferrari who was giving voice to the three models 
discussed in the chapter, nonetheless criticised the models, calling them 
‘gross oversimplifications’ (Ferrari 2000, 4) as these were “of little use in 
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understanding what is going on in the field of church and state” (Ferrari 
2002, 8). Ultimately, he argued for “a more articulate and precise way” of 
analysis and he suggested a critical reexamination of the foundations of 
European law in order to build a new, Europe wide ‘ius commune,’ that 
could resolve the Islamic challenges to state and law. In addition, to these 
two alternatives, Lene Kühle noted the urgency of reformulating state and 
religion relations and applying a field focus rather than attempting to build 
models, new research programs, where “new types of data on religion-state 
relations need to be collected in addition to traditional data” (Kühle 2011A, 
116).  
Each of these three contemporary researchers of church, state and 
religion relations applies a qualified term of field as alternative to the 
existing model approach. Sandberg identifies the need for ‘new 
conceptualisation of the field of law and religion,’ Ferrari is determined to 
investigate ‘what is going on in the field of church and state’ and Kühle 
identifies the field as the focus to study the ‘existence of relations between 
religious organizations.’ Therefore, before concluding this chapter it seems 
appropriate to summarize the perspectives that have been brought forward 
and point to the need of analysis of the religio-organisation field as is the 
possible alternative to modelling suggested in this PhD thesis. The religio-
organisational field was conceptually devised in chapter two and has an 
analytical focus on ‘the relations and positions of religious organisations in 
the wider institutional environment.’ As seen throughout the present 
chapter, the analysis, discussions and criticisms of models have yielded 
additional insight as to this religio-organisational field. 
Several critics and analysts (Sandberg 2008, Ferrari 2008, Bader 2007B, 
Spielhaus 2010) referenced in this chapter have voiced concern with the 
complexity of the empirical data that grows when the introduction of the 
many new variables and contested presumptions following the presence of 
Islam. With this presence comes the complexity of culture, ethnicity, 
religion, demography, language and so on, and the explanatory power of 
the models begins to fade. The revisions of the models need to include 
institutions of the organisational environment that Bader listed as ‘markets, 
networks, associations, communities, private and public hierarchies’ with 
its ‘relevant interactions between economic, social, cultural, political, legal, 
juridical, administrative and religious relations in all their diversity’ (Bader 
2007B, 875). As a logical extension of this, Lene Kühle calls for a renewed 
effort to collect new data and conduct new studies in the comprehensive 
breadth and depth of the field in order to, on a continuously revised basis, 
propose new models. What is sought is a comprehensiveness of a more 
complex representation and mapping that does not modulate.  
For this purpose, the religio-organisational field as a distinct focus, 
rather than as a model, seems to be a viable, alternative strategy. The virtue 
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of a field focus is reduction of complexity not by simplification but by limit 
of scope. Rather than a field of religious power, which is defined by the 
value and exchange of religious capital as its governing logics, the religio-
organisational field is a field where the organisational, neo-institutional 
logic governs. Rather than a struggle between different religions, the 
religio-organisational field is a struggle between different organisational 
actors in the struggle for positions and capital of different sorts. The 
religio-organisational field therefore includes state, church and religious 
organisations defined by the logic of organisational institutionality. It is the 
recognition of both the organisational and the religious presence of Muslim 
organisations that is at stake and fought over. The religio-organisational 
field emphasises the number of relations to religious as well as non-
religious actors, organisations and institutions. By contrast to Lene Kühle’s 
field of religious power, the religio-organisational field as analytical 
strategy looks not only for recognition and positional strength amongst 
religious organisations, but between all the relevant influences on this 
struggle for institutional recognition and strong positions. Also in contrast 
to the field of religious power, the religio-organisational field does not 
reflect one single kind of capital, but is focused on the exchange of 
different kinds of capital and the positioning of this capital as symbolic.  
Simply said, success for Muslim organisations in the religio-
organisational field would be to be taken for granted and to be an integrated 
and autonomous part of organised religious life. Failure in the religio-
organisational field, by contrast, would be to disappear from the struggles 
and debates and be relegated to an irrelevant and unrelated position. 
Without anticipating the analysis in the chapters to come, it is safe to say 
that Muslims are at present somewhere in between and that the 
shortcomings of modelling are a testament to this. As long as the state 
maintains a selective prerogative and trying to fit Islam into the model, 
assuming that it will organise like churches, and represent itself to the state 
on the state arbitrarily demands, the struggle of the religio-organisational 
field will be ongoing. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Outlines of the Religio-Organisational Fields in  
Denmark, Germany and England 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Muslims in the religio-organisational field  
Framing and constructing a religio-organisational field is by default a 
particular exercise dealing with concrete entities of time and space. It is 
particular by reference to the organisations that enter into the field and to 
the variety and complexity of the positions available. Perhaps most 
particular to the exercise is the task of framing and understanding the 
relationships that govern the power, the hierarchies and the capital 
available at the most augmented positions in the field. In the religio-
organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England the associated 
institutions of the state do, not surprisingly, hold such augmented and 
defining positions. The legislative, judicial and administrative regulation of 
religion and the law of organised religion are central, because these 
produce and reproduce many of the formal and informal norms that govern 
relations and organise structure. Not only do they regulate the relationship 
of church and religion with the state, but together with the more informal 
norms of the field, they also regulate the relations to other religions and 
other actors in the wider organisational environment.  
The relationship with the state is, of course, of considerable importance 
to a nuanced understanding of the religio-organisational field, but so are the 
intra- and interreligious relations that are outside the jurisdiction and 
political mandate of the state. Of equal importance are the particularities of 
certain religious aspects that are of little relevance to the state. Important 
are also the organisational environment that influences the religious groups 
not by design but by circumstance. Ultimately perhaps, some of the most 
interesting relations in the religio-organisational field are those that are in 
opposition to state regulation and that hold an institutional position of 
counter-power designed to be invisible to the state. Strictly speaking these 
are still in relation to the state and the performance and symbol-production 
is contingent upon the state, but it is so in a cultural, political and religious 
disagreement with government and state affairs.  
The religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England are 
particularly complex, because in these countries there is no single and 
explicit regulatory norm that defines the regulation of the state relations to 
neither religion nor other religions. It was seen in Chapter Three that the 
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constitutional models that would label the different European countries 
were flawed and too simple to describe the complexity of the objects 
framed within the paradigm of church, state and religion relations. The 
categories into which Muslim organisations in Denmark, Germany and 
England were labelled could not satisfactorily explain the particularities or 
the commonalities of the three countries. Russell Sandberg took the failure 
of the tripartite models as an opportunity to introduce an interdisciplinary 
perspective (Sandberg 2008: 329). Silvio Ferrari reprimanded the 
oversimplifications and called for a new principle for regulating European 
church, state, and religion relations in the wake of the emergence of 
European Islam (Ferrari 2000, 4). Veit Bader called for a study programme 
of the ‘relevant interactions between economic, social, cultural, political, 
legal, juridical, administrative and religious relations in all their diversity’ 
(Bader 2007B). None of these alternatives, however, went into significant 
detail and neither is conducive for a comparison of these three countries.  
From a comparison point of view, what is interesting in the three 
countries is that all three are characterised by diversity, ‘fuzziness’ (Menski 
2010) or intertwinement (Christoffersen 2006, Vinding 2009) in the 
approach to religion. None of the three countries employ a single 
unequivocal regulatory norm when dealing with church and religion, and 
there is no unconditional recognition of religion. Nonetheless, all three 
countries have incontrovertibly guaranteed freedom of religion and all 
three have what can be called an established relationship with religion. In 
Denmark, this is the established relationship with the Church of Denmark 
and the Evangelical Lutheran faith. In Germany, this is the ‘informal 
multiple establishment’ (Monsma & Soper 1997, 11; Sandberg & Doe 
2007, 569) relationship with, most notably, the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) and thus with the 
Catholic and the Evangelical Protestant faiths. In England, this is the 
established relationship with the Church of England and the Anglican faith.  
Despite these significant and deeply institutionalised relations embedded 
in the religio-organisational fields and the inescapable connection with the 
state, there is no governing political paradigm or strategy to deal with 
religion and from a sociological point of view different religions are 
privileged in different ways. Each of the three countries has media-debates, 
academics, political parties and opinion makers that try to essentialize 
religion in general or Islam in particular to the specific ends of many 
different agendas. Equally, each of the three countries has had its 
experience with religiously motivated terrorism and as one of many 
consequences, the public position of religion in society have become 
seriously contested. All of which characterise the mark-up of the religio-
organisational field and influence the position of institutionalised Islam and 
Muslim organisations.  
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A final common trait of these three countries and a trait that they share 
with many other European polities is the fact of Islam. ”Today, it is clear 
that Islam is part of Europe’s demographic and cultural landscape. 
Europe’s Muslims are no longer guests that one day will return home, but 
rather Europeans of Muslim faith, who will remain a permanent part of 
Europe’s social and political fabric” (Ramadan 2001, 207).  
The present chapter concerns itself with the structures of this social and 
political fabric. The chapter focuses on four perspectives pertaining to the 
religio-organisational field in each of the three countries. This follows the 
analytical strategy introduced in Chapter Two, building in particular on the 
ideas of Bourdieu (1985, 1986, 1990 inter alia), Bourdieu & Wacquant 
(1992), Powell & DiMaggio (1983, 1991), Hatch (1997) and Scott (2008). 
Firstly, a general historical and socio-legal introduction to the structures of 
the environment in which Islam and Muslim organisations must navigate. 
Specifically, this involves the neo-institutional understanding of the taken-
for-grantedness of the dominating norms and positions in the field. 
Secondly, the chapter presents the current status and challenges of the legal 
regulation of church, state and religion relations. Thirdly, an introductory 
analysis of the Muslims and Muslim organisations concerns itself with the 
positions taken, but also the positions available to the Muslim organisation. 
In turn, this reveals the outline of dominating structures and the strategies 
available to Muslims. This includes an outlook on the inherent and limited 
opportunities for Muslims and the strategic potential of navigating and 
overcoming the structural challenges of the old models and old paradigms, 
which for all there countries include the established relationship of church 
and state (Nielsen (2004; Soper & Fetzer 2005; Klausen 2005; Kühle 2004, 
2012B and others). Fourthly, each section ends with a summary of the 
basic tenets of the religio-organisational field in the country in question.  
Before venturing forth with the country introductions and the outlines of 
fields below, one important caveat must be reiterated. This chapter is by no 
means an exhaustive, or even sufficiently detailed, presentation of the 
religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England. It attempts 
to outline the most important parts of the historical and legal context for 
Islam and Muslims and it introduces some of the most important facts 
about Muslim organisations in their environments in the three countries. 
The chapter is intended to be introductory and to serve as a resource for the 
much more focused and detailed studies into select aspects of the religio-
organisational fields in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
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4.2 An outline of the religio-organisational field in Denmark45 
From a legal point of view, it is the Danish Constitutional Act from 1849 
(Danmarks Grundlov) that governs the frame of the relationship between 
the state, the Church of Denmark and ‘the religious communities other than 
the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark,’ as they are termed in 
Article 69 of the Constitutional Act (My Constitutional Act, 2012, 39). The 
constitutional act has been amended several times, lately in 1953, and apart 
from the deletion of a small section on taxation for the educational system, 
according to Professor of Ecclesiastical Law, Lisbet Christoffersen, the 
“Constitutional law governing relations between State, Church and 
Religions has not been changed in the 160 years since 1849” 
(Christoffersen 2010A, 147). It guarantees freedom of religion and belief 
and there is no legal demand in Denmark to register or to get approval in 
matters of faith and religion. However, there is also no equality of religion 
and the Danish history of regulating religion is characterised by the 
difficulty of deciding politically over religious affairs, even if such political 
settlements should merely regulate the external affairs of religious life 
(Vinding & Christoffersen 2012).  
 With My Constitutional Act (2012), the Danish Parliament has 
published a semi-official English translation of the Constitutional Act with 
explanations by and in consultation with Supreme Court Judge, Jens Peter 
Christensen. Here, Article 4 of the Constitutional Act defines the nature of 
the relationship between State and Church, stating, “The Evangelical-
Lutheran Church of Denmark (Folkekirken) is the established Church of 
Denmark and, as such, is supported by the State” (My Constitutional Act 
2012, 3). Article 4 identifies the confessional specificities of the supported 
church and defines the relationship with the State as obliged to support the 
Church financially as well as in other ways. A direct translation of the 
Article has ‘the Evangelical-Lutheran church is the People’s Church (lit., 
folkekirken) and is supported as such by the state’ (Zahle 2006). 
Apparently, the Danish text does not have the word ‘established,’ nor does 
‘Church of Denmark’ appear twice, but it rather identifies the Evangelical-
Lutheran church – inter alia – as the Church of Denmark. The grammar of 
the Article is a basic subject complement with the Church of Denmark as 
the predicative nominal expression that renames and describes the subject, 
here the Evangelical-Lutheran church. As such, legally speaking the 
Constitutional Act transforms the Church of Denmark from a State church 
to an established Church (My Consitutional Act, 2012, 3).  
Part seven of the constitutional act gives the specificities of the religious 
matters in Articles 66 through 70. In Article 66 it is specified, “the 
Constitution of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark is regulated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Several of the paragraphs in section 4.2 follow Vinding and Christoffersen 2012. 
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by an Act” (My Consitutional Act, 2012, 38). This is a provision that dates 
back to the 1849, but it has never been implemented beyond the 
administrative practices of the government ministries. Article 67 mandates 
that “Members of the public are entitled to associate in communities to 
worship God according to their convictions, but nothing may be taught or 
done that contravenes decency or public order” (Ibid.). This is the 
positively defined freedom to associate and to worship and Article 70 
negatively defines the guarantee that “nobody may be deprived of access to 
the full enjoyment of civil and political rights or evade the fulfilment of 
any general civic duty on the grounds of his or her profession of faith” 
(Ibid., 39). There is no obligation to be a member of a specific religious 
community, let alone the Church of Denmark. Nobody is to be 
discriminated against on account of religion and people may serve public 
office regardless of religious affiliation. This, in turn, means that religion in 
Denmark is public and that people are allowed to gather publically in 
worship (Christoffersen 2012B, 243).  
In specific relation to Islam and other minority religions, Article 69 of 
the Constitutional Act enables Parliament to pass an act regulating other 
religious communities: “The affairs of religious communities other than the 
Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark are regulated by an Act” (Ibid., 
39). Again, the English translation falls short of the original Danish, which 
has the word ‘deviant’ rather than ‘other’ in defining the relationship to 
state in contrast to the relationship enjoyed by the Church of Denmark. 
Also, here the object of regulation by the Act is not the communities 
themselves, but rather the affairs of these. No such act has been passed yet 
and the promise of this is seen as analogous to the promise in Article 66. A 
number of rules and regulations, however, exist to recognise religious 
clergy and communities to perform ceremonies and weddings. These rules 
and regulations amount to a ministerial administrative practice regarding 
religious communities with the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs and other 
ministries, which governs the legal frames of the communities until the 
promise in Article 69 is enacted (Roesen 1976; Huulgaard 2004, 29).  
4.2.1 History of Regulation of Religion in Denmark 
Denmark has a history of regulating religion that draws on a particular 
majority context of Evangelical Lutheranism after the Peace of Augsburg 
(1555) where the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio46 defined that the 
religion of the country was the religion of the sovereign (Witte 2002, 4, 
14). Although the Peace of Augsburg was set in a German context, the 
Kingdom of Denmark and the Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein had in 
1537 adopted the Evangelical Lutheran faith as laid down by the Augsburg 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 From Latin, ‘Whose realm, his religion.’ Ozment (1980) note that the phrase was not coined at the 
Peace of Augsburg, but by jurist Joachim Stephani in 1582.  
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Confession from 1530.47 Until the introduction of the democratic 
Constitutional Act of 1849, matters of religion were under the jurisdiction 
of the King. Here, Article 4 of the Constitutional Act of 1849 did firmly 
establish the Evangelical Lutheran Church as one of the four pillars of 
Danish society where the territory, the monarchy and the divisions of 
power were the first three (My Constitutional Act, 2012, 3; See also 
Christoffersen 2010A). As mentioned, religion was given a dual 
constitutional promise of autonomy and establishment, where, on the one 
hand, Article 66 promised a law that would establish the Church of 
Denmark as a self-determining and autonomous institution independent of, 
but supported by, the state, and on the other hand, Article 69 was to 
regulate on equal terms the status of other religious communities with an 
expectation of similar freedoms and responsibilities granted to the Church 
of Denmark. However, and this defines many of the contemporary debates 
on church, state and religion in Denmark, no such laws were ever passed 
and instead of becoming a societal institution supported by the state, the 
Church of Denmark still resembles a state church more than anything 
imagined by Martin Luther (Andersen 2010, 393; See also Witte 2002, 
97ff). Contemporary Danish theologian Peter Lodberg notes that the 
Church of Denmark is to be identified somewhere “between state church 
and free church” (Lodberg 2005, 18), which nicely captures the difficulties 
of defining the Church of Denmark.  
During the second half of the 19th century and repeatedly in the 20th 
century attempts were made to fulfil the legislative agendas promised in the 
1849 constitutional act. From then until today, three short-lived crises and 
subsequent changes in the political landscape managed to put religion on 
the political agenda, only for it to be neglected in the dawning political 
reality of the succeeding governments.  
Already in the first decades after the constitution, three commissions 
were set up to begin the promised legislative processes. The work of the 
first two commissions, of 1853 and 1868 respectively, stranded in internal 
disagreement amongst the different wings of the Church of Denmark. The 
Church Council of 1883 that was set up to finally produce a workable 
political, ecclesiastical, and legal compromise was disbanded in 1901. By 
this time the entire political structure had been reformed with the 
introduction of the parliamentary system, which meant the end of any 
effective political power of the king and the formation of governments 
based on the mandate of the popular vote (Vinding & Christoffersen 2012, 
10-11). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Following years of feud from 1533 and a coup in 1536, Christian III could on 2 September 1537 
established an Evangelical Lutheran Church Order for the Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway and the 
Duchies of Sleswick and Holstein (Ordinatio ecclesiastica regnorum Daniae et Norwegiae et ducatuum 
Slesvicencis et Holtsatiae). C.f. Schwarz Lausten (1989, 2002).	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The second change came with the politico-economic arrangement of 
1933 that aimed, firstly, to end a general conflict on the reduction of wages 
between unions and employers; secondly, to avoid a threatening crisis for 
Danish agricultural exports; and thirdly and most importantly, to open up 
for social reforms that would build the foundation of the modern welfare 
state. Although the issue of religion and church affairs had resurfaced in 
the Church Council working from 1928 to 1939, the religio-political 
agenda gave way to the social reformist agenda of the Social Democrat 
party, which in turn backed away from a traditional leftist opposition to 
established religion. This reframed and re-systematised the entire social 
welfare system and made it primarily an issue of state rather than of other 
actors, including the churches. In research on the subject (Østergaard 2005, 
Hansen, Petersen & Petersen 2010 and others) there is widespread 
disagreement as to whether the Danish welfare state is built on Lutheran 
ethics – in their adaptation following N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783–1872), who 
stressed individual engagement and voluntarism – or whether it is the 
product of a social democratic agenda that succeeded to the extent of 
becoming obsolete. Whatever the case, the very nature of the crisis of the 
1920s and 1930s paved the way for the social and economic empowerment 
instituted in the settlement of 1933. Danish welfare became a matter for the 
state and religious issues disappeared once again from the political agenda.  
A third attempt was made by a commission on the structure of the 
Church set up in 1964 to establish the nature of the relationship between 
the state, the people, and the Church of Denmark. The Social Democrat 
Minister of Church Affairs, Bodil Koch (1903-72), wanted to know how 
best to secure church and religion as the ‘marrow and muscle of the 
people’. Unfortunately, the work of the commission ceased with a change 
of government and the coincidental death of the minister. The result was 
the reaffirmation of Danish church law by permanent secretary August 
Roesen (1909-87) on the argument that the Church of Denmark had in fact 
become a part of public administration and in effect had no independent 
governance. All matters pertaining to the Church of Denmark would be 
regulated by Parliament and the Minister of Church Affairs, while the 10 
bishops would remain ‘inspectors’ of the Church of Denmark and 
consultants to the Ministry (Roesen 1976; Huulgaard 2004, 29).  
From the time of the 1849 constitution and up until very recently, 
Denmark seemed to be Christian by history and culture on one hand, and 
secular in all legal, public, and administrative matters on the other.  
 
4.2.2 Current status of law and religion in Denmark 
The two promised sets of legal norms that would ideally give autonomy to 
the Church of Denmark and equality of religion among other religious 
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communities never came into being. Until recently, the political and public 
debates always ended without substantial change. The legislative agenda 
was never revived and the administrative handling of religious issues 
remained the law of the land. Over time, the best of worlds envisioned by 
the constitution made way for the dual reality of regulating religion in 
Denmark. Firstly, the sociological reality that the actual numbers of “other 
religions” was insignificant, and secondly, the closely related political 
reality that there were no problems to mention, no significant dissidents, no 
media attention, and most importantly, no votes to be gathered in a political 
engagement with religion. 
Christoffersen notes that as Denmark with Articles 67 and 70 of the 
Constitutional Act guarantees the freedom of religion, there is no case for 
illegal discrimination in the inequality of the religious communities in 
Denmark. “The system of an established church combined with freedom of 
religion, yet inequality between religious communities, was accepted as the 
Danish structure when Denmark ratified the European Convention of 
Human Rights in 1950” (Christoffersen 2010A, 154). She does, however, 
also note that with the changing religious landscape in Denmark and the 
influx of a sizeable Muslim population opens for a new debate about the 
law of religions in Denmark. Similar pressure on existing structures comes 
from the other churches outside the establishment that goes beyond the 
mere change in demographics (Ibid, 159).  
Agreeing with Christoffersen, Danish sociologists of religion Marie 
Vejrup Nielsen and Lene Kühle suggest a recent shift in relations between 
state and religion that is not entirely visible from a legislative point of view 
or with a focus merely on formal norms (Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle 2011). 
They point to a number of changes that seems to confront the unequal 
treatment of other religions and the lack of religious autonomy. The 
aftermath of the Cartoons Crisis from 2005-6, the inauguration of a Muslim 
burial ground in 2006 and the very symbolic, but entirely legal ban on 
veiling for judges and laymen in court from 2008-9, are all examples of 
how pressure is put on the treatment of other religions in the public sphere 
(Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle 2011, 173-174). While Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle 
highlight that discrimination does not mean deprivation of religious 
freedom, they do operate with a descriptive understanding of 
discrimination as constitutionally enacted differential treatment.  
Both Christoffersen and Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle observe that the 
question of enacting the constitutional promise of autonomy to the Church 
of Denmark is the single most defining issue in current Danish law and 
religion. While Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle maintain that the lack of autonomy 
is a key for understanding religion-state relation in Denmark (Vejrup 
Nielsen & Kühle 2011, 178), Christoffersen in Law and Religion in the 21st 
Century – Nordic Perspectives (Christoffersen, Modeer and Andersen 
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2010) goes as far as to say that autonomy is the defining challenge for law 
and religion as it pushes on the limits of the constitutional legitimacy. 
Christoffersen quotes Robbers (2001) and understands autonomy to be “a 
freedom of institutions of pre-constitutional existence. It is not formed by 
the constitution, it has to be respected and protected by the law. “Church 
autonomy means the right of self-determination of religious bodies” 
(Robbers 2002, 5; cf. Christoffersen 2010B, 565).  From a legal point of 
view – Christoffersen’s point of view – the difficulty of granting or 
recognising church autonomy rather than mere freedom of religion is that 
autonomy implies a jurisdiction parallel to the civil legal realm 
(Christoffersen 2010B, 565). Structurally speaking, these are the internal 
affairs protected by an autonomous rule of the church, which are beyond 
the jurisdiction of the parliament and thus falls back to the privilege of the 
sovereign. Christoffersen clarifies, 
 
“… the concept of Church Autonomy thus in this understanding means a broad 
understanding – based on freedom of religion – of a right for religious 
communities to act outside the law of the state, framing their own legal structures. 
That is: church autonomy implies an understanding of parallel legal systems with 
national law as one legal system, regulation areas outside the religious realm…”  
(Christoffersen 2012B, 565) 
 
This is the logic implicit in an argument in favour of autonomy taken to its 
ultimate conclusion in a completely parallel and entirely separate 
jurisdiction, which originates from before the constitution. As such, it is a 
legal freedom of the same nature as, and parallel to, the one granted 
universally in the constitution. If such autonomy ever were to be 
recognised, the question of competence and jurisdiction would need a clear 
definition as to the limits of the respective legal systems, because much of 
what pertains to the regulation of church affairs that falls outside the 
religious realm. It is important to note that autonomy is not strictly 
speaking what was promised in Article 67 of the constitutional act. Rather, 
the promise was for a law governing and regulating the Church of Denmark 
under the jurisdiction of the constitution. Law cannot enact ‘true’ 
autonomy, which in its literal sense means ‘giving oneself one’s own law’ 
(Cf. section 3.2.2 in Chapter Three).  
The lack of autonomy and the lack of legislation promised in Article 66 
have the consequence of a lack of self-determination for the Church of 
Denmark. This in turn means that there is no independent representation, 
the legislative body of the Church is and remains Parliament and there is no 
such thing as a general synod or a governing council of the Church. It is 
easy to speak of wide freedoms and benign prerogatives at the everyday 
and local levels of the Church, where it enjoys limited self-government and 
“a relative broad range of freedom” (Mortensen 2001, 398). As such, the 
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Church of Denmark is organised structurally from the bottom, but 
institutionalised legally from the top.  
Describing this specifically Danish constellation of church and state 
relations, Christoffersen applies a concept of ‘intertwinement’, which 
pragmatically infers distinction but maintains inseparability (Christoffersen 
2006, 109). At the face of it ‘intertwinement’ and ‘autonomy’ are ideas that 
point in separate directions, but the pragmatic argument from the 
ministerial departments has always been that the strong relations to the 
state have been in defence of the internal freedoms and tolerance that the 
church enjoys (Vejrup Nielsen 2012, 42). The unresolved questions of 
autonomy for the state and inequality for the other communities seems to 
have a decisive impact on the mark up of the entire religio-organisational 
field in Denmark 
This intertwinement of church and state, with its lack of self-
determination and organisational clarity, has a significant impact on the 
minority religions in Denmark. An important and very fundamental 
principle that both Vejrup Nielsen & Kühle and Christoffersen operate with 
is the assumption of a correlation of the conditions of the both the Church 
of Denmark and other religious communities. The state has always 
organised its relationship to religion in general through the specific focus 
on the Church of Denmark (Vejrup Nielsen 2012, 42), and changes in the 
one will have implications for the other. This reflects the principle of state 
cooperation with church and religion in the pyramid model suggested by 
Silvio Ferrari (Cf. section 3.2.2 in chapter three).  
The most recent and most significant of changes in the regulation of 
religion in Denmark is the announcement by current Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Manu Sareen, of the formation of a commission to 
look into the relations between Church and state with specific reference to 
Article 66 of the Constitutional Act (Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 
2012; Broadbridge 2012). The commission was announced on the 10th of 
September 2012 and the aim is to ‘have proposals for one or more models 
for the administrative future of the Danish Lutheran Church’ by the end of 
2013 (Broadbridge 2012). The announcement follows the vision for the 
agenda of the centre-left government from 2011 and there has been some 
academic speculation into the work of the commission and its eventual 
proposals. Speculating about the outcome of the commission, the Danish 
Society for Church Law published a draft report titled ‘A Constitution for 
the Church anno 2011’ in an attempt to re-ignite both the public and the 
political debate about the future of the church (Christensen et al 2011). The 
commission is chaired by former Ombudsman and professor of Law, Hans 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, and consists of some 20 members drawn from 
academia, from the political parties, from the relevant ministries, from the 
ranks of bishops in the Church of Denmark, and from many of the 
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institutions associated with the Church, such as the National Association of 
Parish Churches and aid associations with a Christian life stance. 
(Ministeriet for Ligestilling og Kirke, 2012) 
The changes under way have considerable impact on the Church of 
Denmark, but also a potential influence on the frames of the religious 
communities other than the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark and 
most significantly so for the Muslim communities and organisations in 
Denmark. The Constitutional Act applied a legal framework for explicit 
recognition by royal decree of the small number of religious communities 
that were already present in Denmark by the time of the constitution. This 
recognition by royal decree was a continuation of a practice from before 
1849. Among the communities that were recognised by royal decree were 
the Jewish community, which had been recognised already in 1685. This 
system of administrative recognition was extended after the introduction of 
the constitution to include a list of Christian churches, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Orthodox Russian church in Copenhagen, the 
Norwegian, the Swedish and the English (Anglican) Churches, the 
reformed churches, the Baptists, and the Methodists.  
In speaking of the minority religions and religious communities, there is 
a need to critically distinguish between ‘official or constitutional 
recognition,’ ‘recognition’ and ‘approval’ due to the history of changes in 
the practices. Official recognition  – meaning legal and based in the 
constitution – is according to Christoffersen (2012A) limited to the Church 
of Denmark in the identification with the Evangelical Lutheran faith in 
Article 4 of the Constitutional Act. This ‘recognition’ is recognition of the 
state’s responsibility towards the specific Church of the majority of the 
people in Denmark, as long as they are the majority (Christoffersen 2012A, 
76). In this strict legal reading, no other communities or faiths are 
recognised by law, but there is a historic and political reason to speak of a 
practice of recognition by royal decree, which is a status that 11 religious 
communities currently enjoy (Christoffersen 1998; Jacobsen 2012B, 177).  
In 1969, this paradigm of recognition by royal decree was ended with a 
change in marriage legislation. The pre-constitutional system of 
recognition was abandoned because the Marriage Act of 1970 now had 
jurisdiction, so that religious communities such as Muslims and Buddhists 
who arrived in significant numbers after the Second World War had only 
been ‘approved’ by the Minister of Church Affairs (Geertz 2007, 27). 
‘Approved’ meaning only in the strictest legal sense authorised to perform 
marriages of civil legal validity. Those who have already attained 
recognition by royal decree did not loose this symbolically important 
recognition by royal decree. After 1969, the more recent religious 
communities were thus relegated to the administrative competences of the 
ministers and permanent secretaries of changing ministerial departments 
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and offices. These asked the Bishop of Copenhagen and his special advisor 
for counsel in questions of approval and more often than not the 
recommendations of the Bishop were followed (Christoffersen 2012A). 
Being approved as a religious denomination or congregation will allow 
the religious group to perform weddings with civil, legal validity. In 
addition, there is a financial upside to registering as a religious 
denomination with the ministry responsible. There are tax deductions for 
those who support such a community and the community may apply for tax 
exemptions from real estate taxes (Christoffersen 2012A, Kühle 2011A, 
Kühle 2011B). As an alternative, a religious organisation may freely 
register as a voluntary cultural association, which may attract subsidies for 
work with children and youth or integration and education (Kühle 2012A, 
89). Kühle have demonstrated as early as in 2002 and 2004 that many 
Muslim organisations chose not to register with the tax authorities, but are 
looking for the public recognition and symbolic – rather than the financial 
– capital available (Kühle 2002, Kühle 2012A). 
In 1998, after significant criticism from religious communities and from 
scholars of both law and religion, Det Rådgivende Udvalg vedr. 
Trossamfund (Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations) was 
established. This was a change of procedure and the new committee was to 
consist of impartial, knowledgeable persons. Four professors of sociology 
of religion, history of religion, law and theology, respectively, were 
appointed (Geertz 2007, 28). According to the press release by then 
Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Ole Vig Jensen, the committee was to 
“advise the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs on applications concerning 
official recognition as religious denominations” (Press Release, February 4, 
1998, cited in Geertz 2007, 28). However, even in the press releases from 
the ministry, there seems to be much confusion surrounding Danish 
‘official regulation’ of minority religions. The language used to distinguish 
recognition and approval is, as mentioned above, legally specific, and as 
such, the committees sees it as its task to continue the practice laid down 
by the ministry from 1969 and therefore to define and clarify the 
terminology in use, clarify the procedural rules of approval and to specify 
the requirements in place (Geertz 2007). This includes significant demands 
for organisational structure and demands for a particular understanding of 
religion on behalf of the applicants. As will be seen both in the next 
sections and in Chapter Five, this is especially important when 
understanding the attitude of Muslims towards the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Denominations and the entire system of state recognition and 
approval.  
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4.2.3 Islam and Muslim organisations in Denmark 
According to a critical and calibrated estimate from January 2012 there are 
some 236.300 Muslims in Denmark (Jacobsen 2012B). Of these, most 
come from or are descendants of immigrants from Turkey (23.6 per cent), 
from Iraq (10.8 per cent), from Lebanon (9.9 per cent), from Pakistan (8.7 
per cent) and from Somalia (7.2 per cent), but there are also significant 
communities of Muslims from Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iran and Morocco, not 
to mention the Danish converts (Jacobsen 2012A, 45-46).  
From a structural and institutional point of view, Muslim life in 
Denmark is most commonly organised around the ethnic-religious 
associations and is often related to or located at a Mosque or a prayer halls. 
While an optimistic 2004 estimate has 150 mosques in Denmark (Klausen 
2005), Kühle has a more recent and more conservative approximate 
number in 130 such Mosques and prayer halls (Kühle 2012A, 83). 
Following the outline of a significant fieldwork study of Mosques in 
Denmark from 2006 (Kühle 2006), these can be classified into lay 
mosques, organisation mosques and sheikh mosques. Most of the Danish 
literature on organised Islam follows this typology (Kühle 2006, 2011A, 
2012A; Jensen 2007; Jacobsen 2012B). Lay mosques are organised by the 
local community or congregation and attracts a varied audience and has no 
specific theological observance within Islam. Most have small 
democratically elected boards in charge and are often narrowly defined 
according to ethnicity. Typically, they do not have paid staff, but openly 
welcome imams and khutaba with knowledge of Islam (Jensen 2007, 125; 
Kühle 2012A, 87). There are an estimated 70 per cent of mosques that 
organise in this way (Kühle 2012A, 87).  
As for the organisation mosques, these are usually organised with strong 
ties to the international organisations and communities of Muslims. They 
actively engage with the ethnicities and countries of origin and seem to blur 
the distinction between organisations acting on behalf of foreign 
governments and ordinary civil society organisations (Kühle 2012B). 
Amongst the most significant ethnic-religious associations is the Dansk 
Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation) with its 
relation to the Diyanet and the Turkish authority for religious affairs in 
Denmark. A number of local Turkish associations have established the 
Danimarka Müslüman Göcmeler Teskilati (Union of Muslim Immigrant 
Associations), which is regarded as having relations to the Milli Görüs 
movement (Jacobsen 2012B, 178). Five Bosniaki congregations constitute 
the Den Islamiske Forening af Bosniakker i Danmark (Islamic Association 
of Bosniacs in Denmark), which in 2001 was approved by the ministry as a 
religious denomination in Denmark. Also Det Albanske Trossamfund 
(Albanian Religious Community) and the Idara Minhaj-ul-Qur’an 
Outlines of the Religio-Organisational Fields	  
	  
130 
International Denmark have established themselves with strong relations to 
the ethnic community (Jacobsen 2012B).  
As for the sheikh mosques, these centre on the authority of the imam and 
identify with him on basis of his charisma and his position within the 
Muslim environment. Such a mosque will usually organise as an Islamic 
Centre and be very active as hubs for Arabic classes, after school projects, 
integration and dialogue and work to further the general knowledge about 
Islam. Financially speaking they are well to do and have the ability to 
invite international speakers and authorities of Islam. Among the most 
significant of the sheikh mosques, Danish commentators count Islamisk 
Trossamfund (Islamic Faith Community) formerly lead by the late Imam 
Abu Laban (Jensen 2007, 127). Similarly, the Danish Islamic Centre seems 
to be a loosely organised community of different Muslim institutions that 
follow the convert imam Abdul Wahid Petersen. Amongst these are the 
independent non-profit relief agency, Danish Muslim Aid, and the 
bookstore Zahra Book, both of which are run by imam Petersen. In her 
characteristic of Abdul Wahid Petersen, Kühle observes that “due to his 
position as a convert [Petersen] has managed to move successfully around 
in the Islamic milieus of Denmark” (Kühle 2012A, 83). Futhermore, Kühle 
elaborates on the positional power of these ‘sheikh’-imams and note that 
although this kind of mosques only make up some 5 per cent of Sunni 
mosques in Denmark, these usually take a dominant position in relation to 
other mosques “…and may regard themselves as the natural leaders of 
Islam in Denmark” (Kühle 2012A, 87). This was in part evident by the 
impact that the Cartoons Crisis in 2005-06 had, where both Abdul Wahid 
Petersen and Abu Laban had significant influence (Kühle 2012A, 83). 
From the perspective of the religio-organisational field, these imams are 
examples of how different institutions like books stores, community 
centres, Mosques and relief agencies are tied together in institutional 
relations across the environment. Although strictly speaking not a part of 
religion, they are rather important elements of the production of religious 
and symbolic capital that can be reapplied to secure better and stronger 
positions of the imams in the wider religio-organisational field.  
Of recent development these past ten years, researchers note the coming 
to life of Muslim umbrella organisations and more advanced networking 
organisations in Denmark. The purpose, reception, lifespan and success of 
these have been very diverse. Some of them disappeared quickly and some 
are still active, but from an instiutionalist perspective the reasons for their 
existence and demise are interesting and reveal important insights into how 
Muslims address their environment and navigate the religio-organisational 
field. Compared with Germany or England they are relatively recent, but 
like other countries there is no single Muslim organisation that can claim to 
represent neither all nor most Muslims.  
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In 2002, Muslimernes Landsorganisation (National Organisation of 
Muslims) was established by imams Fatih Alev and Abdul Wahid Petersen. 
Both these imams embrace Danish as the language of Muslims in Denmark 
and the ambition was to unite Muslims from across ethnic divides. They 
aimed to become a partner or party to negotiations with the public 
authorities in Denmark regarding matters of Muslims and Islam (Kühle 
2012A, 90). However, the organisation never gained any real support and 
was unable to corral existing Muslim associations and groups under their 
authority. Imam Alev was one of the informants of Jytte Klausen’s The 
Islamic Challenge – Politics and Religion in Western Europe from 2005, 
where he is described as one of “Europe’s new Muslim political elite” 
(Klausen 2005, 15). They are seen as well educated, talented and have risen 
to the top of the political and civic institutional life because of their 
engagement with both the Muslim environment but also the surrounding 
religio-organisational field. Both imams Petersen and Alev have been very 
active in Islamisk-Kristent Studiecenter (Islamic-Christian Study centre) 
that is promoting interreligious dialogue as well as the Church of Denmark 
standing forum on the religions’ meeting (Folkekirkens Religionsmøde), 
which is engaging both Muslim and Christian leaders in high profile 
religious dialogue. As for the National Organisation of Muslims, it was 
never able to gain critical mass and never able to attract the attention of the 
government and other public authorities. Something similar can be said for 
the uniting initiatives of Islamisk Trossamfund (Islamic Faith Society) and 
Det Danske Islamiske Råd (Danish Islamic Council) (Kühle 2012A, 
Jacobsen 2012B).  
Regarding the ambition on behalf of Muslims in engaging state and 
government in dialogue, a series of three meetings held in 2004, 2005, and 
2006 are of particular interest. At the initiative of then Prime Minister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who gained international fame during the 
Cartoons Crisis, the Ministry and Office of the Prime Minister invited a 
number of immigrants and politicians to informal talks at the official 
residence, Marienborg. On the agendas of the meetings held 30 November 
2004, 20 September 2005 and 13 February 2006 were issues concerning 
integration, terrorism, Islamic extremism and Muslims in Dialogue. 
However, what remains clear from the press releases and the comments 
from these meetings is that participants were invited, the agenda was set 
and the meetings were held entirely at the discretion of the Office of the 
Prime Minister. There were a clear secular approach to the issues and the 
participants were deliberately selected in order to promote consultation as 
part of the existing policies. At this point the idea of including any widely 
represented Muslim organisations was utterly foreign and even impossible 
due to the limited scope of the existing organisations at the time. As shall 
be seen in the German discussions, there is ample opportunity for a 
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comparison with the endeavours of the German Islam Conference (cf. 
section 4.3.4 below and Chapter Six).  
Much of this changed after the Cartoons Crisis, were – amongst other 
realisations – the Muslim community saw a need for a consensus internally 
and the government saw the potential of dialogue with a widely 
representative Muslim organisation (Klausen 2009). Thus in September 
2006 – approximately one year after the Cartoons were originally published 
– the United Council of Muslims (Muslimernes Fællesråd) held its first 
General Assembly. The organisation brings together thirteen different 
Muslim organisations, mosques and schools widely representing Sunni 
Muslims in Denmark (Kühle 2012A, 90-91). The United Council of 
Muslims united some 40.000 members of which the Danish Turkish 
Islamic Foundation is the largest of the associate organisations speaking on 
behalf of some 30.000 members. Through its diverse support base, the 
United Council of Muslims acts as a body that speaks on behalf of its 
members and is actively in dialogue with the authorities, the Church and 
many Danish NGOs. 
The second of the umbrella organisations speaking on behalf of a wide 
base of Muslims in Denmark is Dansk Muslimsk Union (Danish Muslim 
Union). Set up in 2008, the Danish Muslim Union brings together a number 
of significant ethnic-religious organisations and the objective is to create a 
common institution for a large number of Muslim associations, promoting 
integration and fighting extremism. According to the statement issued at 
the formation of the union, the ambition is to go beyond ordinary advisory 
functions, ”We do not limit ourselves to only providing counselling to our 
members, to the Muslim community in Denmark or to the public 
authorities and other institutions that require our advice regarding Muslims 
and Islam, but we cooperate internally in all areas to strengthen our 
community and our Muslim identity.”48 The Danish Muslim Union seems 
to go to certain lengths in the statements to stress the unique and 
groundbreaking work in the organisation, without, however, having much 
to show for it. There is ongoing cooperation between the Danish Muslim 
Union and the Muslim Council of Britain. On occasion they have held 
conferences together and it seems the Danish Muslim Union is looking to 
the British as an organisational pattern to build on. According to its own 
claims, the Danish Muslim Union speaks on behalf of 25.000 members.  
Other, narrower networking organisations in Denmark include Muslimer 
i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue) from 2003. It has four direct affiliate 
branches that work under the national organisations and seek to “make 
Muslim values visible through active civic citizenship and dialogue, and to 
promote Danish-Muslim identity.”49 It currently has 440 members 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 www.dmu.nu, my translation – accessed 20 February 2013. 
49	  www.muslimeridialog.dk, my translation - accessed 1 October 2012	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(Jacobsen 2012A). Forum for Kritiske Muslimer (Forum for Critical 
Muslims) from 2001 work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to 
Islam, and there are other, less significant organisations as well (See 
further, Jacobsen 2012A, “Denmark” in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, 
Nielsen 2012). 
In general, it seems that the realisation that Muslims in Denmark are 
poorly organised and not sufficiently represented helped bring about the 
formation of the umbrella organisations, especially in the wake of the 
Cartoons Crisis. Also, there seems to be a significant need for clarion 
voices that are able to speak authoritatively about Islam in the Danish 
public beyond much of the internal strife of the Muslim environment. 
However, as Kühle stresses repeatedly (2011A, 2012A) there is no 
consensus and despite the two significant umbrella organisations, there is 
no unity amongst Muslims in Denmark.  
4.2.4 The Religio-Organisational Field in Denmark 
In her analysis of the State’s relations to religious organisations, Vejrup 
Nielsen employs a hierarchical mapping of levels of structural positions in 
Denmark. All religious communities in Denmark are governed by the 
religio-organisational logic evident in this hierarchy and can be placed 
somewhere on the same gradient scale between proximity to the state and 
internal autonomy. Ultimately, no religious communities in Denmark have 
any independent legislative autonomy or jurisdiction, but are free to 
practice their religion under the privileges secured and guaranteed by the 
state and in relation to the state. Vejrup Nielsen writes: 
 
“ … the state in Denmark has organised its relationship to religious communities 
in three categories. The first is the Church of Denmark, which is closely related to 
the state, due to its constitutional relationship to the state, through the political 
composition of the ministry of ecclesiastical affairs, and via the different tasks 
performed by the Church on behalf of the state – just to name a few. Next is the 
category of ‘approved / recognised religious communities,’ where groups, who 
have received approval from the state, receive certain privileges, i.e. in relation to 
deductions and visa for visiting religious leaders. The third category may be 
characterised best as ‘everything else’ and includes all religious activity that does 
not enter into formalised relations to the state and is regulated only by general 
laws…” 
(Vejrup Nielsen 2012, 45, my translation) 
 
This rudimentary outline of the three categories – taken together with the 
evidence from Danish researchers and scholars presented in this chapter – 
points to a few distinguishing features of the religio-organisational field in 
Denmark. As can be seen from the quote, Vejrup Nielsen’s categories are 
similar to the pyramid model used by Silvio Ferrari (Cf. section 3.2.2). 
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Firstly, this echoes one of the key lessons from Fetzer & Soper’s study 
on Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany from 2005, 
namely that the historical relationship between Church and state greatly 
influence the Muslim organisations. From the bird’s eye perspective of the 
religio-organisational field the Church of Denmark enjoys a privileged 
position and the impact of the relationship between state and church cannot 
be overstated. The mere number of members, churches, ministers and 
capital available – not to mention the long history and the deep institutional 
relations – are beyond anything that any minority religion or religious 
community can ever muster. However, a warning against viewing the 
Church of Denmark as one coherent institution in agreement with itself is 
warranted. While most of the other religious communities are relegated to 
the fringes or analogies of the state and church relationship, this seems far 
from the case of Muslim organisations when noting the differences within 
the church, the available soft structure positions in Denmark and the 
relative voice given to minorities in debates on civil, political and religious 
engagement of religion in the public sphere. This means that while there is 
no unified voice that may speak on behalf of the Church and while there is 
a difference of opinion and attitude regarding Muslims in Denmark from 
within the Church, there is nonetheless a potential for alliances between 
Muslim organisations and Church institutions. These may prove to be both 
a positional resource for Muslim organisations and a sounding board for 
Muslim voices in the greater public debates. The presence of both the 
Islamic-Christian Study centre and the Church of Denmark standing forum 
on the meeting of religions testify to this and the later have grown to 
become an institutionalised forum for much of the high level interreligious 
talks between Christians and Muslims in Denmark 
Secondly, Muslim organisations are clearly faced with two structural-
normative barriers in the religio-organisational field. The first barrier 
presents itself in the guise of the guidelines of the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Denominations, which advices the ministry on approval of 
religious denominations, and the second barrier is seen as the limits in 
access and equality. Far be it from all Muslim organisations to want the 
approval and limited privileges that come with the ministerial approval, but 
as the chairman of the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations, 
Armin Geertz note, “most applicants are apparently interested in something 
else entirely, namely symbolic advantages” (Geertz 2007, 40), which is not 
what the technical and legalistic approval is about. As a result, until 2004 
few Muslim organisations and communities had taken advantage of the 
ministerial approval. This number, however, is increasing and with the 
increasing public awareness on Islam and the greater visibility of both 
mosques and Muslim organisations the values and prestige of the 
recognition embedded in the ‘approval’ increases greatly (Kühle 2011A). 
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That being said, Kühle concludes that “the establishment of Muslim 
organisation in Denmark may be described as an aspect of the 
institutionalization of Islam,” (Kühle 2012A, 83) which in turn points to 
the fact that Muslim organisations are an unavoidable part of the religio-
organisational field.  
Thirdly, a particular characteristic of the Muslim organisations’ 
navigation in the religio-organisational field is the alternative of exploring 
the hidden potential of the fieldin Denmark. The ability to build institutions 
like book stores, relief agencies, community centres, Mosques, political 
and cultural associations and more is a testament to the opportunities 
navigated. These different institutions are structural resources and will help 
Muslims establish a stable base for contesting future opportune positions in 
Denmark. Kühle note that these “Muslim strategies of incorporation relate 
to the opportunity structure present” (Kühle 2012B, 88; following Nielsen 
2004). 
Fourthly, the limits of the religio-organisational field become clear 
where religious activity does not organise, does not address the state or 
government associations and does not conform to the institutional logic at 
play amongst the existing religious organisations. In Denmark and in the 
case of Muslims, the recent PhD thesis by Nadia Jeldtoft has clearly 
demonstrated that this Everyday Lived Islam gives preference to highly 
individualized, pragmatic and innovative ways of practicing Islam and that 
many “prioritise personal autonomy over religious authority and they place 
their own ‘true selves’ at the centre of what it means to be Muslim” 
(Jeldtoft 2012, 283). To many of these Muslims the idea of an 
organizational expression of religious commitment does not resonate and 
as such the symbolic power of a strong institutional position holds no 
currency to them.  
A specific focus in the religio-organisational field in Denmark, which 
draws on much of the material form this section, is analysed in Chapter 
Five. 
 
4.3 An outline of the religio-organisational field in Germany 
Turning the perspective to Germany, it is clear that the composition of the 
religio-organisational field is significantly different from the Danish. Taken 
together, the facts of the federal system, the Christian history, the German 
church, state and religion relations, the history of migration, and the recent 
discourses on Islam, integration and security all point to the applicability of 
the analytical strategy of the religio-organisational field. As Kerstin 
Rosenow-Williams note in her insightful monograph Organizing Muslims 
and Integrating Islam in Germany from 2012, “the German institutional 
environment provides a rich field of study with regard to shifting dynamics 
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between the government, the media, the general public, and different 
groups of Muslims and their organisations” (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 
105).  
As with the two other countries of focus in this thesis, the history of 
religion and state relations has major influence on the current legal status of 
Islam in Germany. Here, especially the status of corporations of public law 
granted to select religious organisations in Germany is a contested issue. 
From this and from all the other influences in this ‘rich field,’ the turn of 
the millennium has seen at least three significant changes in the structures 
that define the position of Muslim organisations in Germany. Firstly, the 
German conception of migration and the approach to immigrants has 
become more inclusive. Secondly, the question of security and a recent 
shift in security laws produce a considerable normative pressure on 
Muslims and Muslim organisations (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 106). 
Thirdly, the German federal state has sought to establish an active and 
inclusive dialogue with the major Muslim organisations in the German 
Islam Conference (cf. Chapter Six). After these framing observations, the 
specifics of Islam and Muslim organisations in Germany will be 
introduced, before concluding the German section of the chapter with a 
summery of the religio-organisational field in Germany. 
4.3.1 History of religion and state relations in Germany 
Understanding how the German state and the Muslim organisations in 
Germany have struggled over the official recognition and status of Islam 
requires a critical insight into the history of church and state relations in 
Germany (Jonker 2002, 2003; Robbers 2001, 2005, 2010; Rohe 2008, 
2012; Rosenow-Williams 2012). 
The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century has informed much of the 
later configurations of church and state in Germany. The reformation of the 
Roman-Catholic Church by Martin Luther (1483-1546) from 1517 onwards 
and the subsequent wars and schisms of Christian denominations were the 
catalyst for a century or more of remarkable changes (Robbers 2005, 78).50 
At the time, the German Empire was governed as many Länder under the 
rule of different princes and lords, who as it were, had pledged allegiance 
to the different factions of the religious schism. Seeking to balance power 
and enforce peace, the Peace of Augsburg from 1555, which decided to 
distribute power over religion according the principle of cujus regio, ejus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Luther, obviously, was not the only reformist influence in Germany. Within the Lutheran reformation, 
he is joined by Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560) and John Bugenhagen (1485-1558) and others. 
Melanchton became known as Praeceptor Germaniae, which literally means the ’teacher of Germany’, 
whereas Bugenhagen’s great feat was spreading the Lutheran reformation to the northern German Länder 
and the Scandinavia. Somewhat parallel to the Lutheran, the reforms of Ulrich Zwingly (1484-1531) and 
John Calvin (1509-1564) had significant impact on religious life in Germany in the 16th and 17th 
centuries; cf. Witte 2002.  
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religio, which as seen above had significance influence in Denmark as well 
(Robbers 2010, 39). The great minds of the German reformation had been 
able to bring about the changes with the support of the German princes and 
lords, who in turn were to be summus episcopus (lat. ‘supreme bishop’) of 
churches of the different Länder. This rather close relationship between the 
‘Throne and Altar’ existed until 1919 (Robbers 2010, 38). From this 
emerged the constellation of different Lutheran territorial churches in 
Germany (and Scandinavia) that would position the churches parallel to the 
universities and the courts as institutions under the authority of the 
sovereign princes (Witte 2002). With the Peace of Augsburg followed - in 
theory - the right to emigrate from the specific territory if a citizen’s 
religious faith and conscience did not match that of the sovereign. This 
would allow religious and political homogeneity to grow without forced 
conversion or religious prosecution. 
However, tension grew significantly between the Protestants and 
Catholics during the following century. The Catholic counterreformation 
and the subsequent Catholic revival from the middle of the 16th century 
brought about the Thirty Year’s War (1618-1648), which spread to most of 
Europe. With over a hundred different parties to the conflict, the war ended 
with these signing the Peace of Westphalia51 in 1648. Part of the cause of 
war between Protestants and Catholics was that the ruling sovereign had 
previously personally decided the denomination of the different German 
Länder. This was changed with the Peace of Westphalia, which embedded 
the religious denomination of either Protestantism or Catholicism into the 
constitution of the state. With this constitutional basis, Protestantism and 
Catholicism were equal before that law and the state was to be religiously 
neutral (Robbers 2010, 39). The impact of this can to this day be seen in 
the religious demography in the different German Länder, as some are 
predominantly Protestant while others are Catholic. 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, not only Länder sovereignty in 
religious affairs grew with the increased power over the state churches, but 
also individual freedom was allowed to grow. The Huguenots from France, 
who were Calvinists, were in 1685 granted full religious freedom (Robbers 
2010, 40). A century later, in 1794, a change in the common laws of 
Prussia made it illegal for the state to legislate on questions of individual 
conscience, belief and other affairs ‘concerning God and godly issues’ 
(Robbers 2010, 41). Privately any religious service could be held. 
Publically deviant church associations were tolerated. However, the 
demand from the state remained that public laws were obeyed, loyalty to 
state intact, public moral and order kept, and that nothing taught that was 
irreverent to God (Ibid.).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The Peace of Westfalia was in fact a series of peace accords signed in Münster and Osnabrück during 
May to October of 1648.	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Seen from a contemporary perspective, there are several reasons why 
there is no strict separation between church and state in Germany and why 
scholars are speaking of a multiple establishment in the German context 
(Jonker 2002, Fetzer & Soper 2005, Sandberg & Doe 2007). Even though 
the Peace of Westphalia had significant impact, the cohesion of the earlier 
German Empires was fragile and did not have the institutional stability and 
wide legitimacy required of, e.g., the later constitutions. As a consequence, 
the members of the different Länder with each their denomination usually 
stayed close to their sovereign to be protected against the violence and the 
intrusions of the other members of the confession. This explains the close 
relationship between the denominations and the Länder in Germany. 
However, it also maintained a denominational duality in Germany, where 
none of the two denominations would become too powerful within the 
German republic. This in turn meant that an opposition to the churches 
could emerge, which would eventually lead to the cultural struggles of the 
19th and 20th centuries.  
For a brief period of time from 1848-49 to 1851, full freedoms of belief 
and conscience were granted in the revolutionary German Constitution of 
1848. Robbers references the articles of religious freedom from this 
constitution, saying, “Article 147 of the German Constitution provided that 
each religious association shall regulate and administer their affairs 
independently, but remain subjects to the general laws of state” (Robbers 
2010, 42). The freedoms extended in this constitution coincide with the 
articles from the Danish constitution from 1849. However, the short-lived 
revolution that had given this liberal constitution failed in 1851 and the 
constitution was formally repealed.  
The struggles and development of the second half of the 19th century had 
significant impact on the composition of the German national state. The 
overwhelmingly Protestant Prussia had succeeded in a unification of 
German speaking states, which rendered the Catholics in a minority 
position. After the Franco-Prussian wars and the Treaty of Versailles of 
1871, a unified German Empire with Prussia as the largest constituent both 
in terms of population and territory had emerged. As chancellor of the 
Empire and Minister President of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck was able to 
unite German interests with the Prussian Protestant realpolitik (Lamberti 
2001). With these combined powers, the Protestants and Catholics clashed 
in what came to be known as the ‘Kulturkampf,’ (lit. ‘cultural struggle’). 
Protestants wanted to enact a neutral system with non-confessional 
education and civil marriage (Riedel 2008, 254). This was rejected by the 
Catholics who saw it as an attack on the institutional power and influence 
of the Roman-Catholic Church. Being in the superior public position, 
Bismarck abolished the Catholic department of the Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs and Education, imposed government supervision of 
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Catholic education and made sure that Germany broke off diplomatic 
relations with the Holy See (Robbers 2010, 43). Michael B. Gross, a 
historian and scholar of the Kulturkampf, observed that ”the attack on the 
church included a series of Prussian, discriminatory laws that made 
Catholics feel understandably persecuted within a predominantly Protestant 
nation.” (Gross 2004, 1).  
Rather than weakening the Roman-Catholic Church, the Kulturkampf 
united the Catholics who formed the Catholic Center Party, which was 
launched to defend Catholic interests. The German Kulturkampf was a 
blow to the liberal political voices and despite the intensity of the struggles 
it did not lead to a marked secularisation of the German state. In the end, 
Catholic and other resistance to the suppression of the Kulturkampf was so 
great that the laws enacted were repealed or accepted into the concordats 
made with the Vatican in the wake of the struggles (Robbers 2010, 43).  
After the First World War and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the Weimar 
Constitution of 1919 gradually liberalized state and church relations, but 
the changes came about without assaulting the churches. This established 
the foundations for legal separation of Church and State. Article 135 
guaranteed full freedom of religion and belief, while Articles 136 to 141 
provided religious freedom and freedom of manifestation of religion or 
belief for all individuals and for all religious, confessional, non-
confessional and philosophical communities (Robbers 2010, Ibid.). 
Compared with earlier German constitutional orders, the Constitution of 
Weimar was the first coherent and institutionally stable regulation of the 
church and state relations in Germany, which allowed for religious freedom 
and autonomy without discrimination. The provisions of the Weimar 
Constitution guaranteed that the discrimination of one denomination by the 
state – as seen during the Kulturkampf – could not happen again. The 
carefully organised outcome was a system where the establishment of a 
single state church was forbidden, but which allowed for connections 
between churches and state in a number of associated areas, thus 
“recognizing and allowing for a cooperation in matters such as religious 
instruction in the public school system, the Church tax and military 
chaplaincy” (Robbers 2010, 43).   
After the Second World War and the aftermath in the years following the 
war, the constitution of 1949, also known as the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland),52 
was enacted (Robbers 2010, 24). As shall be seen, in regards to church, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The German Bundestag Administration’s Public Relations Division provides an English translation of 
the Basic Law; The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, translated by Professor Christian 
Tomuschat and Professor David P. Currie in 2008.  
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state and religion affairs and freedom of religion and belief, the Basic Law 
follow in the tradition of the Weimar Republic.  
4.3.2 Current status of law and religion in Germany 
At the hub of the German legal system is the Basic Law. As the most basic 
and therefore highest ranking norm in the German legal system, the Basic 
Law governs the federal system and sets the legal frame for the 
constitutions of the Länder. This means that these lesser ranking 
constitutions must conform to and be interpreted according to the federal 
constitution of the Basic Law (Robbers 2010, 24). This also means that if 
legal conflict should arise federal law takes precedence over the laws of the 
Länder.  
In Germany, the Basic Law governs the legal frame of church, state and 
religion relations. While it contains the most important provisions in its 
own articles, it indirectly governs all law on church and religion. Legally 
speaking much of the regulation of law and religion in Germany is 
embedded in the distributed federal system, where the individual Land has 
the legislative and judicial competence to decide in a series of matters of 
relevance to the religio-organisational field, including police, education, 
administration, culture and other non-federal issues (Robbers 2010, 23).  
In the Basic Law, several specific measures regulate the most important 
principles of the German system. The specific measures of the constitution 
include the preamble, Article 4 on freedom of faith, conscience and creed, 
Article 7 on religious education in public schools, and Article 140, which 
includes provisions respecting religious societies and builds upon the 
Articles 136 to 139 and 141. It is here and in the administrative practice 
that the principles structure the relationship between church, state and 
religion. In Robbers’ typology of the legal system, these include the 
principles of cooperation and separation, the principles of neutrality, the 
principles of tolerance, the principles of parity and pluralism and the 
principles of institutionalism. In what follows, these measures and 
principles will be explored as these give a status of the law on religion in 
Germany while giving a crude outline of the legal aspects of the religio-
organisational field in Germany.   
4.3.2.1 The articles of the Basic Law concerning religion 
The preamble to the Basic Law states, “Conscious of their responsibility 
before God and man, inspired by the determination to promote world peace 
as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise 
of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law” (Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany, 13). The preamble does not imply that 
the Basic Law is given by the grace of God, but rather calls attention to the 
fact that this law is adopted in humility of the human legislative endeavour. 
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The reference to God is non-specific, anti-total and inclusive of all religion. 
It serves as a reminder that the state is not all encompassing and that 
constitution is a human creation and structuration of its own doing 
(Robbers 2010, 75).  
With Article 4 the freedoms of faith, conscience and creed are 
guaranteed. This includes the freedom to profess religious and 
philosophical creeds without being violated by state. It also includes the 
provision that no-one shall be compelled into military service against their 
conscience.  
Article 7 regulates the entire German school system and every school in 
Germany operates under the supervision of the state. According to Section 
3 of Article 7 religious instruction and education is an ordinary subject in 
public schools, limited by the freedoms that teachers are not obliged to 
teach against their convictions and parents are free to control the 
participation of their children (Robbers 2005, 85).  
Article 140 is without a doubt the most influential legal text when it 
comes to the regulation of church, state and religion relations. Here the 
relationship to religious communities is specified and the law of religious 
denominations given. The provision of Article 140 is a direct incorporation 
of the articles from the Weimar Constitution. The text of the article merely 
states, “The provisions of Articles 136, 137, 138, 139, and 141 of the 
German Constitution of August 11, 1919 shall be an integral part of this 
Basic Law” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 89).  
The Weimar Constitution Article 136 specifies the free exercise of 
religious freedom. This means the separation of civil and political rights 
and duties from religious affiliation, including eligibility for public office. 
No one is required neither to disclose religious convictions nor to perform 
any religious acts or ceremonies. Article 138 of the Weimar Constitution 
guarantees additional rights, article 139 specifies that the holidays shall 
remain as they are and article 141 enables the possibility of religious 
service and pastoral work in public institutions. This leaves the Weimar 
Constitution Article 137, which has the most impact on the affairs and 
regulations of the religious communities in Germany. Here it is as extracted 
from the Weimar Constitution and appended to the Basic Law:  
 
Article 137 
(1)  There shall be no state church. 
(2)  The freedom to form religious societies shall be guaranteed. The union of 
religious societies within the territory of the Reich shall be subject to no 
restrictions. 
(3) Religious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently 
within the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer their 
offices without the participation of the state or the civil community. 
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(4)  Religious societies shall acquire legal capacity according to the general 
provisions of civil law. 
(5)  Religious societies shall remain corporations under public law insofar as 
they have enjoyed that status in the past. Other religious societies shall be 
granted the same rights upon application, if their constitution and the 
number of their members give assurance of their permanency. If two or 
more religious societies established under public law unite into a single 
organisation, it too shall be a corporation under public law. 
(6)  Religious societies that are corporations under public law shall be entitled 
to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in accordance with Land 
law. 
(7)  Associations whose purpose is to foster a philosophical creed shall have 
the same status as religious societies. 
(8)  Such further regulation as may be required for the implementation of these 
provisions shall be a matter for Land legislation. 
  (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 93). 
 
As the text reads, it becomes clear that this is where most of the divisions 
and distinctions in the German religio-organisational field originate. 
Although the first three paragraphs dismiss state churches, restrictions of 
religion and dependence of religious societies on the state, the limits to 
religion in Germany reveal themselves. Obviously, religious societies must 
remain with in the ‘limits of the law that applies to all,’ but in addition 
religious societies are to acquire legal capacity as regulated by civil law. 
This clearly defines religious societies as governable and legally regular 
entities. The fifth paragraph is perhaps the most important as this is where 
the legal category of ‘corporations under public law’ (Körperschaft des 
öffentlichen Rechts) becomes applicable to religious societies. This grants 
the religious societies the right to levy taxes, to organize as a parish, to 
have their employees recognized under religion-oriented labour law, tax 
reductions for buildings and other exemptions, and the right to nominate 
members to the boards of broadcasting corporations (Rohe 2008, 57).  
The legal status of religious communities is framed widely by Article 
140 of the Basic Law and narrowly by the Weimar Constitution. Article 
137 requires some additional comments as it has significant influence on 
the current status of Muslims in Germany. Robbers calls it the “central 
reference point for the legal and social existence of religious communities 
in the Federal Republic of Germany” (Robbers 2005, 82). As things 
currently are, the largest religious communities and also a significant 
number of smaller religious communities have the status of corporations 
under public law. This includes of course the Protestants and the Catholics, 
but also the Orthodox Christians, the Jewish community, the Jehovah’s 
witnesses and several others enjoy this status (Jonker 2003, 50-51). While 
regulated as corporations under public law, religious communities are not 
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part of the state structure. They are guaranteed their independence by 
section 3 of the Weimar Constitution Article 137.  
The status as corporation under public law has clear historical origins. 
The idea of public law corporation can be traced back to German 
constitutional law of the 17th and 18th century. Here, the Lutheran 
churches, in particular, were granted the special status as they organised 
social work for the poor, weak and elderly and organised education for 
children on behalf of the state (Jonker 2003, 50). The status of corporation 
under public law was a convenient way to organise for both state and 
church. Through specific contracts with the individual Land, the churches 
would be obligated to provide welfare, pastoral care and education in return 
for the state collecting religious taxes (Jonker 2002, 38). According to the 
text of the Weimar Constitution article 137, it takes as its object the 
religious societies and not religion as such. This means that the protection 
extended is for the individuals and groups in worship only, rather than the 
abstract entities of religion. 
Today – that is, after 1919 – any religious community can apply to the 
Länder government in their state and will be eligible for the status of a 
corporation under public law if and when they live up to the standards set. 
Religious communities need to demonstrate the democratic nature of 
membership, transparency in structure and by-laws, well defined articles of 
faith, sufficient numbers and a stable tradition and permanent community 
in Germany (Jonker 2002, 40). According to Mathias Rohe, professor of 
civil and comparative law and a former Court of Appeals judge, this is 
interpreted to mean that a religious community has to prove that it has been 
a stable entity during a period of at least 30 years (Rohe 2008, 57) and that 
it represents at least 0.1% of the state’s population (Rohe 2012, 247). It is 
the courts and in particular the Federal Constitutional Court that decides on 
eligibility and exceptions can be made from case to case (Ibid.). In this 
regard, the Federal Constitutional Court has clearly stated that a loyalty to 
the law and allegiance to the constitution is required to in order to receive 
the status as corporation under public law.  
However, as seen from the perspective of the non-Christian religions, 
these stipulations can be difficult to meet. For Muslim organisations the 
proof of institutional durability and organisational transparency does not 
easily translate into inherently Muslim dispositions. The courts in Germany 
have stipulated that status as corporation under public law requires a 
membership organisation with bureaucracy and a clear representative body 
with decision making powers. As Gerdien Jonker argues, Muslims might 
not prefer intermediary institutions to broker their relationship with God 
and she warns against “pressing Muslim community life in the mould of a 
democratically organized bureaucracy with boards, directors and expert 
committees [as these] produce severe changes in the traditional forms of 
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bonding, which provokes uneasiness and withdrawal on the part of 
believers” (Jonker 2002, 40).  
In the light of the German history of regulating the relationship between 
church, state and religion, Jonker explains this forcing of Muslim 
community life in the context of the predominant Protestantism. This she 
argues is a challenge to all non-Protestant religious communities in 
Germany and the first to experience this was the Roman-Catholic Church, 
who in important cases transferred decision-making power to the Holy See. 
Jonker’s conclusion is that of an institutionally embedded bias in favour of 
Protestantism against other communities: “… As might be expected given 
its historical roots, the article regulating the relationship between church 
and state was formulated with the Lutheran Church in mind. And indeed 
the Lutheran Church represents the cast that others now have to try to fit 
into. Lutherans can produce a democratically chosen board and internal 
structures, which have given it more and more the shape of a bureaucracy. 
Thus, over the past 80 years the Lutheran Church has produced and 
perfected the standard by which every new religious candidate wishing to 
enter the public sphere has been measured” (Jonker 2002, 41). 
So far, there is no Muslim community in Germany that has achieved the 
status of corporation under public law. The question, if and under which 
circumstances Muslim communities might achieve this status is very much 
discussed in Germany.  
4.3.2.2 The principles of the Basic Law concerning religion 
As noted above, Gerhard Robbers has identified the most important 
principles that structure the relationship between church, state and religion. 
These all follow from the articles of the Basic Law and are all aspects of 
the emphasis in German constitutional law on the duality of cooperation 
and separation. Robbers explains, “under the church-state systems of 
Europe, Germany takes a middle of the road approach between that of 
having a State Church and having a strict separation between church and 
state. The Basic Law lays down a system under which there is a separation 
of church and state while at the same time a constitutionally secured form 
of co-operation exists between the two institutions” (Robbers 2005, 80. Cf. 
Robbers 2010, 86). In the light of this governing principle of separation-
with-cooperation, the principle of neutrality, the principle of tolerance, the 
principles of parity and pluralism and the principles of institutionalism are 
introduced (Robbers 2005, 2010). 
Cooperation is only possible if the state is neutral and does not identify 
with a specific religious community. This in turn means that the state must 
separate itself from the churches and not establish any single church, 
according to Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution. Furthermore, 
neutrality means that the state must not disadvantage a religious 
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community or enact anti-religious policy as was the case of the 
Kulturkampf. Equally, the state is not allowed to intervene or take any 
particular action in the autonomous dispositions of the religious 
community, but must remain completely impartial (Robbers 2005, 80). In 
the interpretation of these principles of the German legal system the 
neutrality of the state is interpreted in contrast to the French idea of laïcité, 
in that the official discourse of state authorities insist on neutrality meaning 
positive neutrality and equal treatment (Robbers 2010, 86-87). The state is 
obliged to support religious communities and to make sure that religions 
are given ample room to establish themselves autonomously. Robbers 
observes that this has been a defining challenge in the integration of the 
Muslim population (Robbers 2010, 87). 
While neutrality regards the organised religious communities, tolerance 
addresses the religious creeds and beliefs of the individual and requires the 
state to respect all religious and non-religious positions of conscience and 
belief. This is seen most significantly in the school system where 
attendance in religious services is completely optional and discrimination 
as a consequence of opting out is not tolerated (Robbers 2005, 80).  
The principles of parity and pluralism grow out of the German history of 
church and state relations. As Robbers explains, “parity is a specific, 
group-oriented shaping of the idea of equal treatment that finds its 
historical roots in the equality of confessions – the result of the religious 
wars of the 16th and 17th century” (Robbers 2005, 80-81). The virtue of 
parity in this context is symmetry and equal treatment without identical 
treatment. In the light of the history of strife between the Protestants and 
the Catholics, parity was a crucial principle of realpolitik. When dealing 
with more than two religious communities, parity roughly translates to 
pluralism, providing equal opportunity and making no preferences in the 
religious landscape of great variety (Robbers 2010, 88).  
The last of the principles of significance in Robbers’ typology is 
institutionalism. This returns to the decrees of the Weimar Constitution 
Article 137, sections 4 and 5, where religious communities are understood 
as legal capacities with the option to receive status as corporations under 
public law. German constitutionalism assumes that religions take the form 
of religious communities and operates only with these as such. This is 
based on the expectation that the religious communities will represent 
themselves to the state, so the state may deal with them, cooperate with 
them and establish structure and relationship with them. This is the 
institutionalist assumption that is embedded in the German Basic Law, and 
as Gerdien Jonker noted above, it is one of the primary reasons for the 
serious challenge that Islam has posed to the German legal system 
(Robbers 2005, 88; Jonker 2002, 40-41).  
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As shall be demonstrated below, Islam and Muslim organisations as seen 
from a German constitutional point of view pose at least three significant 
challenges to the structures of church, state and religion relations as defined 
by the articles and principles of the Basic Law.  
4.3.3 Islam and Muslim organisations in Germany 
According a recent estimate from the German chapter in the recent volume 
of The Yearbook of Muslims in Europe (Rohe 2012) there are around 3.8 
and 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany. Most of these come from or 
are decendants of immigrants and guest workers from Turkey to the 
amount of approximately 2.5 million. From the Middle East and North 
Africa there are some 600.000, mostly from Egypt, Iraq and Libanon. From 
the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans there are more than half a million 
Muslims. South and South East Asia accounts for approximately 180.000 
Muslims, while roughly  70.000 Shi’a Muslims can be traced back, 
primarily, to Iran (Rohe 2012, 246). In his enumeration of Muslims in 
Germany, Mathias Rohe estimates that there can be anything between 
10.000 to 100.000 converts.  
From an organisational point of view, it seems Muslims have so far 
organized in one of two ways; either at a local level with the purpose of 
running Mosques or prayer halls and usually as associations under civil 
law, or, as major organisations on the national level with the purpose of 
organizing local member communities and Mosques (Rohe 2012, 249).  
Concerning the Mosques and the prayer halls, Rohe (2012, 251) 
estimates that there are approximately 2,700 buildings used for Muslim 
religious purposes, while Rosenow-Williams estimate that there exist some 
2,400 communities (2012, 164). Most of these are not built for this 
purpose, but have been refurbished to house congregations and 
communities in prayer. Some 200 buildings are built for the specific 
purpose and these draw on or are inspired by the traditional architecture of 
Mosques in the Middle East, North Africa and South East Asia (Rohe 
2012, 251-252). There is much debate about Mosques in Germany and 
while there is not legal basis for restricting Muslim rights to establish 
houses of worship (cf. Article 4 of the Basic Law), the popular opinion is in 
favour of restricting the religious freedom of Muslims in Germany (Rohe 
2012, 252).  
Turning the perspective to the major Muslim organisations that organize 
as umbrella organisations for local communities and Mosques, it seems a 
very long list can be composed. For the purpose of giving an overview of 
those that represent the far largest sections of Muslims in Germany, this 
presentation is primarily concerned with four organisations and the 
coordination council they formed in 2007. They are the Türkisch-
Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (DITIB – Diyanet İşleri 
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Türk İslam Birliği / Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs), the 
Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V. (IRD – The Islamic 
Council for the Federal Republic of Germany), the Verband der 
Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V. (VIKZ – the Association of Islamic 
Cultural Centres) and the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V. 
(ZMD – Central Council for Muslims in Germany).  
By far the largest umbrella organisation in Germany is the DITIB. It was 
established in 1984 and is closely linked to the Turkish Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). It has almost 900 member 
associations and one of the most important functions of the DITIB is to 
make sure that religious personnel trained in Turkey according to the 
directions of the Diyanet serve these associations. As Muslims of Turkish 
background are the largest segment in Germany, it is not surprising that 
they are a very heterogeneous group and as a consequence there are a host 
of other Turkish umbrella organisations. However, the DITIB is the most 
influential and most professional of Muslim organisations in Germany and 
institutionally speaking it sets the standard. It participated in both phases of 
the German Islam Conference (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 166; Rohe 2012, 
250).  
The Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (IRD) was 
established in 1986 and it represents some thirty member organisations, 
including the IGMG and others. It was set up as national coordination 
institution and common decision-making body of Islamic religious groups 
in and around Berlin. On its website, the IRD state that it is an autonomous 
Islamic religious cmmunity in the Federal Republic of Germany under the 
Constitution (Basic Law) and the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Germany.53 This is an important part of the IRD’s perception of itself and it 
sees itself as a Muslim community in a secular and pluralistic polity 
structured. It does so because “The Islamic Council seeks recognition as a 
corporation under public law on behalf of Islam in Germany and it seeks of 
the equality with the two Christian churches and the Greek Orthodox 
Church” (islamrat.de, my translation).  
The Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIKZ) is based on a former 
association based in Cologne named the Islamic Culture Centre that was 
founded in 1973.54 It defines itself as a social and cultural charitable 
organisation that seeks to further its Islamic activities under the provisions 
of the law. Today it coordinates and represents the efforts of more that 300 
mosque and educations associations. It is important to the VIKZ to state 
explicitly that it is committed to the constitution of Germany and that it is 
politically neutral and works in line with a free democratic order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 www.islamrat.de - accessed 20 February 2013.  
54 www.vikz.de/index.php/organisation.html - accessed 20 February 2013	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The Central Council for Muslims in Germany (ZMD) was one of the 
first attempts in Germany to organise a Muslim umbrella organisation in 
Germany united by a focus on the common interests of the Muslims in 
Germany (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 355). It was based on earlier groups 
from 1988, but was registered first in 1994. In 2002, the ZMD gained 
considerable attention by drafting the Islamic Charta, the long title of 
which was “Fundamental Declaration of the Central Council of Muslims in 
Germany (ZMD) on the relationship between Muslims, their State and their 
Society” (ZMD 2002). In this twenty-one point declaration, the ZMD 
actively sought to position themselves in the German religio-organisational 
field, stating “As an important minority in this country, Muslims are under 
the obligation to integrate themselves into German society, with an open 
mind, and to enter into dialogue about their faith and religious practices” 
(ZMD 2002).  
Of the organisations mentioned here, the ZMD is probably the one most 
oriented towards the general public as it understands itself primarily as an 
interest organisation (Rosenow-Willliams 2012, 349). The organisation 
survives as long as it is able to demonstrate that it successfully fights for 
equality and rights. The ZMD distances itself from the agendas of the 
German Government and vocal protests against policies, as this maintains 
its membership base (Ibid.).  
The creation of the Coordination Council of Muslims was a 
reconciliation of internal disputes in the Muslim community and the 
bringing together of the DITIB, the Milli Görüs and the Süleymali 
movement was a significant organisational achievement. Also in light of 
state relations and the wider German public, the establishment of the 
Coordination Council of Muslims was in organisational terms a prudent 
and timely thing to do and would place the Muslims in a strong position in 
the light of the emerging possibilities of receiving the status of a public law 
corporation. As Frank Peter observes, the ”reconciliation and the recreation 
of the KRM marks a crucial shift in the organisation of Islam in Germany” 
(Peter 2010, 122).  
Rosenow-Williams makes several observations about the place of KRM 
in the wider Muslim community. Firstly, similar to the comments made by 
Spielhaus (2010) and Jeldtoft (2006) in chapter three, she stresses that 
Muslims are not a coherent group of people and not everyone feels 
represented by a religiously focused coordination council. Secondly, in 
order to be able to speak on behalf of Muslim in the strictest sense, the 
KRM must have a significant number of formal members (Rosenow-
Williams 2012, 170). Both of these reservations return to the implicit 
Christian assumptions that govern the institutional expectations to 
organised Islam in Germany. Very few of the individual associations 
require formal membership or rites of initiation, such as the Christian 
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parallel of baptism. Rather, the sentiment remains that ‘one belongs to 
Islam through sheer belief’ (Şen 2008, quoted in Rosenow-Williams 2012, 
170). The Federal Government in Germany estimates that somewhere 
between 15% and 20% of Muslims are formal members of a religious 
association or organisation, while some half a million attend the 
community prayers Friday at noon (Ibid.).  
On the large national umbrella organisations and the coordinating 
council, Rosenow-Williams conclude that although the official recognition 
and status as corporation under public law has significant priority to the 
Muslim organisations, they are not yet in a position to represent the 
majority of Muslims nor demonstrate the official affiliation that the 
German courts require regarding the recognition as corporation under 
public law (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 172). 
Turning the focus to the religio-organisational field in Germany, it 
becomes clear that in this official barrier has been of huge hindrance in the 
ability of organised Muslims to relate and incorporate with both the 
political levels and the other organisations in Germany.  
4.3.4 The Religio-Organisational Field in Germany 
The achievement of Kerstin Rosenow-Williams is the in-depth analysis of 
the Muslim organisations in the micro, meso, and macro level the 
organisational field. Building on organisational sociology and neo-
institutionalist theory, primarily drawn from Scott and DiMaggio & 
Powell, she has conducted some very comprehensive case studies into the 
shifting relationships and interactions of Muslim umbrella organisations 
and the other actors in their environment (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 351ff.). 
These include the Federal and individual Länder governments, the 
churches, the media and public debates, the courts and other institutions of 
law, academia, the many other groups and organisations, and international 
actors, just to name a few. An exhaustive study of relations and interactions 
amongst these institutions and organisations is virtually impossible, and as 
discussed in Chapter One a critical choice of focus must be made. As can 
be seen from figure 4.1 below, to Rosenow-Williams this choice is to focus 
on the four umbrella organisations that have united into the KRM.  
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Figure 4.1: The organisational field of the four main Islamic umbrella 
organisations in Germany, adapted from Rosenow-Williams (2012, 
352).  
 
There is a slight difference in the conceptual difference between Rosenow-
Williams’ organisational field where she looks at Muslim umbrella 
organisations and the religio-organisational field, which has been the 
returning focus of this PhD thesis. The most significant difference is that 
Rosenow-Williams does not include any reference what so ever to 
Bourdieu or the theories associated with his thinking. Rather, the 
organisational sociology and neo-institutional theory that Rosenow-
Williams apply is traced back to the DiMaggio & Powell characterisation 
of the organisational field, also included in the discussions in Chapter Two. 
This means that Rosenow-Williams does not have an eye for the struggle 
and conflict in the field, which is the specific value of Bourdieu’s theory. 
By contrast, the present PhD thesis has as specific focus on the tensions, 
fault lines and conflicts on the different religio-organisational fields to the 
exclusion of the very wide and comprehensive analysis championed by 
Rosenow-Williams.  
As will be seen in Chapter Six, a narrower focus on conflict and tensions 
in the relations and interactions between Muslim organisations and its 
environment can be seen in the specific case of the German Islam 
Conference. This is done to the exclusion of most of the other actors in the 
field, the international actors and the relations to the general public, cf. 
Figure 4.1. The institutions of the German government, in particular the 
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Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) has made it very difficult 
for Muslim organisations to take part in the wider political, civic and public 
parts of life (Azzaoui 2010). Especially, the coveted status as corporation 
under public law has proven to be a glass ceiling and dominating force, 
which keeps the Muslim minority from achieving institutional equality and 
the symbolic status associated with it (Azzaoui 2010, 4). The German 
government and the Ministry of the Interior specifically maintain that the 
Muslims in Germany do not have the institutional stability and 
organisational structure needed to achieve the public corporation status. 
This has been met with significant criticism from academics and 
commentators and seems to be single most contested aspect of German 
regulation of Muslim organisations and affairs.  
A staunch critic of the structural power play in the politics of German 
state and religion relations, Frank Peter notes that ”the standard charge 
made by German politicians that Muslims do not have an organisational 
structure adequate for the incorporation into the German legal system has 
served for many years as a welcome excuse for ignoring Muslim demands 
and excluding them from the benefits accorded other ’churches’” (Peter 
2010, 126). In this interpretation of the denial of the status, Peter draws on 
the research of professor Axel von Campenhausen, who as a director of the 
Institute for Ecclesiastical Law of the Evangelical Church in Germany has 
argued, that the organisational demands made by the state should be 
changed, rather than insisting that the Muslim organisations should make 
up for their ‘organisational deficiencies’ (Campenhausen 2000). Speaking 
exactly of the Muslim organisations, Campenhausen notes “the 
constitutional reality and the constitutional culture cannot endure 
permanently a status in which major parts of society are excluded from the 
legal options available” (Campenhausen 2000, my translation).  
Evidence of the field returns to the assumptions on behalf of Muslims, 
that they will act as other religions have before them. It was an explicit 
expectation from politicians and Christian leaders in Germany that 
Muslims would have one national Muslim organisation with one 
spokesperson, “similar to the spokespersons of churches and the Jewish 
community” (Spielhaus 2006, 20). If religious groups and organisations 
behave in a similar way and adapt institutionally to each other, they will fit 
the models and pattern assumed of them, cf. Chapter Three, section 3.3. 
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that Muslim organisations have taken 
considerable important steps towards meeting the demands and 
expectations of the state structures. The old state relationship with the two 
Christian churches has defined a number of formal principles to which the 
Muslim organisations must comply, most particularly the demands required 
to become corporations under public law. In this regard Muslims have 
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explicitly stated their fidelity to the German constitution, they have sought 
to organise as an umbrella organisation to live up to the demands of 
representivity and by 2013 it has been more than forty years since the first 
Muslims settled as labour migrants. However, as will be seen in Chapter 
Six, the standards against which the Muslims have to measure are nearly 
impossible. The consequence seems to be a German Islam Conference that 
is the scene and setting for the struggle of Muslim organisations in the 
religio-organisational field.  
 
4.4 An outline of the religio-organisational field in England55 
In his Leviathan from 1651, Thomas Hobbes could declare, “… both State 
and Church are the same men… “ (Hobbes 1996: 366). There could be 
none without the other and the epithet ‘Christian’ was impossible not to 
carry if one would assume to be ‘English.’ Religion was impossible to 
ignore. Today a similar point can be made, in spite of a 20th century of 
secularism. In their 2011 RELIGARE country report on fieldwork in the 
United Kingdom, Ashraf-Ul Hoque and Prakash Shah state that it is “… 
difficult to imagine a field of life in its inter-­‐relationship with the law 
which has remained untouched by religious questions” (Hoque and Shah 
2011). The urgency of the religious questions and the breadth of their 
influence is a testimony to the social and public reality of religion in 
England. While ‘Christian’ was the predominant identifier in Hobbes’ 
account, the present situation seems to be addressing religion in its broadest 
appeal, not monotheistic, but ‘hyper-diverse’. Borrowing the term from 
Vertovec (2007), Hoque and Shah see religious hyper-diversity as 
pluralism taken to a significant extent.  
4.4.1 History of Regulation of Religion in England 
It is helpful to recapture the history of church, state and religion relations in 
England in order to see how it is not a model paradigm or exemplary 
framework but rather the product or expression of English history with all 
its negotiations, struggles and challenges (Hill 2010: 199).  
It was the will of King Henry VIII to be “… the only supreme head on 
Earth of the Church of England” that gave birth to the Church of England 
(Davie 2008, 2). Prior to the English reformation the name of the former 
institution had been Ecclesia Anglicana (ibid.), which was the English 
Church in the Roman-Catholic Church and its ultimate authority rested 
with the Holy See in Rome. Through the Act of Supremacy from 1534, 
Henry VIII was able to name himself Supreme Governor of the Church of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Some of the material in the English sections are based on – and follow closely – the much more 
extended presentations and discussions in The English State’s Regulation of the Relationship between the 
State and Anglicanism and Islam, respectively (Vinding 2009), which won the University of Copenhagen 
Gold Medal for Academic Excellence in 2009.  
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England and both the Crown and Parliament would be free of the Roman-
Catholic Church by the provisions of the Act against the Papal Authority of 
1536. In addition, the property of the Church was seized through the Act 
for the Submission of the Clergy and Restraint Appeals from 1534. From a 
historical perspective, these three acts of legislation are the beginning of all 
state regulation of church and religion in England (Vinding 2009, 22).  
Obviously, the regulatory body concerning the Church of England did 
not change so drastically over night. Rather, with the annexation of the 
church institutions, many of the responsibilities of the church became the 
responsibilities of the state, now delegated to the Church of England. 
Hospitals, poorhouses, schools and much more now slowly grew to be part 
of the state. The most important of these institutions were the trained 
scholars of the local administrative institutions of the Church who had 
experience with the kind of tasks that now fell to the state (Vinding 2009, 
24). William T. Cavanaugh makes an excellent point in the regard, namely 
that the annexation of the Church institutions not only gave birth to the 
Church of England, but also gave birth to the administrative body of the 
modern state, “... The concept of religion being born here is one of 
domesticated belief systems which are, insofar as it is possible, to be 
manipulated by the sovereign for the benefit of the State. Religion is no 
longer a matter of certain bodily practices within the Body of Christ, but is 
limited to the realm of the ‘soul,’ and the body is handed over to the state” 
(Cavanaugh 1995, 9).  
As Queen Elizabeth I succeeded to the throne in 1558, she set out to give 
the Church of England a legal frame and a set of governing principles that 
would allow it some measures of autonomy under the discretionary rule of 
the sovereign (Vinding 2009, 23). She revised Henry’s Act of Supremacy 
and she gave the Act of Uniformity from 1559, which defined the proper 
order of prayers in the English Book of Common Prayers and made it 
mandatory to go to church on Sundays. The purpose, of course, was to 
secure the protestant faith against the turmoil of the Catholic elements that 
remained. By 1563 she would authorizes the Thirty-Nine Articles of 
Religion, which would define the doctrines and sacraments of the Church 
of England (Smith 1997, 110-113).  
The autonomy, which the Church had known as Ecclesia Anglicana, 
would not an option for the Church of England until 1919. In the years 
since the Glorious Revolution, the policy and internal affairs had been 
governed through acts of Parliament with the institutions of the Church as 
advisory bodies (Hill 2007, 34). By the authority of the Church of England 
Assembly (Powers) Act of 1919, the Church would be free to govern its 
internal affairs and it would maintain a constructive and established 
relationship between Church and State. The act allows the Church of 
England to legislate on its affairs through the legal instruments of 
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measures, which have the force and effect of Acts of Parliament but are 
restricted to the dealings of the Church.  
Although the Church of England through its long history would be able 
to use its close and established relationship the state to its benefit and gain 
much both legislative and executive power and influence, the history of 
regulation of religions would not be so kind to the other and deviant 
religions in England. Catholics, first of all, saw centuries of persecution, as 
did other Christian denominations. It was not until the so-called Glorious 
Revolution of 1689 that non-Anglican Christian dissenters would be 
tolerated in England, although this did not include the Catholics. Through 
the Toleration Act of 1689 it became possible to not be a member of the 
Church of England, and with the Bill of Rights 1689, some civil and 
political rights were extended to other religious groups (Vinding 2009, 43).  
During the 19th Century, a number of concessions were made to the other 
religious communities and denominations in England. During four decades 
from 1820’s to 1850’s, the legal frameworks for the modern church, state 
and religion relationship was given (Rivers 2010, 20-24). The changes to 
the Test and Corporations Act from 1828 dealt away with most of the 
religious tests and requirements for the non-conformists and dissenters in 
England (Ibid., 20). By the authority of the Roman Catholic Relief Act 
1829 and the Roman Catholic Charities Act 1932, the Catholics were 
allowed civic participation and they were to be treated as the other 
dissenting Christian communities. With the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration Act 1836, the General Registry was created and it was made 
compulsory to register all births, deaths and marriages. This separated the 
religious ceremonies from the civil institutions. By 1855, it was the Liberty 
of Religious Worship Act and the Places of Worship Act, also from 1855, 
that gave Jews, Catholics and other religions the means for registering 
places of worship with the Registrar General (Rivers 2010, 21). Julian 
Rivers in his The Law of Organized Religions called this “a slow transition 
from the maintenance of one true religion to the principle that there is, in 
law, no false religion” (Rivers 2010, 24). The change was significant and 
the foundational assumption of law, when dealing with religion, was 
completely turned around, “Rather than assuming that all religion was 
unlawful except for that of the established Church and other ‘sects’ 
expressly tolerated by Act of Parliament, the underlying assumption 
became that all religion was lawful unless it breached some specific 
prohibition” (Ibid.).  
As for explicit freedom of religion as a statutory right, it was not until 
the Human Rights Act of 1998 that England adopted the right to freedom of 
religion as a ‘right and fundamental freedom.’ In March 1951, England had 
ratified the European Convention of Human Rights with its article 9 on 
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freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but tolerance nonetheless 
seemed to be the legal doctrine of the land. 
4.4.2 Current status of law and religion in England 
Two aspects are of the particular importance when considering regulation 
of religion in England. Generally speaking, legal authority in England 
follows two overall paths that determine both legislative and administrative 
regulation is not random, not without precedence and not without specific 
intention. One is by statutory law and the other is by common law. These 
need to be considered before turning to the specifics of law and religion in 
England.  
In the English legal system, the laws that have been enacted in 
Parliament and that are mandatory for all subjects are called statutory laws. 
These are legal norms understood to be an Act of Parliament in the sense 
that this is what has been agreed to act upon or to give legal action. These 
statutory laws are explicit and have been written down. (Walker 1980: 
1184). When speaking of statutory law as regulation in England it means 
that the executive powers – those of the Crown, which are delegated to the 
government – are restricted in their authority. Regulation in this sense is a 
limitation of the executive by the legislative (Vinding 2009, 56).   
That the regulatory powers in the ’statutory law’ are limited to the 
executive does not mean that both the legislative and the judiciary do not 
have considerable influence. In England, the judges and courts have an 
explicit responsibility to common law and its impact on what is considered 
the body of law. This is in contrast to the regulation of statutory law. 
In the English legal system and its accentuation of common law there is 
much greater focus on the establishment of law in the courts rather than in 
the codices of civil and statutory law. The rulings of the courts are part of a 
very large corpus of binding legal precedent. It is a widely used part of the 
English legal system that cases are tried at court because there is no valid, 
statutory law that has jurisdiction. A case by case assessment is made, 
where the judge exercises his legal authority and actively deal with the 
details and facts of the case. He will interpret these and in his judgement, 
which – if the court is of sufficient relevance – will be binding upon the 
body of common law (Wacks 2005, 84). As part of this assessment, former 
and similar cases are brought into consideration, the precedent is examined 
and the intentions of the relevant and related laws are considered. The 
common law exists of course to secure justice, but it does so at the level of 
the common man and the common land (Walker 1980, 1184).  
Common law must be understood in principle as a residual category of 
law, which governs where nothing else has jurisdiction – not the King, the 
Lords, the Church or any of the many other sovereign bodies in the old 
England. According to an English judge, it is the judicial establishment that 
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maintains common law as a defining influence on what England could and 
should be. This anonymous judge is quoted by Sebastian Poulter, saying, 
”England, it may be said, is not a country where everything is forbidden 
except what is expressly permitted; it is a country where everything is 
permitted except where it is expressly forbidden” (Poulter 1990, 1). This 
distinction is defining to an understanding of English law and it remains a 
relevant aspect when considering legal practice of interpreting foreign law 
and when considering what is common in a country with a growing 
multicultural population and their legal plurality.  
England does not have a constitution in the way that most of continental 
Europe of a civil legal tradition has. Rather, England is drawing upon a 
cross between common law and a constitutional practice that relegates the 
governing institutions under the sovereign power of Parliament. In 
England, the legislative, executive and judicial institutions are kept in 
balance rather than strictly separated (Vinding 2009, 57). This is called ”… 
the doctrine of the mixed or balanced constitution, in which monarchical, 
aristocratic and democratic elements were joined and held in equilibrium, 
rather than strictly separated” (Turpin & Tomkins 2007, 103). To be broad 
it can be argued that the separation of powers in England is a political idea 
rather than embedded directly into law. According to renowned jurist and 
constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey, the reason for this is the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty whereby ‘Crown in Parliament’ has the ‘right to 
make and unmake any law whatever’ (Dicey 1885[1915], 37ff.). 
The constitutional system in England and the importance of the 
difference between common and statutory law, allows for the specificities 
of Ecclesiastical and Canon Law to be of much relevance still – even when 
approaching Muslim communities in England. The most central feature 
perhaps of the English state of affairs regarding state, church and religion – 
and a key institution in the religio-organisational field – is the established 
relationship between Church of England and the English state.  
Beyond the specific legislation mentioned in the present and previous 
sections, it is important to stress that England has no common legal or 
constitutional regime that governs the status of religion (McLoughlin 2012, 
620). Rather, as was seen above, specific aspects are governed by specific 
measures and mostly for the individual aspects of religion. There are 
however, two important aspects of public religion that are important to 
understand when approaching the religio-organisational field in England. 
In his analysis, Julian Rivers identifies two possible candidates for a 
‘regime of public religion’ in England (Rivers 2010, 147), namely, the 
registration of places of worship and the charitable status. 
The registration of places of worship had been mandatory since 1689, 
but in 1977 the obligation to register was formally repealed leaving a right 
for religious communities to register. Certain privileges follow form 
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registering as a place of worship including specific protections under public 
order law, exemptions from Local Government taxes, the right to 
solemnize marriages with civil legal validity and as a registered place of 
worship, there is no reason to register as a charity (Rivers 2010, 153). With 
these privileges the sacredness of the place of worship is respected and 
with the exemptions available, it notion of registering reflects the idea that 
certain religious practices are and must be ‘publicly accessible and publicly 
beneficial’ (Ibid., 147). If a religious community agrees with these ideas 
and want to take their religion into the public sphere, they can register with 
the General Registrar Office to receive the certification needed. Private 
chapels and businesses cannot be certified and do not receive the tax 
exemptions (Ibid., 156). On an ad hoc basis, other venues may be approved 
for the registration of civil marriages independently of religious affiliation. 
For the second of the two aspects of public religion in England, the 
advancement of religion is considered a charitable act if it is to public 
benefit. In the Charities Act of 2006, religion does no need to involve the 
belief in one god, but might as well be many gods or none at all (Rivers 
2010, 158). It is the different Charity commissioners that in their practice 
administer the limits, but it is debated very much in several court cases. 
With the charitable status follows financial advantages and the religious 
organisations that are interested in the status must demonstrate public 
benefit. Rivers note the difficulty of this and says, ‘”at the heart of the 
problem of a definition of charitable religion lies the uncomfortable fact 
that it is not possible to completely transcend religious difference” (Rivers 
2010, 159). The issues addressed when dealing with charity status and 
religious difference comes close to the issues dealt with in Denmark with 
‘approval’ of religious communities and in Germany with the ‘status as 
corporation under public law.’ In his diagnosis of the problem, Rivers 
demonstrates the impossibility of government regimes that will ‘approve’ 
through secular privileges without engaging directly with religion and the 
merits of their arguments, 
 
“… Once the courts had decided that they were not able to take sides on the 
relative merits of any religion, they were left searching for supposedly neutral or 
secular principles by which to determine which religious objects do and do not 
merit public recognition and privilege. But wherever one draws the lines, it is 
relatively easy to show that the criteria of distinction are themselves bound up in 
controverted value-judgements … with all its profession of neutrality, the law still 
shows a ‘Protestant bias’…”  
(Rivers 2010, 159) 
 
Rivers argues against the subordination of religion to government ends and 
that government should accept direct engagement with religion. An 
approach to religion that would no try to assimilate the religious diversity 
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and pluralism into the existing protestant categories would allow for more 
autonomy and allow for religious organisations to position themselves 
independently and to the benefit of the public. Ultimately, the argument is 
in favour of a regime that ‘levels up’ and approaches religion rather than 
‘levels down’ and distances itself from religion.  
Similar issues will be addressed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, and 
will be discussed in the conclusions in Chapter Eight.  
4.4.3 Islam in England  
There is no specific account of the first visit of Muslims to the British Isles, 
or of the first Muslim residents. Coins have been found with Arabic 
inscriptions and Quranic references dating back to the eighth century, but it 
is impossible to know whether these have been used by Muslim merchants 
in England or English merchants who brought them home (Khaliq 2004, 
219; Gilliat-Ray 2010, 7; McLoughlin 2012, 619). In all likelihood, 
travellers and merchants sailed between England and the Muslim al-
Andalus on the Iberian Peninsula as early as early medieval times (Badawi 
1981, 7). Despite the fact that nothing can be known for certain about the 
earliest influences, Sophie Gilliat-Ray nonetheless concludes, “The very 
existence of this nevertheless indicates some degree of influence from the 
Islamic World upon the Anglo-Saxon economies and politics” (Gilliat-Ray 
2010, 7).  
Additionally, the renowned Islamic philosophers Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, c. 
980-1037) and Averröes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198) were known in England 
from early on and their texts were used and discussed at the Universities in 
the fields of theology, law, philosophy and medicine and knowledge. In the 
general public, by contrast, the myths and stories of the Arabic world have, 
without a doubt, been influenced by the crusades and the Christian 
propaganda (Badawi 1981, 7).  
The first encounter between Islam and the English legal system date 
back to 1764, where the courts discussed whether a Muslim could swear on 
the Qur’an rather than the Bible (Khaliq 2004, 219). An English version of 
the Qur’an is known from the hand of Alexander Ross, who was a chaplain 
to King Charles I (Gilliat-Ray 2010, 19). The first Mosque in England was 
built in 1890 in Woking near London with the support of a wealthy Indian 
Lord (Bradney 2000, 182). The Mosque was intended for diplomats, 
travellers and resident Muslims from South East Asia. At the beginning of 
the 20th century Muslims in England were still considered a very small 
community and Ansari estimates some 10.000 in all (Ansari 2004; Gilliat-
Ray 2010, 32).  
It was not until after the Second World War that actual migration to and 
settlement in England came about. Most were subjects of the Crown who 
came from the former colonies in South East Asia, the Middle East and 
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North Africa. Just after the war it was mostly a few hundred men who had 
served during the war, who would continue to serve back in England 
(Nielsen 2004: 40). As more and more of the colonies became independent 
and the new countries in the New British Commonwealth struggled to 
establish themselves, many found that they were British rather than 
anything else. As subjects of the Crown, anyone from the Commonwealth 
enjoyed the ’automatic right of entry’ and was allowed to take up 
permanent residence in England (Nielsen 2001, 146). As a subject of the 
Crown and as a permanent resident, one was considered a member of the 
English society and enjoyed full civil and political rights (Vinding 2009, 
159).  
With the economic boost of the late 1950’s and the 1960’s, the demand 
for an able workforce grew and many the former colonies would seek their 
fortunes in England (Nielsen 2001, 145). By 1962 the rules of immigration 
were tightened with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and 
significant migration control was set up. With the increased migration and 
the changing conjectures of the 1960’s, the policy on immigration changed. 
By 1968 the automatic right of entry was abandoned and now only family 
reunification was possible (Nielsen 2004, 41).  
In many ways the migration history in England is similar to the patterns 
of the rest of Northern Europe, where labour migration would be succeeded 
by chain migration, which again was succeeded by family reunifications, 
which again was succeeded by significant rise in refugees. These came to 
England from Iran and Iraq, Lebanon in the 1980’s and later on from 
Bosnia, from former Yugoslavia and from Palestine in the 1990’s (Nielsen 
2004, 43). Much of the migration into England in this period can be 
understood in terms of a structural ‘push and pull’ mechanism, where 
poverty and wars would push people from their homes and where the 
demand for labour and the promises of a better life would pull them to 
Europe and England (Gilliat-Ray 2010, 44-45).  
The event that had the most significance the Muslim life in England was 
the publication of the Satanic Verses in 1988 by Salman Rushdie. It and the 
subsequent chain of events would bring Muslims from the periphery 
English society to the very centre of the political agenda (Vinding 2009, 
111). Many Muslims in the United Kingdom and in the rest of the world 
saw the publication as an attack on the Quran and the personal integrity of 
the Profet Muhammad (Allievi 2003, 334). In the winter of 1989 this 
brought about book burnings in Bolton and Bradford, which was covered 
by the media and broadcast across the world (Joppke 1999, 253). This led 
to significant reactions in Pakistan, India, and the Middle East and in Iran, 
where on 14 February the Ayatollah Khomeini would release his infamous 
Fatwa commanding just Muslims to murder Salman Rushdie (Modood 
2005, 107). During the spring of 1989 demonstrations would be frequent 
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and in London some 20.000 people would meet on Parliament Square and 
demand the trial of Rushdie according to the English law that would protect 
against blasphemy (Pipes 1990, 181). In the light of the past 25 years since 
the publication of the Satanic Verses, it may be seen as the occasion of the 
return of religion to the public debates, which was to be a complete surprise 
to the political agenda in England. 
The conflict of the Rushdie Affair can be explained as a riposte to the 
English integration and race policies of the 1970’s and 1980’s. A contested 
revision of the problematic Race Relations Act of 1976, which focused on 
ethnic rather than religious discrimination, was made in 1992 by the 
Commission for Racial Equality, which maintained that ”… Incitement to 
hatred against a religious group and discrimination against a person 
because of membership of that group are lawful in Great Britain” 
(Commission for Racial Equality 1992, 17). Some exceptions were made 
by explicit statutory law, such as the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets 
(Religious Exemption) Act from 1976 and The Slaughterhouse Act from 
1974 (Joppke 1999, 234), but the Blasphemy legislation concerns 
specifically the Church of England: “…The law of blasphemy was thus 
restricted to protecting the tenets and beliefs of the Church of England, 
other religions being protected only to the extent that their beliefs 
overlapped with those of the Church of England” (House of Lords Select 
Committee 2003, 46). The report from 1992 by the Commission for Racial 
Equality point to the clear injustice in this, “… There is good reason to 
suppose that in not offering any protection in respect of religion the UK is 
in breach of international treaty obligations as regards Britain” 
(Commission for Racial Equality 1992, 60). It was not until ten years after 
the Human Rights Act of 1998 that the common law offence of blasphemy 
was repealed in 2008. 
As Muslims in England experience their religion as discriminated 
against and distinguished for no apparent reason, the unjust or even 
arbitrary nature of the system becomes visible. Muslims naturally perceive 
this as Islamophobic or xenophobic. In 1997, the Runnymede Trust 
published a report on “Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All,” which 
gives evidence of a mistrust and deliberate misunderstanding of Muslims in 
England. One Muslim voice referenced in the Runnymede report gave 
expression to the Muslim frustration, “instead of trying to understand the 
offence The Satanic Verses has caused to Islam and Muslims and instead of 
listening to authentic Muslim points of view, the entire establishment in the 
West, with a few exceptions, has turned against Islam and hounded the 
Muslim community with all its might and contempt” (Ahsan 1991, quoted 
in Runnymede 1997, 28).  
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It is against such arbitrary discrimination and structural dispossession 
that Muslim organisational struggles takes place in the religio-
organisational field in England.  
4.4.4 Muslim organisations and institutions in England 
According to the estimates by Sean McLoughlin in the Yearbook of 
Muslims in Europe (2012), which is built on a 2010 estimate, there are 
some 2.869.000 Muslims in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (McLoughlin 2012, 619). This translates to 4.6 per cent of 
the population by 2010. As per the numbers of the Census 2011, the 
number of Muslims in England and Wales are 2.706.066, which translates 
to 4,8 per cent of the population (Office for National Statistics 2012).  
As with Denmark and Germany the composition of the Muslim 
population in England reflects the history of migration, which is why most 
Muslims are from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The data from the 2011 
Census correlating the numbers of religion and ethnicity have not been 
made available, but in England and Wales there are 1.412.958 who 
identified as Indian, 1.124.511 who identified as Pakistani, and 447.201 
who identified as Bangladeshi (Office for National Statistics 2012). These 
probably identify with most religions, but building on 2001 number, we 
know that 73.7 per cent of those identified as Muslim were of Asian origin. 
Demographically considered, Muslims are an exposed group. An 
estimated 60 per cent of all Muslims are living in London, compared to 17 
per cent of the general population (Office for National Statistics 2012). 
According to the Census 2011, the local authorities with the highest 
proportions of Muslims are Tower Hamlets with 34.5 per cent and 
Newham with 32 per cent, both in London (Ibid.). For Tower Hamlets 
specifically the number in 2001 was 36 per cent, but self identified 
Christians have gone down from 39 per cent in 2001 to 27 per cent in 2011 
(Ibid.). One researcher estimated in 2004 that the majority of Muslims have 
not gained any better position or status in England since the arrival of their 
earlier generations, ”many are still concentrated in semi-skilled and 
unskilled sectors of industry, thereby stratifying them as ’working class’ … 
[they] suffer from unemployment, poor working conditions, poverty, poor 
and overcrowded housing, poor health, and low educational qualifications” 
(Ansari 2004, 257). 
A special characteristic of Muslims by contrast to the Jewish community 
and the Church of England, is that there is no single Muslim representative 
organisation, but rather a number of contesting Umbrella organisations who 
speak for different segments and clusters of Muslims in England. Of the 
largest and most important Muslim umbrella organisations in England, the 
Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO) is the oldest, as it was founded in 
1970. The UMO is based in London and designates itself as a 
Outlines of the Religio-Organisational Fields	  
	  
162 
representative body of the Muslim community living in the UK and 
Ireland. It is a registered charity. 
The largest of the Muslim umbrella organisations is the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB). The MCB was created in 1997 in close collaboration 
with Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw after realising the frustration of 
conflicting and disagreeing Muslim parties. This frustration was the 
unofficial reason why Iqbal Sacranie, who had actively protested the 
Rushdie affair, was responsible for the series of hearings and consultations 
among 250 organizations in the Muslim community, which lead to the 
formation of the MCB (Q-News 2002, 22; Vinding 2009, 165; McLoughlin 
2012).  
According to their own website, the MCB is an umbrella organization 
consisting of more than 500 different Muslim organizations, mosques, local 
religious, charitable foundations and private schools, at both local and 
regional levels. MCB is organized as an independent, impartial, non-
sectarian umbrella organization a thought as a representative of both 
individuals and Muslim groups.56 The ambition of MCB is to “… make 
Britain a successful multi-faith and multi-cultural society” (Modood 2005: 
166). The MCB is a charitable foundation.  
Another large Muslim organisation in England is the British Muslim 
Forum (BMF), who claim to have the largest network of Sunni members in 
England and has a strong base in the Midlands and in North England. It 
was established in 2005, and gained considerable influence after the 
London Bombings when the political agenda of Preventing Violent 
Extremism marshalled Muslim partners. Under the strategy of Pursue, 
Prevent, Protect and Prepare, the UK Government sought to fight religious 
extremism by ‘Understanding, and engagement with, Muslim 
communities’ (Preventing Violent Extremism 2010, 5). The BMF 
benefitted from the PVE funds and made a name for itself in contrast to 
MCB who represented Muslim groups, who felt the PVE programme was 
made to ‘spy’ on and stigmatize Muslims, rather than focus broadly on 
political and religious extremism (Ibid., 3). The BMF is a registered 
charity. 
The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which was also established 
in 1997, has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and denied to support the 
government’s ‘War on Terror’ and the PVE. This seems to be the reason 
why the MAB needs to specify on their website that, “MAB cooperates 
with others in tackling the complex and intractable issues affecting our 
society like rising crime, failure in education, the spread of racism, drug 
addiction, disassociation of youth from society, rise in anti-Islam hatred 
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and violence — whether organised or individual, regardless of its 
motives.”57 The MAB is a charitable trust.  
Besides these few umbrella organisations, many of the organisations 
seen in Denmark and in Germany are also found in England. There are Sufi 
organisations like the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) and the Pakistani 
originating Minhaj ul-Quran (MuQ). Of special interest among the Muslim 
organisations in the English religio-organisational field are the considerable 
number of Shari’a councils that provide arbitration and mediation to the 
Muslim communities in England. There are of course examples of these in 
Denmark and Germany, but the phenomenon is much more widespread in 
England. Chapter Seven returns to the Shari’a councils and will take a 
closer look at six of these, at Alternative Dispute Resolution and their 
symbolic importance in the religio-organisational field in England. 
4.4.5 The religio-organisational field in England 
In the light of the history of regulating religion, the specific approach to 
Islam and especially following the Rushdie affair and the Preventing 
Violent Extremism programme, it seems fair to say that the attitude of the 
state and legal system towards Muslims is minimal. The English legal 
system allows for what has not yet been regulated and generally speaking 
Muslims have benefitted from this, while they at times have been 
neglected.  
The approach to Muslims in England demonstrates that structurally 
speaking Muslims hold a marginal position. As seen through the example 
of the Blasphemy legislation, Muslims did not warrant a dedicated norm, 
but were merely tolerated. From the Muslim perspective this is seen as a 
systematic reluctance to incorporate and accommodate Islamic culture and 
religion. Werner Menski explains this pragmatically, stating “… 
‘traditional model jurisprudence’ appears to leave no formally recognised 
space for a personal law system based on different religious and cultural 
traditions” (Pearl & Menski 1998, 51). 
Menski takes a highly critical position against the state’s regulation of 
the minority legal orders.  He argues, “... the policy of the English legal 
system towards recognition of ethnic minority laws has been inconsistent, 
haphazard and uncoordinated” (Pearl & Menski 1998, 70). It is the 
deliberate strategy of the state to consider Islam not as a coherent whole, 
but rather in its particularity. The state’s relationship to Islam is defined by 
its approach of not addressing or taking note of Islam as religion, but rather 
as an irregularity in society.  
This is a dangerous strategy and the state risks that Muslim organisations 
will withdraw from the public sphere and stop addressing the courts and the 	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government institutions when solving the problems of interest and 
importance to the common good. This tendency was discussed in Chapter 
Three and Menski argued that “… British Muslims, men and women, are 
now refusing to accept English law as binding for them and feel that 
recourse to Muslim law in Britain, albeit unofficial, is preferable” (Menski 
2008: 60). This strategy of withdrawal is a countermeasure to the lack of 
recognition in the English legal system and the consequence will be the 
undermining of English legal authority and it increases the religious risk in 
England. From a Muslim organisational perspective in the religio-
organisational field it is a strong move that will expose the distance from 
an unengaged and mis-recognising state to religion in general.   
In his conclusions, Julian Rivers says of the positions of religions in the 
English legal system that the place of religion is relegated to certain small 
compartments. This he argues is the case of both Christianity and Islam. He 
observes, “… religion in the secular State is entirely interstitial, playing its 
part in the gaps left by the law. The only question is the size of the gaps” 
(Rivers 2010, 332). This gap or these compartments are created because the 
English state and government do not properly distinguish between 
secularism-as-separation and secularism-as-indifference (Rivers 2010, 
331). The first principle recognises that religious organisations are distinct 
and justified institutions that exist to the benefit of their communities and 
to the promotion of religion as a public good. The second principle, 
however, with its inherent indifference, creates as legal body with allows 
the state an unlimited sphere of activity without respecting the autonomy of 
non-religious norms and institutions. Rivers quote the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, who on behalf of all religion argues against ‘an unqualified 
secular legal monopoly’ (Williams 2008; Rivers 2010, 332). 
Muslims and Christians form, in this regard, a particular alliance against 
the indifference of secularism. It is the criticism of the state and the respect 
for religious life that provides common ground of Organised Islam and the 
Church of England. Williams observes that “... Christians and Muslims can 
work together to challenge uncritical models of state sovereignty, and top 
down models of social management. This seems to me to be something that 
we can do, that we are doing and that we ought to be doing more of ...” 
(Williams 2007: 345). The joined opposition to the state is self-reinforcing 
for base for criticism of the state and it allows the organised religion a 
much stringer voice than what the Church or the Muslim organisations 
could muster independently. Not only are this religious alliance in a strong 
position against the state, the mutual recognition of religions further refines 
the criticism of the state in that the Church of England does exactly that 
which the state neglects: the Church of England actively recognizes Islam 
as legitimate in its own right. Islam is, and should be, part of a serious 
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discussion about faith and religion and about the position of religion in the 
legal system (Vinding 2009, 144-145). 
Taken together, the counter power of Muslim organisations arguing for 
recognition of their minority legal order and the strong alliance with the 
Chruch of England are key aspects if the overall position of Muslims in the 
religio-organisational field. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, this 
position holds the potential of symbolic and institutional recreations of 
Islamic norms and Muslim identity.  
 
4.5 Conclusions  
When adding up the different key elements presented in this chapter, a 
governing logic of the religio-organisational fields begins to emerge, 
although with slight differences in each of the three countries. It seems that 
the logic, which governs the structures and positions available to Islam and 
Muslim organisations, is the logic that was shaped historically through the 
dealings of the state with religion. As each of the country cases suggest, 
this is no mere coincidence or feat of a long history, but rather it seems to 
be embedded into the structure of the state from its very genesis. As the 
modern apparatus of the state grew, it borrowed its mode of governance 
from the Christian churches, which it had subjugated by securing legitimate 
jurisdiction. 
When dealing with a new religious community and new religious 
organisations, like the Muslim, an institutionally embedded paradigm of 
structural ecclesiastification is applied. In treating Muslim organisations as 
if they were Christian churches, the expectations, the governing norms and 
the logic of perceiving that recognise religion are the same that have 
always been used. This is amounts to an institutional mis-interpretation of 
Muslim organisations and the result is a structural mis-recognition of 
Islam.  
The examples of this are clear in each of the three countries. In 
Denmark, the impossibility of recognition and the subsequent ‘lesser 
status’ is a source of frustration for Muslims. In Germany, Gerdien Jonker 
argues against ‘pressing Muslim community life in the mould’ of the 
existing relationship with Christianity. In England, Julian Rivers point the 
fact that a neutral and benignly distant secular state ends up alienating 
religion, which is relegated to roaming in the gaps and compartments of 
limited structured space not yet regulated (Rivers 2010, 332).  
Something similar is seen in the repeated examples of optional schemes 
of ‘approval’ in Denmark, ‘corporation status under public law’ in 
Germany and ‘charitable status’ in England. These are all built upon 
models that favour the religions that originally informed the creation of 
these models. In this context, Muslim organisations are doing the best to try 
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to fit the standards, expectations and requirements, which the state defines. 
All of these are of course voluntary and anyone is free to exercise their 
religion, but with the incentives built into the statuses, the Muslim 
organisations that are fighting to establish themselves in the religio-
organisational field would be mistaken not to pursue the opportunities 
available and to attempt to gain the access, the status and the resources 
contingent upon the approval and certification of the state. As such, the 
states and governments are able to define a distinguishing norm and 
thereby divide the field of organised religions. As Vejrup Nielsen (2012) 
argued – echoing Ferrari (2002) – the categorisation of organised religion 
follows a logic of selective cooperation with the state. A defining feature of 
the religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England seems 
to be that it is the degree to which a religious organisation cooperates with 
the state that dictates its status and position in the field.  
As Menski suggested in his criticism of the inconsistent and haphazard 
approach to ethnic minority law, this forcing of Muslim organisations into 
pre-designed moulds and compartments might result in Muslim 
organisations actively opting out of the structures of the religio-
organisational field. Rather than cooperating with state and government, 
Muslim organisations are actively moving away from the structures and 
programmes of the state and actively resisting the paradigms of approval 
and registration.  
The alternative to opting out is seen in the corporation of Muslim 
organisations with the Churches. In Denmark, the Church of Denmark has 
a standing forum on meetings of religion, which actively includes Muslim 
and others into the conversation about public religion. In Germany, the 
regional churches are actively helping local and regional Muslim 
organisations set their structures and organisations. In England, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury voices a common cause of public religion 
against the indifference of secularist state institutions.   
Equally, Muslim organisations can be seen to take advantage of the 
width of the religio-organisational field. Imams in Denmark, for example, 
use different institutions like books stores, community centres, Mosques 
and relief agencies, which they tie together in institutional relations across 
the environment. Although strictly speaking not a part of religion, they are 
rather important elements of the production of religious and symbolic 
capital that can be reapplied to secure better and stronger positions of 
Muslim organisations in the wider religio-organisational field.  
Chapter Five 
 
The Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations, 
Danish Muslim Organisations and the fundamental 
dividers in the religio-organisational field in Denmark. 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the religio-organisational field it seems every case must be treated as a 
special case. The need for a coherency and requisite variety in order to 
represent the complexity of church, state and religion relations demands 
that the socio-religious fact of Islam in the European context be worked 
into the models that both the policy and academia had been relying on. In 
an attempt to move away from generalisations, simplifications and 
exclusions of heterogeneity, studies into the religio-organisational field 
demand a specific focus and limitation of scope. The deliberate choice of 
emphasis and focus becomes that much more important if it is to be of 
significance and interest to the particularities and varieties of the field. The 
focus should therefore be on those fault lines in the field where the struggle 
is visible, where it is revealed how positions are lost and won, how capital 
is produced, reproduced and converted and how the governing logic of the 
field operates and influences the organisations and institutions of the field. 
Denmark, the country case of this chapter, has such a complexity of 
church, state and religion relations in the religio-organisational field and 
nowhere are the struggles, logic and positions that define this field more 
clearly seen than in the specific example of the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Denominations (Det Rådgivende Udvalg vedr. Trossamfund).58  
As was shown in Chapter Four, the pragmatism and realism of the 
Danish history of regulating church, state and religion relations in the wide 
religio-organisational field had crystallised into a ministerial practice rather 
than into either of the two constitutionally promised laws (cf. section 4.2 in 
Chapter Four). The Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations is 
the partially reinvented continuation and administration of this ministerial 
practice. Formally speaking, the committee is an advisory institution that 
produces an opinion and a recommendation on whether or not the relevant 
ministry should delegate the competence to perform legally valid marriages 
on behalf of the state. This is the approval that the state makes available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 A literal translation of the name of the committee would have the ’Advisory Committee regarding Faith 
Communities.’ However, I follow professor Armin W. Geertz, chairman of the committee, and his 
translation from 2007.   
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religious communities and - in the strictest sense of the law - it is an 
approval specifically to perform these legally recognised marriages. A 
delegation of power on behalf of the state and nothing else.  
The Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations becomes the 
focus of this chapter and of particular relevance for a study into the religio-
organisational field because this is the institution to which changing 
governments have delegated and allocated the last forty years of the state’s 
perception of and attitude towards the ‘religious communities other than 
the Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Denmark.’ Strictly speaking, the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations only has the competence 
to advise on issues regarding approval of religious communities to perform 
legally valid marriages. However, this delegation of power can be given 
only if the religious community lives up to a number of specific 
organisational, structural and institutional demands and norms and must 
live up to a the specific legal interpretation of what it means to be religious 
communities and denominations.  
The opinions and recommendations of the experts in the Advisory 
Committee on Religious Denominations thus become of great importance 
in deciding who receives the only approval available to religious 
communities in Denmark. Although it is the law of the land that draws the 
definitional lines between different religious communities and it is the 
ministry department which delegates the approval, the committee holds the 
power to administer and execute the interpretation of the norm that arrange 
and classify the religious communities in the religio-organisational field in 
Denmark. This power is accentuated by perceptions held, often mistakenly, 
by the religious communities who believe that the committee can grant 
recognition of religious communities on behalf of the state. Such a practice, 
however, is defunct as of the Marriage Law 1969 (cf. section 4.2 in Chapter 
Four) and only the approval to perform marriages of civil legal validity 
remains. The importance of approval or recognition, mistaken as it might 
be, is of extraordinary significance when seen from the structural and 
institutional perspective of marginalised or recently established religious 
communities such as the Muslim organisations. To them, the perceived 
official recognition is thought to bring with it access to an attractive 
position in the religio-organisational field and is seen as a public 
acceptance of the religion in question by state officials in Denmark. 
The present chapter is a presentation and analysis of the institution of the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denomination in the religio-
organisational field. It has become an institutional focus for many of the 
norms that draw the all-important boundaries in the field in order to protect 
the core values of society. As an extension of its advisory capacity, the 
committee has set about to decide what religion is in order to properly 
decide on the religious communities (Geertz 2007, 34). Furthermore, the 
Fundamental Dividers in the Religio-Organisational Field in Denmark  	  	  
	  
169 
committee has revised the procedural rules for approval and thereby sought 
to define the divisions and distinctions between positions in the religio-
organisational field.  
The chapter first presents the transition from the defunct legal paradigm 
of recognition to the new procedural rules (5.2). These are presented as 
they are interpreted in the preceding ministerial practice and in the 
Guidelines that the committee has given to itself and to the religious 
communities who are considering an application for approval. Following 
this self-understanding of the committee, the next section (5.3) focuses on 
the Muslim organisations and institutions that for more than fifty years 
have been applying for recognition and approval. The applications have 
been of varying purpose and quality and have led to some being approved, 
but most denied and none recognised.  
The materials for the analyses in this chapter are drawn primarily from 
two different sources. Firstly, in the general characteristics of the 
committee and its regulatory context, the chapter relies on the Guidelines 
(2011), which are now in their sixth revised edition and the other public 
comments, presentations and discussions made by the members of the 
committee. This includes a paper from 2007 given by the Chairman of the 
committee, Professor Armin W. Geertz, titled “Recognition of Minority 
Denominations in the Kingdom of Denmark” (Geertz 2007) and an article 
from 1998 by associate member of the committee, Professor Margit 
Warburg, titled “Lige ret for Loke så vel som for Thor? Religionsbegreber 
og retspraksis i forbindelse med religioner uden for Folkekirken” (Warburg 
1996).59 Secondly, in addition to this publically available information, the 
chapter relies heavily on material received from an extensive freedom of 
information request from the spring of 2012 to the Division of Family 
Affairs with the government agency of National Social Appeals Board, 
which is where the approval of religious communities is currently based. 
The freedom of information request was granted on 26 September 2012 
after looking through a 25.000 page body of case files during a few weeks 
of the summer of 2012. The material included in the granted request 
includes applications from 26 Muslim organisations and religious 
communities as well as from 31 other religious communities totalling more 
than 1.000 pages. The oldest of the applications go back to 1961, where 
representatives from Islam’s Ahmadiyya Mission in Scandinavia are 
applying for official recognition and the most recent are from the spring of 
2012. For all the applications made in the time of the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denominations, the freedom of information request also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The title translated is ”Equal Justice for Loke as well as for Thor? Concepts of religion and case law 
concerning religions outside the Church of Denmark.” The question in the title is an unattributed 
reference to N.F.S. Grundtvig who in The Mythology of the North from 1832 argued for ’Freedom for 
Loke as well as for Thor’ (Grundtvig 1832). 
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included the responses and opinions of the committee as well as answers 
and interpretations given by the relevant ministers on various issues 
regarding recognition and approval. Building on this vast material, three 
aspects of the procedural and administrative practice of the Advisory 
Committee on Religious Denominations and its guidelines are presented. 
Firstly, this regards the recognition of Islam as religious denomination 
(5.3.1) secondly, the demand for a ‘primary purpose of god worship’ 
(5.3.2) and thirdly, the organisational and institutional demands (5.3.3). 
The Muslim criticisms and frustrations from the encounters with the 
structural barriers are voiced and the position of the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denominations in the religio-organisational field is discussed 
and critiqued, and the explicit Bourdieuan perspective in the analysis is 
revisited and especially the question of symbolic capital is discussed (5.4).  
5.2 From defunct recognition to new procedural rules  
In Denmark, the affairs of religious communities have historically been 
managed administratively through a ministerial practice because legislation 
on different, ‘deviant’ faiths never came into being. As things are presently, 
religious communities outside the Church of Denmark can either have the 
status of ‘recognised religious community’ or as a ‘religious community 
approved’ by authorisation to perform marriages of civil validity. There are 
eleven communities in Denmark who enjoy the former of these two 
statuses and since the Marriage Act of 4 June 1969 the practice of 
recognition through royal decree is defunct. As of 1 January 1970, the 
provision of article 16, section 1 of the Marriage Act made the need for a 
royal decree redundant as it is now regulated directly by law.  
This new provision stated that a religious marriage could be performed 
“within other religious communities, when one of the parties belonged to 
this community, and when the religious community have priests, who are 
authorised by the Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs to perform such 
marriages” (Kirkeministeriet 1998, my translation). During the 
deliberations and discussions in Parliament before passing the Marriage 
Act of 1969, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs had clarified what it 
meant to be a religious community as this was a precondition on the 
authorisation to perform marriages. Quoting from the clarifying notes that 
the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs produced in 1998, the specification is 
that the applicant to be approved must be,  
 
“a proper religious community in the ordinary meaning of the word, and not just a 
part of a religious movement or a religious or philosophical association, but an 
association or body (a religious community), whose primary purpose is god 
worship (cult) according to specially formulated teachings and rites”  
(Kirkeministeriet 1998, my translation).  
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In order to help assess what a ‘proper religious community in the ordinary 
meaning of the word’ is, the ministry responsible for the recognising and 
approving religious communities would solicit the advice and 
recommendations from the Bishop of Copenhagen and who-ever he would 
consult in the diocese and in his administration. This practice has seen 
criticism from multiple angles and has been partially reorganised by setting 
up the impartial committee of the Advisory Committee on Religious 
Denominations (Warburg 1996, Christoffersen 1998, Kirkeministeriet 
1998).  
Currently it is the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations that 
advises the Division of Family Affairs at the National Social Appeals 
Board under the Ministry for Social and Integration Affairs in matters 
concerning the recognition of religious communities. The committee was 
originally established in March 1998 to advise the Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs in matters of religious communities outside the 
Church of Denmark. (Kirkeministeriet 1998). The Committee consists of 
four academics from law, theology, history of religion and sociology of 
religion. It has produced a set of guidelines to advise applicants. These 
guidelines are now as of 18 August 2011 in the sixth revised edition. As 
chairman, Professor Armin W. Geertz states regarding the guidelines, “the 
idea was to give the impression that this was a typical, standard Danish 
bureaucratic procedure, and that there was no reason for panic” (Geertz 
2007, 33), and as such the guidelines are designed to provide transparency 
and ensure professional, unbiased assessment of religious affairs 
(Guidelines 2011, 1). These guidelines are a key document and they 
provide information about the committee’s self-understanding, the working 
definitions of both religions, denominations and religious communities, and 
– last but not least – it introduces the normative framework on the basis of 
which Danish society assess communities before delegating the executive 
power that is embedded in the marriage authorization. 
According to the Guidelines (2011), central to the particularities of 
approval of a religious community is the need for religious diversity and 
pluralism, and the right of a minority religion to believe, think and profess 
freely. The Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations is therefore 
working with an inclusive and broad definition of religion. The intention is 
to set the individual free to have his understanding of religion and belief 
and to make organizations free to preach and administer rituals as they see 
fit. Accordingly, the definition that “the committee understand a religion as 
a specifically formulated belief in human dependence on a power or 
powers that are beyond people and the laws of nature, and a belief that 
guides human ethics, morality and behavior” (Guidelines 2011, 2). The 
committee does not see it as its task to assess religions or to pass 
essentialist judgement on a religious community.   
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By contrast, the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations sees 
it “as its main task to ensure that all organizations seeking special status as 
a religious community in Denmark, will be evaluated based on uniform, 
clear, objectively justified criteria” (Guidelines 2011, 2). Thus, it is 
important for the committee that approval as a religious community 
happens on objective criteria and that neither the Ministry nor the 
committee under any circumstances make judgments of religion. Therefore, 
the committee shall only consider applications from religious organizations 
seeking the National Social Appeals Board for approval as a religious 
denomination or community and in the end it is the National Social 
Appeals Board, which makes the decision on approval (Guidelines 2011, 
3). From the freedom of information request it is clear that the associates at 
the National Social Appeals Board put the committee to good use and did 
not blindly accept the recommendations of the committee. 
Both the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations and National 
Social Appeals Board apply the distinction established in the Constitutional 
Act between, on one hand religions, which enjoy absolute freedom, and on 
the other religious denominations or communities whose affairs and 
relationship to the state is governed by law. It is rightly only the latter, 
which may be required to adhere to the criteria in the guidelines of the 
committee and only if they apply at their own initiative. It is these 
requirements and criteria are cornerstones of its work. In the committee’s 
prioritization of criteria the organizational structure and institutional 
stability holds significant weight. Based on the Parliament discussions of 
Marriage Act and existing administrative precedents, the committee has 
determined that considerable emphasis is put on size, on institutional 
durability and on the stability of the organization to ensure that in the 
future there will be a well-trained staff to manage the religious ceremonies 
and the delegated power (Guidelines 2011, 5). Therefore the committee 
maintains by definition that stable organization means that religious 
denominations must have at least 150 members and religious congregations 
must have at least 50 members. 
In addition, in relation to practice of approval, the committee regards it 
as its legal position to make some content-based demands of religious 
communities, which they must meet in order to obtain approval. The 
committee builds upon the established understanding of the religious 
communities, which they summarize as follows, 
 
Based on the existing state of the law, the committee has given the following 
summary: 
 
First, the term “worship” is a theistic concept, which is too narrow for a modern, 
religiously pluralistic society. Therefore, it is necessary to use a more abstract 
Fundamental Dividers in the Religio-Organisational Field in Denmark  	  	  
	  
173 
“concept of God” as covering “the perception that people rely on one (or more) 
transcendent power(s).” 
 
Secondly, worship takes place on the basis of specifically formulated teachings,  
a) There must be a creed or other text that summarizes and refers to the 
religion's teachings basis and / or learning tradition. 
b) That there must be a common faith, which gives guidelines for human 
actions, i.e. ethics, morality and behaviour. 
c) That there must be a common faith, as expressed through marriage and other 
rituals. 
d) That there should be a rule or a description of the most important rituals. 
e) The wedding ritual must meet the requirements of Danish marriage law. 
 
Thirdly, the term “religious community” is understood as follows: 
a) That society has such an organizational structure that can serve as an 
accessible basis for public scrutiny and approval. There shall be by-laws that 
may be subject to assessment under Danish law. 
b) There must be designated representatives who can be held accountable to the 
authorities. 
c) That there is formal membership with guidelines for both recording of 
members of both voluntary as involuntary termination of membership. 
(Guidelines 2011, 7, my translation). 
 
In this summary of applicable requirements and criteria, it is clear that 
these are the three prevailing terms, that are most significant to understand 
the structural demands and institutional norms to which Muslim 
organisations and communities are held. Firstly, a religious community 
belong to a religion, with the provision that it is not everything that looks 
like religion that actually is. Secondly, the religious community based must 
be based on ‘specially formulated teachings,’ which must be explicitly 
formulated, written down and made available to the members of the 
community. Thirdly, the community make organizational and formally 
understandable to the authorities and conform to the international human 
rights standards of equality between the genders and refrains from violence 
and coercion.  
 
5.3 Muslim organisations and fifty years of struggle for recognition  
Reviewing the vast material and the many correspondences between on one 
hand Muslim representatives and organisations in Denmark and on the 
other hand the various Ministers of Ecclesiastical Affairs, permanent 
secretaries, associate secretaries and the advisory institutions, three issues 
seem to be problematic for Muslim organisations in Denmark, when 
dealing with the question of recognition and approval. These three issues 
concern firstly the repeated demand from Muslims that they ought to be 
recognised by royal decree as a religious community like the Church of 
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Denmark, the Jewish Community in Denmark and the other ten recognised 
communities in Denmark. Secondly, the issues concern the demand for 
‘specifically formulated teachings,’ the demand for explicitly formulated 
rituals and the demand for a clear statement of religious purpose in the by-
laws of the Muslim community, as per the requirements of the guidelines 
above. Thirdly, many of the problems occur for Muslim organisations 
when applying for approval because their organisational structure and by-
laws, their membership numbers and their institutional stability do not meet 
the demands of the law or the interpretations of the committee.  
Three examples from the material of the freedom of information request 
are discussed to illustrate these three problems. The examples illustrate the 
length and consistency of the Muslim struggle for recognition of Muslim 
organisations in Denmark these past fifty years. From the 42 members of 
‘Islam Denmark’ and the religion of migrant workers in 1961 to the more 
than 236.300 Muslims across several hundred organisations and Mosques, 
the struggle of Muslim organisations seem to be locked in one or more of 
the structural challenges of the three problems discussed here.  
5.3.1 Recognition of Islam as religious community 
A repeated reason for indignation and criticism from the Muslim 
communities in Denmark has been the reluctance prior to 1970 to extend 
recognition as a religious community to Muslim communities and after 
1970 the legal impossibility of such recognition. An excellent example for 
discussing the issue of recognition is the case of Islam’s Ahmadiyya 
Mission in Scandinavia and the attempts on behalf of its Vice President 
Abdus Salam Madsen to obtain the recognition by royal decree for ‘Islam 
Denmark.’ The material in the freedom of information request consists of 
correspondence between A. S. Madsen and the Ministry of Ecclesiastical 
Affairs from 18 April 1961 through to 8 February 1975. Madsen addresses 
the ministry as ‘Amiir’ of the Danish Muslim congregation and asks how 
the ministry would react to an application for recognition from ‘Islam 
Denmark.’ Madsen and the Muslim organisation are asking for the 
delegation of the right to naming, to perform marriage ceremonies and to 
conduct funerals with full civil validity (Madsen, 18.04.1961).  
Throughout the correspondence with the Ministry and then Minister of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Bodil Koch, it becomes clear that the primary 
conditions for recognition are the size of the community and its 
organisational stability. Koch clarifies that recognition “will in the first 
instance depend on the size of the community and whether it has a 
sufficiently firm organisation, including training facilities for priests, that 
there can be given a guarantee of the continued existence of the community 
and continued supply of priests” (Koch 08.07.1961, my translation). The 
argument hinges on the fact that Madsen and Islam’s Ahmadiyya Mission 
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in Scandinavia can only muster 42 members (45 in December 1961), 
because resident foreigners and diplomatic personnel are not included.  
This is to Madsen’s obvious frustration. On 15 November 1961, Madsen 
filed a complaint with the office of the Ombudsman and in the review of 
the case the legal reason for the difficulty of recognition becomes clear 
(Folketingets Ombudsman, 16.12.1961). The Ombudsman notes that while 
there are no explicitly defined conditions to live up to, the problem remains 
the size of the community. He concurs that it would be unlikely that the 
administrative practice of the Ministry would result in granting the desired 
right to perform religious ceremonies with legal validity (Ibid.). Both the 
Ombudsman and the Ministry underline in their correspondence that ‘Islam 
Denmark’ is protected by the freedom of religion and that they may 
practice their religion freely.  
The Ombudsman does, however, take the time to consider the 
administrative practice and its legal basis somewhat further. After the 
Constitutional Act of 1849, the first religious community to apply for 
recognition were the Methodists. As the promised law in Article 69 of the 
constitution had never been established, the debates in Parliament from 23 
and 24 February concluded that ‘regarding the recognition, the government 
would be allowed to resolve the matter administratively’ (Folketingets 
Ombudsman, 16.12.1961, 3, my translation). From the debates it was also 
revealed that the Methodists were ‘about 100 members’ and that this was a 
problematically low number, because ‘of the conclusions to be drawn 
thereof by other quite small communities’ (Ibid.). According to the 
conclusions of the Ombudsman, there is no reason to criticise the 
Ministry’s decisions and any recognition will only be possible, if the 
organisation has a fitting number of members, but that such a number 
would remain unspecified. The ambition of Madsen and Islam’s 
Ahmadiyya Mission in Scandinavia to be recognised would remain 
unaccomplished.  
As late as 6 August 1973, Madsen writes to the Ministry once more to 
request recognition. He states that there are now more than 12.000 Muslims 
in Copenhagen and that some 3 to 4.000 are in contact with their Mosque. 
By 1973, however, the recognition by royal decree had been discontinued 
as a legal option because of the jurisdiction of the Marriage Act 1969. 
Islam’s Ahmadiyya is therefore encouraged to apply for approval, which it 
receives in 1974 as the first Muslim community in Denmark.  
The fascinating thing about this example is the mismatched expectations 
on behalf of the Muslim community. In the letters at the hand of Madsen it 
is clear that the symbolic aspect of the recognition is important and that the 
lack of recognition is an affront to the Muslims’ understanding of religious 
equality. This lesser position and the weaker status remains a source of 
continuous frustration to Muslims. In a consultation with then Minister of 
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Ecclesiastical Affairs, now Minister for Economic and Interior Affairs, 
Margrethe Vestager, Muslim representatives gave clear evidence of this. 
“To a large degree it does concern emotions, and we would very much like 
to see a breakthrough regarding religious equality,” one representative said 
(Kirkeministeriet, 15.07.1998).  
The mismatch of expectations on behalf of Muslims also affects the 
relations with the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations and as 
will be seen below (5.4), it is exactly the ‘symbolic advantages’ of 
recognition and approval that are the object of the struggle. 
5.3.2 An association ‘whose primary purpose is god worship’  
Another of the repeated problems faced by Muslim organisations is the 
insistence in the opinions of the Advisory Committee on Religious 
Denomination that it can only recommend for approval organisations 
‘whose primary purpose is god worship.’ As is seen from the materials in 
the freedom of information request, the committee allows for little 
ambiguity or deviance from this provision. 
Here another mismatch is seen. Muslim organisations that apply for 
approval are under the impression that interreligious dialogue, ambitions to 
further democracy and general social welfare are important for the 
approval. However, as is seen from the material of the freedom of 
information request, this is not the case. Actually, it is often 
counterproductive to the approval. 
The case of the Islamic Community in Northern Jutland reflects this 
well. The community applied for approval on 14 September 2001 and had 
submitted their by-laws and gave an account of their membership figures. 
In their by-laws, the community specifies that their purpose is threefold: 
 
Article 2, Purpose  
1. To serve the interest of Muslims [and] to defend their religion and to aid 
them in adhering to their Islamic obligations, as God says in Sura 5, Verse 4 
of the Quran: (But aid one another in justice and fear of God and do not aid 
one another in sin and trespasses) 
2. To create a good contact, and honest, just cooperation with members of the 
Danish society to the common societal interest. 
3. To mission under free conditions and without force, as God says in the 
Quran in Sura 16, Verse 126: (Call to the road of your Lord through wisdom 
and good admonition and struggle in the best way possible) and as God also 
says in the Quran, Sura 2, Verse 257: (there is no compulsion in religion) 
 
(Ankestyrelsen 14.09.2001, “75868-92073,” my translation) 
 
In reviewing these by-laws, the purpose of the Islamic Community in 
Northern Jutland and the other relevant articles, the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denomination conclude in their assessment that, 
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“Of the above mentioned formulations of by-laws, it reads that two of three of 
the purposes of the association are of a religious nature, but these 
formulations are contradicted by two conditions. Firstly, the application as 
well as article 1 of the by-laws stress that the main purpose is to further 
constructive dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims in Denmark. 
Secondly, it reads in article 3 of the by-laws that the working methods are not 
of a religious nature. The committee is therefore on this basis unable to 
conclude that at this is a religious community with god worship as its primary 
purpose” (Ankestyrelsen 22.04.2002, “98531-120155,” 2, my translation) 
 
As is clearly seen from these conclusions, the committee actively interprets 
and weighs the information available and makes an overall assessment of 
the religious community. This is an established part of the ministerial 
practice, which the committee has integrated into its procedures. In the 
assessment of the different aspects of the application by the Islamic 
Community in Northern Jutland, it is clear that the ‘constructive dialogue’ 
and the working methods ‘not of a religious nature’ is enough to outweigh 
the two explicitly religious statements of purpose of the association.  
Almost all of the Muslim organisations that apply have some statement 
in their by-laws that promotes celebration of ethnic or national occasions, 
intercultural cooperation, cultural dialogue, and the general promotion of 
non-violence and welfare. Laudable as these intentions may be, they are of 
no interest to the committee who focus solely on god worship in the 
specified requirements.  
As a direct consequence of the structural insistence on the religious 
purpose explicitly demonstrated in the articles of association, there are 
numerous examples of organisations that are deliberately changing their 
name and statements of purpose to fit the requirements. Former ethnic and 
cultural associations are now Islamic associations and several of the 
applicants have been aided by lawyers, who have drafted new by-laws that 
fit the requirements of the committee. 
In a downplayed tone, Armin W. Geertz comments on this fact, “We 
have noticed that a dialectical relationship has risen between the 
committee’s rules of procedure and the applications that we receive. It is 
sometimes quite obvious that organisational structure, rituals, and even 
beliefs reflect our rules” (Geertz 2007, 41). The consequence of the 
structural demand that the association has as its primary purpose the god 
worship and that it therefore is ‘a proper religious community in the 
ordinary meaning of the word’ seems clear. The requirements of law and 
the practice of the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations are 
effectively creating Muslim and Islamic religious communities in 
Denmark. This is a generative structuration as coined by Bourdieu and 
presented in Chapter Two. Structuration was defined as the production and 
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‘being-produced-by’ structures in a network of social relations. In the 
present case, the structures of the law and the practice of the experts of the 
committee produce its own legal and academic object. As such, the cultural 
and national associations of the immigrants and guest-workers of the 
1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s are now structurally becoming Islamic and 
Muslim associations and organisations.  
The Islamic Community in Northern Jutland has not been approved. 
5.3.3 Organisational structure and institutional stability 
The third of the returning problems of Muslim organisations that apply for 
approval to perform marriages with legal validity is the issue of having 
sufficient institutional durability and the stability of organization to ensure 
that in the future there will be a well-trained staff to manage the religious 
ceremonies and the delegated power. In the guidelines, the number of 
members has been understood as a mere 50 to be approved as a religious 
congregation and some 150 for a religious denomination. In addition, the 
by-laws and articles of association must comply with the three 
requirements of organisational structure, designate responsible 
representatives and formal membership in order to satisfy the committee.  
As for the number of members required, there is evidence in the freedom 
of information request to substantiate that some Muslim organisations 
misunderstood this criterion to their own misfortune. One organisation 
could not demonstrate that they had enough members because they only 
listed the male individuals of the organisation in keeping with a customary 
practice of guardianship. Other organisations do not specify membership, 
but assume that they represent an extended group of people who frequent 
the Mosque or celebrate occasionally. Still others do not live up to the 
requirement to explicitly state in their by-laws that they adhere to the 
associational freedom of the individual to enter and exit the organisation 
willingly. There are several examples of this in the material and the 
committee will often return the application, asking the organisation to 
remedy or specify the matter.  
Similarly, a recurring problem for Muslim organisations has been to 
demonstrate that they are accountable in terms structure and leadership. 
Besides the question of the primary purpose of worship, which was 
discussed above, the articles of association must demonstrate that the 
organisation will submit itself to public scrutiny and assessment under 
Danish law. In the material from the freedom of information request, it 
seems that the committee understand the relations of Muslim organisations 
with international umbrella or mother associations as a problematic issue. 
When confronted with the matter, the Muslim organisations have been 
asked to verify that they are autonomously led organisations in Denmark. 
This was the example of the Association Ahlul Bait, who during 2002 to 
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2004, was corresponding with the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denomination about the circumstances 
of their approval. Here, Ahlul Bait had to specify, “… the Danish 
association is an independent association, cf. By-Laws, Art 1. The 
connection to the international association is solely of a spiritual kind and 
is only relevant if disagreement should arise between Danish members in 
religious questions” (Ankestyrelsen, 10.12.2004, “180684-215486”, 2, my 
translation).  
From the first assessment made by the committee in August 2002 it was 
clear that the Association Ahlul Bait did not live up to the requirements and 
could not be considered a religious community (Ankestyrelsen, 31.08.2002, 
“11639-136004”). The association did not have any services or religious 
activities and was according to its by-laws more of a representative and 
administrative unit than a religious community. However, in the course of 
the correspondence and the deliberations between the lawyer of the 
association, the Ministry and the committee, it became clear that the most 
significant problem for the association was their insufficiently audited 
accounts. The committee had requested a copy of these, but were given 
only account statements and the comments from an authorized auditor, who 
had declined to do the audit, because of “the want of administrative 
procedures of the association which would result in deficiencies in the 
financial accounts” (Ankestyrelsen, 10.12.2004, “180684-215486”, 2, my 
translation).  
From the review of the case of Ahlul Bait, it becomes clear that the 
committee understood the requirement of by-laws as an indirect 
requirement of financial auditing of the accounts of the community. The 
Association Ahlul Bait received its approval in 2005 after satisfying the 
committee on the issue of the audited accounts.  
5.4 The Consecration of Arbitrary Boundaries  
Armin W. Geertz, who has been the chairman of the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denomination since its inauguration in 1998, has from time to 
time written about the work of the committee, taking the opportunity to 
comment on criticism and misunderstandings. In an English article from 
2007, written on the basis of a Danish outline from 2004, he gives a 
thorough introduction to the responsibilities that the committee has been 
given and the choices made as part of its mandate.  
Regarding the applications of Muslim communities and the 
recommendations of the committee, Geertz observe, “out of all those 
applications who consider themselves to be Islamic organizations, we have 
recommended that 71% be rejected. This high rate of rejection is due to the 
fact that the applications are often immigrant organizations that do not 
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distinguish between cultural clubs and religious denominations” (Geertz 
2007, 40).  
The committee promotes a distinction between culture and religion, but 
the argument on behalf of the Muslims organisations is that such a 
distinction is artificial and counterproductive. It reflects a Christian 
paradigm and understanding of religion that does not correspond to 
anything Muslim or non-European.60 Equally, the distinction between 
religious communities as approved to perform marriages with legal validity 
and the many other purposes that a religious community may have to its 
members and general society seems alien to Muslim organisations. It is 
seen as a narrow, exclusive and quasi-Protestant interpretation of religion 
and religious communities that the Danish state and government will only 
designate the increased status and strongly symbolic approval to those 
organisations that fulfil the requirements.  
Why Muslim organisations that are cultural rather than religious do 
apply nonetheless, Geertz explains by guessing at the motives of the 
applications. “Most applications are apparently interested in something else 
entirely, namely the symbolic advantages. The well known French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu understood the term ‘symbolic capital’ as a 
resource used to create one’s own reality in terms of the reality of the 
majority […] Symbolic capital is apparently very important for Muslim 
organizations in Denmark” (Geertz 2007, 40). 
In his efforts to explain and legitimate the definitions and boundaries of 
the religio-organisational field as guarded by the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Denominations, Armin W. Geertz clearly places the mandate of 
the Committee with a frame of societies defining reality. “Definers decide 
who or what is to be included and excluded. In terms of religion and 
denominations, the Danish Parliament mandated the Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs to define what is meant by denominations outside the 
Church of Denmark.” (Geertz 2007, 35-36). He goes on to explain how 
societies “use classificatory systems and canons of law built on values and 
concepts that order and classify the world. They build up institutions that 
ensure that the citizens abide by the system. Social and legal boundaries are 
drawn and those individuals or groups that try to move these boundaries 
can expect reactions from society” (Geertz 2007, 34). 
Geertz comments on the procedural rules in the guidelines, stressing that, 
“the committee understands a religion to be a specifically formulated belief 
in humanity’s dependence on a transcendental power which stands over 
and above humanity and the forces of nature, and a belief which serves as 
guidelines for ethics and morals.” (Geertz 2007, 39). This understanding of 	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Parish Council in the Church of Denmark.  
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religion with its basis in the academic research on religion is given a legal 
basis, as the work committee has become part of the administrative practice 
in Denmark. The experts in the committee are allowed to both define the 
norm and are charged with the task of inspecting and controlling that the 
norm is upheld. As such, the committee claims a technocratic power.  
Geertz notes the reference to Bourdieu and observes that there is struggle 
for symbolic capital in relation to the institutionalisation that the Advisory 
Committee on Religious Denominations had to offer. This he explains has 
to do with the power that has been delegated to the committee. However, 
he does not reflect further on this struggle for symbolic power and does 
note take heed of the conceptual understanding that Bourdieu provides into 
these struggles. While Geertz argues that society will make order, it 
becomes clear from a Bourdieuian critique, that the making of order is 
delegated to the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations. “To 
institute, in this case, is to consecrate, that is, to sanction and sanctify a 
particular state of things, an established order, in exactly the same way a 
constitution does in the legal and political sense of the term” (Bourdieu 
1991B, 119).  
The approval and recognition of religious communities in Denmark, as 
Margit Warburg writes, "determine how the Danish government distinguish 
between religious and nonreligious organizations" (Warburg 1996, 9). The 
division in the field that the committee is producing by the continuous 
examination of Muslim organisations, requires according to Bourdieu: “a 
system of criteria that could account for the set of meaningful and 
significant differences that objectively separate entities in the field, or if 
you will, enable a set of relevant differences among them to arise” 
(Bourdieu 1996, 232, my italics). From this quote a criticism for the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denomination and the comments by 
Armin Geertz can be drawn. Division must be built on these three criteria 
(i) meaningful and significant difference must be established, (ii) that are 
objectively defined, that is not, contingent on coincidences or particular 
accidents, and (iii) relevant, in that these are the differences in play of the 
particular logics and capital of the corresponding field.  
From a Muslim perspective the definitions and boundaries are not 
necessarily seen as ‘a system of criteria’ that is build on meaningful and 
significant differences between those who are approved and those who are 
not. The consequence of this is the loss of legitimacy and loss of the 
authority that the government enjoys concerning validation of marriage, 
specifically, and regulation of religion, generally.  
The Imam from Nørrebro, AWP, who was interviewed in Vinding & 
Christoffersen 2012, gave evidence of the loss of legitimacy and the 
increasing distance that some Muslims are putting between the state and 
their own institutions: 
  Fundamental Dividers in the Religio-Organisational Field in Denmark	  
	  
182 
 
AWP: “So we are a few, and I’m one of them, who have chosen not to seek 
marriage authorisation from the ministry because I am not interested at all in 
performing civil marriages. I am utterly indifferent to that in a religious context. 
Of course, I advise people when they come to me solely for a religious marriage. I 
advise them to also have a civil marriage performed.  
AWP: […] because then you’re under a ministry, no no, that’s the last thing 
that I’d want… it’d be terrible to have a political boss. No. [laughing] That’s 
doubly bad goes double. Internal freedom to preach. But also protection against 
outside influence, I mean wouldn’t... that’s the last thing I could imagine, that 
Muslims would be under some ministry or other and there’d a publicly elected 
politician sitting there, bossing around what you can and can’t do. No thank you!”  
  (Quote 3.09 & 6.22 in Vinding & Christoffersen)  
 
The Imam is disjoining the civil marriage from the religious marriage and 
thereby he makes the power of the Advisory Committee on Religious 
Denominations redundant. He is structuring religious life independently of 
the opportunities of the state and thereby he exposes the state to the risk of 
not being the only legitimate provider of marriage. This danger includes the 
risk making the marriage invalid in the eyes of the state, where by the 
rights and protections for spouses seeking divorce is also put at risk. (cf. 
Liversage & Jensen, 2011).  
Though the definition of religion proposed by the committee, a symbolic 
definition is also given of the collective of organisations that is eligible to 
enter the stronger positions in the religio-organisational fields. The social 
capital required is defined and a structural boundary is created to keep 
certain religious groups in a dominated position. It seems society in 
Denmark has delegated the very laborious expenditure of time and energy 
to the committee. The social capital invested in the existing, ‘recognised’ 
religious groups is the result of decades of accumulation and maintenance, 
and will not easily be put at risk. The power of the committee is 
institutional in the sense that it not only maintains a distinction and protects 
the social investment and the symbolic status thereof, but it also does this 
by way of procedure, namely, management of risk.  
The profound confusion that Geertz reproduce in his dealing with 
Muslim organisations is that symbolic power is not something to be had as 
a ‘symbolic advantage’, but is a strategy of misrepresentation and 
domination. In a note on his 1986 argument on capital, Bourdieu says 
“Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital – in whatever form – insofar as it is 
represented, i.e., apprehended symbolically, in a relationship of knowledge 
or, more precisely, of misrecognition and recognition, presupposes the 
intervention of the habitus, as a socially constituted cognitive capacity” 
(Bourdieu 1986). This he explains further a few years later, saying: 
”Symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with 
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the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it 
or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991B, 164). 
In summary of the symbolic struggle between the Advisory Committee 
on Religious Denominations and the Muslim organisations and 
communities, it seems clear that the power of institution embedded with the 
committee is a power to establish and consecrate a difference, which in the 
eyes of Muslims is both illegitimate, arbitrary and artificial. From a 
Bourdieuian perspective this is not surprising and it seems that Muslims are 
not subjecting themselves to the dominance of the established order 
reproduced by the committee. Structurally speaking, it seems the that well 
hidden behind a veil of objectivity and a cloak of unbiased knowledge, the 
committee is a technocratic institution that enforces a ministerial 
interpretation of the constitutional promise. The enforcement builds on an 
arbitrary set of criteria in order to maintain, consecrate and sanction the 
existing order of things. This is indeed far from the promise of an act 
governing the affairs of minorities as given in the constitutional act.  
5.5 Conclusion: Limited Muslim positions  
“The State’s choice to have an official religion presupposes a religiously 
homogeneous country: when people are divided among different faiths, the 
State adoption of one of them becomes a hindrance because it prevents a 
part of the citizens from fully identifying with the public institutions. The 
new religious, ethical and cultural plurality has outdated the systems of 
Church-State relations that are characterised by the legal identification of 
the State with one religion.” This is the analysis that allows Silvio Ferrari 
to conclude that out of a Nordic context, “only Denmark seems to resist the 
wind of change” (Ferrari 2010, 33-34).  
Returning to the models introduced and discussed in Chapter Three, it 
seems the Danish regulatory paradigm concerning church, state and 
religion lingers in the model that was referenced as the ‘Silvio Ferrari 
pyramid priority of selective State co-operation’ (See section 3.2.2., Figure 
3.1). The state control that Ferrari argues is embedded in the structured 
recognition of the Danish administrative practice. Islam as is the particular 
case here is allocated as “a second group of religious communities [in] a 
middle position” and remains “regulated by special laws enacted for 
religious associations” (Ferrari 2002, 10). The fact remains that this 
allocation is wholly decided by the governing state institutions and are 
allowed to hold only limited positions in the associated field of selective 
state cooperation. 
As the Danish case illustrates, the question remains that the narrow 
understanding of religious communities and the demand for a ‘primary 
purpose that is god worship’ as a condition for performing the civil and 
legally valid marriage does not correspond very well with Muslim 
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understanding of a religious community in all its inclusive variation and it 
does not correspond very well with the demands that society in general 
have of religious organisations. All purpose and intentions to promote 
integration, democracy, welfare, fight discrimination, fight radicalisation 
and to educate and build the future generations has no relevance to the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations if the main purpose of 
the organisation is not the worship of a god, as understood and interpreted 
from the discussions in parliament in 1969. 
The Bourdieuian understanding of the divisions in the religio-
organisational field and the insistence on selective state co-operation by the 
Danish government explains how the Advisory Committee on Religious 
Denominations has become an institution to delimit by definition and 
subjugate by structure the Muslim organisations in Denmark. In his 
conclusions, Armin Geertz writes, 
 
“Definitions and rules of procedure are acts of power in the name of clarity and 
routine. They create all kinds of problems even as they resolve other problems. 
Even though it is a universal human trait that societies define their social reality in 
this manner, it is just as universal that exceptions to the rules are quickly 
discovered and used. […] Majorities maintain their majority, and minorities use 
whatever means the have to improve their situation. There are often clashes of 
worldviews within a society with resultant battles for symbolic capital. Applying 
for official recognition as a religious denomination in Denmark is one way of 
winning the battle of self definition” (Geertz 2007, 46).  
 
With a focus on the scope for action arising from the normative evaluation 
that takes place in the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations it 
is clearly demonstrated in this chapter how Muslim organisations seeking 
formal recognition must navigate within the organizational framework as a 
religious community different from the church. Equally, there are several 
organisational and institutional tests they must pass in order to have a form 
and face where the Danish administration is able to relate to them. 
Communities that want recognition must face a number of clearly defined 
requirements and criteria and from the analyses it seems three possible 
positions are available to Muslim organisations in Denmark. Firstly, they 
can adapt to these standards and through an application satisfactorily 
demonstrate that their values and organizational forms are acceptable to the 
wider Danish public. Secondly, for one reason or other there is in the 
Danish religio-organisational field the possibility that they do not succeed 
in obtaining the recognition, and if they wish to remain organised they are 
welcome to do so within the general Danish legislation. From a legal or 
administrative point of view they will not be seen as religious community, 
but seen as any other association or group free to gather and worship. 
Thirdly, in Denmark there are communities who do not seek recognition 
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and do not want the government and authorities to do them any favours or 
give them any privileges. In the first two cases, the norms and standards of 
the committee govern the frame for Muslim organisations and communities 
and it is clear that there is a tendency towards majority of dominance and 
that there is a distinct risk that the minority religions are left in a limited 
position of adaption. In the third case, there is room to manoeuvre for 
religious organisations. This, however, represents the danger that Muslim 
organisations may disappear from the awareness of the state and escape the 
regulatory sphere. 
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Chapter Six  
 
The German Islam Conference 
and the Structuration of Muslims in Germany 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A team of skilled researchers associated with Werner Schiffauer (2012) has 
successfully and convincingly documented and criticized the power 
struggle and the security risk management executed at the expense of the 
Muslim organisations by various institutions of the German government 
and state in the context of the German Islam Conference. These include 
Frank Peter (2010, 2012), Levent Tezcan (2012), Schirin Amir-Moazami 
(2005, 2011), Riem Spielhaus (2006, 2010) and Nina Mühe (Mühe 2011, 
Mühe and Schiffauer 2012). Their approach is very much inspired by 
Michel Foucault (2009), Judith Butler (1997), and Wendy Brown (2001, 
2006). The main objective of this team of young researchers has been to 
demonstrate that the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz, 
DIK) is the place not only for dialogue and integration, but also an 
occasion for reasserting a domestic security agenda and maintaining 
Muslim organisations in a structurally dominated position. In a number of 
critical analyses the researchers investigate and question a number of 
power tactics, social constructionist initiatives and struggles over the 
definition, the understanding and the identity of Muslim organised life in 
Germany. 
By drawing on the material, results and conclusions of this group, the 
contribution in this chapter is to add the religio-organisational field as a 
frame for the struggles and to add the insights of a Bourdieu-inspired 
analysis to the specific case of the German Islam Conference. The game in 
the religio-organisational field as it unfolds in the context of the German 
Islam Conference can be seen as a game of symbolic recognition and mis-
recognition, representation and misrepresentation of Muslim organisations. 
The assumed representivity of Muslims in the German Islam Conference 
and the realization of the myth of such representation reveals that symbolic 
domination and divisive normative powers are pitting the Muslim groups 
against each other and splitting the fragile unity of the Muslim 
organisations and environment into factions. As the four key Muslim 
umbrella organisations, contrary to expectations, actually do organise into 
the Coordination Councils of Muslims in Germany in early 2007, the 
government representatives of the German Islam Conference actively 
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discredits their legitimacy and questions the representative authority of the 
Muslim groups.  
In the case of the German Islam Conference, the normative power of 
vision and division is utilized once more. As was seen in Chapter Two, the 
norms – the nomos in Bourdieuan terms – was first of all the principle of 
inclusion and exclusion in relations to the field. This is put to specific use 
when deciding who speaks on behalf of the Muslim community in 
Germany in the eyes of the state and by strategically changing the norms 
and standards that Muslims are held to. If Muslims want to achieve the 
status of corporation under public law in the short run and a more 
publically integrated position in the long run, Muslim organisations are to 
be measured against a higher standard of cultural norms embedded in the 
agenda of the German Islam Conference. The game of exclusion and 
inclusion is analysed in this chapter in terms of an examination of the 
Muslim norms and ideals.  
A second relevant perspective from the theory of fields, as suggested by 
Bourdieu, is the symbolic or signifying application of the institutionalised 
identity of Muslim organisations. A struggle over how to perceive Muslims 
is being fought in the documents, proceedings and conclusions of the 
German Islam Conference and it seems the tactics and social technologies 
applied are particularly refined on behalf of both parties. On one hand, with 
a security-based agenda, the state representatives are framing Muslim 
support for and adherence to the higher standards of the conference as a 
sign of support for the fundamentals of the Basic Law. This is put in terms 
by the German Muslims as a higher standard – a ‘Constitution Plus’ - 
applied to them only and a ‘loyalty test’ that they as the only religious 
community are asked to meet. On the other hand, Muslim organisations are 
working to frame the dialogue in terms of fundamental freedoms and rights 
of religion and belief, and the Ministry of the Interior in particular are seen 
as overreaching, power hungry and manipulative in their denial of the basic 
freedom of all religions. The threat to  core values and the identity of the 
nation is portrayed as substantial and the stakes are high. This struggle is 
asymmetrical and biased against the Muslims and presently it seems that 
the possible field of action for Muslims in the religio-organisational field is 
being re-defined and re-negotiated.  
In this light, the German Islam Conference constitutes some of the most 
significant fault lines in the German religio-organisational field and is 
therefore the returning focus of the present analysis. Many of the different 
relations and interactions in the religio-organisational field can be seen as 
tied together in the case of the German Islam Conference because it 
involves both a broad number state representatives and institutions, other 
religious and civil society associations, the public, media and more (Cf. 
Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four, see further Rosenow-Williams 2012, 352).  
German Islam Conference and Structuration of Muslims in Germany	  	  
	  
189 
The relations and interactions of the Muslim umbrella organisation in 
Germany are in play and the future positions, resources and institutional 
reproduction of Muslim identity in the German public sphere seems to be at 
stake. The structures of the old church and state relations seem to hold 
much influence still, and when – or if – change will come to the Muslim 
organisations in the religio-organisational field in Germany, it will be 
incremental and it will be at significant cost for both the established norms 
of the German leitkultur (lit. ‘Guiding Culture’) and to Muslim 
organisations in Germany.  
 
6.2 The German Islam Conference  
The German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz) was initially 
intended to shape specific policy that aimed at integrating foreigners in 
Germany and improving the state’s ability to counteract terrorism (Van 
Wyck 2012, 42). After the Christian Democrats successfully established 
government in 2005 and after having assumed office as Chancellor in 
November 2005, Angela Merkel appointed Wolfgang Schäuble as Minister 
of the Interior and charged him with the task of developing initiatives for 
furthering the unresolved policy issues. Therefore, in September 2006, 
Schäuble presented the idea of the German Islam Conference to the 
German Parliament. In contrast to earlier attempts, he specified that 
through this forum of larger planar sessions and smaller working groups 
Muslims and non-Muslims, citizens and non-citizens should ‘produce 
readily implementable policy recommendations and the “end result should 
be concrete guidance derived from careful analysis” (Schäuble 2006; Cf. 
Van Wyck 2012, 43).  
As of end of 2012, two independently commissioned phases of the 
German Islam Conference has taken shape. The first was set up in 2006 by 
the initiative of Schäuble and was concluded in 2009. This initiative is 
often referred to as DIK I. The second was set up after the Christian 
Democrats had renewed their mandate and a new Minister of the Interior, 
Thomas de Maiziere, had assumed office. This process, often referred to as 
DIK II, began in 2010 with a new constellation of participants, new 
guidelines and a new practical approach to producing support of the 
government policies amongst Muslims (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 379).  
Seen in the light of the history of migration and religious integration, the 
dialogue set up in the German Islam Conference is generally regarded as a 
positive, open and respectful initiative (Azzaoui 2010, 5). Initially, 
Muslims and politicians alike welcomed it and at the hand of Schäuble it 
had been given higher priority compared to previous attempts. However, as 
things progressed and especially looking back, Frank Peter is rather critical 
and insists, “the DIK was and remains a contested initiative” (Peter 2012, 
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121). The difference in these two attitudes towards the German Islam 
Conference reflects the great expectations that followed the first 
announcements of the conference. At the time it was a significant 
innovation and it marked a departure from the policies of migration, 
citizenship and non-recognition of the previous decades (Peter 2010, 122).  
6.2.1 Framing and structuring the German Islam Conference  
The German Islam Conference from 2006 to 2009 was made up of 30 
invited participants;of these, 15 were drawn from the German political 
establishment from different federal, regional and local levels and another 
15 were Muslim representatives. Of these 15, five were speaking on behalf 
of German Muslim umbrella organisations. These were the DITIB, the 
IRD, the VIKZ and the ZMD which were introduced in Chapter Four and 
in addition, it included the Alevi Community in Germany (AABF - 
Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, Alevitischen Gemeinde in 
Deutschland e.V.).61 The other ten Muslim representatives were teachers, 
authors, economists, leaders and more from the ‘public Muslim life,’ but 
these were invited as individual members and spoke only as such 
(Rosenow-Williams 2012, 379).  
Working under the slogan “Muslims in Germany – Muslim Germans,” 
the first phase was organised around four annual plenary meetings and 
during the span of the phase four working groups were working with four 
key topics. The items for the working groups were (i) the “German Social 
System and Value Consensus”, (ii) “Questions of Religion in the German 
Constitutional Framework”, (iii) “the Economy and Media as Bridges” and 
(iv) “Security and Islamism” (Van Wyck 2012, 46; Rosenow-Williams 
2012, 379). The topics had been decided by the Ministry of the Interior, 
who as hosts had invited the ones they saw most fit, facilitated the process 
and – as will be discussed below – took charge of the conference’s minutes 
and conclusions.  
The second phase, which began in 2010, has seen some major changes. 
Drawing on the experience of the first phase and taking into consideration 
the new political mandate from the 2009 election, the conference has been 
structured in a ‘more practical way’.62 While keeping the plenary sessions 
hosted by the Minister of the Interior, now Thomas de Maiziere, with parity 
amongst the representatives with 15 from the government institution and 15 
from the Muslim communities, a significant change has been made to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In particular, the specific participants from the Muslim organisations were: Sadi Arslan, Counsellor for 
Religious Affairs of the Turkish Embassy in Berlin and Chairman of the DITIB; Ayyub Axel Köhler, 
Chairman of the ZMD; Mehmet Yilmaz, president of the VIKZ; Kızılkaya Ali, chairman of the IRD and a 
member of the Islamic Association Milli Görüş; Ali Ertan Toprak, Secretary General of the AABF. 
62 According to the material made available by the German Islam Conference on its website, 
http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/DIK/EN/DIK/UeberDIK/Struktur/struktur-node.html, accessed 
1 February 2013.  
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composition of the Muslim organisational representative. Due to the 
security risk of their involvement with the IGMG, the Islamic Community 
of Millî Görüs, and the ongoing investigations, the IRD was excluded from 
the second phase. This sparked criticism from the other representatives 
from the Muslim organisations and the ZMD initially boycotted the 
preliminary meeting conference on 24 March 2010 only later to resign 
completely from the conference (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 379). 
A further new feature of the second phase of the conference is the new 
topics proposed for the conference and the way in which the topics are 
framed. The main issue remains to improve Muslim integration into 
Germany and in the second phase this seems to embody a trade-off 
between the government institutions and the Muslim communities. Quoting 
from the website of the German Islam Conference, the balance of the 
second phase finds its equilibrium thusly:  
 
“… The central issue for the German Islam Conference remains improving the 
integration of Muslims in Germany. This encompasses issues of structural 
integration, such as promoting co-operation between the German state and 
Muslims based on the principles of the German religious constitutional law. This 
includes, for example, gradually establishing Islamic religious studies lessons in 
schools, Islamic theological courses at universities and offering state-funded 
training and further education of imams. 
However, it also includes promoting social cohesion in Germany, which will 
continue to be a central issue for the German Islamic Conference. This will 
particularly involve the issue of gender equality and the prevention of extremism 
and social polarisation” 
 (www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de, accessed 1 February 2013) 
 
In short, the second phase of the German Islam Conference seems only to 
be possible if the government is willing to facilitate Islamic theological 
courses at universities, state-funded training and education of imams, while 
the Muslims must be willing to discuss and enforce gender equality and 
help prevent extremism and social polarisation.  
6.2.2 The symbolic struggle  
As mentioned in Chapter Four, it was the occasion of the German Islam 
Conference that in March 2007 led to the formation of the Coordination 
Council of Muslims (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime, KRM) as a unifying 
umbrella organisation of Muslims in Germany. It was created in March 
2007 as the possibilities of incorporating Islam under the status as a 
corporation under public law looked hopeful. At the time, it seemed the 
organisationally prudent thing to do. It gave Muslims a very strong voice 
and position as they engaged with the German Islam Conference.  
The establishment was welcomed by the Ministry of the Interior calling 
it ‘an important and significant step’ and Frank Peter notes that, “while the 
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ministry regularly points out that it was not in a position to identify Muslim 
representatives due to Germany’s lack of adequate Islamic organisational 
structures, the convening of the conference and the selection of Muslim 
members by the ministry itself constituted a major attempt to define both 
the boundaries of Germany’s ‘Muslim community’ and the qualifications 
of those authorized to speak for it” (Peter 2010, 120). Van Wyck (2012) 
concurs and notes, “As a symbol, the KRM embodies [a] new era in inter-
associational relations” (Van Wyck 2012, 47).  
Seeing the formation of the Coordination Council of Muslims in the light 
of the German Islam Conference, the four founding umbrella organisations 
made a strategically appropriate move. They pooled organisational 
resources, put aside significant differences of a national, religious and 
political nature and gathered the social and cultural capital needed for a 
strategically opportune conversion of these resources and this capital into 
symbolic capital. This gave them a very strong and unified position in the 
German Islam Conference and by extension in the German religio-
organisational field.  
The symbolic power of this apparently unified position, as we saw in 
Chapter Two, was twofold.63 On one hand it allowed Muslim organisations 
the symbolic efficacy of acting on the representation of Muslims, rather 
than on any actually delegated mandate or even on any deeply rooted base 
of support amongst Muslims. Crudely stated, Muslims entered the world of 
theatrics by establishing the Coordination Council as a symbol. On the 
other hand, it allowed Muslims to define and to institute themselves 
according to a common norm amongst the four organisations. This would 
not only allow the Muslim organisations to unite and stand stronger in 
agreement, but also allowed Muslims to present the Muslim position as 
legitimate, attractive, natural, proper or authoritarian, when it when it 
clearly was not so by default. This allowed the Muslim organisations a 
window of opportunity to oust ‘the hidden imposition of arbitrary 
principles of division’ applied by the government institutions in the 
German Islam Conference (Cf. Chapter Two, section 2.6.2). 
In short, through the establishment of the Coordination Council of 
Muslims, the Muslim organisations in Germany are attempting to muster 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 In order to recapture the essential observations by Bourdieu from Chapter Two, these are some of the 
relevant quotes, “To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right to be that is an 
obligation of being so (or to be so). It is to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct 
himself as a consequence. In this case, the indicative is an imperative …” (Bourdieu 1991B, 120). And 
further, “The institute, to give a social definition, an identity, is also to impose boundaries…” (Ibid.). And 
to return once more to his comtemporary durkeheimian perspective, the institutionalisation is also “… an 
act of communication, but of a particular kind: it signifies to someone what his identity is, but in a way 
that both expresses it to him and imposes it on him by expressing it in from of everyone (kategorein, 
meaning originally, to accuse publically) and thus informing him in an authoritative manner of what he is 
and what he must be …” (Bourdieu 1991B: 121). Cf. Chapter Two, section 2.5.1. 
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the complete force, efficacy and power of being a properly institutionalized 
organisation. 
 As could be expected, both aspects of this stronger Muslim and 
symbolic position were vehemently questioned and discredited by the 
representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and their dominating 
discourse of the texts and proceedings of the German Islam Conference. 
This concerns both the claim to represent Muslims and the attempt to 
present the Muslim position as legitimate. As will be demonstrated through 
the criticisms from the Schiffauer team, the question of representivity is a 
myth kept alive for the Muslims to keep struggling towards. Equally, the 
legitimacy of the Muslim position was denied by the ex-Muslim speakers 
invited to keep Islam contested in the forum of the conference. The 
technology of norms here used by the representatives from the Ministry of 
the Interior was the norms and strategy of examination (Section 6.3). In 
addition, this strategy was supported by a number of different tactics of 
power (Section 6.4) as analysed by the team of young scholars associated 
with Werner Schiffauer. 
6.2.3 Understanding and interpreting the German Islam Conference 
The team of young researchers affiliated with Werner Schiffauer gives at 
different times and in different contexts at least five interpretations of how 
to ‘basically,’ ‘at a fundamental level’ and ‘generally’ understand the 
German Islam Conference. The language used in all five of these 
observations is summarizing, interpretative and may be seen as 
generalising, but taken together they demonstrate a tendency in the 
perception of the German Islam Conference. The factual basics have been 
given above, but each of these observations is an attempt to distil the 
essence of the entire dialogue project and its impact on Muslims 
specifically and the German state and population generally.  
The first of these distilled interpretations of the German Islam 
Conference is given by Schirin Amir-Moazami, who argues that ‘the DIK 
could firstly […] be interpreted as an overdue political commitment to the 
ideological diversity of Germany. Regarding Muslims as a ‘section of 
German society,’ [it] must firstly be interpreted as a symbolic gesture of 
acceptance” (Amir-Moazami 2011, 7). Although imagined as a ‘free and 
democratic’ enterprise by then Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble 
(2006), the reality of the conference was that Muslim organisations were 
seen more as ‘security partners’ who needed to be persuaded to distribute 
the government security agenda into the extended networks of the umbrella 
organisations. This could happen only if the conference is received by the 
Muslim organisations as a ‘gesture of acceptance,’ symbolic as it may be.  
The second interpretation is drawn from Frank Peter’s analysis of the 
difficult integration of the Muslim organisations into the established 
  German Islam Conference and Structuration of Muslims in Germany	  
	  
194 
spheres of the German religio-organisational field. He says, “at a 
fundamental level, the DIK is concerned with forms of self-government 
and the field of possible actions by subjects […] Its primary aim is to 
remake Muslim subjectivities – by interpellating them as objects of 
tolerance – and to simultaneously guide them in a continual process of 
normalization. The DIK thus conforms to a productive exercise of power” 
(Peter 2010, 128). Peter obviously seeks to find the deepest and most 
fundamental level of the discourse of the German Islam Conference. The 
hidden ambition of the conference is to have Muslim organisations and the 
Muslim community in general adopt the structures and norms set forth not 
only by the Basic Law but also by the additional standards Muslims are 
held to. Peter draws from the core observations from Foucault (2009, 1-4) 
on the governmental strategy bio-power, which makes human life in all its 
aspects a governable object of power. This totality of the object of power is 
only possible in this case if the Muslim subjectivities will only emerge if 
they willingly and knowingly produce and govern themselves.  
The third interpretation also comes from Peter’s critical analysis and 
builds on the above given interpretation. He expands on the normalizing 
and governmental aspects into a full scale pastoral bio-power project on 
behalf of the German state: “At its most basic level then, the goal of the 
DIK is to change how German Muslims understand themselves as Muslims 
in the context of Germany, a context whose specificity is itself defined in 
the process by the government and the DIK […] Government discourse 
around the DIK addresses Muslim representatives, and German Muslims 
more generally, as moral subjects who are (supposed to be) willing to 
contribute to the integration of Islam in Germany …” (Peter 2010, 129). 
This is a significant observation and follows from the extraordinary 
demands made to the Muslims in Germany. They should not just live, work 
and be citizens in Germany and it is not the responsibility of the state to 
integrate Muslims into the organised and public life in Germany as it was 
in the cases of the other religions in Germany. Rather, it seems Muslims 
should demonstrate their willingness and moral obligation by integrating 
Germany into the Islamic worldview. If this is the true ambition and if it is 
to succeed, it will be a true feat of Foucaultian bio-power and pastoral 
governance.  
Like the second and the third interpretation, the fourth comes from Frank 
Peter who has now brought his critical arguments full circle and returned to 
German Islam Conference to the frame of the existing norms, laws and 
heritage. “The DIK should be considered, at its most basic level, as one 
institution contributing to the discursive interpellation of Muslims as 
objects of tolerance. It addresses Muslims as not-yet-perfected Germans 
and situates them in a specifically German moral landscape. The major 
points of reference in this landscape are the law, Germany’s historical 
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identity and memories, its Christian heritage and its dominant social 
norms” (Peter 2010, 134). This, then, becomes the formula for the perfect 
Muslim as a perfect German. Such a perfection of Muslims will only come 
when Muslims themselves takes it upon themselves to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the law, to integrate the identity and embody the memory of 
Germany’s history and last, but certainly not least, as Muslims submit 
themselves to the social norms and dominant norms of the Christian 
heritage.  
The fifth and final of the interpretations of the German Islam Conference 
is drawn from Werner Schiffauer, who argues that the “basic idea behind 
the Islamkonferenz was to make the major Sunni Islamic Organizations 
(whichare suspected of creating parallel societies) accept a European Islam 
which presumably would fit into the Federal Republic of Germany. It was 
after they had proved to be hesitant in accepting such attempts at modelling 
them by referring to their constitutional rights that one community – seen 
as the ‘heart’ of the resistance – was overrun with a series of meanwhile 
abandoned court cases and subsequently excluded from the conference” 
(Schiffauer 2012, 363). This interpretation of the German Islam 
Conference summarizes the very heart of the problem that Germany – as 
well as many other European countries – face, in that it is the abundance of 
assumptions of the Muslim motives that create the very problem. Here, the 
basic idea is to make Muslim organisations conform to a European ideal of 
Islam that is modelled according to the assumptions of the constitution and 
backed by the legal system out of fear of emerging parallel societies and 
jurisdictions. Organised Islam is seen as a subversive resistance that must 
fought legally and structurally, but Schiffauer’s argument is that the 
resistance and subversive stance is only a reaction to the very condition of 
Islam in Germany. The result is a conundrum of a circular logic, which 
forces the earnest ambition of dialogue framed by Schäuble in 2006 into 
the intricacies of securitization, normalisation, pastoral governance of 
conduct and impossible standards. In what follows, several different tactics 
are put in to motion and calculated dominance is asserted in order to carve 
out a limited space available for Muslim organisations in the religio-
organisational field.  
 
6.3 The Examination of Islam in Germany and German Muslim 
Organisations 
The Muslim umbrella organisations in Germany are being put to the test in 
the German Islam Conference. In her discussion of the possibility of 
Muslims being granted the recognition and the coveted status as 
corporations under public law, Amir-Moazami noted, “the state rhetoric 
and setting of subjects for discussion make it clear time and time again that 
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Muslims first of all must fulfil certain conditions and/or that when the state 
gives recognition to Muslims it is able to demand certain preconditions 
from them in return” (Amir-Moazami 2011, 7).  
There is a clearly asymmetrical relationship between the state 
representatives and the Muslims in the German Islam Conference, which 
leaves the state representatives in a position of power and dominance. This 
structurally asserted and symbolically rebuffed dominance opens for a 
number of specific tactics of power to be applied by the state 
representatives in securing the strategic dominance over Muslim 
organisations and closely managing the space and positions allowed for 
Muslim organisations in the religio-organisational field.  
In 2005, Fetzer & Soper included Germany as one of the three 
comparative countries in their study and stressed the importance of the 
institutional heritage of church and state relations (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 
126-129). This was seen to be of special importance to the calibrations of 
mutual expectations between state institutions and Muslim organisations 
that entered into the German Islam Conference. As Fetzer & Soper note, 
”Muslims expect the state to accommodate them in the same manner that 
the state treats Christian religious groups” (Fetzer & Soper 2005, 127). 
This specific expectation had been voiced by Muslim representatives 
repeatedly as they entered the first phase of the German Islam Conference 
in September 2006. Of the many different factors that went into 
consideration, when the Muslim umbrella organisations decided to create 
the coordination council (KRM), it was a definite part that a unifying 
institution that could be able to speak on behalf of most Muslims would 
help speed along the process of granting Muslims the status of corporation 
under public law; “The Islamic organizations expected – wrongly, as it 
turned out – that the DIK would finally resolve the pending question of the 
legal status of Islam in Germany and their recognition as religious 
communities” (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 380). Rosenow-Williams even 
references an interview with key participants amongst the Muslims who 
said that this hope of recognition was the ‘main reason of motivation’ for 
entering into the German Muslim Conference (Ibid.).   
The expectations on behalf of the Muslims to be treated similarly to, by 
analogy to or be held to the same standards as Christian organisations were 
not met by the state and came to be a serious disappointment to Muslims. If 
Muslims desired the equal treatment of the law and enjoy the privileges 
that had been delegated to the Christians as an integral part of the church 
and state relations in Germany, they would have to meet the standards of 
the law and the standards to which the other religious communities in 
Germany were to be held. This was repeated by courts and ministries alike 
and had even been incorporated into the attitudes of the German Churches, 
among whom the Evangeliche Kirche in Deutschland that argued that the 
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reasons for incorporating Christian religious institutions were the exact 
same for incorporating the Muslims (EKD 1999, referenced in Fetzer & 
Soper 2005, 128).  
However, as Muslims started to position and reproduce themselves to 
meet the standards that had been repeated as the expectations of them, the 
reality of the structural predispositions in the German model gradually 
became clear. Rather than issues of theology, which would be part of the 
negotiations that the state would enter into with religious communities, it 
became clear that a series of security-related topics were on the agenda. It 
soon became clear that Muslims were to explain themselves and their 
positions on a number of issues like domestic policy, security and loyalty 
to the constitution. Even further, Muslim organisations on the German 
Islam Conference were put into a default apologetic position as the 
Ministry of the Interior had invited several individuals to speak, who were 
highly critical of Islam as such (Rosenow-Williams 2012, 382-383).  
The Muslim representatives were very disappointed with this and 
repeatedly argued that this was not how the state would deal with the 
Churches or other religious communities. They explained that they were 
put to a ‘loyalty test’ by the Ministry of the Interior and that a ‘principle of 
divide and rule’ were applied to divide the Muslim organisations 
(Rosenow-Williams 2012, 360). In her extensive research, Rosenow-
Williams gives evidence of an interview with a representative from the 
ZMD, who argues that the state institutions and representatives had 
repeatedly tried to find fault with Muslims in order to reprimand them, 
 
“…ZMD has been related to Millî Görüs […] and I think one [Un-specified state 
institution] finds accusations for every association. DITIB was criticised for its 
closeness to Turkey. Therefore, every organization has some hobbyhorse for 
which it is reprimanded and told ‘you have to look at this. And none of you is in 
line with the constitutional requirements’ […] I think that this is also a political 
game that was played as soon as one noticed that they [the Islamic organisations] 
band together and achieve to become a unity, then one approaches one [of the 
organisations] with a carrot and tries to achieve a new division …” 
(ZMD interviewee, quoted in Rosenow-Williams 2012, 360) 
 
According to the interviewee, the ‘carrot and the stick’ is the preferred 
technique for creating division. The sentiment in the interview is similar to 
the sentiment that the Muslims voiced after the first sessions of the German 
Islam Conference. One interviewee referenced by Rosenow-Williams was 
convinced that the German government never intended to grant neither 
recognition nor status of corporation under public law, but rather wanted to 
‘make the establishment of a corporation of public law unnecessary’ 
(DITIB interviewee, quoted in Rosenow-Williams 2012, 381). The 
interviewee further accused the Ministry of the Interior of trying to 
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‘circumvent its own constitution’ by resolving the issues in the less formal 
German Islam Conference rather than by the measures and privileges of the 
formal law (Ibid.). According to the minutes of the meetings in 2008 and 
2009, the fact of the matter remains that the issue never makes any 
appearance in any of the working groups (Van Wyck 2012, 56).  
From Peter’s and Schiffauer’s analyses and from the comments by both 
Muslim members and commentators, it seems clear that a number of higher 
standards are applied to the Muslim organisations in Germany. Muslims 
are asked to adhere to a higher standard, namely a demand of extra loyalty 
colloquially dubbed ‘Constitution Plus’ (Grundgesetz Pluz, see Amir-
Moazami 2011, 8), and to demonstrate a rather formalistic understanding of 
representation, that no other religious group in Germany must adhere to. 
Peter’s criticism of the German Islam Conference and the government 
discourse that surrounds it focuses on the substantial deviations from the 
governing principles of regulating religion in Germany. Most significantly, 
the regular accusations of extremism and demands for Muslims to distance 
themselves from all sorts of biased assumptions are testing the Muslim 
community and organisations.  
The mutually mis-calibrated expectations between state and Muslim 
organisations and the apprehension of the much higher standards to which 
the Muslims are held make it clear to Muslim parties that the level of 
expectations are continuously being raised on them and that the state and 
government institutions have deliberately worked to circumvent the 
possibility of recognition.  
However, it equally becomes clear through the critical analysis that a 
certain essential criterion is being applied over and again in the 
examination of the Muslim organisations in Germany. This criterion is the 
‘being-as-church’ and with that the fitting of the Muslim organisations into 
the model of the churches. As discussed in section 2.4.6 of Chapter Two, 
from a Foucaultian reading the examination was seen as the epitome of 
governmentality and is designed to discipline a body of the population into 
the frames designed for them. If this principle was the only one defining 
the criteria concerning Muslims, it would be plausible that certain Muslim 
organisations would have met the criteria. It seems Muslims have not failed 
for lack of trying (Jonker 2002, 2003). Rather the insight from Bourdieu is 
of particular relevance here as it becomes clear that the impossible 
standards are institutionalised “to consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary 
boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of the limit 
and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate” (Bourdieu 1991, 118). 
The consequence of this kind of examination is that it does not concern the 
Muslims, but rather is a process of institutionalising and protecting the 
existing order in Germany. The division is indeed arbitrary, but the line 
drawn between Muslims and Christians is the most important division, in 
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that it passes unnoticed, because it separates those who are subject to it 
from those who are not (Bourdieu 1991B, 118-119).  
In this context, Gerdien Jonker (2002) has put forth a critical analysis, 
which demonstrates exactly that it is only those Muslim organisations 
willing to transform themselves and conform to the arbitrary standards, and 
thereby implement the Christian community structures, that are even 
subject to the examination. It is their attempts and achievements that are 
measured and graded, while those Muslim organisations that do not 
transform themselves and insist on their legitimate Muslim identity can 
never be subject to the examination for the status of corporation under 
public law. Jonker’s analysis furthermore demonstrates that this division is 
driving a wedge through the Muslim community:  
 
“The wish to obtain the right to enter schools and provide religious instruction is a 
powerful motor indeed. It has set in motion forms of religious self-organisation 
that are foreign to the Islamic tradition. It also created a new divide among 
Muslims themselves. On the one side there are the orthodox believers, those who 
are engaged in more intensive forms of religiousness and willing to devote their 
lives to a mission. Through the building of Christian-type community structures 
they hope to satisfy the majority society and gain acceptance. Even if they are 
treated with suspicion, in the eyes of German majority society these Muslims form 
the centre of Muslim religious life as they aim to meet the legal demands. On the 
other side, there is a new periphery emerging. It consists of individuals who do 
not want to be represented – especially not by zealots that, in the eyes of what 
might be considered the Muslim majority, mightily ‘overdo’ it and in any case do 
not represent ‘normal’ Muslim faith. […] 
This is the trap that the German legislation has set up, and it is still likely to 
function. On the one hand, legislature has set up rules for the acceptance of new 
faith communities. In turn, these set into motion the building of a new centre and a 
new periphery, forcing activist believers and secularised Muslims into two 
different camps. On the other hand, the legislation made the demand for loyalty – 
a rather vague notion that in public discourse seems to comprise both the 
legislation, the government, and German identity”  
(Jonker 2002, 44)  
 
As is well-known, so far no Muslim organisation has been granted the 
status as corporation under public law. The attempts so far have furthered 
disunity in the Muslim community. It is clear that, if ever the Muslim 
organisations were to meet the structural standards set up for them they 
would be perfect Germans, which by default means being as Christian 
Germans. This again is, to many Muslims, utterly incompatible with being 
Muslim.  
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6.4 Tactics of power 
In the religio-organisational microcosm of the German Islam Conference, 
the Ministry of the Interior was in a powerful position to use a number of 
specific tactics. These are deliberate and calculated actions or events that 
take advantage of opportunities offered by the gaps within the structures of 
the conference, specifically, and the religio-organistional field, generally. 
Werner Schiffauer (Schiffauer 2012) has demonstrated in his analysis that 
three such tactics were applied in order to undercut the position of Muslim 
organisations. This was done firstly by denying the representivity of the 
German Muslim umbrella organisations, secondly by controlling the 
operational procedures of the conference and thirdly by keeping the records 
and writing the conclusions (Schiffauer 2012: 367-70). Schiffauer is not 
amicable in his critique of the Ministry of the Interior and in what follows 
his analysis of the three tactical instruments is examined a little closer. 
6.4.1 The dogma and myth of representivity 
On the first point of critique, Schiffauer exposes the non-corporation by the 
Ministry of the Interior regarding the representative position of the Muslim 
organisations in the conference. With reference to the balance of the 
composition of the conference, the Ministry of the Interior invited a 
number of individuals with a Muslim background to occupy a third of the 
seats available. This attempt at balancing the conference was made by 
reference to a 2009 report by the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees, which showed that only about a third of the respondents had 
declared themselves as Muslims. These were respectable individuals but 
did not represent anyone and spoke only as individuals. The objective, 
Schiffauer maintains, was to level and to undercut the voice of the 
organised representatives. As some of the individuals were known critics of 
organised Muslim life, Schiffauer concludes that, “the authorities followed 
a plan by which certain critics on the one side and the representatives on 
the other side would neutralize each other so that the previously defined 
line of action of the Ministry of the Interior could now appear as a rational 
compromise” (Schiffauer 2012, 368).  
This denial of the representivity of Muslim organisations is especially 
problematic in the light of the repeated demands by the state for the 
Muslims to organize properly as one single partner (Schiffauer 2012, 368, 
n. 8). Then as the Coordination Council does present itself as the 
representative partner ready to negotiate recognition on behalf of the 
Muslims, the State institutions disqualify the very notion of a single 
representative body of Muslims. Mournir Azzaoui has documented this 
change of position on the representivity of Muslims and he calls the 
question of representivity a dogma that is invented for the occasion 
(Azzaoui 2009, 2010). First of all, it has no basis in law and nowhere else 
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is representivity a demand. Secondly, in the reports on which the Ministry 
of the Interior base their criticism of the Coordination Council, there is no 
distinction between Muslims and other immigrants from the Muslim 
countries. Thirdly, if true representivity was to be accomplished, Azzaoui 
argues, why not invite the hundreds of Muslim student organisations, youth 
organisations and women’s associations to the table (Azzaoui 2009). His 
fourth and last argument is common sense politically and he maintains that 
the failure to develop ‘a Muslim representation’ is because representation 
in Germany is a political issue and is left to the political parties in the 
democratic institutions at local, Länder and federal level (Azzaoui 2010, 
4). Ultimately, the tactical maneuvering by the Ministry and the politicians 
has “led to a large reduction in trust and de-motivated Muslims in general 
to conduct further organizational changes to adapt to the German religious 
constitutional law” (Azzaoui 2010, 5).  
Seen in the light of the structural attempts to discredit organised Muslim 
positions, it becomes clear that representivity as such has a very important 
dual power as applied by the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior. 
Firstly, keeping the myth alive of the needed religious representivity posed 
an ambitious goal to reach and thus Muslims exhausted significant 
resources to demonstrate that they were like the other religious 
communities in this regard. Secondly, with the question of representivity it 
was easy for the government representatives to keep moving the goalposts 
on the Muslims and keep insisting discursively that the Muslims did not 
meet the standards. Quoting from a 2009 article available from the 
magazine that the German Islam Conference published, titled “Muslim 
Associations: New Figures, But No End to the Debate,” it becomes clear 
that the repeated questioning of the representivity of Muslims discursively 
denies this very representivity. “The majority, a half, or less than a quarter? 
For how many Muslims in Germany can the Muslim associations speak? 
Various figures have been bandied around for years on members, mosque 
attendance and Muslims for or against the claim of associations for 
representation and recognition. The study ‘Muslim life in Germany’ 
provides new figures … but no end to the debate” (DIK magazine, 2 
October 2009). As long as the debate is kept alive the problem remains and 
the representivity needed to gain influence in the German Islam Conference 
and needed for the coveted status of corporation under public law remains 
absent.  
6.4.2 Power over conference procedures 
The second point of criticism championed by Schiffauer is the very tight 
control over the operational procedures of the conference (Schiffauer 2012, 
368). Not only was the composition of the Conference defined single-
handedly by the Ministry for the Interior, but also the agenda, the topics of 
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discussion and even the structure of the sessions were defined by the state 
representatives.  
Schiffauer notes that the unilateral concern with the topics of discussion 
and the procedures was especially worrisome with regard to the theme 
heading of security. Although the Muslim organisations invited had 
repeatedly suggested that under the heading of security issues, the problem 
of the security of mosques and the security of daily life of the communities 
associated with the mosques should be a topic under the security agenda. 
However, as Schiffauer observes, “the proposal was rejected as the issue of 
the whole circle of discussion was to discuss the risks caused by the 
Muslim communities rather than the threats they are exposed to” 
(Schiffauer 2012, 269; Shiffauer 2008).  
What is at risk are the privileges that are to be granted to Muslim 
organisations if they successfully adapt to the demands of the constitution 
and the courts and eventually receive the coveted status as public law 
corporation. With this comes influence into the core German formative 
institutions, such as protection as legal persona, influence on school 
curricula, recognition and representation in different public institutions and 
so on. Frank Peter notes that “among the political establishment today, 
there is near consensus that the German state has long failed to sufficiently 
attend to the question of Islam and, in this way, has neglected its duty to 
protect the security and well-being of the German population” (Peter 2010, 
127).  
The issue of procedure and the concerns with security and risk are very 
much interrelated. Referencing the discussions from Chapter 2, the insights 
from Ewald, Hatch, and Bourdieu may cast some light on what is at stake 
in German Islam Conference. From an institutionalist and organisational 
point of view, Hatch (1997) argued that organisations expose themselves to 
risk if they cannot adequately respond to the changes of their environment. 
Looking to the Ministry of the Interior and the organisers of the German 
Islam Conference, exactly the inadequacy of integrating and engaging in 
dialogue with Muslims and Muslim organisations over the past thirty years 
was now posing a considerable risk. As social organisations and 
institutional guardians of the values of the German people, both the 
Ministry of the Interior and Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution were now struggling to remedy this oversight. From a social 
point of view, Bourdieu maintained that there is no greater risk than the 
exposition of the very identity and definition of core values, and according 
to their own analyses this was what the two state institutions were facing. 
Risk is the calculated potential of loss of capital and, as Ewald argues, 
norms with their techniques of building divisions in society are a 
procedural way of limiting risk and insuring society against the negative 
impact when destruction does occur (Ewald 1991). As Bourdieu suggests, 
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norms may limit the exposure of core values to unwelcome change with the 
divisions of limited space, hierarchical levels and social compartments they 
produce to maintain disaster.  In addition to this, Ewald has a focus on the 
normative imperatives and moral orders as expressions of procedure that 
will keep the adherents out of harms way. Under threat of direct and 
indirect sanction, the normative power of procedures are social insurance 
technologies that guarantee that if they are followed to the last detail, then 
the desired result will occur and nothing bad will occur.  
In this light it becomes clear that with the German Islam Conference the 
Ministry of the Interior and Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution are trying to minimize the risk that they feel exposed to by 
immigration and by the permanent presence of Muslims – to say nothing of 
the Muslim organisations that might prove any threat, imagined or real. 
The procedures of the conference are put in place to minimize the risk of 
the conference being a failure, which would in turn mean that the 
politicians, the state institutions and the general public would be exposed to 
a privileged and empowered Muslim body in Germany. Rather, the straight 
and narrow procedural path could not be strayed from under any 
circumstances.  
6.4.3 The power of the narrative: keeping record and writing conclusions  
In the third of his criticisms of the structural tactics employed by the state 
representatives in the German Islam Conference, Schiffauer points to the 
insistence of the authorities to write the proceedings and conclusions of the 
thematic sessions and the general meetings.  
Control of the narrative of the German Islam Conference is a significant 
source of symbolic capital to control, as it will keep the Muslim 
organisations in line. The framing the outcome and the conclusions are 
made against a backdrop of immanent Islamic extremism and continuously 
relates to the security agenda-driven narrative of a constant threat of 
Muslim organisations subverting the constitution. Against this implicit mis-
representation of the motives of the Muslim organisations in Germany, the 
state representatives are forcing the Muslims to commit to the proceedings 
and conclusions of conference. Any criticism of details or disengagement 
and withdrawal from the conclusions will be seen in the media and in the 
public as support for the framed narrative of the subversion of the 
constitution, and will come at too dear a price for the Muslim 
organisations. 
 
6.5 Conclusion: From “Muslims in Germany” to “German Muslims” 
Applying the analysis of Frank Peter, the governable difference in the 
religio-organisational field in Germany with regard to Muslims is 
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embedded in the motto of the German Islam Conference, “Muslims in 
Germany – Muslim Germans” (Peter 2010, 130). All of the strategies and 
tactics analysed above are put into operation in order to limit the 
manoeuvrability of Muslim organisations and to define the position 
available for them within the religio-organisational field in Germany. Here, 
they must conform to the norms and standards of adapted Christian 
community structures. “The gap separating ‘Muslims in Germany’ from 
‘German Muslims’ is identified by politicians with reference to a number 
of norms which Muslims today do not fulfil sufficiently” (Peter 2010, 130).  
The logic of representation as Bourdieu had proposed it still holds its 
symbolic power over the Muslims in the religio-organisational field in 
Germany. While the credentials explicitly given by the invitation to the 
German Islam Conference are made to look authentic, rather it is a division 
made between different groups of Muslims in Germany. In Germany, there 
are those who have the status of public corporation and those who do not. 
Muslims belong to the latter of these groups. Yet even here, there seems to 
be a division within the Muslim community. The division is between those 
invited and those not invited, but this divison is only made to draw the 
attention away from the coveted recognition, which remains unavailabe. 
The struggle of the field in German is – like the Danish – layered, but the 
hierarchy is more obscure and more difficult to manage.  
However, as with the power of the norm, this division in the Muslim 
community is not the most significant one. This is merely a division or 
examination between those qualified and those not. Rather, the true 
distinction – or most significant division – is between those who will 
adhere to the entire system or field or those who will abandon it – between 
those who will struggle for a stronger or weaker position and those who do 
not even address themselves in the field.  
As seen from the interpretations of the German Islam Conference, there 
is significant ongoing academic effort to perceive and understand what is 
going on and where things are going in the dialogue. This reveals that there 
is plenty at stake and it underscores that German Islam Conference is a sort 
of microcosm or modelled representation of the broader changes and 
challenges in German society. It seems that this is where they are breaking 
new land with regards to the fundamentals of the German identities and 
values. As was demonstrated, this does not happen without significant costs 
to the Muslim organisations as they are examined and scrutinized in the 
light of the governing norms and it is not without significant risk to the 
core values and beliefs of the German nation. 
Max Weber said of political change that it is ”a slow, powerful drilling 
through hard boards” (Weber 2004/1919: 93) and that when striving for 
change and ideal goals through political means, they act in the name of an 
ethics of responsibility and make use of violent methods. In so doing they 
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jeopardize the ‘salvation of their souls’” (Weber 2004 / 1919: 91). As the 
question of representivity so nicely reveals, the change that Muslims are 
waiting for in Germany is political in nature and the lesson from Weber 
remains that it comes only in excruciating increments to those who want it. 
As Frank Peter’s analysis nicely reveals, the ‘goal of the DIK is to change 
how German Muslims understand themselves as Muslims in the context of 
Germany.’ To both the state representatives and to the conservative forces 
who oppose the coming of new norms and who risk the renegotiation of 
identity and to the Muslim organisations engaged in structuring and 
organising their whole future existence, it seems a small comfort that in the 
process something of the soul may be lost. However, to all those engaged 
in the German Islam Conference and to all those who expect anything from 
the dialogue on Islam, state and religion in Germany, may they remember 
that the methods of all struggle – in the religio-organisational field as well 
as elsewhere – is violent.  
The result of the struggle, however, is change.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
 Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution in England 
and the power of symbols 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
On 7 February 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, 
gave a by now rather infamous lecture, which under the title ‘Civil and 
Religious Law in England: A religious perspective’ (Williams 2008) 
addressed some rather hot-button issues and made the so-called ‘Shari’a 
debate’ peak. In England, the lecture addressed the broader problems that 
arise from the clash of legal needs and norms when religious groups relate 
to the civic English legal system and find that the laws do not take religious 
motivations and practices seriously (Williams 2008: 262). Needless to 
reiterate, the lecture – and the BBC interview the same day – sparked a 
number of calls for the Archbishop’s resignation and kept a public and 
media driven debate alive for several months, which in turn has resulted in 
significant political and academic attention (Bano 2008; Blackett 2009; 
Ballard, Ferrari, Hoekema, Maussen and Shah 2009; Bowen 2010; Cumper 
2011; Douglas et al 2011).  
Much has been said and written of the Archbishop’s speech itself and 
there is plenty of public and scholarly debate on the matter (Bano 2008, 
Shah 2009, 120), but some of the most iconic of his remarks were drawn 
from the BBC interview where he demonstrates that the matter of 
recognition is at the heart of the issue: “... certain provision[s] of Sharia are 
already recognised in our society and under our law; ... we already have in 
this country a number of situations in which the internal law of religious 
communities is recognised by the law of the land as justified conscientious 
objections in certain circumstances in providing certain kinds of social 
relations” (BBC 2008, 07.02.08). Not only did the Archbishop give a 
precise and nuanced reading of the current legal status of the internal law 
of religious communities, which Lord Phillips, then Lord Chief Justice, 
concurred in a speech of his own in July 2008 (Phillips 2008), but he also 
argued a wider demand for recognition of religious law from the state. Both 
the religious communities and the state may benefit from a constructive 
mutual interest in matters of religious concern. That ‘something other than 
the British legal system alone’ (Williams 2008, 262) which the religious 
communities relate to is key in the attempt by the communities to define 
and redefine its norms and its collective. The Anglican community in and 
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around the Church of England and the many other religious communities in 
England stand to benefit from a furthered and nuanced view of the complex 
religious, ethical and legal norms that remain intertwined in the internal 
affairs of religious communities. A non-recognition or misrecognition on 
behalf of the state as understood by multiculturalists like Charles Taylor 
(Taylor 1994: 25-26) and understood by Bourdieu as a symbolic power 
grab and as a form of oppression will lead to a counterproductive view of 
Shari’a and Muslim norms broadly understood. Although the state does not 
do this deliberately, the Archbishop’s argument seems to be that it falls to 
him and the Church of England to argue the case of proper recognition of 
these issues, because the Church through its established position speaks on 
behalf of all religion. As argued in Chapter Two, the misrecognition of 
religious groups and their normative cores are – according to Bourdieu – a 
first step towards symbolic violence and subversive struggle in the religio-
organisational field. The extraordinary public and academic attention given 
to Shari’a these last years is symptomatic of this emerging struggle and 
making anew of iconic Islamic norms and Muslim identities. As such, the 
Archbishop’s speech was occasion for criticism of Shari’a rather than 
reason for it and did little more than light the spark (Cumper 2011).  
One of the reasons for this increased attention is that the issue of Shari’a 
in Europe is very complex, difficult to make sense of, and very easily 
misunderstood. The Archbishop is well aware of this and quotes Oxford 
Professor of Contemporary Islamic Studies, Tariq Ramadan, who in his 
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam points to the fact that “… In the 
West, the idea of Sharia calls up the darkest images of Islam: repression of 
women, physical punishments, stoning, and all other such things. It has 
reached the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer 
to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all 
their work by the mere mention of the word” (Ramadan 2004, 31; Williams 
2008, 263). The Archbishop quotes only the first of these two sentences, 
however, and the speech does exactly that which is the object of fear in the 
second. So much stronger then, seems the images of darkness and the 
deficiency of Islam, when the discussion turns to the so-called Shari’a 
councils with their assumed subversions and parallel legal systems.  
The identification of Shari’a as given by Ramadan resonates not only 
mis-recognition but a deliberate symbolic struggle that – as will be shown 
in this chapter – is a catalyst of Muslim production of clear markers of 
identity, reasserted norms and a strong continuous production of religious 
iconic symbols in their everyday life. There is a sense in both interview 
material and academic literature of a potential clash of conflicting norms 
that will impact how people of faith resolve conflicts in family matters. 
This clash requires critical investigation. Why – for example – do some 
Muslims and Jews address their legal needs to the Imam or the Rabbi, and 
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what difference does it make to them? From the perspective of the 
established legal systems some concerns may rightly be raised, i.e., how 
does this impact the rule of law, for the principle of equality before law, not 
to mention the expectation of equality of justice in a modern democracy? 
From the perspective of both the Muslim communities and the Shari’a 
councils themselves, what supplementary functions and what particular 
needs cannot be fulfilled by the established legal system? What other legal, 
ethical and religious needs are heeded or performed by the Shari’a 
councils? 
The ambition of this seventh and penultimate chapter is neither to 
endeavour an explanation or introduction to Shari’a nor to educate on how 
in a European context Shari’a is to be properly understood by both 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Rather, this chapter takes the opportunity 
of the complexity of the issue to address the structural position of Shari’a 
councils within the breadth and depth of the religio-organisational field. In 
doing so, the chapter unfolds an analysis that will maintain the complexity 
of the issues concerning Shari’a while at the same time opening up for an 
interpretive approach to the symbolic performance of the councils. It 
becomes clear that the Shari’a councils in a highly institutionalised context 
need to navigate the difficult structural environment flanked by the Muslim 
community, the men and women who address the councils and the wider 
public. It is an exposed position and it holds both risks and potential 
rewards. On the one hand, the religiously motivated legal dispositions of 
the Muslim community provide both opportunity and necessity for 
institutions such the councils to address family matters, divorce, 
inheritance, private international legal matters and ad hoc conflict 
resolution and arbitration. All of these issues are community sensitive and 
the Shari’a councils depend on the ability to perform a desired service and 
function. On the other hand, the two-fold normative structuration from the 
formal legal system and the informal popular debate force the Shari’a 
councils to justify, legitimize and repeatedly explain themselves and their 
purpose. Between these two ends the contestations surrounding the 
councils are frequent and the Shari’a councils seem to hold very difficult 
positions in the religio-organisational field in England. 
The argument of the chapter maintains that much of the trouble and 
many of the misunderstandings surrounding the councils must be 
understood not only within the structuring analysis championed by 
Bourdieu, but also in the light of the active institutional production and 
continual reproduction of new Islamic and symbolic norms. The production 
and reproduction aspect is particularly important to the analysis as it 
demonstrates that not only in spite of, but due to the structurally challenges 
of position and the lack of conventional capital resources, the Shari’a 
councils and their communities are producing a stronger and more resilient 
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religion. It seems to be a logic that counters the prevailing one, which is 
predominant both amongst a host of non-Muslim observers and to Muslim 
men, namely that Shari’a disadvantages and dominates women financially, 
socially, legally and religiously. However, the argument has been made by 
the academics who have done detailed analysis (Bano 2004, Douglas et al 
2011, Walker 2012), by many of the Muslim women (ibid.) and key 
Muslim observers (Birt 2011, Ramadan 2011) and by non-Muslim religious 
leaders and observers, primarily Hindu and Jewish (Patel 2011, Wittenberg 
2011), that the Shari’a councils perform a function solicited by the women 
in particular to strengthen their faith, to empower them and to the 
perfection of their religion (On the virtues of perfection of religion, see 
Murata & Chittick 2000).  
The chapter returns to one of the classic Bourdieuian arguments, namely, 
that of the structural power of the resignification of symbolic capital, which 
was put forth in section 2.5 of Chapter Two. It seems that in addressing the 
Shari’a courts, the women are at a more or less favourable rate exchanging 
financial and formal normative capital against symbolic and informal 
normative capital. In doing so, mahr may be forfeited and some women 
may freely choose a less favourable legal position, but there seems to be a 
significant gain in symbolic and religious power and capital. Not only are 
the women socially and religiously re-established as seen from their 
communities in the encounter with the Shari’a council, but the Shari’a 
council becomes the producer and re-producer of redefined Islamic norms. 
For the analysis of this chapter much information and data is drawn from 
the growing academic literature and surveys on Shari’a councils in 
England. Most prominently, perhaps, Samia Bano’s dissertation from 2004 
was one of the first and most extensive studies of Shari’a councils and the 
construction of identity of South Asian Muslim women, who address these 
councils in family matters such as marriage, divorce, and matters of 
custody and marital assets. Bano’s work was not the first done on the 
Shari’a councils nor on religiously based mediation (Poulter 1995, Mir-
Hosseini 2000, Shah-Kamezi 2001), but her accomplishment is a very 
thorough anthropological investigation of the relationship between Muslim 
Pakistani women and a select group of Shari’a councils in England. From 
the point of view of the scholarly field on Islam in Europe, she was integral 
in putting the Shari’a councils on the map amongst scholars of legal 
pluralism and sociology of religion. On a critical note on previous studies, 
she says that these “fail to achieve the active engagement of women in 
developing strategies, negotiations and interrogation spaces that challenge 
the hegemonic power inherent in both official and unofficial law” (Bano 
2004, 152). Following her, the literature on Shari’a councils grew, but it 
was the speech by the Archbishop that gave the religiously based dispute 
resolution a public and highly contested profile. With the speech, further 
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academic study and publication on the subject has increased many fold 
(Bano 2008, Williams 2008, Blackett 2009, Bowen 2010 & 2012, Shah 
2009 & 2010, Christoffersen & Nielsen 2010, Cumber 2011, Douglas 
2011, Douglas et al 2011, Walker 2012, just to mention a few). Still, only a 
relatively small number of these have actually done fieldwork within or on 
the councils themselves. This small number of studies inform the present 
chapter.  
Closely following Samia Bano’s study (2004), Tanya Walker conducted 
in-depth interviews from 2009 to 2011, observed sessions and did case-by-
case studies of four of the most significant Shari’a Councils in England 
(Walker 2012). Walker’s specific focus was the Muslim women who 
addressed their legal and religious needs to the courts. Walkers approach is 
ethnographical and from the perspective of the women she challenges the 
assumptions of power and authority that cling to the courts. Inspired by 
Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety (2005), which investigates the deliberate 
strategy of structural subversion within the field of power by Muslim 
women in Egypt, Walker’s research suggests that Muslim women in 
England are applying calculated tactics of power in addressing the religious 
councils. In spite of the women’s refusal of the councils’ authority, they 
address themselves nonetheless. This is done, firstly, to resolve their legal 
issues, but secondly because their communities believe in the authority of 
the councils. As Walker explains, “the women attempted to use processes 
that they assumed were held as authoritative by their communities, in order 
to govern and to manipulate the responses of those communities in line 
with the women’s own desires” (Walker 2012, 184). For the present 
purpose, Walker’s ethnography informs the sociological dialectics between 
the women, the councils and both the narrow Muslim community and the 
wider public community.  
Gillian Douglas and colleagues from Cardiff Law School undertook to 
investigate religious mediation at three different religious courts and 
published their most significant findings in Social Cohesion and Civil Law: 
Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts (2011). In order to remedy some 
of the lack of knowledge of how religious courts operate, the report 
introduces the general status of regulation of religion in England and Wales 
before turning to the Jewish Beth Din in London, the Shariah Council at 
Birmingham Central Mosque and the Catholic National Tribunal for Wales 
in Cardiff. Especially, the question of jurisdiction of these courts is 
explored and evaluated in order to compare with and distinguish from the 
jurisdiction of the civil legal system.  
After attending sessions of several of the Shari’a councils in England, 
John Bowen published a book on Blaming Islam (Bowen 2012) in which he 
looks at the relationship between Shari’a councils and the English law. 
Here, and in the 2010 and 2012 articles, he studies the reception and 
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discursive context of the Shari’a councils and seeks to actively debunk a 
number of myths surrounding the councils and the public misconceptions 
about Islam. From a structural point of view, the question of recognition of 
the councils by the English civil courts seems to be at the core. His results 
from studying the civil courts and the religious councils suggest that “… 
tribunals provide an open and institutionalized framework to encourage a 
convergence of Islamic norms with English law” (Bowen 2012, 92). 
Bowen is expected to publish the full analysis of his results on Islam and 
Shari’a in England in the near future.   
To these four specific studies, the RELIGARE material on the United 
Kingdom and the interviews conducted by Dr Prakash Shah and Mr Ashraf 
Ul-Hoque in 2011 are added as basis for the analysis of the chapter. From 
the interviews with key informants and elite profiles within the religio-
organisational field in UK are drawn a substantial number of the evidential 
quotes cited here, and the evidence therein points to the field’s reception 
and the position therein of the Shari’a councils. As a contrast to the 
evidence and research drawn from the likes of Bano, Walker and partially 
from Douglas et al, the RELIGARE material views the Shari’a councils 
from the structurally objective point of view, by which it becomes apparent 
how the Shari’a councils impact the wider field. As such, the point of view 
of the RELIGARE interviews is akin to that of the Archbishop, the Chief 
Justice Phillips and the observers from the legal system, which includes 
Knights (2007), Blackett (2009), Shah (2009) and to a certain extent also 
Douglas et al (2011).   
These studies, articles and reports inform the basis of the analysis in this 
chapter. As such, no original data is presented here, but rather an 
interpretative exploration of the recurring question ’Why do Muslims take 
their disputes to the Shari’a councils’? (Walker 2012, 54) is given with 
particular emphasis on the implications for the ’religio-organisational 
field’. The material gives evidence of the position of the Shari’a councils as 
seen from the councils themselves, from the women who address them and 
from the local Muslim communities that draw normative identity from the 
councils. As will be argued throughout the present chapter, the position of 
the Shari’a councils is symbolically iconic and central to the local 
communities as brokers of appropriate conduct and as setting the standard 
of epitomic Muslim identity. As such, the Shari’a councils may be 
understood in part as conveyers of legal resolution to conflicts of personal 
and family law, but also to a substantial degree as institutions of Muslim 
norms that protect the significant values of the community. So much so are 
these councils brokers of norms that they can even be understood as 
normative signifiers of the common values and thus themselves gain a 
symbolic or iconic power both within and outside the community. All this, 
of course, generated within the compartment or subsection appropriated for 
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mediation, negotiation and arbitration within the broader religio-
organisational field in the UK.  
The chapter first explores how Shari’a is understood and misunderstood 
(7.2) and attempts to give context to the transportation and transformation 
of Islamic norms from a distant time and place to the present modern and 
European context. Based on this firmer understanding of Shari’a, the 
chapter turns to introduce the Shari’a councils (7.3) and to investigate how, 
with procedural precautions, these are navigating the dangers and 
opportunities of their environments. This of course begs the questions of 
how the Shari’a councils appropriate their Islamic norms and put them to 
use as arbitration in the context of the English legal system (7.4). From the 
perspective of the Muslim community and wider environment and society 
(7.5), the Shari’a councils hold a much contested position and have 
recently become the object of specific legal measures, as is seen by the bill 
proposed by Baroness Cox. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
resignification of the Islamic norms and the reproduction of Islam in the 
English context (7.6). 
 
7.2 How Shari’a is understood and misunderstood 
In order to properly assess what Shari’a is in the context of Shari’a 
councils, of the European legal systems, and in relation to the religio-
organisational field, an apt and inclusive understanding of Shari’a must be 
discussed. There is no agreement of a single definition of the term Shari’a, 
but it is commonly thought to be the body of codes, standards and criteria 
of Islamic norms given on the basis of primarily the two core Islamic 
sources of knowledge: the divine revelation given in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah-example of the Prophet drawn from the many subsequent Hadith-
collections thereof. In turn, this has been developed in later Muslim 
generations by the different bodies of legal and theological doctrinal 
scholarship to become the Islamic law, often associated with the word 
Shari’a. From the Arabic root, the word Shari’a denotes a ‘path that leads 
to the spring,’ (Ramadan 2004, 31) which in the context of the legal codes 
and theological ethics is understood to be the right path of conduct that 
leads to the metaphoric spring of salvation, justice or peace – that is, to 
proper Islam (Kamali 2008, 2). This, however, has in history of Islam been 
understood differently in different spheres of life. Firstly, in its outset 
Shari’a gives explanations to the concepts of creation, existence, life and 
death and directs conduct of a Muslim’s way of life. This general 
understanding of Shari’a is concerned with the values and good of Islam 
and assumes a theological or ethic character. Secondly, from this is derived 
the detailed body of principles for understanding Shari’a, which is known 
as Fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence. This serves to bring the message of the 
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Prophet forward to deal with the problems of Muslims of a new day and 
age. The directives and principles of the Prophet have been scholastically 
refined over centuries by different jurisprudential schools and as such 
constitute an ongoing human effort known as Usul al-Fiqh, or the legal 
theory of Islamic jurisprudence. This is the continued efforts to produce 
law as based on the Islamic legal sources of which the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah are the primary ones, but to which later generations have added 
consensus of the scholar (Ijma) and the analogy of new problems to the 
existing law (Qiyas). According to Norwegian Historian and Professor of 
Islamic Studies, Knut Vikør, Shari’a must be understood as “a body of 
sources of revelation and a methodology for making rules from these 
sources” (Vikør 2005, 1), which means that validity and applicability does 
not derive from “any decision from a parliament or council, but is the result 
of individual efforts by the scholars working with God’s revelation” (Vikør 
2005, 3).  
Taking the study and application of Shari’a into any contemporary 
context, European or otherwise, warrants a number of warnings – or rather, 
calls for nuance – from scholars of Shari’a. Being subject as it is to 
misunderstandings and prejudice, as the examples from section 7.1 show, 
any operational understanding of Shari’a must represent it earnestly and 
prudently. This means maintaining nuance, taking heed of warnings and 
pitfalls, satisfactory breath of the representation, meeting complexity with 
requisite variety (section 2.5) and avoiding simplicity, stereotypes and 
reductions to essentials.  
In an attempt to produce such appropriate nuance, contemporary scholar 
on Islamic law and jurisprudence Mohammad Hashim Kamali reference 
Joseph Schacht and his understanding of “… Shari’ah … as the core and 
kernel of religion and the essence of Islam itself” (Kamali 2008, 1). 
Avoiding such simplification and presenting a detailed analysis, Kamali 
shows that Shari’a understood narrowly as legal code finds little basis in 
the sources. He maintains that Islam is primarily faith and Shari’a moral 
code (Kamali 2008, 5), while the Islamic law and the legalistic content of 
Shari’a are secondary aspects. Kamali strongly warns against ‘the total 
emphasis on conformity to rules and statements … that designate Islam as a 
law-based religion, a nomocracy and so forth, and not enough emphasis on 
the meaning and purpose of Islam and integration of its values in one’s 
conduct” (Kamali 2008, 6). Such a warning is echoed by McGill Professor 
of Islamic Law, Wael B. Hallaq, who takes the cultural and conceptual 
ambiguity of the Western term ‘law’ to be “… responsible for a thorough 
and systematic misunderstanding of the most significant features of the so-
called Islamic law …” (Hallaq 2009, 1-2). They both stress that Islamic law 
only becomes law through the interpretation, application and human 
cognitive endeavour.  
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In a European setting and taking note of such frequent 
misunderstandings of Shari’a in the public debates, Tariq Ramadan adds to 
the depth of understanding Shari’a by adding his warning not to simplify 
the comprehensiveness of Islam and the extent to which Shari’a as complex 
of norms influence the lives of Muslims (Ramadan 2004, 33). 
Comprehensiveness does not mean that Muslims are incapable of 
integrating into secularized societies, but rather that “Sharia, insofar as it is 
the expression of the ‘the way to faithfulness,’ deduced and constructed a 
posteriori, is the work of human intellect” (Ramadan 2004, 34). Ramadan, 
summing up his careful distinction between human and divine affair, spell 
out his position on the sociological nature of both religion and Shari’a: 
“The ‘way to the source’ is never confused with the Source itself: the latter 
declares the absolute and the universal outside of time, but everything 
along the way must consider itself in time, in change, in imperfection, 
immersed in the reality of humankind” (Ramadan 2004, 37). 
Taking the consequence of Shari’a as an ongoing historical institution 
and production of human endeavour, Wael Hallaq has in his impressive 
body of work – of which Shari’a. Theory, Practice and Transformations 
from 2009 is a prime example – given a crucial lesson and warning about 
understanding Shari’a from a 21st century European perspective. Hallaq 
distinguishes between the ‘systemic components of Shari’a’ and the ‘other 
contingent features that vary from time and place’ (Hallaq 2009: 15). The 
first of these two – ‘the systemic components’ – is his primary concern and 
he gives a detailed and accurate historical narrative of the structures of 
authority and the discursive and cultural practices that are integral to 
Shari’a. Of relevance to the present concern with the Shari’a councils of 
contemporary England, these include the function and modality of the legal 
system in its complexity, which defines Shari’a in its particularities. The 
critical institutional functions within the system – or the critical positions 
with the field, as Bourdieu would say – include the “… jurisconsult (mufti), 
the judge (qadi), the author-jurist (musannif), the law professor (shaykh), 
the notary (shuruti), the court scribe (katib), and several other 
‘functionaries’ who were constants insofar as their structural performances 
were concerned” (Hallaq 2009, 16).  These functions constitute, according 
to Hallaq, “… the highest achievement in practicing, performing and living 
the Shari’a” (Ibid.). However, the second of the two, the ‘other contingent 
features’ as mentioned above, have substantial impact on the systemity and 
practice of Shari’a. Referencing Foucault,64 Hallaq speaks of an epistemic 
break or rupture in the system. Hallaq gives a thorough account of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Hallaq does not realise that Foucault incidentally has it from Gaston Bachelard’s The Formation of the 
Scientific Mind from 1940 (Bachelard 2002). The epistemic ruptures are understood as unconscious 
structures that are immanent in the realm of knowledge, such as principles of division and distinction. 
Naturally, it is of interest to the present endeavour.  
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development and progression of Shari’a until the dawn of modernity, 
where he points to a collapse of those structures of authority and discourse 
that always existed within the system. These, however, ‘met their structural 
death in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’ (Hallaq 2009, 15-16).  
This epistemic breakdown or structural death at the dawn of modernity 
points to the institutional collapse of the very features of Shari’a that made 
it possible in the first place and made it self-reproductive over time (Hallaq 
2009, 15, n 33). Hallaq’s analysis demonstrates that because the 
structurally and systemically reproductive features were destroyed with 
modernity, colonisation and all-important hegemonic domination of Islam 
before and around the turn of the 20th century, the interrelation amongst the 
juridical, the juristic and legal functionaries disappeared. It is now 
impossible for academics, scholars or Muslims to ‘inspect and speak of the 
Shari’a’s episteme” (Ibid.). Keeping with the language of Bourdieu and the 
neo-institutionalists as presented in Chapter Two, it seems the 
institutionalisation of Shari’a has broken down, which means that the 
historic coherence of Shari’a and its impact as a complex set of social, 
economic, moral and cultural norms was transformed or mediated into 
something else (Hallaq 2009, 545). Hallaq is very direct and not the least 
amicable in his description of the ‘displacement,’ the ‘transmutation,’ the 
‘desiccation and final dismantling of the Shari’a’s institutional structures 
and he assigns responsibility to centralisation, codification, 
bureaucratization, jural homogenization and ubiquitous militarization, 
“which are all the props of the modern state project” (Hallaq 2009, 547). 
The encounter with the modern state meant the downfall and death of 
Shari’a and rendered it nothing but a textual residue:  
 
“Over the past two centuries or so, the Shari’a has been transformed from a 
worldly institution and culture to a textuality that not only represents the 
subtracted differential between the pre-modern organic structure and its entexted 
version, but also engages the very characteristic of being entexted in a politics that 
the pre-modern counterpart did not know. Which is to say that even the surviving 
residue, the entexted form, functions in such uniquely modern ways that the very 
residue is rendered foreign, in substance and function to any possible genealogical 
counterpart […] Profoundly epistemic and structural, this transformation was the 
outcome of the confrontation between the Shari’a and the most significant and 
weighty institution that emerged out of, and at once defined, modernity, i.e., the 
state …”  
(Hallaq 2009, 547). 
 
Despite this very discouraging diagnosis of the desiccated and dismantled 
Shari’a, Hallaq does point to the transformation and ‘transmutation’ as the 
future of Shari’a. It cannot be a reincarnation of its historical self, nor can it 
be reinstated or reengineered to perform a function at the will of the state 
(Hallaq 2009, 550). The normative power of the legal and juristic 
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institutions of Shari’a has disappeared. However – and this is a deliberate 
irony in Hallaq’s analysis – Shari’a itself has become a modern expression 
and marker of identity much more concerned with culture and politics than 
with law. In his analysis, he predicts that Shari’a as such an identity marker 
will be very enduring.  
Hallaq’s analysis of the dismantled key Muslim institutions of Shari’a 
and the epistemic systemity needed for Shari’a to function within a set of 
checks and balances seem to be both a criticism of those who still speak of 
Max Weber’s kadijustiz and to champion the potential for reinterpretation 
and reproduction that still lies within the tradition of Shari’a. Weber 
assumes that the decisions of the qadis are “…informal judgements 
rendered in terms of concrete ethical or other practical valuations … Kadi-
justice knows no rational ‘rules of decision’ (Urteilsgründe) whatever.” 
(Weber 1968, 3, 976, quoted in Turner 1978, 109). Max Weber’s well 
known criticism of the Islamic legal and ethical complex behind the wide 
label of Shari’a was exactly that the practitioners of justice, the qadi’s and 
councillors from the shura-councils were unable to operate within the 
complex and resorted to dispensing justice at a whim: “… according to 
considerations of individual expediency” (Weber 1954: 351, cf. Rosen 
1989, 58; Vikør 2005, 13-19, Shah 2009A, 82). Weber sees Shari’a in an 
apparent entanglement of normative principles: “… [Shari’a has] an 
inadequate differentiation of ethical, religious and legal norms and a low 
level of systematization” (Turner 1978, 111). From this it seems clear 
Hallaq is opposing the Weberian position. Hallaq demonstrated exactly a 
high degree of institutionalised systematization with appropriate checks 
and balances between qadis and other practitioners within the field of 
Islamic justice. In the light of Hallaq’s analysis, it seems the understanding 
of Shari’a that Weber depicts is unfitting of classic Shari’a, but it is also 
clear that modern Shari’a is being dismantled and remains only in textual 
residue and in scattered practice.  
It seems the insight to be taken from both Hallaq and Weber remains that 
the legitimate normative power of the legal and juristic institutions of 
Shari’a has disappeared as it once was and what only remains now is one of 
two possible shapes. On the one hand, Shari’a with ‘no rational rules of 
decision,’ justice according to individual expediency and is at the service of 
the modern nation state in its political power game, which is roughly 
speaking how it is applied today in Marocco (Rosen 2000), Malaysia 
(Jahan 1992) and Palestine (Welchman 2000). Many of these strong 
warnings against misunderstanding Shari’a are important to keep in mind, 
when understanding the relationship of Shari’a to the states across the 
world, Muslim or not. The reason for this remains its instrumental and 
political application rather than its systemic and highly institutionalised 
function in the service of religion. On the other hand, Shari’a can be 
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reapplied as an identity marker that draws the values and norms of a 
heritage and tradition rather than a system. As such, it is normative still, but 
as something symbolic, essential or iconic of the community in its new 
time and context.  
In the context of the Archbishop’s speech, it seems that the 
understanding of Shari’a remains split between the before and after 
positions of Hallaq’s epistemic breakdown. The Archbishop assumes the 
possibility of a return to the comprehensive Shari’a, but notes that such a 
scenario is not yet viable. Shari’a “… is to some extent unfinished business 
so far as codified and precise provisions are concerned. To recognise 
Shari’a is to recognize a method of jurisprudence governed by revealed 
texts rather than a single system” (Williams 2008, 264). Somehow, the 
textuality governs the jurisprudence, but without the systemity. Tariq 
Ramadan is sceptical of the import of Shari’a norms from another time or 
another part of the world. Commenting specifically on demands for 
recognition of Shari’a in an English context and referencing the 
Archbishops position, he states: 
  
“… I see too many scholars and people just importing ideas [from the Islamic 
world] and thinking that the only way to be faithful is to be faithful the way we 
were. … Muslims should understand that they have a great deal of reassessing the 
priorities and what they want to achieve … This is what I said when the 
Archbishop said that we need to find a place for shariah; I thought that he was 
right from a legal viewpoint – it’s open and it’s offered already – but I don’t think 
that Muslims need that today. At the end of the day, what we need, is trying to 
understand how Islamic references work in the West, trying to find merging 
processes and not parallel systems. If you have parallel systems, then it’s not 
really your country”  
 (Ramadan interview 2011, Hoque & Shah 2011, 37).  
 
In responding specifically to the archbishops lecture, Samia Bano says 
“Muslim engagement with Shari’a cannot be understood merely in terms of 
the need for legal right and obligations to be reformulated to make faith-
based minority communities more legally and socially inclusive” (2005) 
but remains a much more complex matter. It seems Shari’a may fruitfully 
be understood as a comprehensive and complex body of norms, which 
derives from human effort with divine revelation and application in most 
aspects of life. It requires great earnestness and prudence to approach 
Shari’a both academically, theoretically and practically because the law 
cannot simply be taken out of Shari’a and looked at independently. Shari’a 
councils in particular as an Islamic institution must be seen in its 
organisational environment that is appreciative of both the norms at play 
and the community needs at stake. This means that the Shari’a is to be 
understood in connection to its field. The religio-organisational field, as 
demonstrated in chapters two and four, is a subdivision of the overarching 
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field of power relations, and this focus on the religio-organisational is 
framing Shari’a in the English context. The field in question can cope with 
the complexity and the variety of the norms, institutions and agents, 
without preconceptional reduction to models and without limiting the 
breadth of academic disciplines in the study of Shari’a councils.  
The question of what Muslims need and do not need seems to be at the 
core of the question of the Shari’a councils. No doubt about the fact that 
the Shari’a councils serve to resolve conflict, mediate and sort unofficial 
Muslim family matters, but in the quote above Ramadan seems to imply 
that resolutions for these needs have already been offered - either by way 
of the established legal system in England or by way of the limited 
leniencies already given to arbitration and mediation (Phillips 2008). 
Rather, the Muslim matter of understanding ‘how Islamic references work 
in the west,’ is the need at the end of the day. According to Ramadan, the 
needs of Muslims concern the reception, understanding, and cognitive 
recognition of the complex of Shari’a in the west, generally, and in the 
English debates on Shari’a courts, specifically. This comes much closer to 
Shari’a as an identity marker that Hallaq suggested and in this guise Shari’a 
is a good example of ‘Islamic references in the West,’ which has a life of 
its own. With a pairing of the strictly legal power of Shari’a to a new iconic 
and symbolic power of shari’a as an identity marker, the layers of the 
complex of Shari’a seem to become visible and analytically discernable.  
 
7.3 The Shari’a Councils and the power of the procedures  
The Shari’a councils in England are not something new, and even though 
the majority of studies made on the councils are recent, academics and 
commentators have made note of the community mediation in the late 
eighties and early nineties. Both Poulter and Badawi gave a status on 
Muslim arbitration in England in Michael King’s God’s Law versus State 
Law from 1995, with Badawi summarizing the situation: “… Having 
recognised that the official legal system has hesitated to solve their disputes 
in the context of Islamic family law, Muslims have established informal 
conciliation mechanisms … they interpret Islamic law according to the 
needs of the Muslim community in Britain” (Badawi 1995, 77; Walker 
2012, 23). If, structurally speaking, the Shari’a councils can be assumed to 
address the needs of the community, then a closer look the councils 
themselves will provide insight into the Muslim community understood as 
a key part of the institutional environment of the councils.  
Amongst the studies referenced there is a general agreement as to the 
overall profile of Shari’a councils in England. Each of the studies address a 
particular angle of the related questions of resolving marital disputes (Bano 
2004), authority (Walker 2012), jurisdiction (Douglas et al 2011) and 
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association with the civil courts (Bowen 2010, 2012). Basically, the Shari’a 
councils are more or less formally established institutions that offer a 
service of reconciliation guidance, mediation, dispute resolution and/or 
divorce to the different Muslim communities in England. None of the 
studies cited gives a precise number of Shari’a councils in England. While 
Bano (2007) estimates somewhere between 60 and 70 larger or smaller 
councils, the very critical Civitas report Shariah Law or ‘One Law for All’? 
(2009) asserts that there is at least 85 councils operating in England – either 
out of mosques or other more or less established network relations 
(MacEoin 2009; Douglas et al 2011, 28). Walker, however, takes this 
number to be inflated and she argues that smaller, unofficial, ad hoc 
groupings of local dispute resolution should be regarded as part of the 
everyday business of different ethnic and language groups (Walker 2012, 
58-59) Together with Bano, Walker takes an interest in the ‘larger, more 
prominent councils’ which operate in the different languages and provide a 
number of similar services for the Muslim communities. As a rule these 
services include general guidance and advice, counselling and mediation in 
marital disputes, miscellaneous social affairs (Walker 2012, 60, 64) and 
‘producing expert opinion reports on Muslim family law and practice’ 
(Malik 2009, 17). Douglas et al suggests that 95 per cent of their material 
regarding the Shari’a councils concerns matrimonial problems of one sort 
or the other (2011, 29). Specific to these problems, the issuing of 
internationally recognised Islamic certificates of divorce is the single most 
important service provided (Malik 2009, 17).  
Walker’s and Bano’s focus on the more prominent councils has certain 
overlaps. They both consider the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) in London 
and the Sharia Council of Birmingham Central Mosque (BSC). As it 
happens, of the religious courts in Douglas et al (2011), the only Muslim 
institution studied was the BSC, and Bowen (2012), in turn, refer to both 
the ISC, the BSC and in a forthcoming article on his research also to the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT), (Bowen, forthcoming). However, 
Bano (2004, 129 – 131) in addition looks at the Muslim Law (Shariah) 
Council (MLSC) and the Shariah Court of the UK (SCUK), while Walker 
(2012, 60 – 72) in particular looks at further at the Family and Social 
Affairs Department of the Islamic Centre of England (ICE) and the MAT. 
This brings the number of Sharia Councils studied in detail up to six. In 
due order, these six are presented here. 
The Islamic Sharia Council of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (ISC) 
has its base in London, offices in Leyton and representatives across 
England. It was established in 1982, and deals annually with approximately 
500 to 600 cases and services a diverse clientele in multiple languages. The 
members of the council who are involved in deliberating on cases are 
considered by the clients to be Islamic scholars. The ISC draws from all 
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four Sunni legal schools in deciding disputes and are very explicit about 
their rules of procedure in order to complement the work of civil courts and 
hoping for closer collaboration in the future (Bowen, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, the ISC is a registered charity with the Charity Commission, 
which means that its financial summaries and records are publically 
available. (Bano 2004, 131; Walker 2012, 60-82; Bowen 2012, 78-83; 
Bowen, forthcoming). 
The Muslim Law (Shariah) Council (MLSC) is located in Ealing, 
London, and was one of the first institutions of its kind. The MLSC was 
established in 1985 and has dealt with over 3000 cases so far.65 There are at 
present twenty-one Ulama, Imams, scholar and various barristers on the 
council and it works with the ‘various schools of Fiqh in Great Britain,’ 
which must be assumed to be both Sunni and Shi’i. It primarily provides a 
number of services for the Muslim community, but is very much aware of 
its position within the wider religio-organisational field, as it is frequently 
“… approached by institutions, organizations and individuals from diverse 
spectrum of ethnicity and faiths seeking expert opinions in accordance to 
Islamic Law on social, theological, cultural, political and academic issues.  
Solicitors and other legal bodies and authorities also approach the Council 
for guidelines on cases relating to Muslim families,” and even helps with 
queries that ” … are referred to the Council from other European countries 
where no such Islamic Council is available to help the Muslim 
Community” (www.shariahcouncil.org, 2012). Even thought the MLSC 
does not necessarily enjoy the key position both nationally and 
internationally, it claims, it nonetheless seems the MLSC is positioning 
itself strategically and availably. The MLSC operates from the Muslim 
College in West London, which is “a religious academic institution 
specialising in the study of Islam, its culture and history” and which enjoys 
status as a registered charity (Bano 2004, 130, 169-175). 
The Shariah Court of the UK (SCUK) was established in 1992 and is 
located in Tottenham, North London. It was set up to give advice and to 
mediate locally, and consists of an Imam, a Muslim solicitor and three co-
counsellors, who work as witnesses on behalf of the community. It is 
perhaps the smallest of the six councils mentioned here, and by the data 
given by Bano, it seems to be organised in a rather simple and straight-
forward fashion, which reflects the organisational minimums of a Shari’a 
council (Bano 2004, 132, 182-186) or of the informal mediation of the 
community elders. It operates closely to the person of the imam, who in 
2004 was Sheikh Abdullah and at a later point seems to be Dr Anjem 
Choudary. A web search reveals that most of the information available on 
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the SCUK is given by the critics from the far right politic, the media and 
the public. It is unclear whether the SCUK is currently in operation.  
The Sharia Council of Birmingham Central Mosque (BSC) is as the 
name suggests located in Birmingham and has gained some attention as a 
council run by a majority of women as part of a crisis centre begun by Dr. 
Wageha Syeda. It was established in the mid-1990s and is run voluntarily 
with the assistance of the mosque. With approximately 150 ongoing cases, 
the BSC meets once a month, which is an increase in meetings since 
Bano’s visits in 2004. The BSC explores reconciliation as a first option and 
if the parties are irreconcilable, it insists on a civil divorce before granting a 
religious one. Walker explains this by reference to the Islamic principle of 
public welfare – maslaha – and references the council, saying, “it would be 
to the harm of the Muslim community and to the individuals involved if 
they were married under one law and divorced under another” (Walker 
2012, 63). Like the ISC, the BSC makes its decisions based on the four 
Sunni legal schools. The BSC does not shy away from tangible and 
practical advice to the women, who are mainly of Bangladeshi or Pakistani 
origin, and tries to help the women with the general direction of their lives 
(Bano 2004, 130-131, 149-168; Bowen 2012, 84-87; Walker 2012, 62-63).  
The Family and Social Affairs Department of the Islamic Centre of 
England (ICE) is the only council in the different studies that is an 
explicitly Shi’a institution. The Islamic Centre of England was established 
in 1995 and is closely associated with a number of Shi’i organisations in 
England, such as the El-Khoei foundation and the Imam Ali foundation. 
Together, these three form the Family Affairs Committee (FAC) which 
draws together the resources and contacts of the wider Shi’a community. 
Although the ICE services both Sunni and Shi’i clients, there is a strong 
link to the Iranian community in England. The council provides guidance 
explicitly according to Iranian law, so divorcees may travel to Iran without 
added difficulty. For this reason, the ICE does also solemnise marriages, 
but the main issues dealt with remain to be marital disputes and divorces. 
The ICE has a wider ambition of providing spiritual guidance and spread 
the knowledge about Islam (Walker 2012, 64-66).  
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) is the most recent of the 
Shari’a councils surveyed and was established in 2004-05 (or 2007, 
accourding to Walker), after Bano completed her fieldwork. Shaykh Faiz 
al-Aqtab Siddiqi is the head of a Sufi community in the Midlands where he, 
his late father, Muhammad Abdul Wahhab Siddiqui, and several brothers 
and brothers-in-law run the Hijaz College Islamic University and several 
affiliate institutions (Bowen, forthcoming). Shaykh Siddiqui had been 
mediating family conflicts as part of his community engagement, but 
together with the fellow leaders of the Hijaz Sufi community, they decided 
to formally set up the MAT in order to make the decisions contractually 
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binding. Although Shaykh Siddiqui is distancing himself from the other 
Shariah councils in England, Bowen nonetheless calls the work at the Hijaz 
community a “full-service religion and law centre for some young women 
…” (Bowen, forthcoming). It is important to stress that the MAT does not 
apply arbitration, as the name suggests, to family law and custody cases, 
because this is not subject to arbitration according to British law. Strictly 
speaking, the MAT and Shaykh Siddiqi work as arbiters in business 
disputes (Bowen, forthcoming) and in disputes between groups and 
Mosques in the Muslim community (Walker 2012, 68). Strictly speaking, 
alternative dispute resolution or mediation would cover marital issues and 
disputes (See also further in this chapter about arbitration). The MAT is 
one of the Shari’a councils in England that remains shrouded in imprecise 
media stories and accusations of public mis-representation. Most of it 
seems to be run of the mill prejudice and printed rumours, but it remains 
problematic that Shaykh Siddiqui makes almost no distinction between his 
acts as head of the community and spiritual leader, nor between what the 
Hijaz community has achieved these past thirty years and what the MAT is 
currently doing (Walker 2012; Bowen, forthcoming).  
These six councils are in addition to being the more prominent, also the 
leading representatives of Shari’a councils in England. There is evidence to 
suggest that these hold the stronger positions within the religio-
organisational field and that they have the most significant impact on the 
other Muslim institutions and the communities in their environment. On 
basis of her empirical work, Walker defines community rather widely, as 
referring “to any collective group of (Muslim) people who were associated 
together in the women’s minds as forming their social field” (Walker 2012, 
142). The social field, in turn, infers geography, kinship, and the Muslim 
community as a whole. The position of the Shari’a councils and the 
interactions with the women involved are framed within this social field as 
the particular interpretations of Shari’a are taken together with the 
community norms of law, religion and culture into shaping a wider ‘field of 
possibilities,’ which is Walker’s borrowing from Foucault. This field of 
possible action, as Walker presents it, is drawn from the subjective intra-
positional view of the women involved, and as such, is to be seen in a 
dialectic relationship with the objective inter-positional view taken by 
Bourdieu. Walker, again borrowing from Foucault, sees the women in 
‘relations of domination,’ but taking the wider field into account, it seems 
reasonable to apply Bourdieu’s terminology and analytical framework of 
structuration and distinction as presented in Chapter Two.  
Walker, Bano and to a certain extent Bowen look at the structural 
position of the Muslim women between the community and the councils, 
trying to answer the question ‘why do individual Muslim women living in 
Britain choose to take up their disputes in these unofficial fora?’ (Walker 
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2012, 14). This is the most common approach in the literature (Bano, 
Walker, Bowen) and the focus on the women and their struggles is also the 
starting point for the study of the legal implications of the religiously 
motivated mediation and arbitration (Bowen, Douglas et al, Shah & 
Hoque). While Bano maintains that the community context is to be 
understood as linked internationally to the countries of origin in Pakistan 
and Bangladesh (Bano 2004, 2007), Walker accentuates the human agency 
of the women with the structures of subordination (Walker 2012, 33). 
Rather than accepting the clichés concerning the weak, forced and 
subjugated women, the strength of Walker’s argument is that women have 
possibilities and agency in the structural positions they hold; “Women act 
to negotiate and navigate their way through these inequalities – 
reinterpreting, subverting, and manipulating hegemonic norms and praxis 
to their own desired ends in creative and instructive ways” (Walker 2012, 
34). The women do not necessarily accept the authority of the Shari’a 
councils, but use them and address them as they act on the viable options in 
managing the expectations of their communities. 
Bowen (2012) also notes the structural position of the women, but his 
focus is on the councils themselves. He argues the structural function that 
the councils have in relation to the women as seen from the wider society 
perspective: “ … the shariah councils require that wives get civil divorces 
as well as religious ones […] They thus push the women toward the justice 
system, not away from it” (Bowen 2012, 87). Bano also pays careful 
attention to the councils and she stresses the procedural aspects of the work 
of the Shari’a councils. She meticulously recounts the details of the 
procedures of the four councils in her study, noting commonalities, 
variations and differences. From her findings, Bano distils a ‘common’ 
approach to granting a divorce, which takes the main applicant trough a 
number of stages and the council through a number of procedural steps.  
A word of warning is in order before looking into synthezised procedure 
of the councils. Both Bano and Walker come dangerously close to an 
oversimplification of the procedures involved, and as was noted above in 
the presentation of the six different councils, they are very different 
institutions. They are in turn Sunni, Shi’a and sufi, and some have legal and 
political ambitions while others have spiritual ambitions. The main trait to 
keep in mind, when looking at similarities, is that these councils are 
diverse, mainly because they service different communities and manage 
very different expectations from different constituents.  
Procedurally speaking, the first step towards a divorce is the initial 
contact. In the accounts given, there is no evidence of obligation or 
coercion in the use of the Shari’a councils, and emphasis is on the 
willingness of the community – though the council – to help remedy the 
present problem or conflict. This is usually done at the initiative of the 
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women, who are usually the ones in distress and in increasing numbers. 
From an Islamic point of view, men are usually easier to divorce due to the 
unilateral nature of the talaq proclamations. Divorce, when initiated by 
women is called a khula, which requires the consent and sanction by the 
Shari’a council. The contact is established through friends or family, who 
are familiar with the particular council and the first exchange of 
information is with a clerk or secretary at the council and made through 
telephone, email or done in person (Bano 2004, 133-137). 
Secondly, an application is produced. The Shari’a council asks the 
applicants, or ‘petitioners’ as they are called, to fill in a detailed form 
stating the reason for the breakdown in the marriage, the grounds for 
divorce and the impossibility of reconciliation. The burden of proof rests 
with the applicant and the councils usually see this as an opportunity for a 
new attempt at reconciliation. The forms are designed to stress the 
seriousness and importance of the proceedings and that a khula-divorce is 
neither given easily nor without reason. The records reviewed by Bano 
reveal that the applicant takes the opportunity to state a version of the 
events. Commonly, they cite their husband’s impotence, bigamy, abuse, 
threats, lies and physical harm as the main reasons and usually several of 
these at once. It remains the task of the council to investigate the facts of 
the conflict. Also, a registration fee is due before the investigations can 
begin (Bano 2004, 137-140). 
Thirdly, an investigation into the facts and details of the conflict is 
launched. Typically, this begins with establishing contact to the husband 
and gathering his perspective. He may challenge the claims and grounds, 
which requires the wife to provide the proof. If he agrees or does not 
respond to the council, they will proceed. This includes uncovering 
whether civil divorce proceedings have been undertaken and establishing 
whether there are reliable witnesses who can testify to the breakdown of 
the marriage. The question of evidence draws on a long Islamic tradition 
and is different from council to council and often subject to an assessment 
in the individual case. This has a structural bias in favour of the husband to 
the extent that he can deliberately extend the proceeding to the suffering of 
the women. 
Fourthly, the Shari’a council meets and weighs the facts of the 
application and the investigation after which the decision is made and the 
applicant is informed. Typically, a panel of minimum three scholars weigh 
the facts of the case and attention is given to the possibility of 
reconciliation, the validity of the marriage, any evidence of abuse, wider 
family and community implications or breakdown in relations, and other 
factors such as desertion or impotence (Bano 2004, 144). If the council 
does not find proper cause for divorce, this usually means that the wife 
must return to her husband or restate her case after a specific waiting 
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period in order to properly establish the breakdown of the marriage. If the 
council finds in favour of a divorce, it is usually a khula divorce. This is the 
most common result and the woman is expected to return the dowry (mahr) 
to the husband and forfeit any claims of maintenance (Bowen, 
forthcoming). From the perspective of the council, this is done so the 
husband will be more lenient, but often done at the protest of the women, 
who argue her right to the dowry as the marriage was valid and argue that 
the husband was deliberately looking for this outcome adding a financial 
gain to strained and prolonged process. In the case of the ICE, Bowen notes 
the strategic value the return of the dowry and suggests that such 
procedures are deliberate and increases likelihood of the husband’s 
acceptance (Ibid., 17). 
As a final part of the process, the council issues a divorce certificate, 
which is made so as to satisfy the Muslim community and the counterparts 
of the Shari’a institutions in the Muslim world.  
In a discussion of the power at play in the procedures of the Shari’a 
councils, Walker contests the constructions of authority that the councils 
create (Walker 2012, 92-109). She challenges the authority and even 
though the councils claim to build on Islamic principles and derive their 
reasoning from the schools of law, she finds critical defects in the 
deliberations (Walker 2012, 95). Specifically, the ISC and the BSC 
asserted the interpretation of Islamic texts as their authoritative core, but 
Walker find that ‘the deliberations lacked any formal procedure and 
appeared to draw loosely on broad maxims” (Walker, ibid.). In addition, 
she found “an unusual shortage of formal cross-referencing of opinions and 
rulings, which were rather (at best) prefaced with a general 
acknowledgment such as ‘according to Islamic law’ or ‘according to the 
Qur’an/hadith’” (Walker 2012, 96). Walker’s criticism is directed at most 
of the deliberations she witnessed and seems to echo Max Weber and his 
kadijustiz, which criticized exactly the fact that the deliberation of justice 
was informal, ‘at a whim’ and had no rational ‘rules of decision.’ She, 
however, takes the criticism into a contemporary context and speculates as 
to the motive of the lack of formality. She suggests that this is a specific 
strategy of the councils and a ‘potentially calculated part of the power 
relations:’  
 
“The lack of clarity regarding the form and types of laws being applied work to 
cloud the mechanisms of power at work and the kinds of ‘truth’ being called upon 
in judgements. This hinders the ability of Muslim women who approach the 
Shari’a councils to question judgements or to navigate the process for their own 
advantage (through the strategic negotiation of legal provisions), as they do not 
have access to the modes of reasoning that lead judges to their final 
pronouncements.”                                                                     (Walker, 96, n. 102).  
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The entire proceedings – especially the investigations and deliberations – 
constitute a very sensitive part of the work of the councils. Any procedural 
misconduct has serious implications not only for the welfare of the 
applicants and their families, but also poses a critical risk to the work of the 
council. The proper procedure and conduct in establishing the case is of 
dire importance for the needed legitimacy and credibility. Furthermore, 
proper procedure is an expression of justice as seen from an Islamic point 
of view. Allah will judge those who judge, and the councillors are usually 
well aware of this. In contrast to Walker, Bowen argues that the councils 
are highly aware of their environment both locally within the Muslim 
community, nationally within the wider society and even internationally in 
relation to the Muslim world. “The councillors believe that the legitimacy 
of their outcomes, in the eyes of the British officials, British Muslims, and 
even overseas judges, depends on maintaining transparent and consistently 
followed procedures” (Bowen, forthcoming, 12). It seems there is an added 
value from the institutionalisation of councils. Discussing cases from the 
MAT and the Hijaz Sufi community, Bowen is not blind to the outcome for 
the community; “Hijaz ended up recruiting two new acolytes as the 
outcome of the dispute, just as Meena became a member of the community. 
Disputes begin with practical concerns, but lead some individuals toward 
spirituality” (Bowen, forthcoming, 9). Summing up his conclusions, Bowen 
speaks of ‘articulating religiosity with legalism,’ and he suggests that the 
procedural regularity and legitimacy drawn from this will be conductive to 
the religious development of the juridical institutions in Britain. In these 
perspectives, Bowen thus returns to the debate on the Archbishop and the 
Chief Justice with a reiterated answer “… tribunals provide an open and 
institutionalized framework to encourage a convergence of Islamic norms 
with English law. Ultimately, it is in this sense that we ought to understand 
the calls by the archbishop and Lords Phillips to ‘recognize sharia’” 
(Bowen 2012, 92).  
 
7.4 Arbitration and the institutional application of Islamic norms 
In addition to pronunciation and certification of Islamic divorces, perhaps 
the single most defining feature of the relationship between the Shari’a 
councils and their communities is the promise to arbiter or mediate in 
conflicts.  
Bano, Bowen and Douglas et al in particular discuss the implications of 
the arbitration within the Shari’a councils, whereas Walker with her 
ethnographic approach focuses on authority rather than the arbitration 
specifics. As mentioned in Chapter Four, in England religious groups are 
considered voluntary associations, which means that they may make rules 
and organise structures, which are binding upon their members (Douglas et 
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al 2011, 9). Civil courts remain therefore reluctant to involve themselves in 
disputes of religious law and religious family law. Religious family law has 
only in a few cases been treated as part of the facts of a case or as part of 
the special rules that concern different religious groups in England, such as 
the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995, which 
allow for Muslim and Jewish ritual slaughter. Most relevant for the Shari’a 
councils, however, there is in English law recognition of religious bodies 
through alternative dispute resolution, which has been practiced in Britain 
for decades and is regulated by the Arbitration Act of 1996. Equally, the 
social, religious and cultural aspects of Islam are (mostly) uncontested, and 
recognized and provided for in Britain.  
The complex and comprehensive nature of Shari’a means that the 
different legal, theological and ethical aspects are always embedded in any 
partial representation of Shari’a and it means that in the restricted space 
available to Shari’a in the religio-organisational field in England, only a 
limited representation of Shari’a is available. The compartmentalisation of 
religion in England that was demonstrated in Chapter Four by reference to 
Julian Rivers’ analysis of the law of organised religion (Rivers 2010, 276), 
leave religious organisations and institutions in a position of emerging 
constrains when asked to remain distinctly religious in a ‘culture of 
equality’ and ‘informal pressure’ (Rivers 2010, 284). Rivers is writing with 
an outlook on both majority and minority organised religion in England 
points to harrowing reality of negative liberalism, where “… religion in the 
secular State is entirely interstitial, playing its part in the gaps left by the 
law. The only question is the size of the gaps” (Rivers 2010, 332). Adding 
to Rivers’ observations drawn from the broader religio-organisational field, 
the UK RELIGARE report on Fieldwork by Shah and Hoque (2011) 
observes, “… that religion is treated as a marginal issue in various, 
arguably ‘public’, areas of life …” (Hoque & Shah 2011, 2). From Rivers 
and Shah & Hoque, it is safe to conclude that not only the legal and 
administrative dispositions by the state have massive impact on the 
manoeuvrability of the religious organisations, but also that it only leaves 
the organisations two choices. Either to establish themselves in the 
dominated position left for them or to dissociate themselves completely 
from the state structures.  
It is in these compartments in the religio-organisational field that Shari’a 
councils find their structural positions. The specific organisations and 
councils are left to take a particular stance in between the ‘gaps left by the 
law’ and the demands of the communities of representing authentic Shari’a 
on their behalf. This means that the application of Shari’a must take place 
in the compartments of law, such as the Arbitration Act of 1996 which 
stresses the freedom to knowingly and willingly enter into agreement with 
another party (Blackett 2009), and the Human Rights Act of 1998, which 
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protects the freedom of religion of organised religions to regulate their 
internal or spiritual affairs in consistent analogy with the Church of 
England (Knights 2007, 75). Prakash Shah comments further on the 
possibility of operating analogously to the other religious communities: “In 
the UK, the Arbitration Act of 1996 offers a perfectly operable system and 
the Jewish Beth Din have been using this mechanism for decades, but no 
reported case of a Muslim arbitration can be found as having been settled 
under its auspices although certain Muslim bodies are gearing up to use this 
legislation effectively, while Lord Phillips, in his speech of July 2008, 
certainly seems to favour this option” (Shah 2009, 85). 
The compartments are not voluntary expressions of an Islamic 
disposition of freedoms and organisational prerogative. Rather, it seems 
that the room to manoeuvre made available by legislation is given 
analogously – that is institutionally isomorphic – to the other and more 
deeply rooted institutions in the religio-organisational field, such as the 
mediation initiatives in the Church of England, the Catholic tribunals and 
the Jewish Beth Din (Douglas et al 2011).  
 
7.5 The structural environment of the Shari’a councils  
In an analysis of the religio-organisational position of the Shari’a councils 
in England, it is necessary to make sense of the environment of the 
councils. Most of the studies do refer to the communities surrounding the 
councils, but none of them go deeper into the relationship between the 
communities and the councils. Professor of Law at King’s College in 
London, Maleiha Malik, places the social activism that is the ‘call for 
religious arbitration and tribunals’ squarely within the context of the 
Muslim communities (Malik 2009, 16). In her optics, Shari’a councils are 
framed as Muslim community organisations and the needs met and 
functions performed are the needs and functions of the community. 
According to Malik, there is a correlation between the family law issues 
and the institutionalisation of the Shari’a courts which has everything to do 
with the interrelated triad of the councils, the women involved and the 
wider community. 
 
“Women and family law become a focus […] for traditional groups concerned 
with the preservation and transmission of their culture or religion because they 
recreate collective identity by reproducing and socialising future members of the 
group. … From this perspective, it becomes a critical matter that women should 
enter into their most intimate relationships and functions in a way that preserves 
the membership boundaries and identity of the whole community … Women are 
also often given the status of passing on the particular collective history of the 
tradition and its social, cultural and religious norms to the next generation. 
Women become a public symbol of the group as a whole …”  
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(Malik 2009, 19, My italics)  
 
The impression from the Malik quote is reflected in the data presented by 
Bano. She quotes a Sheikh Abdullah, a religious scholar with the SCUK, 
who says, “Women nurture the Muslim family and today these roles are 
being undermined and destroyed with this emphasis on material wealth. 
Twenty years ago we would not have had so many young women walk 
away from their marriages as we see today” (Adbullah, quotes in Bano 
2004, 137).  
The reproduction and recreation of Islamic identity markers are at stake 
in the focus on the community that both the Malik quote and the Abdullah 
quote indicates. While the Muslim women are often seen as ‘forced’ into 
the forum of the councils and in the two qoutes women are made to be the 
carriers of the social, cultural and religious norms it seems that they often 
use these willingly, actively and to successfully navigate the expectations 
of the communities (Walker 2012, 183; Malik 2009, 18). Also, the 
instrumentalisation of the women on behalf of the communities denies the 
agency and active engagement that Walker argues so well. While Malik is 
correct that these norms do need to be carried and do need to be 
transmitted, recreated and reproduced, the women do not embody the 
adequate degree of institutionalisation that is required for this to make any 
impact on the structural position of Muslims in religio-organisational field.  
Rather, from a structural point of view, it is the councils that are 
symbolic representations of the reaffirmation of Muslim identity and 
Shari’a as a complex of norms is institutionally expressed. These are the 
institutions that carry and protect the Islamic norms on behalf of the 
community. As was seen in section 2.4 of Chapter Two, norms were both 
common denominators, standards for the community and technologies of 
control and security. All three of these functions are performed by the 
councils on behalf of the community. They ultimately protect the 
community – both against itself and outside influences. It is by the 
discipline, the examination and the policing by the councils that the 
recreation and reproduction of the norms of Shari’a is made and the 
Muslim community as a group can define and position itself. As Bourdieu 
had so eloquently stated, norms is a ‘principle of vision and division,’ and 
as a consequence, the normative division that maintains the Muslim group 
as a whole in the self-interest of the Muslim community has been both 
visible and invisible. The visibility of the Muslim community is focused on 
the Shari’a councils and they are made to represent or signify the 
community. The public debates concerning Shari’a in England is a 
testament to this and will be explored in the next section. But the 
construction and constitution of Muslim identity vis-à-vis the symbolic 
power and position of the councils also has an invisible and arbitrary nature 
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to it, in that the difference and contrast needed in the positioning often 
comes at the price of a strict internal discipline and critique of those not 
Muslim ‘enough,’ Muslim in another and unorganised way (Jeldtoft 2012) 
or critical of the ‘credential’ invested with the councils.  
Such a critical internal voice is Yahya Birt, a London convert, who is 
speaking to the organisational and institutional order of this within the 
Shari’a councils. His criticism exposes exactly that which the councils seek 
to hide from the public image and protect with the formalities of procedure 
“… shariah councils seem to me to be currently highly amateurish, 
disorganised, and some of the practices are not correct. Some of the people 
making the decisions are woefully misinformed […] If shariah councils 
cannot organize sufficiently, that may encourage the state to come in and 
regulate – which I’ve seen in a number of cases. In a number of our 
institutions, where things aren’t being done properly, the state has not been 
able to wait; it’s had to move in and regulate. It moves Muslim community 
leaderships and organization to sort these issues out responsibly…” (Yahya 
Birt interview 2011, Hoque & Shah 2011, 37). Birt echoes Walker in her 
criticism of the power at play in the councils and their inappropriate and 
generic references to the dogmas of Islam. By contrast to Walker, however, 
Birt’s argument is entirely institutional and raises a demand that the 
Muslim community leadership are to professionally and sufficiently 
organize rather than allow the state to define the frames of the Muslim 
community and thereby force through regulation. This has exactly to do 
with the imperative of the organisational theory that calls for the solution of 
problems and achievement of goals by a particular distribution and 
management of assignments.  
Seen from the wider, external environment that surrounds the Shari’a 
councils in England, of course the government and the other well 
established institutions play a significant part in the religio-organisational 
field. The Archbishop of Canterbury have weighed in on the Shari’a 
council as have the former Chief Justice Phillips, both voicing their 
individual points of view within their respective institutions and the wider 
debate. Famously, also the Prime Minister David Cameron expressed his 
view on radicalisation and Islamic extremism and attacked the failure of 
‘state multiculturalism’ (Cameron 2011). Cameron is an opponent of the 
arbitration provisions and has jokingly said that he was ‘contemplating 
introducing sharia law for bicycle theft’ (Cameron 2008, quoted in Cumper 
2011). It is a given that the issue of the Shari’a councils provoke the far 
right of the British National Party, but it is evident that even within the core 
institutions of state it is a divisive issue.  
Most clearly, perhaps, this is seen from within Parliament. Criticism of 
religious law and arbitration, in particular, has been voiced has come both 
government and opposition. Baroness Falkner of Margravine, Liberal 
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Democrat and herself of Pakistani origin, strikes down the notion dispute 
resolution according to religious law: “No. Statute and case law should 
always be followed when possible to ensure that the law is concise and 
consistent. Religious law is often used by one partner to coerce the other 
partner” (Baroness Falkner interview, Hoque & Shah 2011, 34). Baroness 
Falkner’s point of view is common and it underscores the point that the 
compartmented space available to religion should be limited according to 
the provisions of the secular law of the state. 
There are voices within Parliament that would close even these small 
compartments. Baroness Cox of Queensbury, cross-bench member of the 
House of Lords, has introduced the Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(Equality) Bill (HL Bill 7, 2012-13) as a private members bill to amend the 
Equality Act 2010. It had its second reading on October 19, 2012, and is at 
presently in committee in the House of Lords. The bill is to address the 
‘religiously sanctioned gender discrimination’ and the parallel ‘quasi-legal 
system which undermines the fundamental principles of one law for all 
(HL Bill 7, 2012-13). The bill explicitly targets religious arbitration and 
makes it a crime to ‘falsely claim legal jurisdiction’. In addition, it states 
that discrimination law applies directly to arbitration tribunal proceedings. 
It also requires public institutions to inform women that they do not enjoy 
the full set of legal rights if their marriage is not registered by the civil 
legal system. It explicitly specifies that arbitration tribunals may not deal 
with matters of criminal law. Family law was also part of the items that the 
arbitration tribunals would not be allow to deal with, but as of the second 
reading Baroness Cox intents to amend the bill and remove references to 
family law. Also, the bill does not interfere in ‘internal theological affairs 
of religious groups’ nor ‘abnegate conscience,’ and it still allows for people 
“… to submit voluntarily to the rulings of any body, religious or otherwise, 
even if that means surrendering their rights under English law’ (Cox in 
‘Second Reading,’ HL Bill 7, 2012-13). 
In discussion of the law in both first and second reading, Baroness Cox 
reproduces some of the misunderstandings that surround the Shari’a 
councils in England. Firstly, she repeatedly speaks of MATs – that is 
Muslim arbitration tribunals –, which grossly confuses the Hijaz 
Community institution with the other Shari’a councils at work and gives 
the actual MAT significant overexposure. Secondly, she remains under the 
impression that the Arbitration Act of 1996 opened up for the 
establishment of the arbitration institutions. This is not the case as Blackett 
clarified above, because these have been part of English law for decades. 
Thirdly, there are several of the aspects of the protections under the bill that 
are already covered, but which the bill seeks to make clearer or emphasise. 
While there are these factual and substantial misunderstandings in 
Baroness Cox’ perception of the Shari’a tribunals, the bill and her 
  Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution in England	  	  
	  
233 
arguments in favour of it does reveal an important perspective of relevance 
for this chapter. It seems that it addresses through an instrument of law an 
issue that is either already covered or that an additional piece of legislation 
will not remedy. The problems of discrimination, misappropriation, 
domestic violence and so on are urgent indeed, but it is difficult to see how 
the bill will be a solution. 
Rather, it seems that in her support of the bill, Baroness Cox goes out of 
her way to associate the Shari’a councils engross with a number of 
different crimes and she does so on a very questionable basis. In sharp 
contrast to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Baroness Cox builds her 
argument on rumours, biased reports by think tanks and imprecise accounts 
from the media. In her own words, she builds on accounts that state that 
‘scores more Imams dispense justice through their own mosques’ and 
‘sharia us being used informally within the Muslim community to tackle a 
plethora of crime’ (Cox in ‘Second Reading,’ HL Bill 7, 2012-13). 
Furthermore, she holds all councils accountable for the misdoings of a very 
limited number of them. While Yahya Birt’s critique that they may be 
amateurish and disorganised seems relevant, the Baroness Cox’ critique 
speaks of Shari’a seems not to be seriously concerned with the Shari’a 
councils or the Muslim community in any substantial or factual way.  
The debate during the second reading of the bill echoes these initial 
observations, but the Bishop of Manchester, Nigel McCulloch, in his 
response addressed the more significant problems and discrepancies of 
proposing this particular legislative solution to these problems.  
He doubts whether there is “sufficient evidence to show that, for those 
Sharia councils that may be claiming false jurisdiction on criminal and 
family cases, making such conduct a specific criminal offence is the best 
way of preventing it from happening. Most religious courts are not 
arbitration courts so the majority of practices in these courts would be 
unaffected by the Bill […] the real problem may not be so much false 
claims to civil legality but a lack of awareness of, and engagement with, 
civil legality, which itself is a symptom of a wider religious alienation from 
state and civil society” (McCulloch in ‘Second Reading,’ HL Bill 7, 2012-
13). This ‘real problem’ of Muslims alienated from state and civil society 
echoes Werner Menski’s research on Muslims withdrawing from the civil 
courts and addressing their needs elsewhere (Menski 2008, 60). In turn, the 
wider religious alienation that is not only a trait of the Muslim community, 
but was exactly the problem that Julian Rivers identified. The allocation of 
the religious into compartments without sufficient participation and little 
positional room to manoeuvre seems to be the reinforcing tendency only 
pushing the religiously minded even further away from state and civil 
society. Similarly, the Bishop of Manchester voices his “concern that the 
legislative solution proposed in the Bill, with its implied emphasis on 
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Muslims and Sharia, could have the opposite, and doubtless unintended, 
effect of stigmatising those individuals in communities it is aiming to help” 
(McCulloch in ‘Second Reading,’ HL Bill 7, 2012-13).  
From the Bishop of Manchester’s remarks, it seems the bill is a response 
and an act of communication with the purpose of  sending signals rather 
than making law. The number of misconceptions, misguided measures and 
factual mistakes aside, the bill appears to be an attempt at ‘explicitly 
stating’ that which is already law while pointing blame and unfounded 
accusations at the Muslim community at large. As such, the bill seems 
largely a symbolic ‘legislative response’ and a statement of values. 
Therefore it was a bill that gained much support during the two first 
readings exactly because the issues are so important. From the 
jurisprudential point of view that the Bishop of Manchester voiced, ‘fresh 
legislation’ seems, however, redundant. 
Robert Blackett’s observations from his review of arbitration echoes the 
Bishop of Manchester. Concluding his discussion of arbitration, Blackett 
states that in the debates on Shari’a there is “ … an inaccurate perception as 
to how the current law of arbitration works, and a tendency to 
mischaracterise and exaggerate its effects. Before one can have a 
meaningful dialogue about how the law should be reformed, it is necessary 
to have a clear idea about what the law presently is” (Blackett 2009, 19). 
 
7.6 Conclusion: The resignification and reproduction of Shari’a norms 
“Of all Western countries, Britain has the most developed set of institutions 
for Islamic dispute mediation,” (Bowen 2012, 74) writes John Bowen and 
it seems the reason for this is threefold. Firstly, the sense of Shari’a as a 
complex yet dismantled set of legal and ethical norms warrant a re-
production of Shari’a as an identity marker of the Muslim community in 
England. Secondly, there is a practical legal and social need within the 
Muslim community, which is to be satisfied, and the Shari’a councils are 
providing the service required. Thirdly, there is a structural opportunity for 
a stronger institutional position in the religio-organisational field, which the 
Shari’a councils are filling. This is the general impression from the 
empirical studies made on the Shari’a councils that have been analysed in 
the present chapter.  
Seen from within the community, the norms of the Shari’a councils are 
institutionalised and socially sanctioned, but taken from an outside 
perspective, the norms of the Shari’a councils are symbolic positions that 
articule the Shari’a complex of norms. 
The Shari’a councils are indeed in – if there ever were – a structurally 
dominated position with very limited capital or room to navigate. In such a 
position, as understood from both Foucault and Bourdieu in Chapter Two 
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and as Walker, Malik and Bowen suggested from each of their 
perspectives, one of the most viable strategies is to re-signify or to re-
present the constitutive norms of the community. This means readdressing 
the legal and ethical norms with a sanctioning power into representational 
iconic norms with a symbolic-confessional counter-power. Bourdieu calls 
this a conversion of capital, where a symbolic and cultural capital opposes 
a formalised legal or economic capital, which to the organisation proves to 
be a more effective type of power in the specific dominated position in the 
religio-organisational field (Bourdieu 1986, 252-253). 
In the present context, resignification as a strategy means transforming 
and re-presenting the norms of Shari’a. As the analysis by Hallaq and 
Ramadan (7.2) demonstrated, Shari’a has been displaced and dismantled 
into fragments of its former self. These fragments are being re-assembled 
and reproduced in the Shari’a councils as identifiers and symbols of the 
Muslim communities and common identities.  
Thus, when addressing the norms of the Shari’a councils, this in itself 
becomes a statement and a choice of symbolic significance. To address a 
Shari’a council is addressing the religious rather than the legal, and 
becomes a question of addressing a religious identity as Muslims rather 
than a legal need as citizen. Such an act is confessional in that it 
demonstrates to the community that the applicant has the proper faith. As 
such, the councils themselves become focused symbols of a community 
and a faith. Indeed, the Shari’a councils are one of the few places in Britain 
where Islamic norms are distinctly institutionalized and operationalized. 
This communal and collective aspect is important to understand in order 
to grasp why the Shari’a councils are religious expressions rather than 
legal. As part of their key findings, Douglas et al conclude that “All of the 
institutions studied see their work as a religious duty. They regard 
themselves as providing important mechanisms for the organisation of 
community affairs and the fulfilment of community need. The structural 
framework, organisation, resourcing, and staffing of each of the tribunals in 
many ways reflect the history, economic resources, and social development 
of the communities they serve. The Beth Din, Shariah Council and Catholic 
Tribunal, provide an important service for those Jews, Muslims and 
Catholics for whom a religious divorce ‘in the sight of God’ is important 
from both a spiritual and religious legal perspective” (Douglas et al 2011, 
48).  
The operative word here is ‘in the sight of God’ and if one holds 
Durkheimian tendencies, one might add ‘in the sight of man.’ As seen both 
directly from the careful procedural attention that the councils pay to the 
outcome and success of their deliberations and indirectly from the symbolic 
legislation proposed by Baroness Cox, it is clear that the Shari’a councils 
are under close observation. They are being watched to see if they pose any 
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danger or risk to society, if they can deliver what they have promised the 
communities and if they are capable of transforming and reproducing 
Shari’a. To be able to do this and to really perform the transformation, they 
must – as Bourdieu suggests – truly represent the community. “The 
performative magic of ritual functions fully only as long as the religious 
official who is responsible for carrying it out in the name of the group acts 
as a kind of medium between the group and itself; it is the group which, 
through its intermediary, exercises on itself the magical efficacy contained 
in the performative (Bourdieu 1991, 116, original italics). It is this 
‘performative magic’ that works through the medium of the Shari’a 
councils. Thereby the Muslim community reproduces itself according to its 
own norms as good Muslims and true believers in the context of 21st 
Century England.  
The direct value of this performance and symbolic position-taking is 
seen at the individual level of the women who address the councils. For the 
individual women, Walker argues, the outcome is not the only thing, or 
even the most important thing. In the process of re-producing the Muslim 
norm, the Shari’a councils seem to assign value to the individuals from the 
community. As one Muslim woman from Walker’s study indicates, “My 
valuation lies in their judgement,” (Walker 2012, 136). Thus, the Shari’a 
council functions as an institute of evaluation that draws lines and 
distinctions within the group, indicating what is proper Islam in accordance 
with the Shari’a norms of the community. In this process, Shari’a does not 
necessarily assume something out of the Islamic sources, but is rather the 
name of the common norm and the insignia worn by the members of the 
community.  
Taken in its dual positional context of the dominant culture of the 
broader society and the subculture of the local community, the Shari’a 
councils are locked in a difficult position. The contemporary context 
briefly sketched in the introduction to this chapter adds to the general 
outline of the religio-organisational field in England from Chapter Four and 
the difficulty of Muslim organisations in it becomes clear. On the one hand, 
the dominant culture labels and structuring initiatives like ‘Britishness,’ 
‘togetherness,’ and a general concern with social cohesion helped both to 
unify and to clarify distinctions by forcing sub-cultures to distance 
themselves from their symbolic identity expressions (Bourdieu 1991, 167).  
The Shari’a councils are fighting to resist this. On the other hand, the local 
Muslim community reiterates its demand for authentic Shari’a, which the 
councils cannot recreate. Forever lost in the epistemic rupture, the Shari’a 
of old does not exist anymore, but the councils are fighting to produce an 
alternative that will keep the Muslim community intact and protect Islam.   
By way of conclusion, the Shari’a councils must be both English and 
Muslim at once, while under pressure from the structural contexts to be one 
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to the mutual exclusion of the other. This is the structured position, which 
the Shari’a councils hold. The continuous reading of Bourdieu points to the 
fact that most structured positions are also structuring positions themselves, 
and that the agency and the specific stance of the individual Shari’a council 
demonstrates the wriggle room and the power to symbolically reinterpret 
their norms and thus navigate into a stronger institutional position. This is 
the on-going game of recognition and misrecognition of Shari’a norms, 
which leads to understanding and misunderstanding pending the 
perspective, argumentative strategy and normative position in the field.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Muslim Positions Won and Lost 
 
 
 
8.1 What’s at stake? 
The peculiar game of chess, into which the green pieces were introduced, 
had for centuries been a long and unruly game. However, the positions of 
the black and white pieces had found a relatively stable balance, which had 
built on centuries of struggle, negotiations and violent conflict. The recent 
introduction of a new colour into this balance has been a catalyst for 
dislodging old assumptions about the positions in the game and, with this 
change, new possibilities and new dangers has emerged. 
As we have seen in the analyses in the thesis, upon entering the religio-
organisations fields in Denmark, Germany and England, Muslim 
organisations enter a space of deeply embedded and highly institutionalised 
social forces, close relations and entrenched positions. Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of the field and associated concepts opened up for an analysis of the 
complex struggles between a number of different organisations and 
institutions. Common to these is the conflict between meaningful and 
significant differences and the contestation of possible positions in the 
field. Each of them maintains a claim to the limited power and capital 
available in the field.  
In the specific and focused studies into the Muslim positions in the 
religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England, it 
becomes clear that something is at stake in the struggles and conflicts, 
which to Muslim organisations is worth fighting over. The study of these 
was the overall guiding question of the thesis. 
The field is defined not only by limited resources and something of value 
worth fighting over, but also by an institutional logic of common rules and 
common purpose. These two aspects taken together may shed light on why 
Muslim organisations are engaging with the other institutions and 
organisations in the religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and 
England.  
 
8.2 Something to be won 
To Muslim organisations the recognition, acceptance and respect for their 
religion, their world view and their defining norms is what is to be won. 
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In Denmark, mere approval seemed to be unsatisfactory when others had 
been recognised. The symbolic logic of the arbitrary differentiation was a 
continued source of frustration to Muslim organisations. Even though the 
actual difference between the recognised, the approved and the not 
approved was arguably negligible, it seems the categorisation and 
normative evaluation of Muslim organisations into a lesser position was 
taken by these as structural stigmatisation. Structurally speaking, and as 
seen from the Muslim perspective, the normative evaluations of the 
Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations are understood in 
Bourdieuian terms as sanctioning and sanctifying an arbitrary difference in 
the religio-organisational field. While the committee assumes an unbiased 
approach and insists on god worship as the defining trait of Muslim 
communities, it was acknowledged by chairman of the committee Armin 
W. Geertz that the committee administers the ministry mandate to ‘decide 
who or what is to be included and excluded’ and to ‘build up institutions 
that ensure that the citizens abide by the systems.’ As definers of 
boundaries and writers of guidelines, the committee is able to structure the 
possible field of action of Muslim organisations and is therefore able to 
govern them. In this position, the committee is an institutional gatekeeper 
in the religio-organisational field.  
In the Bourdieuian analysis of the thesis, it became clear that the 
problem with this, from the Muslim perspective, was the system of criteria, 
which did not build on a set of meaningful and significant differences. The 
distinction was seen as arbitrary and unjust. This criticism of arbitrary 
difference reveals in the analysis the Muslim reasons for entering into the 
field in the first place and for struggling with the Danish ministries and the 
committee for approval. They want the official Danish institutions to 
recognize that the distinctions between religions in Denmark are arbitrary 
and exist only to subjugate some religious communities by establishing 
others. By insisting on the recognition of Islam, Muslim organisations hope 
to draw attention to the arbitrary inequality between religious communities 
in Denmark. Ultimately, it seems the Muslim organisational struggle is 
against the illegitimate arbitrariness of the category of ‘deviant from the 
Church of Denmark’ and against the reproduction of the same arbitrariness 
of the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations. 
Something similar can be said for the German case. Here Muslim 
organisations enter an old context of religious struggles and a finely 
calibrated consensus. For this reason, it seems Muslims are put to a rather 
hard test. Muslims in Germany has pooled their institutional capital and 
launched their uniting umbrella organisation, the coordination council of 
Muslims, in order to have structural parity upon entering the German Islam 
Conference. With this, they hoped to be eligible for the status of 
corporations under the public law and thereby secure structural equality 
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with the churches and the Jewish community. However, the German Islam 
Conference was seen to be a way of holding Muslim organisations to the 
standards of the Constitution Plus (‘Grundgesetz Pluz’) rather than the 
actual word and practice of the law. These standards have for Muslims 
been impossible to meet and so far the concessions won by Muslims on 
Germany have been very limited.  
In the religio-organisational field, Muslim organisations seem to fight to 
level the playing field and in this struggle they are supported by a number 
of other actors in the field. In Denmark, this was first and foremost the 
Church of Denmark and its standing committee on the religions’ meeting. 
In Germany, the support was drawn from the academic context, where a 
number of scholars argued against the securitization of Islam and the 
impossible standards. Also, the German Evangelical Church argues in 
favour of equal treatment of Muslims. In England, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury spoke in favour of a common purpose of religious communities 
and against the secularist disrespect of religious law. From this it is seen 
that a number of different agents, institutions and organisations in the 
religio-organisational field share a number of fundamental common 
interests. These include the level playing field, the legitimacy of rules and 
standards and equal conditions and treatment by the government 
institutions. It is this level playing field and understanding of equality that 
is the common logic – the doxa – which all the organisations and 
institutions in the field agrees on and protects. This includes the state and 
governments, although differences of interpretation of what such a playing 
field entails are frequent and used strategically by all parties.   
 
8.3 Something to be lost  
As is with all struggles, while there is something to be won, there is 
something to be lost as well. This holds for all agents in the religio-
organisational field. However, to those with the stronger positions in the 
field there seems to be more to lose and to those in dominated positions 
there seems to be more to win. 
For each of the three country cases a danger can be identified, which 
carries with it significant ‘religious risk’ to the legitimacy and authority of 
the state and government institutions. As was seen in the analysis, 
institutional legitimacy is a fragile phenomenon and its being taken for 
granted is lost when it is called into attention by critical voices. As such the 
legitimacy and authority must be actively qualified again and perhaps 
rebuilt on stronger normative foundations.  
In Denmark, the treat of possible loss of legitimacy, which follows from 
the Muslim criticism, holds the danger of turning Muslim and state 
relations into a scenario of mutual non-recognition. While legal, the 
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approval of religious communities does not enjoy a well founded 
legitimacy as it remains the ministry and the Advisory Committee on 
Religious Denominations, who govern the approval, rather than an Article 
of Law as promised in Article 69 of the Constitutional Act. 
In Germany, the perceived security threat and non-German nature of 
Muslim organisations seems to force the state to hesitate with recognising 
Muslims as eligible for the status as corporations under public law. This 
exposes the state to significant criticism from Muslims and German 
academics, who argue that the state is biased and unjust in keeping the 
Muslims in this structurally disenfranchised and illegitimately 
dispossessed.  
In England, from the perspective of state and government institutions, 
the risk and possibility of loss of legitimacy is expressed most clearly in the 
encounter with the Shari’a councils. In a Weberian sense, the state holds 
the monopoly to dispense legal justice and have therefore enjoyed an 
institutional authority so far taken for granted. As seen, Muslims are not 
necessarily conforming to the structures of the English legal system and are 
not addressing their legal needs to the courts. Rather Muslims are 
addressing the norms of the Shari’a councils which is a statement and a 
choice of considerable symbolic significance. 
Ultimately, in all three countries the possible loss of legitimacy may call 
into question the state’s position as an authority that addresses itself to 
everyone and which may make the same claims of everyone. This question 
is triggered by inequality and bias. Once this is called into attention, it may 
point further to some of the other deeply rooted and taken for granted 
assumptions as to the state. The threats of such a scenario would include a 
dangr to legitimate jurisdiction, the institution of marriage, additional 
aspects of family law and so on. The result would be disconcerting and 
would eventually weaken the foundations of the state.  
However, state and government institutions are not the only ones put at 
risk in the struggles of the field. Because the Muslim challenge to the 
legitimacy and authority of the state and government institutions is so 
pertinent, it puts Muslims themselves at risk. As pressure begets pressure in 
the confined structures of the field, Muslim organisations are heavily 
invested in their positions in the field and risk losing much that is dear to 
them. 
In Denmark, they risk not being ble to recognise themselves as religious 
communities in the eyes of the state and public. The power to define 
themselves would be handed over to the state and government institutions 
and the culture, ethnicity and tradition that are embedded into and carried 
by the organisations would risk withering away. 
In Germany, they risk having their identities co-opted by the German 
‘leitkultur’ and are likely to become German Muslims rather than Muslims 
Conclusion: Muslim Positions Won and Lost	  	  
	  
243 
in Germany. This is the ecclesiastification scenario that builds on the 
normative power of the existing church and state relations. Here Muslims 
are treated, understood and they themselves start acting as if they were 
Christian churches. Institutionally, they would become like churches, 
which would be very alienating to Muslim organisations. 
In England, the risk to Muslim organisations is, perhaps, the most 
significant. The strategy of withdrawal from the legal system was a 
countermeasure to the lack of recognition and it increased the religious risk 
to the state in England. However, it has also exposeses the Muslim 
organisations to considerable risk. The process of producing and re-
producing re-defined Islamic norms, which is done in the procedures and 
stewardship of the Shari’a council, is fragile and exposed. From a Muslim 
organisational perspective in the religio-organisational field it is a daring 
move and it exposes the illegitimacy of recent bills in Parliament and the 
lack of recognition of law as valid. It also puts distance between Islamic 
norms and society and will make it increasingly difficult for Muslims and 
Muslim organisations to remain a permanent part of Europe’s social and 
political fabric (cf. Ramadan 2001, 207; Menski 2008: 60) 
Potentially, Islam and Muslim organisations risk disappearing from the 
struggles of the field and risk being relegated to irrelevant and peripheral 
positions. Here, they would be defined entirely by their subjected and 
subjugated relations to others and they would no longer be recognisable to 
themselves and others as Muslim and Islamic. 
 
In the end, to all those who engage in the religio-organisational field and to 
all those who expect anything from the struggles between institutions and 
organisations in the religio-organisational field in Denmark, Germany, and 
England may they remember that all struggle is slow, difficult and violent 
and that participate stand to both win and loose. 
The result of the struggle, however, is structurally generative change.  
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Summary  
 
 
 
Muslim Positions in the Religio-Organisational Fields of Denmark, 
Germany and England 
The thesis studies the specific problems that Muslim organisations struggle 
with as they navigate and position themselves amongst the churches, the 
state institutions and the many other relevant organisational actors in the 
religio-organisational fields in Denmark, Germany and England. 
In framing an analytical focus on the relations and environment of 
Muslim organisations, the thesis applies the concepts of field, doxa, capital, 
norms and symbolic power as theorised by Pierre Bourdieu and others. The 
thesis proposes the idea of the religio-organisational field as a construct 
informed by the spheres of religious life and of organised, institutional 
logics. The religio-organisational field frames the struggle for the positions 
of power, recognition and capital available in the structural relations of the 
field.  
In this context, the thesis seeks to identify what Muslim organisations 
stand to win and loose in the pursuit of the stronger positions in the field. 
Also, the thesis questions how the Muslim organisation impacts and 
changes the existing institutions and organisations. This is done by 
investigating the structural norms, technologies, tactics and powers of 
dominations and subjection as applied by both the Muslim organisations 
and the governing institutions in the field. 
A core assumption of the thesis is that since the introduction of Islam 
and Muslim organisations into the European context, Islam has been a 
catalyst or occasion for significant changes in the balances of power 
amongst states and churches.  
This is investigated further by looking at the history of regulating 
religion, which is the structural context in which Muslim organisations 
must navigate and position themselves. Not only the history of churches 
and states is revealing, but also the specific laws and norms that frame and 
structure the possible field of action of Muslims are of relevance. 
Within this normative and historical context, a case from each of the 
three countries is analysed and discussed in depth.  
In Danmark, the focus is on Muslim organisations who seek recognition 
and approval to perform marriages with civil validity. The analysis goes 
into significant detail about the ministrial practices and procedures as 
managed by the Advisory Committee on Religious Denominations. The 
Bourdieuian perspective applied here is on the construction and 
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maintenance of fundamental dividers in the religio-organisational field and 
the strict scrutiny to which Muslim organisations are submitted.  
Next, the focus is on the German Islam Conference. This analysis looks 
at the struggle between the German government and the Muslim 
organisations who are trying to position themselves as eligible and 
respectable partners in the religio-organisational field. The Bourdieuian 
perspective applied here is on the generative structuration that transforms 
‘Muslims in Germany’ to ‘German Muslims’ by analogy to the Christian 
institutions. 
In the English case the focus is on the Shari’a councils and their position 
between the Muslim communities and the wider English society. The 
Shari’a councils are locked in a tricky game of managing expectations from 
both these sides. They have the difficult task of stewardship of the Islamic 
norms embedded in Shari’a, which is challenged in a modern context. The 
Bourdieuian perspective is on the symbolic resignification and 
reproduction of Shari’a norms as these become new resources for Muslims 
in the religio-organisational field.  
The thesis concludes on the overall guiding questions and outlines the 
most important perspectives from the analyses of the religio-organisational 
fields. This is done by looking specifically at what Muslim organisations, 
on one hand, and state and governments, on the other, stand to win and 
loose in the struggles of the field. The conclusion, furthermore, summarises 
the most important and critical insights into the impositions of division in 
the religio-organisational field and into the Muslim positions taken in 
response to these impositions. 
 
 
Resumé 
 
 
 
Muslimske Positioner i det Religionsorganisatoriske Felt i Danmark, 
Tyskland og England 
Denne afhandling undersøger de specifikke problemer, som muslimske 
organisationer kæmper med, når de må navigere og positionere sig blandt 
kirker, statslige institutioner og mange andre relevante organisatoriske 
aktører i de religionsorganisatoriske felter i Danmark, Tyskland og 
England. 
Med analytisk fokus på muslimske organisationers relationer og miljø 
benytter afhandlingen sig af begreberne felt, doxa, kapital, normer og 
symbolsk magt som udformet af Pierre Bourdieu og andre. Afhandlingen 
foreslår og anvender idéen om det religionsorganisatoriske felt, som en 
konstruktion, der samtidig trækker på de religiøse magtsfærer og på 
organisationers institutionelle logikker. Det religionsorganisatoriske felt 
danner rammen om kampen om magtpositioner, anerkendelse og kapital i 
de strukturelle forhold i feltet. 
I denne forbindelse søger afhandlingen at afdække, hvad muslimske 
organisationer står til at vinde og tabe i bestræbelsen på de stærkere 
positioner i feltet. Endvidere spørger afhandlingen, hvordan de muslimske 
organisationer påvirker og ændrer de eksisterende institutioner og 
organisationer. Dette gøres ved at undersøge de strukturelle normer, 
teknologier, taktikker og magthandlinger, som anvendes af de styrende 
institutioner i feltet. 
Afhandlingen bygger på et argument om, at efter islam og muslimske 
organisationer for alvor kom ind i den europæiske kontekst, har islam været 
en katalysator eller foranledning til væsentlige ændringer i magtbalancen 
mellem stat og kirke. 
Dette belyses ved at se på den historiske regulering af religion. Her 
findes den strukturelle sammenhæng, som muslimske organisationer må 
navigere og positionere sig i. I den forbindelse er ikke kun kirkers og 
staters magtkampe relevante, men også de konkrete love og normer, der 
indrammer og strukturerer muslimske organisationers mulige handlerum. 
Inden for denne normative og historiske ramme analyseres og diskuteres 
et eksempel fra hvert af de tre lande.  
I Danmark er fokus på de muslimske organisationer, der søger 
anerkendelse og godkendelse til at foretage vielser med borgerlig 
gyldighed. Analysen går i væsentlig detaljer ind i den ministrielle praksis 
og de procedurer, som forvaltes af Det Rådgivende Udvalg vedrørende 
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Trossamfund. Perspektivet fra Bourdieu, som anvendes her, viser, hvordan 
der bygges og vedligeholdes grundlæggende skillelinjer i det 
religionsorganisatoriske felt. Ligeledes undersøges den strenge normative 
kontrol, som muslimske organisationer underkastes i forbindelse med 
ansøgning om godkendelse. 
Dernæst er der fokus på den tyske islamkonference. Denne analyse ser 
på kampen mellem den tyske regering og de muslimske organisationer, 
som forsøger at positionere sig som berettigede og respektable partnere i 
det religionsorganisatoriske felt i Tyskland. Perspektivet fra Bourdieu 
anvendt her ser på den generative strukturering der omdanner ’muslimer i 
Tyskland’ til ’tyske muslimer’ i analogi til de kristne institutioner.  
I den engelske tilfælde er fokus på Shari'a-rådene og deres placering 
mellem de muslimske samfund og det bredere engelske samfund. Shari'a-
rådene er låst i en vanskelig situation, hvor de må forvalte forventninger fra 
begge sider. Dertil kommer den vanskelige opgave at forvalte de islamiske 
normer som er indlejret i Shari'a og som er udfordret i en moderne 
kontekst. Perspektivet fra Bourdieu anvendt her ser på den symbolske 
genfortolkning og reproduktion af Shari'a normer, og viser hvordan disse 
bliver nye ressourcer for muslimer i det religionsorganisatoriske felt. 
Afhandlingen konkluderer på de grundlæggende problemformuleringer 
og skitserer analysernes vægtigste argumenter og perspektiver. Dette gøres 
ved at se på, hvad de muslimske organisationer på den ene side og staten 
og regeringerne på den anden side står til at vinde og tabe i kampene i 
feltet. Konklusionen opsummerer desuden de vigtigste og mest kritiske 
perspektiver på grænsedragningen i det religionsorganisatoriske felt og på 
de positioner som muslimer har taget som reaktion på disse grænser. 
 
Appendix  
 
 
At several points in the thesis reference is made to the Freedom of 
Information Requests made in the spring and early summer of 2012 and 
granted on 26 September 2012 and 1 October 2012, respectively. These are 
attached here and may serve as reference to anyone who wishes to pursue 
the material in further depth.  
 
   



